Jerome Mayhew MP: speeches

Speeches

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 15 requires the Secretary of State to publish a document that sets out the long-term strategy for the railway, which we welcome, after consulting with Welsh Ministers and the passenger watchdog. The Secretary of State must keep the strategy under review and publish any revisions. The clause does not provide any detail, which is part of the problem. The industry is in the dark now, and it will still be in the dark if the Bill ever becomes law. There is no draft prepared. There is no indication of the direction of travel. There is just subsection (4), which is very limited. All it says is: “(4) The Secretary of State— (a) must keep the rail strategy under review, and (b) may revise or replace it.” Well, with what and when? We are in trouble here, with no direct reference to even the development of rail freight, which we have seen in other parts of the Bill is apparently in the Government’s mind. Amendment 224 would serve to correct that by making specific reference to rail freight. More widely, the Government have missed an opportunity to set clear targets for the strategy to achieve. Colleagues will know from the debate on clause 3 that we have already tried to amend the Bill to assist with that. Our purpose clause, new clause 1, would have set a clear direction, and new clause 2 would have set KPIs for what the strategy should achieve. That would have helped to inform our set of amendments to clause 15. We are told that Great British Railways should be the guiding mind, so our approach is that GBR will implement the long-term strategy for rail, based on the Secretary of State’s long-term priorities for the railways. GBR is intended to be the stand-alone expert implementer of the development of the railway. The priorities are set out by the Secretary of State through the licence in schedule 1, access to funding in schedule 2 and the long-term rail strategy. All recognise that the political cycle and control periods are far too short for rail infrastructure projects. The industry really needs more predictable forward views. There is inevitably an uncomfortable fit between the needs of democracy and the political cycle—political views change with general elections and sometimes even between them—and the long-term investment certainty that large projects need. There is currently no indication of how long term the strategy will be, or even what it will seek to achieve. Amendments 24 and 25, which we debated with clause 13 but would also affect clause 15—I do not seek to repeat the debate, but I wish to mention the impact that they would have—seek to address those failings by requiring the rail strategy to be geared towards enabling GBR to meet its key performance indicators. Without the amendments, the clause will set out a long-term strategy that includes no requirement to set clear growth targets for passenger numbers or freight use, meaning that there will be no measurable outcomes or performance metrics. I intend to seek to divide the Committee on those amendments when the time comes. The Liberal Democrats’ amendment 134 would ensure that the rail strategy covers a 30-year period. That is logical given the infrastructure life cycle, and any timeframe is, by its nature, arbitrary, but I have to say that 30 years feels on the long side, given the political cycle of four or five years. I wish the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage well and we should be having a stab at setting out what long term actually means, but that is why we have tabled an amendment that would set the period at 15 years. That would be long enough to show the direction of travel, as he has in mind, but short enough to have some sense of connection between the political cycle and the objectives of the strategy. We may have a difference of opinion, but we are pointing in the same direction.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  So here we are: this is the eminently sensible approach to providing funding for the ORR to continue its operations as a safety regulator. Clause 14 allows the Office of Rail and Road to require GBR to pay a levy to the ORR for performing its non-safety railway functions. That provides the ORR with a legally guaranteed funding source independent of the Secretary of State or Government. The provision aims to provide the ORR with a stable and predictable funding stream that will enable it to plan and carry out its activities. Those were remarkably similar words to the ones used by the Minister—I wonder why! What I have described replaces the current system under which the ORR requires Network Rail to pay a fee for it to perform its non-safety functions via the process set out in the Network Rail licence. The ORR, as we all know, is an independent regulator, so decisions on its funding should be kept separate from organisations that have a vested interest in its decisions, which is why GBR, despite paying the levy, will not determine the amount. The amount is agreed between the ORR and the Treasury and then provided by GBR through this levy. This is one of the few clauses through which the Bill is not actively diminishing the role of the ORR. Instead, it provides the ORR with a legally guaranteed funding source, independent of the Secretary of State or Government—save, obviously, for its negotiations with the Treasury. The aim of that is to provide the ORR with a stable and predictable funding stream that will allow it to plan and carry out its duties successfully. That duty already exists in the Network Rail obligation, as I have already mentioned. I am glad to see from the Government’s explanatory notes on the clause that GBR will not determine the amount of the levy, which will be agreed between the Treasury and the ORR. It seems that the Government do understand the concept of partiality and bias, but are prepared to admit that only when it comes to certain clauses in the Bill.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  GBR may plan on a five year basis, but it is not the same five years, is it?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Our amendments in this group develop the theme that I spoke about in the debate on the last group. We have tabled two small probing amendments to challenge the stop-start nature of funding under the current control period. Amendment 119 would insert the following new paragraph (1A) into schedule 2: “The date specified in section 1(d)”— which, to paraphrase, refers to the funding agreement for a control period— “must be at least 24 months before the start of the funding period.” Amendment 129 would insert the following new subparagraph (6A): “The Secretary of State may not, however, vary the financial assistance provided to Great British Railways”.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  We have heard with interest what the Minister has to say, but I am wholly unpersuaded that he is adequately reflecting the needs of the industry, so I will seek to press amendment 120 to a Division. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Mr Western, you get what you measure. We on this side of the Committee are very keen that we measure the level of involvement for the taxpayer and that we do our best to look after the taxpayer in the design of this structure, so I intend to press all the amendments.