Jerome Mayhew MP: speeches

Speeches

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I understand the point the Minister is making about the lack of relationship between those two documents. In the debate on the previous group, he was able to give an indication of the likely timeframe for publishing the Scottish memorandum of understanding. Can he give a similar hint on the Welsh memorandum of understanding? [ Interruption. ] There seems to be a bit of nodding on the Government Benches, but it is entirely up to him, because he decides.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I hope it will be the last, but I fear I will not be. I have some key questions for the Minister. I understand that the memorandum of understanding has not yet been finalised; has the work to scope it out even begun? The Minister should at least be able to answer that. At what stage in the deliberations between the two Ministries has it got to? What is the timeline for a memorandum of understanding under the clause being finalised and therefore made public? How often, if at all, must the memorandum of understanding be reviewed, updated or renegotiated? Or is it a one-stop shop? It currently seems that the memorandums will have no statutory force. Unless I have missed something in the Bill—I always enjoy being corrected when I have missed something—it is not in there at the moment. Is that by design? What legal standing will the memorandums have? They do not appear to have statutory force, and there is very little democratic accountability, as I have mentioned. As far as I can see, the memorandum is essentially a handshake agreement. Not a single member of this Committee is any the wiser about what will be part of the memorandums. Finally, what happens if no agreement is reached on a memorandum of understanding between the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers? The Minister can give evidence about his willingness to reach agreement, but he cannot give evidence on the part of Scottish Ministers. They can be willing to negotiate, but he cannot say with confidence that they will achieve full agreement until such time as that agreement is reached. I stand to be informed by the Minister, but my current understanding is that that agreement has not yet been reached. The lack of oversight is clearly at the core of this issue. Parliament is expected to allow the Secretary of State and her Scottish counterpart to set the tone of the nature of rail operations without any say from this House, beyond this clause. The Government criticise the franchise system, but at least the parameters for its operation were clearly set out. Memorandums of understanding are nothing more than IOUs to the trust of parliamentarians, and we should not willingly give those out. There is a further issue at stake here: the Scottish parliamentary elections. This is a matter of practicalities, as opposed to principles. The pre-election period, or purdah, is rapidly approaching for the Scottish Parliament. My understanding is that it will be coming into force in late March, which is only weeks away. Given that the Minister will be eager to ensure that all the appropriate orders and memorandums are in place as quickly as is reasonably possible, what thought has he given to avoiding a rush job ahead of the election, or to the timetable for the memorandums of understanding being reached with any change of Government in Scotland? This is actually quite a significant question. Is the Minister going to rush it through to get it in before March? What happens if there is a change of Administration north of the border? It is with that uncertainty in mind that we believe the clause ought to have a clear timeframe for the publication of the MOU. The memorandums of understanding should be laid before Parliament for approval. Parliament is being asked to give broad Executive powers as if an international treaty were being negotiated, but this is not an international treaty. Parliament ought to have the right to approve the memorandums to ensure, in particular, that Members whose constituencies are affected by them have a say on behalf of their constituents. That is what amendment 39 would provide, by providing two additions: that a memorandum be published at the same time as the rail strategy, which would give a concrete timeframe for the delivery of that important document, and that it be laid before Parliament for a period of two months before it can come into force. I look forward to the Government’s response.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 237, in clause 20, page 11, line 21, leave out paragraph (c). This amendment removes the exemption for ORR’s functions under schedule 2 from its competition duty.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am aware that we need to make progress in this Committee, so I will not press every amendment to a Division. I am not persuaded by the Minister’s arguments in relation to amendments 32 and 33, but I will not press amendment 31 to a Division. I wish now to press amendment 33 to a vote. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  To give you an advance clue, I intend to press amendments 237 and 37 to a vote. Depending on the outcome of the vote on amendment 37, I may not seek to divide on the others, apart from amendment 38.