Jerome Mayhew MP: speeches

Speeches

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am unpersuaded. As I previously indicated, I will press amendment 74 to a vote. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Minister’s argument is clearly—is it parliamentary to say nonsense? I hope it is. His argument, that the industry will be confused if the passengers’ council is able to enforce its own deliberations, is ridiculous; he just has to think about it. The ORR has its areas of competence on which it enforces, and the passengers’ council has its areas of competence; they are discrete. Where confusion might really arise is if the passengers’ council thinks it is trying to get information and is stymied by the ORR taking a different view, which is the position the Minister has put forward. I have no hesitation in pushing the amendment to a vote. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 63, in clause 36, page 19, line 35, after “of” insert “all users, and potential users of the railways, including”. This amendment ensures that the Passengers’ Council must have regard to the needs of all users, and potential users of the railway.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  In the wording of clause 39(1), at the moment paragraphs (a) to (e) are additional. If the “or” in “or…it appears to the Council” at the end of paragraph (d) were replaced with “and”, there would be a two-part test. The council would receive complaints from all the kinds of people in paragraphs (a) to (d), and the second part of the test would be that “it appears to the Council that the matter is one that the Council ought to investigate.” That would give agency to the council to monitor and choose the most important things for it to investigate.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I agree. Question put and agreed to. Clause 35 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 36 General duties of the Council

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 47 deals with improvement plans. It allows the passengers’ council to request improvement plans from licensed rail operators “where it judges them to be, or likely to be, non-compliant with the standards it sets and therefore, the consumer licence conditions”— not that we have seen them, and the “improvement plans would be requested from operators to allow them to explain their planned improvements before issues were referred to the ORR or potential enforcement action”— although we do not know whether they would choose to enforce either. The clause highlights—again—just how toothless the passengers’ council will be. It still has no direct enforcement powers, and the explanatory notes confirm that these plans are only a precursor to possible ORR action. If an operator ignores a plan, the council can do nothing about it at all, except refer the matter to the ORR, which may “take such action (if any) as it thinks appropriate”. This is another two-stage approach from the Government, with no guaranteed remedy, and it leaves the council structurally dependent on the ORR for all meaningful enforcement. There is no requirement for the ORR to do anything at all, when provided with a file from the passengers’ council. There is no ability for the ORR to adopt a passengers’ council investigation as its own, and any enforcement action will be required to consider the matter afresh. I accept the Minister’s earlier point that the ORR will be able to read documentation presented by the passengers’ council, but that is it. That will take time and add cost, and it will fail the consumer all the way through the process. It is not the ORR’s fault; it is how the Government are designing the system, which falls well short of the Government’s stated aim of creating a genuinely empowered passenger watchdog. Subsection (2) says: “If the person fails to take the steps set out” in the improvement plan, or does not prepare one “within a reasonable time, the Passengers’ Council must refer the matter to the ORR”. That part is mandatory, but the ORR’s response is not mandatory. Why is that? Perhaps the Minister can help us out. The new system needs to be able to stand up for passengers, with a watchdog worthy of the name. Amendment 74 would give the passengers’ council the power to enforce improvement plans, and new clause 45 sets out how that will be achieved. It would require the Secretary of State to provide the passengers’ council with enforcement powers broadly equivalent to those of the Office of Rail and Road under the 1993 Act. The Government want to put passengers at the heart of the railway, but they have created a passenger watchdog with no teeth—or power—to enforce any of its decisions. To give an advance indication, I will seek to divide on both amendment 74 and new clause 45.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Under clause 43, the passengers’ council can prepare, send and publish a report of its findings in an investigation, but it must obtain the Secretary of State’s consent before sending or publishing a report if the investigation was undertaken following a referral. Similar provisions exist for the Scottish and Welsh Ministers. The wording of subsection (3) makes publication discretionary even after a full investigation and subsection (4) requires ministerial consent before publishing any report arising from a referral. As the explanatory notes confirm, that structure gives Ministers an effective veto over publication. Why should the Minister have a veto over publication when the organisation being investigated is their own creation? If the state has created a toothless investigation watchdog body that, despite its lack of enforcement powers, has managed to do an investigation, write a report that is no doubt critical of the state, GBR or perhaps even the Secretary of State and the Department for Transport, the Secretary of State, or the Scottish or Welsh Minister can, for whatever reason they like, veto its publication. They can muzzle the watchdog at whim. That risks undermining the whole process—where is the transparency?