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Thank you, Mr Western, and for agreeing to be in the Chair this afternoon. We are part-way through consideration of the schedule, with a degree of overlap: amendment 109 was selected in a separate group to this one, although its wording is intricately linked to that of amendments 110 to 116. I shall try to minimise the degree of repetition for all concerned. The amendments in this group seek to constrain the Secretary of State’s ability to modify the licence of Great British Railways without first seeking consent from the Office of Rail and Road and the passengers’ council. The Government’s strategy is for the Bill to be the legislative shell for the creation of GBR. Crucial matters of detail, such as the licence under which GBR will operate, together with important long-term strategies, business plans, targets and so on, which we have mentioned more than once in our deliberations so far, are separate from the Bill. That detail matters and deserves proper scrutiny by this Committee and elsewhere in the Houses of Parliament. When the Rail Minister and his officials appeared before the Transport Committee on 7 January, Members took several attempts to secure an assurance that the draft licence would be published before Parliament completes scrutiny of the Bill, albeit without a specific date set. It is therefore important to include in the Bill stronger checks and balances than exist now, and that is the purpose of amendments 110 to 115. At present, the Bill merely requires the Secretary of State to consult the ORR. Legally, that is of course very weak and, after such consultation, the Secretary of State may simply ignore whatever it is that the ORR comes up with. Amendments 110 to 112 therefore require the Secretary of State to obtain the Office of Rail and Road’s agreement for the licence to be issued, and amendments 113 to 115 require the Office of Rail and Road’s agreement for the licence to be modified. In addition, modification of the licence requirements would need consent from the new passenger watchdog. If the passenger watchdog is to be as powerful in championing the interests of passengers as the Government claim they want it to be, it requires proper powers that go beyond an invitation to be consulted. That leads me to amendment 118, which would leave out line 6 on page 56 of the Bill and would strengthen the right of the ORR to grant a licence to a non-GBR operator. The schedule contains important powers for the Office of Rail and Road to issue licences to operators other than GBR to operate services on the network. However, proposed new section 8(5)(a) in paragraph 3 of the schedule gives the trump card to the Secretary of State, who must consent to the granting of such a licence. Why is that power of veto required? Perhaps the Minister will explain when he responds. If the Government wish to reduce their involvement in the day-to-day running of the railways and the Office of Rail and Road deems that an application from a non-GBR operator meets all the requirements and conditions set out in the Bill, why do the Government think it necessary to have that overriding power? It does not appear to make sense. Amendment 118 would remove that power of veto. The group of amendments, together, would require the Secretary of State to obtain a formal recommendation from the Office of Rail and Road, and would require that the GBR licence adequately ensures that licence obligations relating to safety and standards are not compromised or undermined. The amendments would ensure that, as GBR is granted new responsibilities by the licence, it continues to be subject to safety standards obligations that are in the licence issued by the Office of Rail and Road to the current infrastructure manager, Network Rail. Such licence obligations go beyond obligations under the Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 2006—which are called ROGS for obvious reasons—and would require Great British Railways to participate in the industry’s collaborative structures around collective decision making, managed by the Rail Safety and Standards Board, and comply with safety and interoperability standards set collectively by the sector, including for freight and supply chain. For those reasons, this group of amendments, taken as a whole, would provide important strengthening of the role of the ORR. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 22, in clause 13, page 7, line 22, leave out “as it thinks fit” and insert “as are reasonable”. This amendment would ensure Great British Railways only charges what is reasonable for provision of services in circumstances where it is a monopoly supplier.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Thank you, Mr Western, for allowing me a second bite at the cherry. I misdirected myself in dealing just with clause 12 in itself, rather than the new clauses in the group. A forward view of funding certainty is key to stopping the stop-start approach to infrastructure funding. The Committee has received plenty of evidence from the industry—both in written evidence and in the oral evidence we heard on Tuesday last week—that this is a major concern. The date in schedule 2(1)(d) is therefore important, and needs to be a minimum of two years prior to the start of the next five-year funding period. That is because, given that we currently have five-year control periods, funding certainty decreases in the run-up to the end of one control period and the beginning of the other and, as a result, the amount of work undertaken and committed to by Network Rail decreases proportionately. We therefore get a wind-down of activity, with specialist staff being laid off by the supply industry, before it all grinds up a gear at the beginning of the next control period. We end up with a bell curve of activity. We have heard strong evidence—I will read some out in a moment—about how that uncertainty disrupts the ability of the supply sector to service Network Rail and its infrastructure development plans efficiently. It does two pretty terrible things: first, it drives up costs for Network Rail and therefore for the taxpayer, and secondly, it means that less work gets done per pound. It is expensive and it takes longer. In written evidence to the Transport Committee, the Rail Forum states: “The Bill states in Schedule 2 Part 1 that the SoS can ‘vary the financial assistance’ previously agreed as part of the GBR five-yearly settlement during the five-year term. This flies in the face of providing the stability that the Transport Committee was seeking to address through the ‘Rail investment pipelines: ending boom and bust’ inquiry earlier this year. Re-opening of the settlement should only be allowed in very exceptional circumstances that should be explicit in the legislation.” Why has the Minister moved away from the position that was previously articulated? Why is the sanctity of the funding settlement within a five-year control period—which has been, albeit imperfect, so valuable for the industry—actively removed by schedule 2? To put it another way, why is the Secretary of State being granted new powers to vary the financial settlement without notice? The Rail Industry Association, which represents the supply sector for the railways, states: “The railway, and rail supply businesses, need stable funding to be able to plan effectively and be efficient. Changes to the Control Period style five-year infrastructure funding settlement (Schedule 2) undermine this and amplify the uncertainty already faced by suppliers. RIA and our members are very