Kanishka Narayan MP: speeches

Speeches

• 10 Sept 2026 · Jobs in AI · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend has been a champion of AI in this place and has great experience of technology, given her previous career, which is a source of insight for us all. On the question of AI support for small businesses, our AI skills boost programme has a particular focus on upskilling 2 million individuals in small and medium-sized enterprises—the biggest targeted training programme since Harold Wilson’s Open University programme. Alongside that, my focus is on ensuring that the procurement programmes in AI support small businesses in every part of this country, including through an AI research and development scheme that is supporting those businesses.

• 10 Sept 2026 · Jobs in AI · Hansard source

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  I am working with colleagues right across Government to deliver good AI jobs in every part of this country. That means a focus on capabilities, the AI skills boost for individuals and BridgeAI for funds. It means a focus on compute with the AI growth zone programme and the AI research resource for British start-ups. It means a focus on capital through the British Business Bank and Sovereign AI. At the heart of it, it means a focus on culture, so that we are building AI for good in every part of the country.

• 10 Sept 2026 · Jobs in AI · Hansard source

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  I thank my hon. Friend for her shared commitment to the fact that, unlike in the last wave of technology, everyone across this country must feel the opportunity that AI offers. For that reason, we are focused on both the AI skills boost programme and the AI upskilling challenge fund, so that local areas across the country can benefit from those resources. I am also looking very closely at introducing boot camp pilots so that young people not in employment, education or training can learn about AI, and I am working closely with trade unions through the Early Careers Jobs Alliance. We are thinking about the future of jobs so that Britain is best prepared for every community to make the most of AI.

• 10 Sept 2026 · Technology and Innovation · Hansard source

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  It is my core belief that technology should not be the preserve of the privileged few; instead, it should be a great leveller, supporting dignity in our public services and opportunity for British businesses. That is why I am focused on redesigning the way that Government use AI and technology to support our brilliant public service professionals to achieve those ends.

• 10 Sept 2026 · Technology and Innovation · Hansard source

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  I pay tribute to my hon. Friend; there is only one thing faster than the pace of technology, and that is the pace at which he keeps up with technology, and, in particular, online engagement. I will flag two areas of particular focus for my efforts on this question: first, ensuring that we are creating examples of swift procurement support for British businesses, not least through the sovereign AI research and development procurement scheme; secondly, a more systematic focus on bringing the best package of AI tools to support procurement professionals to move faster.

• 1 Jul 2026 · Ofcom: Crisis Response Protocol · Hansard source

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  May I, as ever, thank the Chair of the Select Committee for such a depth of expertise and experience, and in particular for the report that she mentioned, which has formed the basis of a lot of our thinking? There are clear things that we have done in our engagement with Ofcom, such as ensuring we empower users, not least through the commitments made in the “Protecting What Matters” social cohesion strategy, which will follow up on a number of recommendations that the hon. Lady talked about, including empowering users of algorithms. Misinformation is very much under consideration, and I have spoken to Ofcom about categories of harm as part of the crisis playbooks. We will continue to review that.

• 1 Jul 2026 · Ofcom: Crisis Response Protocol · Hansard source

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  Do we want tougher accountability? Absolutely. That is why the codes published mean stronger review mechanisms, a direct line to law enforcement and a clear crisis playbook required of risky platforms. Do we want it to be faster? Absolutely. That is exactly why we have asked Ofcom to expedite those codes in particular. On whether we take a risk-based or uniform approach, it is right that we focus our resources, in law enforcement and regulatory action, on those that are the greatest risk. We will continue to review that.

• 1 Jul 2026 · Ofcom: Crisis Response Protocol · Hansard source

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  Keeping people safe online at moments of real danger is a top priority for this Government. That is why we have asked Ofcom to expedite its work on updates to its codes of practice under the Online Safety Act 2023. All services face strict duties to deal with illegal content. Of course, it is right that platforms with a greater risk of viral content spreading must do even more to prepare for and manage periods of heightened risk.