—and weakens the credibility of the new watchdog. If the aim is to strengthen passenger oversight, investigation reports should be published as a matter of course, with only narrowly defined exemptions for confidentiality or commercial reasons. Transport for All explains in its written evidence to the Transport Committee how that will affect passengers: “Clauses 42-47 empower the Passengers’ Council to receive complaints, investigate issues, and identify potential breaches of licence conditions. However, the Council has no power to compel corrective action, issue penalties, or enforce compliance. If it identifies significant accessibility failings, it must refer the matter to the ORR, which retains full discretion over whether to investigate or take enforcement action. Disabled passengers already face disproportionate obstacles when raising complaints, and this indirect model appears to add another layer of bureaucracy without increasing accountability. We worry that it will create further delays, weaken enforcement, confuse passengers, and result in inconsistent redress. A watchdog without enforcement powers is fundamentally limited in its capacity to protect passengers’ rights or drive accessibility improvements.” Amendment 69 requires the passengers’ council to publish any report on a matter investigated under clause 39. That will create greater transparency and accountability in the new watchdog. Frankly, if the Government are serious about supporting the rights of passengers, rather than designing in an ability to hide embarrassing conclusions, they must support this amendment. Amendment 70 would require the passengers’ council to publish its report within six months of completing the investigation. Having in statute a specific timeframe in which a report must be published would create a sense of urgency, or at least of purpose, and a culture would develop within the organisation that placed high importance on those reports—exactly as it should. Amendments 138, tabled in the name of the Liberal Democrats—presumably the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage—would require the passenger’s council to prepare a report of findings after an investigation and ensure that any report is laid before Parliament. It is another attempt to strengthen the reporting requirements from a different angle and should be supported because it is seeking to achieve a similar outcome to my own amendments. Amendment 140, also in the name of the hon. Member, “removes the requirement that the Passengers’ Council must obtain the Secretary of State’s consent before sending or publishing a report if the investigation resulted from a referral by the Secretary of State”. Amendment 69 is a mandatory requirement that they must publish every report. If that is not acceptable to the Government for whatever reason, then amendment 140 is a slight variation on the theme in that it takes the discretion away from the Secretary of State and leaves it where it properly lies, if there is to be discretion: with the passenger watchdog. That body, surely, having undertaken the investigation, written the report and come to a conclusion, are best placed to decide whether it is in the public interest to publish, not the owner of the nationalised industry that is being investigated.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member is absolutely right that there is a sequence of complaint. Before going to an external body, one would typically be expected to have exhausted the internal complaints procedure of the organisation against which one is complaining. It would be perfectly reasonable for the passenger watchdog’s first questions to be, “Have you complained to GBR? If so, what did it say?” In fact, that might be its working definition of frivolousness: going straight to the watchdog without having made a complaint. I warn the Minister that the current wording is an open chequebook. It could lead to a huge amount of work for an organisation that is not currently set up to deal with it, and which would require significant funds from somewhere to do so. What assessment of demand has been undertaken for council investigation powers? What budget has been earmarked for the huge increase in workload? Transport Focus, the host organisation, currently has fewer than 30 staff—I speak from memory and stand to be corrected, but when I visited there were something like 22 staff. To what size does the Minister anticipate expanding Transport Focus or the new passenger watchdog? Amendment 142 would make GBR the first stage of a complaint submitted, with the passenger standards council as the appellant body should the complaint not be satisfied by the response from Great British Railways. I doubt whether it needs an amendment to primary legislation, but it would be the right sequence for any complainant to exhaust the in-house complaints procedure first. Does the Minister not mean the passengers’ council to have the authority to pick and choose its investigations? If he does not, he should stick with the current wording; if he does, he should think again.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I understand where you are coming from, Mrs Hobhouse. The problem is that the amendments relate to clause 37, not clause 36, so it is inevitable that I have to describe the clause. I am not speaking to the clause, but explaining how my amendment fits within it.