concerned the current Bill drafting allows the Secretary of State for Transport to remove railway funding mid-period, at no notice and with very limited transparency over the impact, for example, on safety, performance or efficiency. We disagree with the principle that the Secretary of State should be able to remove funding mid-period. Stable multi-year funding settlements are a longstanding principle for infrastructure networks because short-notice funding changes reduce the efficiency of spending and make it harder for suppliers to plan ahead with any confidence. Supply chain confidence in the UK rail market is already historically low with 64% believing the rail market will contract in 2026 and 62% freezing recruitment or reducing headcount (over one in three business leaders plan to lay off staff in 2026), according to a RIA-commissioned Savanta survey of rail business leaders. There is…currently already a lack of full work visibility to the end of the current Control Period, which completes in March 2029, and companies are now repositioning themselves away from rail to target other industrial sectors in the UK and overseas rail markets—the ability for the Secretary of State to remove funding would clearly exacerbate this situation…Concerningly, even on its own terms Schedule 2 does not require transparency over the impacts on efficiency, performance and safety if there are changes within a funding period and longer-term.” Mr Western, you cannot tell me you agree that that is a very troubling statement from the industry, but I am sure you do agree, or are likely to. The difficulties with the current system are only going to be exacerbated by the proposed changes under schedule 2. The statement of funds will indicate what the Secretary of State “reasonably considers may be…available”. That gives no certainty of funding, which is a key concern of the sector. It would be a backward step from the status quo. Paragraph 4(3)(c) of schedule 2 contains no focus on minimising the cost for the taxpayer, but merely refers to “how Great British Railways proposes to meet those costs.” Paragraph 4(5)(b) refers only to “good value for money” and not to good value for money for the taxpayer. Under paragraph 4(7)(a), regarding the business plan, Great British Railways could retain a huge amount of information from potential open access operators, thereby preventing a level playing field. Finally, paragraph 7(3) removes the whole point of funding periods, which is to provide funding certainty for five years. On its own, that provision removes that funding certainty—which is obviously a backward step. The RIA has stated: “The railway has benefited from 5-year funding settlements for infrastructure for over 30 years, but the legislation proposes that the Transport Secretary will be able to reopen these at any time without consultation. Any deviation from 5-year funding stability risks increased future costs for taxpayers and a deteriorating experience for passengers.”

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Committee will be pleased to hear that I am not going to reheat my arguments on clause 7, but we have not yet discussed clause 8. The arguments inevitably mirror each other to a degree, because clause 8 in the main seeks to extend the provisions of clause 7 to Scottish Ministers. Clause 8 will grant Ministers in Scotland the power to issue and publish directions to GBR—so far, so similar—and GBR will be required to comply with those directions. However, the Secretary of State has ensured that they will have the ability to remove a direction of Scottish Ministers where it is inconsistent with her directions. The clause requires the Secretary of State to consult Ministers in Scotland before revoking and must publish any revocations. The clause suffers from the same issues as clause 7, as I have already intimated: granting the Secretary of State, and then by extension Scottish Ministers, the ability to direct GBR, which is meant to be operationally independent. That is the first confusion. I will not rehash the arguments, but hon. Members should take it as read that I repeat them here. As the Minister just mentioned, clause 8(7) will allow the Secretary of State to revoke a direction given by Scottish Ministers under that clause. That is confusion No. 2. We anticipate circumstances in which GBR has a direction of travel—that is not meant to be a rail pun—with which the Scottish Minister disagrees; the Scottish Minister issues a direction for GBR to go in a different direction, and then the Secretary of State disagrees with that direction and issues a revocation. What a recipe for confusion, delay and poor governance that creates! Who is really in charge of the railways in Britain? It is certainly does not sound as though it is GBR, which is being second-guessed on the one hand by the Scottish Ministers and on the other by the Secretary of State. It does not sound as though Scottish Ministers are in charge even in Scotland, because they can suffer a revocation from the Secretary of State. Yet the consultation document tells us, as the Government have told us time and again, that “GBR will be operationally independent, staffed by experts and professionals from the rail sector…who will be empowered to deliver for passengers and freight customers without government interference in day-to-day decision-making.” When did that change? Perhaps the Minister can let us in to the secret. Clause 8 not only prevents GBR from being independent—as clause 7 does—but prevents devolved Ministers from acting within their own devolved settlements without being second-guessed by the Secretary of State. I accept that the Scottish Cabinet Secretary for Transport, Fiona Hyslop MSP, when speaking about clause 8 during the Transport Committee evidence session, seemed not to oppose that oversight, as she recognised that certain aspects, such as access and freight, remain reserved. It seems that Scottish Ministers are content to accept the clause as drafted because a further memorandum of understanding will create firebreaks between non-devolved powers, in which the Secretary of State may intervene, and devolved powers. That could be okay, but we as a Committee do not know, because we have not seen the memorandum of understanding, even in draft. We are going to come back to this issue again and again. There are a plethora of documents designed to support the operation of GBR—to support this skeleton Bill—and yet we have not seen them. How can this Committee do our job of scrutinising this Bill line by line, seeking to improve it and to ensure that it achieves the objectives that the Government say it does, when 19 documents and counting—documents that are crucial to the actual running of the railway both in Scotland and in the United Kingdom as a whole—are absent, even in draft? Bill Reeve, the director of rail reform for Transport Scotland, when invited to add further to the remarks from the Cabinet Secretary, said: “An awful lot will rely on the memorandum of understanding to flesh that out and give examples.” There is a question for the Minister surrounding this memorandum of understanding for Scottish and Welsh Ministers. A lot of the powers in the Bill seemingly rely on a document that is not part of the Bill. Will the Minister provide details of the memorandum of understanding prior to the passage of this Bill? If not, why does he refuse to let us know what the memorandum of understanding is likely to stay? Why does he believe that Parliament should approve a working arrangement between the devolved Governments on which no consultation has been undertaken? I will speak further in detail on the memorandum of understanding when we reach clauses 23 and 24, but it is important that Ministers note that the current framework of the Bill relies on a document that has little oversight or clearly defined objectives, and which we have not seen.