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I hope I am not going to miss out any of those amendments, Mrs Hobhouse, but it is going to be quite a challenge. Clause 20 concerns the “competition duty” of the Office of Rail and Road; it sounds pretty good when you read that title but the clause gets progressively less and less good once you delve into it. The clause requires the ORR to promote competition in the exercise of its functions, subject to certain exceptions. Exempt activities relate to safety, train driver licensing, the funding of GBR, GBR’s access process and decisions in relation to railway infrastructure, licence enforcement, functions under the Competition Act 1998, and monitoring GBR, where the Government believe that other considerations are equally or more important than the need to promote competition. The Government claim that they want the Office of Rail and Road to have a powerful role to monitor GBR and to promote laudable objectives such as “competition….for the benefit of users of railway services.” On the face of it, that is welcome. It is a sound principle, after all, that monopolies—whether they are public or private—are rarely in the interests of the consumer. It is for that exact reason that we created, over time, arms of the state such as the Competition and Markets Authority to break up anti-competitive monopolies in the private sector, although GBR is another monopoly that the Government are setting up, in the other direction. However, when we dig into the detail of what subsection (1) of the clause exempts from the competition duty, the picture becomes considerably less attractive. Excluding from the competition duty chapter 1 of part 3 of the Bill means that key parts of GBR’s operation, such as the access and use policy and capacity duty—two very important issues—are not covered by the duty of competition. That effectively makes GBR all-powerful over any other operator, be it devolved, open access or freight. That is not competition; that is a designed monopoly. The Minister has said that the Government have taken that decision because they want GBR to be a single controlling mind, but GBR will not be the only operator on the railways. The Minister, just a moment ago, said that there are circumstances in which he would wish open access to flourish and grow, yet the Bill as drafted does not give any confidence to that sector that an operator can put forward a business case and attract investment because such an operator does not know whether there will be fair competition around crucial elements of its business case—elements as basic as whether it will get access to the railways. In the Bill, such competition is specifically, expressly excluded. The exceptions in the clause are key to understanding the true intentions of the Government. Despite the appearance that the clause allows the Office of Rail and Road to promote competition, examination of subsection 1(d) shows that the Office of Rail and Road is required to promote competition unless it gets in the way of the access and use policy, which—as the Committee will discuss later—does not promote competition at all. Elsewhere, the Government appreciate the positive impact of competition. Look at international rail. Lord Hendy took the trouble to write to the Office of Rail and Road in July last year, and said: “The Government firmly believes that the arrival of competition will benefit users of international rail services by expanding the number of stations served (including new markets), encouraging greater differentiation in service provision and promoting competitive prices.” I could not have written it better myself. The Government are clearly sending out extraordinarily mixed messages: competition is good, except when it is against the Government. Those statements cannot both be right, can they?

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I do not know why I bothered going to the gym this morning, Mrs Hobhouse, because I have been doing squat thrusts every time I rise to speak to a new group of amendments. Clause 23 deals with the memorandum of understanding, about which we have heard so much but know so little, and the relationship between the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers. It sets out the key arrangements between the UK Government and the Scottish Government, stating the intention for the memorandum of understanding to include steps to facilitate the integration of GBR infrastructure and Scottish railway services. The elephant in the room is that is none of that is set out in the Bill. The Opposition believe it is vital for Ministers to outline, at the very least, the broad framework for the basis of the memorandum if they will not commit to provide core elements in the Bill itself. It really is very frustrating: we are paid to come to this Committee to give the Bill line-by-line consideration, set up the function of GBR and improve the relationship among Ministers in Whitehall, Edinburgh and Cardiff, the ORR and the other organisations affected by GBR, yet time and again we get the blank answer, “Oh well, this is going to be sorted out somewhere else.” It is very hard to say with confidence that we have scrutinised the Bill and come to an improved outcome when the Government have not done the work on the detail. This is not the first time Members have heard me say that—

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Does the hon. Gentleman not see the logic of the lobby group for rail freight saying that we should focus on rail freight while the lobby group in favour of the passenger, which I quoted earlier, says that there should be a passenger growth target? Does he not think that those representing passengers are better qualified to express an opinion on passengers than the rail freight lobbyist?

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Will the Minister clarify his argument? I ask because a business plan by its nature looks forward, whereas a report looks backward and marks homework. How can the business plan mark homework?