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  We are at the final furlong—for today at least. I will keep the pace up for the last straight. I am not going to make any comments on clause 53, the general duties of the LTUC, because there is nothing to be improved. Clause 54, which amends section 252A of the Greater London Authority Act 1999, mirrors the passengers’ council in many ways. We could take the opportunity to seek to apply the same improvements to the LTUC that we have to the passengers’ council, but I have resisted that temptation given the Government’s reaction to all other proposals to date. Clause 55 designates the committee as the body to which complaints about potential infringements of retained EU law on rail passengers rights should be addressed. I see no issue with that other than in relation to the criticism we have already outlined regarding the passengers’ council. It is clear that the clause is designed to ensure consistency in London in line with the rest of the United Kingdom, so we have no amendments there. I take on board the Minister’s comments on Government amendment 173 and make no further comment. Clause 56, which is about complaints to the LTUC, again, allows the LTUC to be the official body in which complaints about retained EU law are handled. As the Minister has pointed out, that clause, like others in this group, mirrors the ability of the passengers’ council, so we have nothing else to add on that one. I make no comments on clause 57 about the publication of information and advice by the LTUC. That brings us to clause 58—restrictions on disclosure of information by the LTUC. As we come to the last clause of the London Transport Users Committee, we also come to the last amendment to the Greater London Authority Act 1999. For those keeping track of these things at home, we are now amending section 252DC. The clause outlines restrictions in a very similar fashion to that of the passengers’ council, so we consequently have no further amendments to suggest for that clause either.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the Minister for his detailed assessment of the new clauses and amendments. In the interests of time, I do not propose to press amendment 71, but I do not swallow the explanations given in relation to amendment 72. We need to focus the passenger watchdog on important issues for passengers, so we will press that amendment to a Division. However, on amendment 71, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Amendment proposed : 72, in clause 46, page 24, line 33, at end insert— “(e) passenger service reliability, including punctuality, cancellations, short-forming, delays and the reliability of key connections, (f) safety and security, including safety incidents, security incidents affecting passengers, staff presence, and delivery of safety-critical maintenance, (g) comfort and on-board experience on passenger services, including cleanliness, the functioning of heating, air-conditioning, and lighting, overcrowding, the availability and performance of any internet connection or power sockets, and toilet facilities, (h) affordability and value for money of passenger services, including fare levels, availability of discounted or flexible fares, transparency of fare information, and passenger perception of value for money.”— (Jerome Mayhew.) This amendment would require the Passengers’ Council to set standards relating to the reliability, safety and security, comfort and on-board experience and affordability of railway passenger services. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  That is all very well, but it is not the wording of the Bill. The text does not say “have regard to”; it is a mandatory requirement to investigate every single allegation. I totally understand where the Minister says he is coming from, but unfortunately his Bill does not agree with him.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 67, in clause 42, page 23, line 7, leave out subsection (2).

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I recognise that the Minister has his line to take and that there will be lots of angry people sitting behind him at tea time if he makes any concessions. However, a simple amendment to the wording of the mandatory requirement in clause 39(1), paragraphs (a) to (e), would give the passenger watchdog the ability to pick and choose. Changing “or” to “and” at the end of paragraph (d), before “it appears to the Council that the matter is one that the Council ought to investigate”, would surely provide the flexibility that everyone probably thinks is necessary.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is much easier when I start with the amendment, because then I know where I am. This clause is about the power to obtain information. I will leave it to the Minister to give a précis, but it seeks to create a sensible power for the passengers’ council to be able to require the provision of information. However, the council has no power to compel compliance—it may only refer the matter further, to the Office of Rail and Road—so we begin to get into one of the problems with the passengers’ council, which is that it has no enforcement powers at all. Any teeth that are associated with the works of the passengers’ council come only from the economic regulator, soon to be just the safety regulator: the ORR. That will lead to some serious problems. There is no proposal to require the ORR, as a regulating body with no enforcement powers, to take the preparatory work of the passengers’ council as automatically worthy of acceptance without reinvestigation. That is quite a serious point, because when an investigation undertaken by the passengers’ council comes to a roadblock that it feels requires some kind of enforcement action, it has to go to a separate body, the Office of Rail and Road, because the Government do not intend to give the council any real powers of its own. The ORR, as an independent regulator and enforcement body, then has to start the investigation de novo. It has no ability to take as read the investigation work of the passengers’ council. That will create the bizarre situation of the ORR having to reinvestigate as an enforcing body, which is a quasi-judicial