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will deal briefly with amendment 143 and develop some arguments on the other amendments. I congratulate the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage on tabling amendment 143, which pushes in exactly the same direction that I have been pushing today, and also last Thursday, in developing the concern about increasing micromanagement by Department for Transport officials in the name of the Secretary of State, which will undermine the independence of GBR as a tactical organisation. The culture is already there: the Department has been micromanaging the railways to an increasing extent since 2012 at the latest. This Bill needs to change culture. It is not a steady-state Bill; it is a once in a generation opportunity to change the culture not just of GBR, moving it away from Network Rail, but of the Department for Transport, which is as necessary as the other cultural change. If this Bill is to achieve what it is meant to, the Department’s relationship with the railways should properly be changing. Amendment 143 is a modest but important proposal that would go some way to facilitating that. Dealing with the group as a whole, and continuing the theme of the exercise of functions and guidance by the Department, the Opposition once again note the contrast between the supposed independence of GBR and the various mechanisms that the Department and the Secretary of State have managed to wheedle into the Bill to grant themselves extra powers, whether as a last resort or, as I fear, to create a micromanaging charter, and where that last resort, as it has been described, has no qualifying criteria—although as we have heard from the Minister, that is seemingly of little consequence. The clause enables the Secretary of State to “issue and publish guidance”, with notable devolved exceptions, which will allow the Secretary of State to “clarify policy intentions to GBR.” The explanatory notes acknowledge that “in most cases requiring course correction, guidance would be used before directions,” although I note that it is not required. The Government anticipate that they could move straight to directions if they wish to. However, subsections (1) and (2) are very clear: “The Secretary of State may give guidance…or revoke guidance” without any qualifying criteria at all. What is guidance? It is a steer short of direction, and an application for an injunction against GBR—which we have just voted in favour of—destroys the myth of GBR operational independence. It will be taking orders from the Department for Transport, because that is the status quo ante. Without strengthening this clause and some others, we will confine the relationship between the Department for Transport and the newly created GBR to “more of the same”. That is the fear that we should collectively be fighting against. The guidance will be not just on the strategic direction or the business case, but on delivery decisions, at the whim of the Department. We can say, “Well, it’s the Secretary of State. This will be done under advisement,” but we all know that in practice it will mean officials micromanaging GBR in the name of the Secretary of State, who will provide the rubber stamp. I fully expect the Minister to reassure me that that would never happen, and that the provision is only for course corrections. Now, if I was in the passenger seat of a vehicle and kept telling someone how to drive, I suppose I would call that a course correction, but they might call it backseat driving. That is the problem: the Bill is designed for backseat driving by the Department for Transport. Will the Minister explain how the clause is nothing short of backseat driving? I obviously wish GBR the best of luck, and I hope the Minister’s enthusiasm and optimism is fully justified, but I fear that the disastrous consequence of forcing it to walk on eggshells will be constant second-guessing. I have been involved in an organisation in which there was second-guessing—no one was sure who had the decision-making power—and it was a disaster. If there is second-guessing, the organisation as a whole does not know when a decision has been taken. Does the power lie with the board? Does the board have to get clearance from a second board in a wholly different organisation, which might have a different view? Should people in GBR wait for the nod from the Department for Transport before taking action within the organisation, particularly if it is a decision with which its sub-department may not agree?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is certainly welcome, but we are still in the position in which an improvement to a line—something as small as the Haughley junction improvement, which costs roughly £15 million to £20 million—still needs ministerial sign-off from the Treasury before it can be authorised. The Government have some way to go to improve the situation. This will leave us with a stakeholder management culture. My hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon is entirely right that many organisations in the 60% of the railway that is not being nationalised as part of GBR will be intimately and hugely impacted by GBR’s decisions—or will they? Will they, too, have to wait for the all clear from the Department for Transport? If GBR gets on the wrong side of Ministers or the Department, its course is going to be corrected to all manner of different ports. The combination of clauses 7 and 9 removes almost any semblance of operational independence from GBR. Clause 9(5) states that GBR “must have regard to guidance given under this section.” That sounds soft, but in practice it creates a standing expectation of compliance and makes it impossible for GBR to make dynamic tactical decisions that are free from day-to-day second guessing by departmental and ministerial intervention. That brings me to amendments 19 and 21, which would help defend the operational independence of GBR. If the Secretary of State is concerned about an aspect of GBR’s performance, they may instead issue guidance to inform GBR of its failure to meet the key performance indicators. Additionally, under clause 10, the Secretary of State may give guidance only if “Scottish Ministers have drawn to Great British Railways’ attention that Great British Railways is not meeting a key performance indicator…and…Great British Railways has not taken action to remedy this failing within the period of two months.” As a result, the amendments would apply to GBR in both England and Scotland. Finally, amendment 20 repeats the argument made about directions or guidance given by the Secretary of State on the general level and structure of fares, and it would introduce new subsection (5A), which states: “If the Secretary of State uses the powers in this section to give guidance to Great British Railways about the general level and structure of fares for travel on railway passengers services designated under section 25 or 26, then the Secretary of State must publish the assumptions, criteria, and objectives underpinning any guidance.” That is self-evidently sensible, and I look forward to the Minister agreeing with me.