Jerome Mayhew MP: speeches

Speeches

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  As I have set out in my series of amendments, the appropriate oversight and control is to remove the chief executive. The Minister must accept that, if the Secretary of State thinks that the organisation is going in the wrong direction, is not listening to guidance or has gone rogue in some way, they have the unfettered power to remove the chief executive officer at any stage. If he does not think that is the case, he should say so now, because if the Secretary of State has the power to remove the chief executive officer and put in place someone who will do his bidding, then none of this is needed, is it?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I echo all the comments made by my right hon. and hon. Friends. I also thank the Minister for facing up to it with a point of order. It was obvious last week that a point of order was on its way. None of us on the Opposition Benches will hold him to his initial, rather quick, response—no doubt I will do something similar during the passage of the Bill—but that does not let the Government off the hook. This is not business as usual for a Department bringing through a Bill of this nature. My right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston, an experienced former Minister, gave two examples of primary legislation that also relied on secondary documentation. In those circumstances, the departmental teams did provide skeleton outlines for Parliament, which is what we are, to consider and do our job properly. I do not want the Minister to rush out a quick affirmative like last week, so I ask him to take time to consider, perhaps discuss with his officials, and reply later today on whether he and his officials are able to commit to some form of briefing—some skeleton outline—on the nature of the licence, at a time when we can collectively discuss and debate it, and see whether it points in the right direction. Clause 11 simply enables GBR’s licensing to be set out in schedule 1, which we will come on to in a moment. That schedule amends part 1 of the Railways Act 1993 and sets out the detailed process by which the GBR licence will be issued and maintained. Both the Secretary of State and the Office of Rail and Road will retain the ability to grant licences to railway bodies other than GBR—for example, open access operators, freight operators and other infrastructure managers such as the core valley lines in Wales. I know we will discuss the contents of schedule 1 and the detail of the licence extensively.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  rose —

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am wholly unconvinced by the explanation the Minister has given. On many of the clauses and amendments I have put forward, and those put forward in the names of other Members, one can see both sides of the argument; on this one, I think the Government are entirely wrong. They are setting up a structure using another arm’s length non-governmental body, National Highways, that is a byword among us constituency MPs for a lack of accountability and for being a frustrating body to deal with. That is not the right direction for the Government to be going in and I will push the amendments to a Division. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the Minister, though I remind him that we do have 14 sessions; we are not cantering to the last fence. He prays in aid National Highways. We are all constituency MPs. We all know how frustrating it is trying to deal with National Highways. I do not want to make a headline unnecessarily, but my personal view, as a constituency MP, is that trying to deal with National Highways in the interests of my constituents is almost impossible. Why would he choose that as the example to follow when designing accountability for GBR?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful for Minister’s explanation, but I am not persuaded by it and seek to put amendment 109 to a vote. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  That demonstrates that the current system is working to hold Trainline to account, and that where there are abuses—if what the hon. Gentleman outlined amounted to abuses—effective systems are in position and they have been corrected. The hon. Gentleman’s intervention did not speak to the overriding point: what do the Government want when they are applying this new structure to retail? Do they want a level playing field? Is that their intention, or do they want a systemically biased system in which GBR retail is given an unfair advantage over independent competition? Both answers are credible—it is possible for the Government to form one decision—but they should not pay lip service to a level playing field but, in design, achieve the opposite, which appears to be the case at the moment. In oral evidence to the Transport Committee, Ben Plowden, the chief executive of the Campaign for Better Transport, essentially agreed with Trainline’s position. He said: “We think that because the independent retail market has produced significant benefits for customers in the time that it has been in existence. It is heavily used by rail passengers. The critical question in relation to the Bill, and the other mechanisms that will be in place once the Bill has been passed, is how we ensure that there is genuine fair and open competition between GBR ticket retailing and the independent retailers currently or potentially in the market.” This is a key point: the Government need to stop and think about what their intention is. If it is to have a fair market, the evidence, and all the feedback they are getting from the sector, is that they have not yet achieved that objective. They need to put their money where their mouth is and decide what their objective is. I hope the Minister will be clear in his response as to the Government’s thinking on that. A second concern is that the sector is nervous about the apparent lack of hierarchy and detail in the functions. GBR is assigned multiple duties under the clause, but with no hierarchy, so it paves the way for potential confusion—or, worse, it gives GBR the ability to pick and choose which function it thinks is important in relation to any decision. It can quietly demote the importance of others so that it can serve itself and thereby reduce the power of the clause. Nick Brooks from ALLRAIL said in oral evidence to the Transport Committee: “To lead from your further question: with the very broad powers for the Secretary of State and a certain lack of specificity on what will happen, what we are looking for is more key performance indicators, like in business. I realise it is a governmental entity, but the quantitative KPIs are not really there.” I would go further than that: they are not there at all. As well as amendment 2, which I have spoken to, we have also tabled new clause 3, which sets out GBR retail requirements. As I have said previously, this is a critical issue given the evidence that the Select Committee received, and the oral evidence that we heard on Tuesday, that the Government have built a structural conflict of interest into the Bill as currently drafted. We also heard on Tuesday about international examples where a similar concern has been addressed in a different manner. SNCF is a state-owned railway in France that has unification of track and train. It also has a retail function, through which is competes with the wider market. SNCF, or, I presume, the French Government—I do not want to claim greater in-depth knowledge that I actually possess—have taken the decision to have a structural separation between SNCF retail and SNCF operations, the equivalent to GBR. The very obvious reason why they did that was for fairness and to have a level playing field. We are not talking about SNCF, but an improvement on the current position, which I fully accept is not perfect.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 2, in clause 3, page 2, line 15, after “sale” insert— “by promoting a thriving competitive market in the retail ticketing market”. This amendment makes Great British Railways’ duty to promote a competitive retail market explicit and aligns the Bill with the Government’s stated aim of delivering a system where competition drives better outcomes for passengers.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful for that direction, Mrs Hobhouse, but it is quite hard to talk about amendments if we have not considered what is in the clause. I fully accept and follow your guidance that the decision and debate on clause 3 as a whole comes later, but to address amendments to a clause I have to discuss the clause as a whole.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  Thank you. We have this generational change in the organisation of the railways; the Government, with their majority, have taken a political decision to nationalise the sector. We know that nationalisation of the railways has been tried before. They were nationalised in 1950 or 1951—