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  In oral evidence before the Transport Committee, Ben Plowden, the chief executive of the Campaign for Better Transport, said: “We have a question about the difference in the duties between the way that freight is treated and passenger travel is treated: the duty on GBR and Secretary of State in relation to passengers is ‘to promote’ their ‘interests’, whereas it is ‘to promote the use of the…network’ for freight. Our view is that in order to incentivise GBR strongly—once it is set up—to grow the network and to grow passenger demand, there should be equivalent duties about passengers in clauses 18 and 17, so that GBR is required to promote the use of the network for passengers and future passengers, with a corresponding duty on the Secretary of State to set a passenger growth target. Our concern is that otherwise, the risk is that GBR might manage demand as a steady state, achieving its other objectives without necessarily seeking to grow demand by expanding the network or making better use of existing capacity.” Hon. and right hon. Members will recall—although the only right hon. Member has done a runner—that Ben Plowden made a substantially similar point in oral evidence to this Committee. I think he prayed in aid the experience post covid, when all sorts of targets were met, but that was because there were not any trains running. He went on to say to the Transport Committee: “It seems to us that the logic would suggest that if it is important for GBR to have a statutory incentive to promote a growth in freight traffic, it also ought to have a statutory incentive to do that for passenger growth. We know that the expansion and increase in capacity and connectivity in the rail network has huge socioeconomic benefits. Look at the Northumberland line that recently reopened; look at Crossrail. There are huge benefits from expanding network capacity and increasing the number of people who are able to travel by rail. If you look at the Bill, it is interesting that service performance is defined in terms of ‘reliability (including punctuality)’ and ‘the avoidance or mitigation of passenger overcrowding’. There could be a scenario whereby GBR decided that, in order to meet its reliability duty”— and this is the point— “it reduced services to smooth them out and improve reliability, and in order to avoid overcrowding, it then introduced fares that” managed “demand, as has been suggested might happen on the west coast main line in the context of HS2. There might be scenarios where, for perfectly logical reasons, internally GBR might decide that it did not want to increase passenger demand either on a particular route or overall. It seems to us that it would be sensible to have an equivalent duty or pair of duties in the Bill on passenger demand as it has for freight. GBR would need, as we were just discussing, to work out how to optimise that objective versus the other objectives it has set out in the duties and functions.”

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful for the Minister’s explanation. I do not intend to stand in the way of the clause standing part of the Bill. It is quite clear that it should do so in some form. However, I respectfully disagree with the Minister’s assessment of the consequence of the drafting where the duties are joint rather than joint and several and I will seek a vote on the amendment. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  If that is the clear objective of the Government, why are they allowing open access to continue?

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Government amendment makes further provision concerning the memorandum of understanding between the Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers. I have no objection to it. The Minister is absolutely right that clause 24 is similar in intention to clause 23, but there are huge questions about the role that Welsh Ministers are to have in the governance and management of GBR in their jurisdiction under the memorandum of understanding, and whether the Secretary of State will have any role in the governance and management of Transport for Wales. The Welsh settlement is very different from the Scottish one, in both geography and degree of devolution— I suppose that is how it can be most simply described. The relationship between the Welsh and UK Governments is far more nuanced and complex than the relationship in the case of ScotRail and the management of rail in Scotland. Transport for Wales covers a significant number of cross-border rail services. I stand to be corrected, but I think that as many as 80% of all its services have an element of cross-border movement. This harks back to the former private sector franchise of Arriva Trains Wales, which ran many England-only services and joint England-Wales services. That system of rail service provision persists under Transport for Wales; it is much more blended than is the case in Scotland. I have some examples. Shrewsbury station, which, for the geographically challenged, is in England, is managed by Transport for Wales. From there, it manages services that run exclusively in England, such as Shrewsbury to Manchester. It also runs all manner of cross-border services, such as the Heart of Wales line, of which about 5% is in England, and Aberystwyth to Birmingham, which is 50:50 England and Wales—on it goes. Any memorandum of understanding will have to outline in detail, one assumes, how the allocation of moneys for tickets will be divided. This works both ways. Former Great Western Railway and Avanti services from London to Holyhead and from London to Swansea via Cardiff have significant portions of their routes running through Wales as well as England. Taxpayers in both nations will rightly presume that the value of ticket sales will be distributed proportionately between both railways, as they