function, and then come to a decision every single time the passengers’ council refers any matter to it. Surely the Minister can do better than that, with all the resources of his many civil servants and drafting professionals in the Department. That messy process will lead to delay and uncertain enforcement—hardly the stuff of empowering passengers. I fear that those on the Treasury Bench have asserted that the watchdog will be a nightwatchman, but the Department has granted it no enforcement powers or powers to compel. That will be bitterly disappointing to many rail passenger groups and advocates. When an issue arises and the council begins an investigation, it will inevitably require information. If it is unable to get that information, it must ask the ORR to step in and take over. We heard a lot about that in evidence to the Transport Committee. For example, Emma Vogelmann of Transport for All said: “In terms of the watchdog itself, I have briefly touched on this already, but we feel very much that the passengers’ council really needs to be given enforcement powers to be able to take proper action on cases that are involving accessibility breaches. In cases where things do get referred up to the ORR, we would like there to be a statutory duty on them to act on those referrals made by the passengers’ council, and to have those outcomes within a clear timeframe.” Another point she makes is that the ORR does not have to do anything. The passengers’ council can refer a matter to the ORR, but the ORR can say, “We’re busy, thank you, and we don’t think it is important.” It has no obligation to act.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am not persuaded by the Minister. There are two amendments. In order to save time, I will press the first one to a Division, and the outcome of that will determine whether or not I press the second one to a Division. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am interested to hear that the hon. Gentleman has been on that railway. I would continue on that, but I have gone on long enough by saying, “and another thing—I remember”. Rail charter services are a different matter that must also be considered. Those with children may have travelled on one of the many Christmas polar expresses that are chartered services. They are very important to tourism and to the financing of the railway, as they make an economic contribution to the running of it. They sit in a unique space of quasi-open access and are a useful component of the railway. Mainline heritage rail routes, such as the Cambrian express—although the Minister of State for Rail, Lord Hendy, still needs to do some work to restore steam, rather than diesel, locomotives to that heritage route—as well as services with the Flying Scotsman, or Sir Nigel Gresley, which is the last working version of the Mallard class, the A4s, are very important, and crowds of people gather to watch them steam past. I applaud the Government for that sensible exemption. All I ask is that they continue to do what they can to facilitate and support heritage and chartered railways, and I would be grateful to hear the Government’s plans to do so, if there are any. I would propose no amendments to clause 51. Clause 52 is the interpretation chapter, and I am happy for that to continue without amendment. That leaves me solely with the pleasure of discussing new clauses 68 and 70, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge. New clause 68 would give the Secretary of State the power to direct GBR to co-operate with transport authorities to ensure the effective operation of transport networks and to reduce disruption. Network Rail is often cited as a poor neighbour, with no interest in co-operating with other transport modes, or frankly with adjacent landowners— I have had more than one letter of complaint from constituents on that—to minimise disruption not on the railway. The Opposition support the intentions behind the new clause. Culture change is needed in the successor to Network Rail, and a duty to co-operate would at least help. The Minister needs to recognise the existing problem of Network Rail’s culture being—I think it is fair to say—deeply suboptimal in relation to this, and set out his proposals for improvement. New clause 70, also in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, sets out the requirements for GBR to ensure that any planned changes to passenger services are only made with due consideration of its objectives and are fully communicated with stakeholders. I read the new clause into the record, but I do not propose to press it to a Division when the time comes.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Thank you, Mrs Hobhouse, for agreeing to chair this afternoon’s deliberations. Here we are at clause 36, on the general duties of the passengers’ council. The clause requires the passengers’ council to consider the interests and needs of disabled persons when it exercises its rail functions. It also places a duty on the council to consider costs and the efficient use of public funds when it exercises its functions. That updates the council’s duty on value for money, which we can see in section 76(7) of the Railways Act 1993, and is consistent with the duty the Secretary of State, the Office of Rail and Road, Scottish and Welsh Ministers and Great British Railways will have if clause 18(2)(f) makes it into the final Act. Clause 36(a), however, is silent on the general travelling public; it only mentions having particular regard to disabled persons. It seems like an odd omission for a provision on a passengers’ council to not mention passengers in the round. For the rest of the public, the council only has to “keep under review matters affecting the interests of the public”, under clause 37(1)(a). The current drafting risks the creation, inadvertent I am sure, of a skewed body, directed to focus on disabled passengers and