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We have made that point as forcefully as we can. I trust the Minister when he says that he will take it away and do his best with his ministerial and departmental colleagues, but it is not just a matter of saying, “We kind of understand that licences already exist. Licences have been issued by the Office of Rail and Road. It will not be some kind of copy and paste, but taken from what already exists and we are going to get something similar here.” As Ben Plowden said, there are various references in the documents that the Government have published to something very different: a streamlined licence. That begs all sorts of questions about what is anticipated to be removed from the licence. The Department for Transport has got as far as saying it is going to be smaller, perhaps significantly smaller because it is streamlined, but this is critical. The licence of ORR is a mission-critical document that anyone who works in the industry would acknowledge, yet we are told it is streamlined, and therefore elements of what is traditionally considered to be a licence under the current system are anticipated to be removed. Is the Minister able to tell us what parts are likely to be removed? What is it? Because the Government documents refer to a streamlined licence, he can tell the Committee what that means. The Department says it is going to be streamlined, but what does it intend to remove to justify that description? It must be somewhere within the Department; otherwise those words would not have been used in the supporting documentation. There is no excuse for the Minister not to describe the definition of a streamlined licence and what is anticipated. My hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon made the point that the Minister has corrected the record on when the draft licence will be provided during the passage of the Bill through both Houses, but in the next breath he said there will be consultation on that document, which has not yet started. How can that consultation be anything other than a paper exercise? The Minister seems confident that he can go through a consultation process that has not yet started, that the Department can then properly consider the contributions and come to a considered view and redraft the licence, taking into account all the comments, good, bad and ugly, that the consultation came up with, and then produce the draft licence in the two or three months that the Bill has to run through both Houses. That is an extraordinary position. It suggests either that the Minister will have to come and make a second point of order in a couple of months’ time, or that the consultation to which he refers is an absolute farce, because the Government have already decided what they want to do. They are going through the performance of a consultation, but they have already made up their mind. Perhaps the Minister will tell us which one it is. Amendment 109 would constrain the Secretary of State’s ability to modify GBR’s licence without first seeking consent from the ORR and the passengers’ council. It is part of a series of amendments including amendments 110, 112 to 116 and 233, to which I will speak later. The Government strategy is that the Bill will be the legislative shell for the creation of GBR. Crucial matters of detail, such as the licence under which GBR will operate and important long-term strategies, business plans, targets and so on are separate and, at this stage, missing. Such details matter and deserve proper scrutiny. We know that other plans and targets are unlikely to be set until after the Bill is enacted, so it is important to include strong checks and balances. That is the purpose of amendment 109. At present, the Bill merely requires the Secretary of State to consult the Office of Rail and Road. Legally, that is weak; after consultation, the Secretary of State may simply ignore whatever the ORR comes up with. The amendment and those linked to it would require the Secretary of State to obtain the Office of Rail and Road’s agreement for the licence to be issued. Subsequent amendments would require the Office of Rail and Road’s agreement for the licence to be modified. Modification of the licence requires consent from the new passenger watchdog. If the passenger watchdog is to be as powerful in championing the interests of passengers as the Government claim they want it to be, it requires proper powers that go beyond an invitation to be consulted. For that reason, I propose that we put amendment 109 to the vote.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is entirely right. That will be a theme of our comments on and challenges to the Bill throughout the progress of our scrutiny: accountability without responsibility is no accountability at all. Time and again, we see an unwillingness from those who drafted the Bill to trust the role of parliamentarians as scrutineers. As a former businessman, I know—I have not made this one up; it is not unique thinking—that, in any organisation, you get what you measure. That will have been the case in any organisation that hon. and right hon. Members may have worked in in the private or public sector: the NHS has targets because it gets what it measures. At the moment, the Bill measures very little on GBR’s performance, and where it does, that disappears off to the Department for Transport and is reported to other civil servants. As parliamentarians, we know our value in holding not only GBR to account but the Government of the day, which will not always be a Labour one. That is our important role, which is done through the Select Committee process and more widely. As parliamentarians, we should seek to improve the Bill. I recognise that we will have a number of Divisions during this process and I am unlikely to win a single one, but I urge the Government to listen—perhaps to the private comments of its own Committee members; they do not have to tell me about it—because these are genuine areas of improvement that we as parliamentarians should be encouraging the Government to add to the Bill. On that note, I will stop.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful that the Minister is being very generous. In my opening remarks, I asked him to give me some real-world examples of when injunctive relief might be required. Could he not forget to provide those?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 12, in clause 7, page 4, line 30, after “functions” insert— “where the Office for Rail and Road, in carrying out its functions under section 69A of the Railways Act 1993 (as inserted by section 74 of this Act), has deemed Great British Railways to be in breach of its statutory functions.” This amendment would restrict the Secretary of State’s ability to give directions to Great British Railways to circumstances where the Office for Rail and Road has deemed Great British Railways in breach of its statutory functions.