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I do. I apologise to the Committee; I erroneously thought that we were dealing with amendment 257 in isolation. There is huge interest in this Bill, which will directly affect lots of people. It will affect the employees, of course, as well as Network Rail, the train operating companies, the remaining franchisees and those already in the public sector, freight and open access operators, the mayoral combined authorities, Transport for London, High Speed 1, the huge supply sector, the trade unions and many others—and that is before we even start to consider passengers. This is a generational change in the organisation of the railways, and it is crucial that the Government do not mess it up. One of the key themes that will run through a lot of our conversations over the coming four weeks is accountability, and new clause 38 would address just one small part of that issue by requiring a ministerial statement, once a quarter, on the progress of the setting up of GBR and its becoming fully operational. There is huge public interest in the Bill, which must be successful, so it would be sensible for the Minister to come to the House and make a statement. That would increase transparency, maintain focus and prevent drift. Mrs Hobhouse, can you give me some guidance? Are we going to talk about the clause more widely later, or should I deal with that now?

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is very nice to have you in the Chair, Mrs Hobhouse. I think this a conversation among Labour Members, and I do not want to get in the way of a private dispute. I might just sit down and listen to what the Minister has to say.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman is quite right. From 1950, we had the high point of post-war passenger numbers on the railways—about 1 billion passengers. From that period of nationalisation, the number of passengers choosing—I use that word advisedly—to use the railways started a long and seemingly unstoppable decline. It went from 1 billion in the early 1950s all the way down to about 735 million in the period of privatisation—1993. It seemed like that was due to the public changing the way in which they chose to live their lives. The Under-Secretary of State for Transport, the hon. Member for Nottingham South, suggested from her seat on Second Reading that it was obvious that people did not want to use the train so much, even during a period of increasing population, because they were increasingly affluent and they bought more cars. That is a possible explanation. But then something very odd happened. In 1993, the then Conservative Government legislated to privatise the railways. Now, we can debate—and I am sure we will multiple times over the coming days—whether that was a good or a bad thing in principle and whether the way the privatisation was done, through the Railways Act 1993, and subsequently amended was perfect or whether it could have been improved upon, but if we consider that the primary objective of a railway—leaving freight to one side for a moment—is to carry passengers, the data shows that the privatisation of the railways in the United Kingdom was an unqualified success. The seemingly inevitable decline in passenger numbers changed direction immediately. It was not just a slow bottoming out; that long-term decline immediately turned in the other direction, and then continued to grow until covid meant that all bets were off from 2019. Those numbers did not just grow to recover all the lost work of the previous 40 years—they did not go back up to 1 billion customers; they increased to 1.75 billion. That was a period of increased affluence, when the number of cars available to passengers increased enormously. The only explanation for the absolute reversal in passenger numbers is the decisions taken through privatisation—the profit motive and the incentive to focus on passengers rather than on the organisation.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  In which case, I will speak first to amendment 2, as that is first in the grouping, and then proceed to the others. Amendment 2 would make explicit the duty of Great British Railways to promote a thriving, competitive retail market, and align the Bill with the Government’s stated aim of delivering a system in which competition drives better outcomes for passengers. The retail market in the UK is currently one of thriving competition, as we can all recognise, and shows UK tech at its best. Trainline is—I think I am right in saying—a FTSE 250 company, and a tech growth story for the United Kingdom, being Europe’s leading train and coach app. The amendment is therefore key to ensuring that the landscape continues to thrive and that we do not drive Trainline and its competitors out of the country. Members will remember that in written