silent on the rest. I know that would not be the intention of the Ministry or anybody else in this Committee, but that is what the draft text would require of the council under its statutory obligations. It sits uneasily alongside clause 18(2)(a) on the general duties of Ministers, GBR and the ORR, which we all remember, and which frames disabled people within a wider body of all users, stating that it is to “promote the interests of users and potential users of railway passenger services including, in particular, the needs of disabled persons”. Why is different language being used? There is a difference, within the same draft text, between clause 18 and clause 36. The effect is to leave the passengers’ council operating statutorily on a narrower basis than GBR. The Minister will need to explain the intention behind that, because I do not believe it is intentional. If it is, he needs to explain why he wishes to constrain artificially the application of the passengers’ council to an area which is less wide than that covered by GBR, which it is meant to be monitoring.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s intervention, although unfortunately he did interrupt my flow—though it was very kind of him to say that he did not want to in the process. He is quite right. Although I obviously love chucking half-bricks at the Government, I do not believe for a moment that there is a serious intention on the part of the Department for Transport to skew the passengers’ council in the way that the drafting currently requires. I am highlighting the provision in the best interests of improving the drafting of the Bill. I am sure the Minister will find a reason not to agree with me in a few minutes’ time, but I hope that he, or his officials, will go away and have a quiet look at it before the Bill reaches the House of Lords. Subsection (b) provides only a duty to “take into account” the costs of recommendations. Surely, as legislators, we want the organisation to balance the public benefits against the likely costs—a cost-benefit analysis, essentially—and not just to consider costs to be met from public funds, because this also involves farebox income. Amendment 63 therefore “ensures that the Passengers’ Council must have regard to the needs of all users, and potential users of the railway”, preventing a skewed council with competing interests, borrowing the language used by the Government in clause 18. Amendment 64 would require the passengers’ council to consider value for money through a cost-benefit analysis, rather than merely the “efficient use” of public funds, which is only half of the issue. There is a key difference here: value for money focuses on achieving the best balance of cost, quality and outcomes, whereas the good use of public funds also requires spending to be transparent, fair and aligned with the public interest and wider policy objectives. That makes this amendment important in achieving the lowest possible cost for the taxpayer. New clause 7 would give the passengers’ council a statutory purpose to champion the interests of all railway users and potential users of the railway. The passengers’ council would advocate for the reliability of passenger services, for safety and security, and for passengers’ comfort and on-board experience, which we have discussed a number of times. It would also advocate for affordability and value for money, passenger growth and network expansion. It is important to have a clear set of directions for this new passengers’ council at its inception, and the new clause would help to provide that.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I think the Minister may have misunderstood my point. I was not for a moment suggesting that the passenger watchdog should take over responsibility for safety-critical functions. I was anticipating that he might argue that the ORR needs to retain a veto right because there might be clashes with its safety-critical functions, in which case the clause could be redrafted to make it clear that that is the area of focus.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have nothing to add on clause 44. Clause 45 provides a duty for the passengers’ council to secure independent dispute resolution arrangements. As the Minister just said, it is anticipated—according to the explanatory notes, at least—that it will take over sponsorship of the Rail Ombudsman from the ORR in order to fulfil that duty. I want to ask the Minister what powers the dispute resolution function will have, because the Bill and the explanatory notes are entirely silent. That is the modus operandi that we have become used to during the course of these Bill proceedings: there is endless putting off, and the detail has not been thought out—or, certainly, not shared. This seems to be a similar case. New clause 46, in my name, would ensure that the Office of Rail and Road continued to publish data on complaints in the same manner as it currently does. During a significant transition such as the creation of GBR, it is crucial that data collection and publication are maintained in a manner that allows for accurate comparison—another small but important point. The new clause would achieve that objective. The alternative is to risk an inability to make like-for-like comparison, which of course would let the new organisation off the hook. Without continuity of data collection and publishing, GBR would be able to avoid comparative scrutiny.