will both be Government-run, rather than going to the operator whose livery happens to adorn the locomotive. The issue is relatively small in the discussions about Scotland, where I think only 3% of services are cross-border between England and Scotland. In Wales, the proportion is much greater, and I am concerned that there is no clear mechanism for how the allocation of ticket sales is set to be achieved or agreed. Will GBR and Transport for Wales—or, more accurately, the Secretary of State and the Welsh Ministers—come to a profit-sharing or fare-box sharing agreement as part of the memorandum of understanding? This is at the core of the issue of value for money, so it should be an important consideration, and I look to the Minister to provide reassurance that it is in the mix. I have a compounding concern, which I expressed in relation to clause 23, about the timeline of the publication of the memorandum of understanding. Again, a purdah period is approaching: the elections for the Welsh Senedd are in May. I think I am right in saying—my right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston mentioned it—that it was suggested in the oral evidence that the heads of terms have already been agreed, but that is not the same as the memorandum of understanding being agreed, so we need a bit more detail from the Minister, if he is able to give it. There is a big caveat for Wales in particular, where—though I do not want to ruin anyone’s sleep tonight—it is very likely that Labour will be removed from office come May, and that there will be a new Government in Cardiff. It would be improper for a rush job to take place in order to shoehorn through a memorandum of understanding between two like-minded Administrations. I have tabled amendment 40 to clause 24 for the same reason that I tabled amendment 39 to clause 23. Amendment 40 seeks to introduce a degree of control over the timeline for the publication of the memorandum of understanding. In the Transport Committee evidence session on 17 December, Peter McDonald, who is the director for transport, spoke on behalf of the Welsh Government. He spoke in some detail about the future relationship between GBR and the Welsh Government, and how it relies on the memorandum of understanding. Will the Minister take this opportunity to reassure the Committee about the safeguards or timeline the Government have in place? Do they believe it would be helpful to have a clearer timeline, especially considering the electoral sensitivities and, if the opinion polls are to be believed, the likely change of Administration in Cardiff Bay? I have plenty more to say about this, but I am aware that it is getting dark outside and we have been going on for some time. Those concerns are the rationale for amendment 40, which would apply similar requirements to those that amendment 39 would have applied to clause 23. I tried to be understanding with the Minister in not pressing amendment 39 on Scotland to a vote, because of the direction he was able to hint at in his response. I look forward to being similarly reassured in respect of Wales.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 34, in clause 18, page 10, line 12, leave out “They” and insert “Each person or organisation designated under section 18(1)”. This amendment clarifies that the statutory duties apply to those listed in section 18(1), namely Ministers, Great British Railways and the Office of Rail and Road.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Minister refers to the booking app also offering the ability to ask for assistance. Will he undertake to provide access to that data so that independent retail operators can provide a similar service in their booking systems?

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The principle the Government continue to establish is important for the relationship between the state and the ORR when it comes to safety-related duties. I recognise the Government’s work to ensure that the clauses protect the ORR’s independence in many regards, rather than encroaching upon it. The protection of that independence is vital. When it comes to the relationship between Great British Railways, the ORR, the Department for Transport and Ministers, as well as the various devolved Governments and mayoralties —not forgetting the fact that passengers count—the Opposition have thought long and hard about how we can ensure that the ORR maintains its standards of excellence as a regulator. I want to take this opportunity to review the safety record of the railways overseen by ORR as the safety regulator since its inception in 2004. The ORR publishes masses and reams of data as part of its continuing mission to provide transparency and oversight. By most key metrics, safety has improved significantly, with the UK being praised as one of the safest railways, if not the safest railway, in Europe. We really should stop and consider that achievement, whether it relates to nationalised or privatised parts of the industry. Government Members criticise privatisation, but it has not impinged on safety, and that is quite an achievement. It is vital that the ORR can continue its strong work in delivering not only a safe railway but a transparent one. The ORR has consistently worked by acting as a critical friend to the franchise operators and Network Rail. In the new age of GBR, it is important that the Secretary of State, who will direct both the ORR and GBR, should be mindful not to create an environment in which the ORR feels it cannot be critical of GBR and its actions. Committee members will struggle to find many sectors where stakeholders praise their regulator, but it is right that Ministers should get out of the way of the work of the ORR, because its oversight work is the difference between life or death. I acknowledge that that is the Minister’s intention in clause 21. Clause 22 sets out the duty of the