evidence to the Transport Committee, Trainline asked that Committee “to recommend that the Bill be amended to require structural separation of GBR online retail from the rest of the GBR organisation and to publish information that enables the ORR, CMA and other regulators to assess compliance with competition law, subsidy control rules and non-discrimination duties. This should not be left to the Code of Practice alone”— and, by the way, we have not seen the code of practice. Trainline also said: “We ask that the Committee recommend that the Bill include a statutory duty that all retail market participants—including GBR online retail—are treated fairly, equally and non-discriminatorily, and that GBR online retail be subject to the same Code of Practice as all other retailers…We ask the Committee to recommend that these economic parity safeguards, including structural separation of GBR’s online retail business, be written into the legislation and the forthcoming Code of Practice…We therefore ask that the Committee recommends…An explicit ORR power to impose binding orders or financial sanctions if GBR breaches its licence or the Code. ORR’s competition duty should explicitly apply in respect of these functions and GBR’s licence…Provision for an appeal body (for example the CMA or the Competition Appeal Tribunal) to hear merits of disputes…The Code development process must be led by ORR, independent of DfT and GBR. It must ensure full stakeholder consultation, clear timetable, transparent publication of decisions and mechanisms for future amendment.” Members may say, “Well, they’ve got skin in the game, haven’t they? They’re a commercial organisation trying to compete with the future GBR, so it will be in their interest to try to fix the corporate structure in a way that gives them an unfair advantage.” But if we look at what Trainline is asking for, we see it is not seeking to gain an unfair advantage. It is merely asking GBR to create a level playing field. Trainline is not the only organisation making that argument; it is joined by others.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I do not wish to interrupt the hon. Member’s flow, but there is a wider point there. The hon. Member is right to mention that the Government have frozen fares, but they have not reduced the cost of providing railway services. All they have done is frozen fares on the one hand and increased taxation on the other—and the taxpayer is having to pick up the difference. Does he agree that what the Government have done is put money into one pocket, but taken it out of the pocket of passengers who are, presumably, taxpayers?

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I enjoyed listening to the Minister read out the explanatory notes; we are all under no illusion as to what clause 2 stands for. The Opposition think it is eminently sensible—in fact, it lifted directly from the structure proposed by the previous Conservative Government for the draft Rail Reform Bill. Government amendment 164 appears to be a clarifying amendment to help with the dotting of i’s and crossing of t’s and we have no objection.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  This is where things liven up a bit. We have had the preliminaries; now we are going to get into the meat of the debate. Clause 3 is where the Government set out the proposed functions of GBR—the list of activities that GBR will be expected to undertake to fulfil its purpose. I use the word “purpose” with some hesitation, because of course no purpose for the organisation is set out in the Bill. The Opposition will seek to address that in a new clause. What is contained within those functions, as well as what is not there, tells us a lot about the Government’s priorities. This is going to be quite illuminating.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have great respect for the Minister and I hear with interest what he said, but I am not convinced that the sector will receive sufficient reassurance from that, so I intend to push the amendment to a vote. Perhaps others, subsequently, as well, but we will deal with those later. Question put , That the amendment be made.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I recognise that improvements are needed for the drafting of the board were it to go ahead. He makes reference, however, to the board of GBR and that it will have a number of directors on it. In normal circumstances that would include a number of non-executive directors outside the main organisation. Will the Minister confirm that that is the intention for this board? If it is the case that external non-executive directors are anticipated for that board, could he go down the list in new clause 24(2)(a) to (f) and describe whether those are the kinds of organisations that might be represented in a non-executive capacity on the GBR board?