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 46 gives the passengers’ council a power to set consumer standards for operators of rail passenger services and station services, which will be imposed on them via licence conditions. Of course, we have not seen any of those licence conditions, so we will just have to take it on faith. The clause sets out matters that the standards may cover, including passenger assistance, provision of travel information, a process for compensation if services are disrupted, and complaints about passenger services. The council must seek the Secretary of State’s and the ORR’s consent before setting new standards or varying existing ones, and it must publish them, and any variations or revocations of them, and monitor how operators are complying with them. In summary, the clause gives the passengers’ council a standard-setting role in areas such as assistance, information, compensation and complaints. What about standards on core passenger priorities, such as punctuality, reliability, crowding, staffing, cleanliness, safety and ticketing transparency? Would the Secretary of State be minded to grant consent for such standards, and if not, why not? Requiring both the Secretary of State and the ORR to consent to any new standard creates two veto points, limiting the council’s independence. The result is a standards framework far weaker than the broader watchdog model described in the consultation. As we have discussed, subsection (2)(a) makes no direct reference to general users of the railway; the only reference is to disabled people. While I understand the additional focus that disability access requires, the current wording risks a wholly unbalanced approach for the new organisation. Amendment 71 would solve that drafting imbalance and encourage the passengers’ council to set standards for all users and potential users of the railway. In drafting it, all I did was take the Government’s own words in clause 18, which, in describing the general functions, refers to all users, both able bodied and disabled. It does not seem to be an enormous stretch to require the passenger watchdog to have a similar functions scope as the organisation that it is watchdogging. Amendment 72 would require the passengers’ council to set standards relating to the reliability, safety and security, comfort, onboard experience, and affordability of railway passenger services. These are the key issues of importance to passengers. Why do the Government not allow their key champion to tackle the real problems and not just the peripheral ones? Instead of focusing on information provision and complaints processes, let us get to the nitty-gritty. Let us have a watchdog that can actually draft and implement standards, and enforce improvement on a large nationalised organisation in the interests of passengers—that is what they actually want—rather than tipping a cap towards it and saying, “Oh yes, we’ve got a watchdog but it has no enforcement powers. It can write standards, but only about what information you receive, not about the really important stuff.” If the Government really want to put “passengers at the heart of the railway”, why do they not vote for these amendments and enhance the powers of the passenger watchdog? They cannot have it both ways. At the moment, it looks like they are just pretending; they have a superficial watchdog that ticks a box but has very limited practical use for passengers. Amendment 73 would remove the passengers’ council’s need to obtain the ORR’s consent to set, vary or revoke standards. A truly effective passenger watchdog needs to have its own real powers, and the ability to set its own standards without the consent of another organisation. Why does the Minister not have faith in his own passenger watchdog to do that? If his answer is that such an objection from the ORR would relate to safety-critical functions, why does the Bill not just say that? The Government are planning on stripping most of the competences away from the ORR, save for the remaining aspect of safety, but they do not say, “If the watchdog has a standard that has an impact on the safety-critical application of the railway, it needs to get the permission of the ORR.” That would make sense. Instead, the ORR has a blanket veto. Amendment 141, in the name of the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage, would remove the requirement for the consent of the Secretary of State and the ORR before the passengers’ council sets, varies or revokes a standard—a similar approach to that which I have put forward. I would be minded to support it, were it to be pressed to a Division. Amendment 144 comes from a similar quarter. I am sure it is unintentional, but it contains a drafting mistake. The notes to the amendment make it clear that it seeks to delete subsection (5), but the wording as it stands relates to subsection (6). I stand to be corrected, but I think that is what has happened. New clause 16, in the name of the Liberal Democrats, would require a review of the Access for All programme. It seeks to ensure that step-free access at stations is provided under the programme. The review would explain historical spending decisions and set out recommendations for future spending. I will leave new clauses 17 and 53 to the Liberal Democrat spokesman. New clause 69, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer), would mandate GBR to publish an accessibility strategy every 10 years, to monitor and improve accessibility across the rail network, and to report annually on its progress against that strategy. I welcome that approach to transparency and the focus on accessibility. It deals with the Minister’s arguments about imposing onerous reporting targets on GBR. Given the number of stations involved, the requirement is limited to once a decade, which would be a reasonable compromise. Without such data, how can GBR expect to allocate resources efficiently? The Minister needs to set out how GBR will address accessibility investment without such data. I anticipate an argument that it would be imposing onerous conditions on GBR for it to have an idea as to accessibility around the country. Every now and again, it should know what its own business is up to.