ORR to have regard to Scottish Ministers’ guidance, and clause 22 mirrors that, enabling Scottish Ministers to give guidance except on the safety-related issues I have mentioned. I have a query about clause 22—I am not leading up to some devastating amendment—in respect of the dispute resolution process, if one exists, between the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers. Under clause 21, the Secretary of State must consult Welsh Ministers—that creates a clear direction for the conversation—but there does not appear to be an equivalent provision in clause 22. I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify that seeming contradiction and expand further on what happens in a situation where the guidance issued by the Scottish Minister contradicts that issued by the Secretary of State, or perhaps the other way round. Would that be covered by the memorandum of understanding, which of course we have not yet seen? Or is a tightening of statute on the horizon that we are not yet aware of? The Minister might not be able to whip an answer out of his back pocket, but perhaps he can clarify that issue once he has consulted his officials. Naturally, Scotland has had oversight of Network Rail for many years, so the working relationship between the ORR and GBR north of the border is not likely to change, but, similarly to my concerns about clause 21, protecting the ORR’s independence is important to the entire smooth functioning of the railways. I know the Minister would not wish to speak for Scottish Ministers, but I would very much appreciate it if he could outline the dispute resolution mechanism between the Secretary of State and devolved Ministers. The Minister will be delighted to hear that, beyond that query, we do not oppose clause 22.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am very grateful.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  This is one of the more important clauses, so I look forward to discussing it with the Committee. It sets out the general duties of Ministers, GBR and the Office of Rail and Road. In other words, it sets out the things they must seek to achieve when carrying out their functions. GBR will have freedom to consider which duties are relevant and what weight to place on each duty, but should be able to demonstrate how it has had regard to its duties. Subsection (1) sets out to whom the general duties apply. In addition to GBR, they apply to the Office of Rail and Road, the Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers and Welsh Ministers when they carry out their railway functions. There is an exception for the ORR’s safety-related functions and train driver licensing functions. No doubt the Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but I assume that is because when it is exercising its safety functions, the intention is for safety to be the priority and to not be second guessed. The ORR should not have to weigh it against other duties. The Bill does not change the current safety regime and the official Opposition wholeheartedly agree with that position. There is also an exception for the functions of the Office of Rail and Road under the Competition Act 1998. When the ORR acts as a concurrent competition regulator with the Competition and Markets Authority, as we previously discussed, both bodies should be applying the same duties, otherwise there really would be confusion. I am going to go through the clause in some detail. It will take some time, but it is an important part of our consideration. The duties listed in subsection (2) require GBR and the sector bodies to consider the following. Subsection (2)(a) provides that they must “promote the interests of users and potential users of the railway”— that is passengers and potential passengers—including the needs of disabled people. Subsection (2)(b) provides that they must promote the use of rail freight. This duty, combined with the rail freight target in clause 17, recognises the importance of freight to the economy and the environment. Subsection (2)(c) provides that they must promote “high standards” in railway performance. Subsection (3) then defines “performance” as meaning “(a) reliability (including punctuality), and (b) the avoidance or mitigation of passenger overcrowding.” That definition is wholly inadequate, as we have discussed at some length on previous days. Subsection (2)(d) provides that they must ensure that railway service providers, such as GBR, devolved operators, freight operators and open access operators can plan, invest and make decisions about their own business. We will come on to consider that point in more detail. Subsection (2)(e) provides that they must run the railway “in the public interest”—so far, so good—which is defined in subsection (3) as including social, economic and environmental interests. Subsection (2)(f) requires them to make efficient use of public funds—that is, to carefully manage the amount of public subsidy required to run the railway. Taken together, the functions in clause 3, which are what GBR must do, and these duties, which are what GBR must think about, demonstrate GBR’s purpose—those are my words. We have put that together into a purpose clause, which I look forward to voting for when we consider the new clauses. The functions under clause 18(2) contain nothing about growing passenger numbers, increasing private sector investment in the network or encouraging open access. Apart from scattered references elsewhere to discounting schemes or the passengers’ council, clause 18(2)(a) is effectively the only substantive accessibility duty in the Bill. It reads as a bit of a bolt-on, rather than a clear, integrated obligation. Subsection (2)(d) is meant to provide certainty for operators, but in practice it offers little reassurance to manufacturers or the wider supply chain. Without statutory planning cycles, which we have discussed, procurement