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I agree with the Minister’s characterisation that these are largely technical or tidy-up amendments. It is right to include freight in the duty to cooperate with TfL. I am glad that the Government have tabled these three amendments and we have no objection to them. Amendment 165 agreed to. Amendments made: 156, in clause 6, page 4, line 26, after “passenger” insert “and goods”. This amendment and amendment 157 add GBR’s statutory functions in relation to freight services to the functions in relation to which GBR must co-operate with Transport for London. Amendment 157, in clause 6, page 4, line 26, at end insert— “(7) In subsection (3A)— (a) after ‘passenger’ insert ‘or goods’, and (b) after ‘passengers’, in both places it occurs, insert ‘or goods’.”— (Keir Mather .) See the explanatory statement for amendment 156. Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I do not propose to divide the Committee on clause 3. If the Bill is going to progress, then some version of the clause needs to be in it. We are doing our best to improve it; we have not been successful so far, but I have not given up hope—there is more to come. New clause 1 is a purpose clause. One of the very obvious gaps in the Bill is that there is no clause setting out its purpose. It is based on a number of objectives, which are set out in subsection (1)(a) to (m)—13 paragraphs. Paragraph (a) sets out the mission that the priority in decision making should be the needs of GBR passengers. That builds nicely on the discussion we have just had. With a nationalised organisation, we need to go the extra mile to clarify exactly what its focus should be, because it is, by design, a top-down command structure of the state. In a functioning—I stress “functioning”—competitive market, the market will force operators to focus on their passengers, because the passengers are also their customers and that is how they grow their profits. When we take the deliberate decision to move away from market competition, something has to replace it, and the only thing that can replace it is the legislative process. That is why the new clause is so necessary. The priority in decision making needs to be GBR passengers; although we can infer this from statements by the Government, enshrining the mission statement would ensure that it remained a beacon for the organisation to follow. Paragraph (b) states the objective of “delivering reliable, safe and accessible railway passenger services”. I do not think that that is controversial for any of us. Paragraph (c) sets the aim of “providing value for money for passengers and taxpayers, including consideration of the affordability of fare prices”. With a state service, the public expect value for money to be the driver, to ensure continued investment and reinvestment in our rail network. At the moment, fares remain a key concern of passengers and taxpayers. The affordability of fares must be one of the primary objectives. Paragraph (d) points to increasing passenger numbers and growing usage of the network. We do not want to see what happened during the nationalisation era, when service quality fell and people consequently turned to other modes of transport when reliability decreased. Keeping people adopting the railways, as we have seen explode under privatisation, is very important. That links nicely with paragraph (e), which would ensure that the network is continually expanded and improved, with constant analysis of service and connectivity improvements as well as restoring and adding routes.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Minister has set out his views on this clause clearly. We have already explored the difference of opinion about whether or not it should be the Secretary of State and GBR that collaborate with TfL. However, the direction of the clause is an eminently sensible one and we do not wish to stand in its way. Question put and agreed to. Clause 6, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.— (Nesil Caliskan.)

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation, and to the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford for giving his lived experience of the TfL area. I am partially convinced. I will not press this amendment to a Division, so I think we can move on. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn .