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 66, in clause 40, page 22, line 11, leave out subsections (5)(a) and (5)(b) and insert “the Passengers’ Council may take such action (if any) as it thinks appropriate.” This amendment would give the Passengers’ Council enforcement powers when its requests for information are not met.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am not going to repeat what the clause does, but it establishes only a passive role. The council must “keep under review” and “make representations”, but it has no proactive duty to investigate or intervene. That is quite a big omission, and it contrasts with what the Minister said in answer to written parliamentary question 76652. The Minister gave an assurance that the new watchdog will deliver clear and robust oversight, but the co-operation duty is narrowly drawn, excluding wider consumer and accessibility organisations. As drafted, the council lacks a clear purpose—in fact, it does not even have a purpose clause—and the practical tools needed to act as the strengthened passenger watchdog the Government have promised. Without a purpose clause, there is no direction as to what the council should be making representations about. Even the title of clause 37 is anodyne: “Keeping matters under review and collecting information” is hardly a strong description of a watchman for the interests of the passenger. Having kept matters “under review”, its only power is to “make representations”, which of course is meaningless. The Urban Transport Group expressed similar concerns in its written evidence to the Transport Committee: “The Bill must ensure that the Passengers Council exercise their powers in relation to GBR as they would any other operator and that these hold weight. It is not enough for GBR to only be held meaningfully to account by the Secretary of State, who has varying responsibilities outside of rail, and who may not have the time to investigate instances of poor performance to the relevant level of scrutiny. Further consideration should be given to the explicit powers and levers the Passengers’ Council will have”— they are going to split the infinitive— “to meaningfully hold GBR to account on behalf of users.” There is a risk that the passengers’ council will be just a busy talking shop, with no ability to effect change. As drafted, it rather feels like an afterthought. For example, there are no enforcement powers, save for referral to the Office of Rail and Road. Under clause 37(1), the council will have the authority to “make representations to…such persons as they think appropriate” on “matters affecting the interests of the public”. In reality, that will mainly be to the Secretary of State and GBR, but there is no corresponding duty for either the Secretary of State or GBR to respond in any way to those representations. Consider that for a moment: there is a duty to make representations, and no duty to respond at all. It could not be more toothless if it tried. Amendment 65, in my name, would go a modest way to rectifying the toothlessness of this representative body. It would simply require the Secretary of State and Great British Railways to respond to any representations the passengers’ council makes under this clause. Surely members of this Committee and the Government would agree that that is a reasonable expectation for the passengers’ council and the passengers it represents. Amendment 235, in the name of the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage, would require the passengers’ council to assess levels of satisfaction with public passenger railway services and report these in a manner that enables GBR to fulfil its functions. Any amendment, and this is one of them, that ensures greater transparency and therefore a better service from this organisation—

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The amendments relate to clause 42, so I will explain what that clause seeks to achieve. Its title is “Representations and referrals”, and its focus is on introducing a power so that “the Passengers’ Council may make representations to such persons as it thinks appropriate for the purpose”, such as train or station operators, to resolve a matter under investigation. If the passengers’ council believes that an operator “is contravening, or likely to contravene” its licence obligations, it must either engage with the operator directly, as we will discuss further when we consider clause 47, and/or refer the matter to the ORR and notify the Secretary of State. There are various other things that clause 42 does, but those are the main things. The clause makes it clear that even after a passengers’ council investigation has identified a licence breach, the ORR retains complete discretion on whether or not to act. Once again, that will create a two-stage process in which the council must refer breaches that it cannot resolve itself, but the body receiving the referral is not obliged to act on it, or to intervene. Therefore, the watchdog investigates, but only the ORR can enforce, which it can choose not to do. That structure falls way short of the supposed strengthened passenger accountability model described by Ministers, and it serves only to risk causing prolonged delays for passengers who face ongoing harm, to the extent that a licence provision is breached, without a guaranteed remedy. Thus far, we have not seen a clear rationale as to why the Government would create a watchdog only for it not to have any enforcement powers. It prompts the question: “What’s the point?” Evidence to the Transport Committee was very clear—the passengers’ council needs to have enforcement powers of its own to do the job envisaged for it. At the very least, if the ORR is to remain the enforcement body, there should not be a weeding process between the decisions of the passengers’ council and the ORR; the ORR should at least get on and enforce. That is what amendments 67 and 68 would achieve, by requiring the ORR to take action when a contravention had been referred to it.