obligations or long-term fleet strategies, which, again, we have discussed, the duty is too vague to give industry the confidence needed for investment. How can GBR be confident in achieving the purposes of clause 18(2)(d) given the ability of the Secretary of State to direct at whim, issue guidance, set the rail strategy and so on? For business, it would be impossible to know when a decision has been taken, since each one can be second-guessed by the Department for Transport. Businesses cannot even take for granted the funding allocations in the control period either, because, for the first time in 30 years—I stand to be corrected; we are in CP7, so 30 to 35 years—inter-year control period funding can be changed without notice on the whim of the Secretary of State. Subsection (3) gives only a narrow definition of “railway service performance”—punctuality, reliability and overcrowding—but omits other core standards such as cancellations, journey time, customer experience, wi-fi, mobile phone connectivity, accessibility, disruption handling and information provision. There are probably a few others as well. This limited list weakens the duty and leaves major aspects of service quality outside the statutory framework. There is no explanation for that. Why are some core elements of the customer experience included in the Bill, establishing the precedent that it is the appropriate place for them to be considered, and then—deliberately, one assumes—are many factors of profound importance to the travelling public and their experience of the railways omitted? Amendment 34 aims to achieve some housekeeping on the drafting of the Bill. Clause 18(2) does not make it clear which of the three bodies has which responsibilities —it simply refers to “they”. That is a recipe for confusion and potential buck-passing. We have three organisations or groups, each with combined duties under this clause. They are, of course, Great British Railways, the Ministers and the ORR. It is not clear which one, in a given situation, is responsible under the clause.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am interested to hear the Minister’s strong hints that the memorandum of understanding may be much more advanced than we had previously been led to believe. The intention of amendment 39 was to flush out the MOU—it sounds like it may well have already achieved its purpose. Taking the Minister’s words at face value, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Clause 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 24 Memorandum of understanding: Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 262, in clause 17, page 9, line 24, at end insert— “(1A) Any proposals by the Secretary of State and Great British Rail about how they intend to meet the target under section must include an assessment of the impact of those proposals on level crossings.”

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the Minister, who is doing his job in highlighting some of the practical challenges that the amendment might entail. The important bit is not so much the strategy; I think what my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge is trying to get at is that, when Network Rail or GBR assesses the function of a level crossing, it also needs to take account of the impact on the society in which it is based: for instance, cutting a town in two or stopping vehicular access for multiple periods during a day. Does the Minister not agree that, if GBR did not consider that—it was not in the list of considerations that the Minister mentioned a moment ago—it would not be doing its full job?

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is quite right that we need to look at modal interoperability. Does she agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge that a level crossing in a conurbation has a negative impact on road use and, in some instances, cuts one side of a town off from the other? Is he right, as I suggest he is, that that should be part of GBR’s consideration?

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The usual procedure applies again. Clause 16 requires both GBR and the Office of Rail and Road to “have regard to” a number of different requirements, such as the long-term rail strategy, the statutory transport or rail strategies published by the Welsh and Scottish Governments respectively, the mayoral combined authorities and the Mayor of London. There is a key political question within this clause: why has the Minister chosen to apply a duty on GBR and the ORR to only “have regard” to those strategies? In practice, that means only that GBR and the ORR will consider transport plans, not that they must, or even should, follow or prioritise them. That seems a slightly unusual position for the Government to take, given their keen approach to oversight of GBR in other clauses, such as 7 and 9, where it looks like they wish to maintain their role as key stakeholder over that of the devolved Governments and the mayoral combined authorities. The weak obligations are shared, whereas the strong obligations are kept primarily to themselves. It is a surprising approach, particularly given that clauses 7 and 9 effectively strip GBR of operational independence. I recognise that the Scottish Government and, to a lesser extent, the Government in Wales have their own clauses to guide and direct, but the mayoral combined authorities certainly do not. I wonder whether this clause is directed at overweening powers demanded by certain mayors, but I could not possibly look into the depths of the psychology of the Labour party as it struggles with its issues at the moment. It is very noticeable, as Mayor Andy Burnham said to us last Tuesday in oral evidence, that there is a substantial difference between the Government’s proposed treatment under the Bill of mayoral combined authorities and that of Transport for