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I was going to say 1.5%, but maybe it is 2%. Let us call it approximately 2%; I leave rail freight in a separate category. But open access operators have a disproportionate impact on driving competitive challenge. One of the very significant concerns of the sector, which I share, is that if the very dominant GBR is created and the operator and open access operators are not supported, even though they represent just 2% of passenger transit what will be lost is the competitive comparator for what good operating processes and customer-focused activities for train operations look like. It is disproportionately important that GBR should be held to account practically by the operations of open access operators, so such operators must receive fair and transparent treatment. That is what paragraphs (i) and (j) set out. They would ensure that the system is transparent where we believe that the legislation as drafted is currently vague. Paragraph (j) enshrines the growth freight targets that we all agree on and that the Government have outlined. Paragraph (k) states the need to strengthen “the financial sustainability of the railways” to reduce reliance on subsidy. That should be an objective, and a purpose, of GBR. The taxpayer has lots of things that his or her money needs to be spent on. If we can reduce, over time, the need for subsidy on the railways, that money is freed up either for tax cuts, which make everyone richer, or to be spent on other important priorities of Government. Meanwhile, paragraphs (l) and (m) speak to another key aim—integration, both of track and train, and of the mayors, with their local transport integration beyond rail, which are important to have. The lack of explicit inclusion in the Bill feels like an oversight that we are more than happy to shed light on for the Government. Sir Alec, you will be pleased to know that that is it as far as new clause 1 is concerned, but I do have new clause 2 to entertain you with, which is about key performance indicators. The Government have been asked multiple times over the last few months to provide, even in draft, the KPIs that they intend Great British Rail to operate under. This clause is a first attempt to fill the gap that the Government have left by refusing time and again even to discuss what the KPIs will be, other than to say, using their go-to phrase, that they will be “robust”. What does that mean? We do not know. The new clause would set a statutory key performance indicator framework, which must include targets for a number of areas, such as reliability, safety, cleanliness, affordability, passenger growth, financial efficiency, freight and others. It is necessary because of the failure of the Government. I would be delighted to withdraw it if the Minister were to stand up and say, “These are the KPIs that the Government have in mind—let’s debate them.” At the moment, we have draft legislation in front of us—we are a scrutinising Committee and we are here for a month to go line-by-line through the Bill to improve it and understand how GBR will be operated—and yet we have no idea what the Government are even thinking on KPIs, which are a central set of objectives. This new clause seeks not to bind GBR or the Secretary of State to rigid targets, but instead to provide an overall remit for where the Secretary of State and GBR must report within. Accountability is at the core of public trust in nationally run services, and setting targets in statute ensures there is a positive feedback loop for officials—very importantly—and GBR agents to work against. It helps frame discussions and engagement between the Departments and GBR, and allows a number of different datasets and parameters to be considered. The new clause would also require the Secretary of State to publish these indicators and lay them before Parliament. The KPIs work as a strong starting position by which GBR can judge itself, and how it in turn can be judged by passengers and the public. Again, the Opposition are having to do the Government’s work for them. We should not be in that position. The Government should have brought forward this Bill with the accompanying documentation, which, as we have heard, is missing— 19 important documents and counting. Finally, I turn to new clause 5. You will be pleased to hear that it is much shorter, Sir Alec. The new clause would give reporting requirements to GBR, continuing the theme of accountability, which new clauses 1 and 2 also have at their core. The layout of the new clause is self-explanatory. Subsections (2) and (3) link to new clause 2 on key performance indicators, and the clause would enhance accountability further, not just by having targets in place, but by having a clear reporting criterion. In the same way that a Secretary of State is expected to appear in front of Parliament on a rotating basis in urgent questions, in Committees and through written ministerial questions, it is reasonable to expect that GBR should publish an annual report in which it reports on the targets set by the Secretary of State. Given the eminently sensible and logical outcome of the new clauses, I urge the Government to consider seriously on what basis it would not want to create greater transparency.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 6 deals with co-operation between GBR and Transport for London. The clause seems to exist in direct juxtaposition to clause 5, and, interestingly, to the general spirit of the Bill expressed in other clauses. While many aspects of the Bill bring powers back to the Department for Transport, GBR and the Secretary of State’s office, the clause is unusual in being one of few examples where those on the Treasury Bench do not seem to want to be involved. That is out of character. Through the clause, the Government seek to remove the Secretary of State’s position in the Greater London Authority Act 1999 and replace that responsibility with a similar one for Great British Railways. That is not based on enhancing accountability or strengthening value for the taxpayer, which should be core principles of the Bill. The clause presents special status for Transport for London that is not enjoyed by other mayoral combined authorities; that relates to a point that Committee members will recall Andy Burnham making during our oral evidence session on Tuesday. He expressly referenced the difference in how the Greater Manchester mayoral combined authority is treated on transport matters compared with how TfL is treated. We need to ask why that is. Mayor Burnham’s evidence highlighted that difference, yet the Government have given no effective answer about the rationale behind treating large, regional mayoral combined authorities differently from Transport for London. The amendments in this group seek to correct that, proposing that, until such a time when the other mayoralties require their own special dispensation, which clause 5 of the Bill actively prohibits, clause 6 should be amended to maintain reference to the Secretary of State, and include the Secretary of State and GBR side by side, so that the relevant subsections of section 175 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 refer to both “the Secretary of State” and “Great British Railways”. That would ensure that the Secretary of State continues to have a duty of co-operation with TfL, alongside GBR.