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is not a perfect analogy, because GBR is at least intended to be more akin to a business—a nationalised business—but my hon. Friend is entirely right that where we have two organisations in competition, each one thinking that it runs the railways, that is a recipe for confusion at the least, and disaster at the worst. This is not an idle concern, because it has happened before. We all remember the Virgin West Coast franchise debacle in 2012, when the slightly arm’s length process of franchising did not go well, causing a communal panic in the Department for Transport. The phrase, “Something must be done to prevent this from ever happening again,” was no doubt repeated many times. The result was that more and more micromanaging took place by the Department for Transport in the setting of franchises. The Department no longer talked only about outcomes that needed to be achieved, leaving how companies went about that entirely up to them, which is the appropriate way to draft a franchise agreement. Instead, that devolved into mechanisms of how a franchise should be operated. We had that mission creep, and I fear that under the Bill we might get exactly the same approach with GBR. It will be set up with the best of intentions, and perhaps in the first two or three years all will run smoothly and the directing mind in practice might well be GBR, but then something will happen, because something always does happen in the real world, with lots of people doing their best but sometimes making mistakes, and there will be a collective gasp from the Department of Transport, because it will feel like it is on the hook, so “Something must be done to ensure that this doesn’t happen again.” We have designed into this mechanism a structure that allows the removal of GBR’s operational independence, and it does so without any reference to actions of last resort by the Government—the Bill is silent on that. We talk about the Secretary of State, but we all know that officials in the Department for Transport will be advising the Secretary of State on what he or she should be doing in a particular circumstance, and there will be a power grab. Without amendment, the clause will absolutely allow for that. We should be alive to the real-world experience that we all have and take this opportunity to strengthen its wording in order to design out that issue and ensure that there is proper accountability—with GBR accountable to the Secretary of State and, through the Secretary of State, to Parliament—and that operational independence stays with what will be a nationalised business, rather than creating a railway version of NHS England, as my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East mentioned a moment ago. I have tabled two amendments to address this issue. Amendment 12 would limit directions to circumstances in which the Office of Rail and Road assesses GBR to be in breach of its statutory functions. It could be argued that the Secretary of State should have an emergency lever; that is fair enough, because bad things happen. One of our great complaints before the election, although I am beginning to hear it from Labour Ministers as well, was, “We pull the levers but they’re not attached to anything—we have no power.” When we form the Government after the next election, we will want to have levers that are attached to something, and I accept that it is necessary to have an emergency lever to pull should a significant unforeseen event occur—another pandemic, perhaps—and an intervention be required. However, amendment 12 would still allow the Secretary of State to intervene in emergency scenarios, as the ORR would deem that such events make it impossible for GBR to conform to its business plan targets. Clause 74 sets out the ORR’s power to monitor GBR’s performance. Elsewhere in the Bill, we shall argue that the ORR needs more teeth to hold GBR to account, and this provision limiting the potential for the Secretary of State to intervene until such time that an independent regulatory body has recognised that GBR has not been able to fulfil its functions will be an important safeguard. Amendment 11 would put the words “last resort” on the face of the Bill, and would provide that a direction may be made only after the removal of GBR’s chief executive officer. The intention behind the amendment is to treat GBR as a business, which I think we all agree is what it is intended to be—albeit a nationalised one. Where there is a board of non-executive directors, they can question the executive team, and they can challenge decisions and require the chief executive to explain and defend the direction of the company. However, when push comes to shove, and the decision is made that the organisation is moving in the wrong direction, the weapon available to the chairman is the removal of the chief executive officer. If GBR is operating on a day-to-day basis with oversight from the Department for Transport—the Secretary of State—and concerns arise as to its direction or performance, the sequence of severity of the response should not start with guidance from the Secretary of State and then mandatory directions. They might be the final requirement, because we all need those levers, but surely they should come only after the chief executive has been challenged and then removed, just as in the private sector with an arm’s length majority investment.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Will the Minister give way?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Where is the reference to persistent, urgent and unforeseen incidents in the Bill?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 109, in schedule 1, page 55, line 10, leave out from “may,” to “grant” and insert— “at the recommendation of the Office of the Rail and Road in relation to matters related to safety and standards and, after consultation with the Passengers’ Council,”. This amendment would require the Secretary of State to get a formal recommendation from the Office of the Rail and Road that the GBR licence adequately ensures that licence obligations related to safety and standards are not compromised or undermined. Schedule 1 contains the meat of what we have been talking about. It amends part 1 of the Railways Act 1993 to set out how GBR will be licensed. Paragraph 2 confirms that GBR should never be exempt from holding a licence, and paragraph 3 inserts new section 7B, which will enable the Secretary of State, following consultation, to grant GBR a written licence to operate specified railway assets. The licence must be in writing and will remain in force unless revoked or surrendered. Surrendering the licence will require the Secretary of State’s consent. Paragraph 3 also sets out the process for granting licences to persons other than GBR. The Secretary of State and the Office of Rail and Road will continue to be able to grant licences to persons other than GBR to operate railway assets. The ORR may grant such licences only with the Secretary of State’s consent or under a general authority issued by the Secretary of State. Licences must be in writing and will remain in force unless revoked or surrendered. Surrendering the licence will require the ORR’s consent, much in the same way as it previously required the Secretary of State’s consent. Proposed new section 8A sets out the requirements for the granting of licences by the Secretary of State or the ORR. It provides that a notice must be published outlining the intention to grant a licence, the reasons for doing so, and allowing at least 28 days from the date of publication for interested parties to make representations or objections. There is a duty to consider representations or objections made within the period specified in the notice. Proposed new section 8B gives the Secretary of State the power to set rules for how licence applications must be made. Among