London. There does not appear to be any rationale for that deliberate divergence—or at least not one that the Government have identified. As other mayoral combined authorities come online, the Bill provides no formal mechanism for their wishes to be respected. Members of the Committee who were in the oral evidence session will remember that Andy Burnham said he would “insist” on greater authority in that area. The Bill as currently drafted does not provide that avenue for him or for others, so those looking for advancement in the future might like to consider their voting strategy on this clause. After all, page 33 of the Labour manifesto states: “Mayors will have a role in designing the services in their areas.” Can the Minister outline the mechanism for existing and future mayoralties to be put on a statutory footing, and for their local transport plans to be given greater consideration from GBR and the ORR? There is one other question regarding this clause. It relates to subsection (3). What does GBR do if the strategy of a mayoral combined authority or Transport for London conflicts with that of the Secretary of State? How are potential conflicts between strategies resolved, and who will be the arbiter? Will it be the Secretary of State, or will there be an independent structure? With that in mind, the clause should be strengthened to ensure that GBR and the ORR respond more clearly and act under greater requirements. That is where amendment 26 comes in. It would replace the very weak “must have regard to” with “must seek to achieve”. That change seems small on the face of it, but it would strengthen the requirement on GBR and the ORR to engage and work with mayoral combined authorities, the Welsh and Scottish Governments and the Mayor of London. Will the Minister support this modest proposal to strengthen that relationship? The clause currently restricts the duty of mayoral combined authorities and the Mayor of London. It is silent on other strategic authorities, yet the same arguments apply to areas that are not yet or will never be mayoral combined authorities when identifying regional needs for current and future transport. We heard that concern eloquently expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon. I hope that she will be able to expand some of her thinking on this in a moment. We have heard examples from the west country where local government reform is floundering, as it is around the country, including in Norfolk where I am a Member of Parliament. It is already delayed until 2028. That is perhaps just the first of further delays as well, as this Government lose steam. There is no idea where, when or even if it will go ahead. There are also many areas that will never have a mayoral combined authority because of the structure of their local government settlement. We do have local transport authorities, though, which are the base level of local government that has responsibility for local transport co-ordination. It seems like a very significant omission that the Bill currently only relates to mayoral combined authorities. That is the lowest level of regional government to which it deigns to provide any form of requirement for co-operation with the ORR and GBR. Why is that? Where there is, for sound local reasons, no mayoral combined authority, why are the Government designing out the ability of local government representatives, the local democrats, to co-operate and co-ordinate with the ORR and—more importantly in this instance—GBR? What happens to their interest? There is simply no explanation as to why these large authorities, which will be the local transport authorities in their own right, have been excluded from consideration. That leads me neatly on to amendment 218, which adds them to the list. New clause 33 requires the Government, or rather GBR, to set out a long-term rolling stock leasing framework. The clause would require the Secretary of State to publish a long-term rolling stock leasing framework, and require GBR to comply with that framework. It mandates a minimum 15-year lease, save in exceptional circumstances. That is because the longer the lease, the better the value for money for the taxpayer. Longer leases lead to lower costs, which will lead to more UK investment, more trading and better value for taxpayers, as the industry and supply chain are able to plan ahead and produce effective business plans. There is a consequence to the leasing’s being done by the public sector, rather than the private sector: the Government will have to consider the impact of the cost of leasing on the national debt. That is, after all, the logical consequence of their political decision to nationalise the railways—the operating companies. There is a cost that comes with it, and that is moving from the private sector balance book on to that of the public sector. The Government need to own the financial consequences of their political and ideologically driven decision, and that is one of them.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for his intervention, and for standing up for the jobs in his constituency, which is something we all need to do. I cannot speak for the actions of the Government before I was even elected as a Back-Bench MP, but we are certainly looking to improve. I would be the first person to say that the status quo ante was capable of improvement. Privatisation did bring many benefits to the railways, particularly in encouraging innovation and focus on the customer, leading to the increase in passenger numbers, which I have already spoken about in previous sittings, but was it perfect? Of course not. As has been trailed by the Government, this is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to redesign and improve our approach to the railways, and I think that taking a long-term approach to rolling stock investment and creating this framework would be taking advantage of