other things, that includes the format of the application, the fee payable—different fees may apply—and the requirements for publishing the application. Before making any regulations, the Secretary of State must consult the ORR. Any fees collected by either the Secretary of State or the ORR in connection with licence applications must be paid to the consolidated fund. Paragraph 4 clarifies that a licence granted to GBR may specify when the authorisation it provides takes effect. It allows the licence to include a start date or a mechanism for determining it. Paragraph 5 provides that the licence granted to GBR may include a condition requiring it to comply with the provisions set out in separate document that is prepared by the ORR and approved by the Secretary of State. It might be something such as a code of practice—one of these operating documents that we have been talking about so much—and it may relate to the sale of tickets by GBR or third parties, or to services that GBR provides to the rail industry to facilitate railway operations that are of particular interest to the independent retail sector. The paragraph makes it clear that an approved document may be used to regulate GBR’s behaviour in relation to the sale of tickets by parties other than GBR, in the independent retail sector. Paragraph 6 provides that, before making modifications to a GBR licence, the Secretary of State must publish a notice explaining the proposed modifications and the reasons for them, and must allow the usual period of 28 days for interested parties to make representations. There is a duty on the Secretary of State to consider representations or objections to the notice made within the period specified. Paragraph 7 clarifies that the ORR must consult the passengers’ council before making any amendments to passenger or station licences that relate to functions of the council. The ORR must also send a copy of the modifications to the council as soon as practicable. Paragraph 9 clarifies that any licence under section 8 of the Railways Act 1993 that was in force immediately before the changes made by the schedule come into force will remain so, per the conditions and periods set out in the licence, unless it is revoked or surrendered. Here is the mystery of the missing licence: where is it? We have explored this at some length, and the Minister is going to go away and see what he can rustle up in the Department’s cupboard to point us in the right direction, or at least to give us the direction of travel of the missing licence. In oral evidence to the Transport Committee, Ben Plowden, chief executive officer of the Campaign for Better Transport, said: “I think the licence will be critical. There are various references in the documents that the Government published to a ‘streamlined licence’, so I would be quite interested to see what that means relative to the current licence that applies to Network Rail. I think the Government are going to consult on the draft licence, so we will all have a chance to look at it. The other point I would make is one I made earlier, which is that the licence will be one of many documents the Government will produce in the next year to 18 months. There is the long-term rail strategy and GBR will produce its business plan. There will be the access and use policy; the new periodic review process; and MOUs with Ministers in Scotland and Wales. There will be guidance on partnerships with mayoral combined authorities, and guidance on the right to request full rail devolution. There is a huge amount still to come. Understanding how the licence intersects with those other documents and processes is going to be critical, because between them they will add up to the set of arrangements that determine whether GBR is successful or not for passengers. We have to see the licence in the context of all the other things that will be guiding, directing and shaping what GBR does, how it invests, and what it does operationally.” That is the experts in the industry repeating what the Opposition have been arguing repeatedly today and last week. More accurately, it is the other way around: we have been listening to the industry in a way that the Government have not, and have been expressing the deep concerns in the sector that the current proposals are half cocked. Huge chunks of the direction, guidance and memorandums are simply missing, including the licence that the schedule is designed to address.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  That is a perfectly fair challenge, but amendment 11 would not require the CEO’s removal by the Secretary of State if those KPIs are not met; it would be a necessary first step to demonstrate that the KPIs are not being met, and then there would be a discretion. I suppose the hon. Member is really arguing that my safeguard is not quite as strong as it could be. Nevertheless, it would be a step in the right direction, and it would not require the removal of the chief executive. New clause 4 would give the Secretary of State the power to dismiss the CEO of GBR on the grounds that a KPI has not been met and—this is an important bit, which the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage might recognise gives the new clause some weight—GBR has failed to act on guidance that has been issued by the Secretary of State under clause 9. It is sequential. First, the chief executive is given guidance from the Secretary of State. Most chief executives worth their salt would take notice of official guidance given by their 100% shareholder, but if for some reason they fail to act on the guidance and they are still missing their KPI, then the power to dismiss would be exercisable. In my submission, that is a good approach. Clause 7(2)—the “interference clause”—anticipates minor direction changes, which is exactly the kind of direction that should not be issued and is contrary to the explanatory notes. We are told that the powers in the clause will be used only as a last resort, but subsection (2) states: “A direction under this section may provide, in particular, that a function is only to be exercised— (a) after consulting the Secretary of State, or (b) with the Secretary of State’s consent.” The clause is not an emergency lever. It is quite clear from the drafting that the circumstances in subsection (2) cannot apply to a last-resort emergency lever. It is saying, “You can carry on doing things, but we need to have oversight in the nitty-gritty.” It is truly an interference clause. Is it the Government’s intention that directions issued under clause 7 will be, as described in the explanatory notes, used as a “last resort” emergency brake, or do they intend—this is the case as the Bill is drafted—that the Secretary of State will give himself or herself the power to intervene in day-to-day management, even down to the level that individual decisions will not be taken until there has been consultation with the Secretary of State or the Secretary of State has consented to them? Clause 7(5) needs improvement. It requires publication by the Secretary of State, but anticipates no role for Parliament in that oversight. The organisation Rail Forum said: “We agree that this is desirable to ensure GBR remains arm’s length and is allowed to manage its own affairs.” That is important. The industry itself is saying that GBR needs to be operationally independent and to manage its own affairs. Amendment 14 would correct that issue. It would require the Secretary of State to lay any decision before Parliament—the right place for primary scrutiny. Rail Forum supports the amendment. It says: “This is essential to ensure that normal Parliamentary process is not bypassed.” Amendment 16 would mean that decisions on fares imposed on GBR by the Secretary of State can be assessed against passenger growth and affordability. Such a direction would have a huge impact on the financial position of GBR, because decisions on fares and passenger growth and affordability are central to revenue. It is crucial that decisions are made on proper evidence and in line with the objects of GBR.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is just as pleasurable to have you in the Chair today as it was last week, Sir Alec. I remind hon. Members that clause 7 gives the Secretary of State the power to issue and publish directions to Great British Railways relating to its railway activities. It also outlines how the Secretary of State must obtain consent from Welsh and Scottish Ministers before giving directions relating to their devolved services, except where powers are used in relation to the access regime. The clause further outlines how GBR will be required to comply with directions, which are mandatory and binding, and intended to be used as a so-called “responsive tool for necessary course correction, rather than as a proactive tool to set requirements on GBR,” or, as further clarified in the explanatory notes, as “a last resort”. Interestingly, although the explanatory notes state that a direction by the Secretary of State is a mechanism of last resort, the clause itself gives no indication to substantiate that. Instead, it suggests that the Secretary of State can act independently of their Welsh and Scottish counterparts’ views, especially as there is a reliance on non-legislative measures. My first question to the Minister is, therefore: why is this supposed last-resort requirement not on the face of the Bill? When dealing with matters relating in particular to the interpretation of devolution, the risk is that any decision taken by the Secretary of State may be disputed by the devolved nations and end up as a political football, which only increases lawyers’ profits. Would it not therefore be prudent to set out in the legislation exactly what is meant? Without a clear breakdown of the procedures and directions, surely we run the risk of granting the Secretary of State a large degree of power with very limited oversight. The clause gives the Secretary of State unrestricted power, other than for operations in Scotland and Wales, to intervene in the running of GBR. That is a step too far. While it is justifiable for the democratically elected Government of the day to set and agree GBR’s strategic objectives, key performance indicators and business plans, after those are set out, the Government’s role should be to hold GBR to account for the delivery of the targets, objectives and strategies, and not to tell it how to do so on a day-to-day basis. A question arises on clause 8(4), and I would be grateful if the Minister could provide clarity on the oversight system outlined in clauses 7 and 8. Subsection (4) states: “Before giving, varying or revoking a direction under this section the Scottish Ministers must consult the Secretary of State.” Presently, GBR must decide whether a decision directly affects devolved services, but the Bill provides no statutory test, which leaves a delivery body making politically sensitive judgments, further increasing the risk of challenge by devolved nations. Clarity for Members, especially those from the devolved nations, will be extremely helpful, so I would be grateful if the Minister would address that directly. Under subsection (5) of both clauses 7 and 8, directions must be published, but there is no requirement for them to be laid before and scrutinised by Parliament—the old trap of creating transparency without consequence. A reporting or laying requirement, perhaps through the Select Committee, would turn publication into genuine accountability. However, I am interested to hear what rationale the Minister has not to allow greater scrutiny of GBR in Parliament. Again, perhaps he will address that directly in his response. That is the rationale behind our suggested amendments to require the Secretary of State to lay directions before Parliament, in order to allow us to scrutinise the decisions in greater detail. There is a fundamental question about leadership and who is the key decision maker. We are told repeatedly by the Minister and others that GBR is the directing mind, but will that really be the case if the clause goes through unamended? If GBR really is the directing mind, what is the necessity for the clause? It is a recipe for decision paralysis, with GBR, given the decision-making structures, undermined by guidance—we will come on to that when we discuss clause 9—and by directions from the Department for Transport in the name of the Secretary of State. Clause 7 really does risk creating the worst of both worlds. We will have the cost of GBR and its oversight structures—we are told in the recently published job application for the part-time chair that GBR will have more than 100,000 employees; it will be an enormous organisation, with its own senior management team—and then we will have the same again, with an overactive Department for Transport second-guessing GBR’s day-to-day working and being able to give guidance and directions as a result of clauses 7 and 8.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  We have debated these two clauses. We have made clear our concerns about the current drafting and have tried our best to improve the Bill through a number of very sensible amendments, the majority of which were supported by the Liberal Democrats. We in our turn have supported some sensible amendments proposed by the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage. I recognise that to vote against the clauses would potentially put a difficult hole in the armoury of the Secretary of State for GBR, so it is with a heavy heart that I do not oppose these two clauses. Question put and agreed to. Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 11 Licensing Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  You are kind to call me to speak again, Sir Alec; I realise that I did not speak to clause 10 earlier. Briefly, I recognise that clause 10 mirrors clause 9, which we have debated substantially, but it is important to note that Scottish Ministers are given a guidance function, whereas Welsh Ministers are not. That reflects the devolution settlement, whereby Scotland funds and controls its rail system in its entirety, whereas Welsh responsibilities are substantially limited to the core valley lines. I repeat our previous arguments about the express need for operational independence for GBR, without constant second-guessing by Department for Transport officials, which my amendment 21 addresses, and about fares, which I discussed in relation to amendment 20. I will press a selection of the amendments to a Division. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I completely agree with my hon. Friend. When one’s children come and ask for something, the wise answer is always to ask first, “What did your mother say?” If we were able to apply that common sense to this situation, I would not be so concerned. What we have instead is stakeholder management culture seeping into the core aspects of GBR functions.