that opportunity to try to improve predictability for the supply sector—for Alstom, but also for Siemens and other manufacturers as well. New clause 36 would require GBR to publish and keep under annual review a 15-year rolling stock investment framework that sets out future needs for new and existing trains. That includes—this is important—not just the replacement of trains but refurbishment, digital upgrades, decarbonisation and accessibility improvements. It would establish how private investors could finance rolling stock and related upgrades, promote energy-efficient technologies such as battery, hydrogen and hybrid traction, and set expectations for competitive, innovative and, importantly, predictable procurement. The framework must align with GBR’s business plan and control period funding, which are two very sensible requirements, and it must also provide transparency on procurement volumes and timelines, explain changes to plans and show how private investment will be used to reduce whole-life costs, improve train quality and support jobs in the UK rail supply chain. The Government have thrown the sector into a period of uncertainty—that is inevitable with large-scale redesigns like the ones we are going through at the moment. My concern is that the way in which they have chosen to do this, through a process of drifting nationalisation before knowing the details of its replacement, has exacerbated that uncertainty and extended it over a prolonged period. As the hon. Member for Derby South has already noted, we are already seeing that uncertainty in the supply chain and the manufacturing base. There is uncertainty—that is the problem. This is a shell Bill; it does not have the answers, and it does not give any confidence to industry that things will be better in the future. It relies on a whole raft of provisions in the 19 documents to which we have referred to time and again, but they do not exist. We do not know whether things will get better or worse, and neither does the industry. There is no supporting documentation on how GBR will function in practice. I am not sure the Government even know that yet, and they really ought to have done better than this. New clause 36 would point them in the right direction, and I certainly look forward to pressing it to a Division, should the opportunity arise. New clause 37 would increase accountability by setting out a reporting and accountability framework for Great British Railways. The new clause states: “Great British Railways must publish a business plan each year”, which we have already considered, and it dictates: “The business plan…must include…a summary of activities that Great British Railways intends to undertake during the following year” and “how these activities will support the delivery of the Rail Strategy”. At the end of the year, GBR would be required to produce a second report setting out its progress against the business plan objectives, the first of which is passenger experience—we all know the Government substantially ignore passenger experience at the moment, apart from reliability in short trains, and have just brushed the other aspects under the carpet. The other objectives include “freight growth…accessibility…passenger growth”, which is also ignored by the Government in the Bill as drafted, “integration with housing and local transport” and “the long-term infrastructure and service improvement.” The ORR must assess GBR’s performance against the key performance indicators set out in new clause 2, which we have already debated but not yet voted on. If the ORR finds any material underperformance, it must give notice to the Secretary of State, who must publish a written response. This general approach is very business focused; it simply asks that GBR sets out what it is planning to do at the start of the year, and then having worked through the year, there is a process for GBR to mark its homework at the end of the year. Has GBR done what it said it would do? If it has not, the spotlight is on. It is also being assessed by the ORR, which retains its role as an independent expert adjudicator that is trusted by all parts of the rail sector. Perhaps the best thing is that, in response to that, GBR must also set out what it will do to rectify any underperformance, and it must lay a report before Parliament and make a statement. The new clause would add critical levels of parliamentary and public scrutiny to GBR, allowing both to hold this new organisation to account, which we believe is paramount when such vast amounts of taxpayers’ money will be used. The current Bill is woefully short on accountability. It lacks strong incentives to encourage GBR to perform, to be held to account and to answer for its actions—or lack of action. This all feels a little too comfortable. We have a nationalised industry reporting to officials from the Department for Transport, and it is not focusing on the experience of customers and passengers, passenger growth or all the other imperatives of rail in the future. The Minister will of course tell us that none of that is necessary. However, with the greatest respect, direct experience of running a business tells us that we need to design in strong incentives—this is crucial; it is not primarily a political point but a trying to improve this Bill point—so that GBR is inclined to focus on the right objectives, without having to respond to external direction. These new clauses would help to point GBR in the right direction. I look forward to the Minister’s support.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Minister is touching on a key issue that the railway will have to address if he is serious about achieving a reliable Sunday service, and that is operating a seven-day schedule with a six-day roster. Does the Minister intend finally to address the six-day roster issue and to move working practices on to a seven-day roster?