• 1 Jul 2026 · Social Media: Dangerous Content · Hansard source

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  This Government have led the world in tackling dangerous content online, including in law with illegal content duties that platforms must comply with, with our full backing for Ofcom’s enforcement of them, and by strengthening the law, with cyber-flashing, intimate image abuse and self-harm content all deemed priority offences needing to be proactively tackled, as well as political conviction in the face of non-compliance. When Grok nudified images, this Government stood up, called it out and won by being on the side of British families, not tech platforms.

• 1 Jul 2026 · Social Media: Dangerous Content · Hansard source

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  I first pay tribute to the families that I have met who have raised the issue of suicide forums, which the hon. Member rightly raises. I have committed to them in the past that we will continue to press for quicker remedies for them when they suffer the worst tragedies imaginable. The Secretary of State and I will, of course, be delighted to look at whether there are ways we can make that a more systematic, rapid response.

• 1 Jul 2026 · Social Media: Dangerous Content · Hansard source

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  I first thank my hon. Friend for championing an incredibly important cause. Content promoting eating disorders is horrific, and I have to be clear that not just at the age of 16, but under the Online Safety Act 2023, platforms must already prevent children under the age of 18 from accessing content about eating disorders or self-harm. Indeed, it is now a primary priority content offence, requiring a higher bar still to be discharged by those platforms. I will of course, as ever, be delighted to work with him and the eating disorders APPG on his further proposals.

• 1 Jul 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  I thank my hon. Friend for raising that critical question for Britain’s creative sector. Just yesterday, on British IP Day, I met with the Alliance for Intellectual Property, including artists, authors, publishers, journalists and media organisations, to talk about how our work on digital replicas and transparency will be critical to supporting the creative sector. I would be delighted to meet my hon. Friend and the APPG.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Role of Big Tech in Society · Hansard source

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  It is always a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Sir Jeremy, but it is a particular pleasure when we are discussing questions of digital markets and regulation, because I know that you bring expertise in and experience of these issues. I thank the right hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard) for securing this debate. He has held me to account in the main Chamber, we have spoken in the corridors of Parliament, and I am delighted that he has now convened a much broader debate on the role of big tech in society. I am grateful to him and to all other hon. Members for their contributions to this important discussion. This debate gets to the heart of what I consider the central question in our politics, our economy and our national security: how we ensure that the extraordinary power of modern technology serves our society, strengthens our economy, protects our citizens, and is grounded in British values. Given the time we have, I will do the courtesy of responding to individual Members first before talking more substantively on the common issues. The right hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard) raised the central question: are we on the side of British values or shareholder values for firms located abroad? It is pretty clear, whether on questions of online safety legislation, where we have the most robust regime anywhere in the world, or on questions of the most innovative set of sovereignty interventions anywhere in the world, that every single decision that this Government have made on technology has been on the side of British values, in the spirit of collaborating and never capitulating. My hon. Friend the Member for Stockport (Navendu Mishra) raised the two magic words: open source. I made a speech a few months ago talking about my passion for open source, not least because aspects of its Welsh grounding—Raspberry Pi, developed by a Welsh founder, is now opening up opportunities for kids in living rooms across the world to develop bits of software. There are three things we have therefore done on open source that make Britain the best place in the world for open-source talent: first, a particular focus on talent, not least a major hackathon we have partnered on to invite the world’s best talent to come and build open source here; secondly, a series of offers of compute, direct involvement in Government strategy on open source and, to the extent it is helpful, personal mentoring from me for winners of public service development on open source; and thirdly, just this morning, significant funding of £30 million for a serious national lab, led by University College London, focused in particular on open-source models. Britain is at the frontier of open-source AI, and this is the right thing to have done for our sovereignty aspirations. My hon. Friend the Member for Stockport raised an important point about kids’ experiences on social media and the impact on educational attainment. That is exactly my personal motivation behind the significant action we are taking to ban social media for under-16s as well. The hon. Member for Yeovil (Adam Dance) raised a series of questions, and I will address two of them in particular. He asked about compliance with social media bans. There are three things we have done to ensure we learn the lessons from elsewhere: more robust age checks; ensuring that enforcement is out of the gate on day one rather than delayed, so that companies feel the heat of enforcement early on; and to acknowledge that this will not be a 100% overnight compliance issue, but a long-term societal shift in culture, as previous regulations have created. That is the right thing to do. The hon. Member for Yeovil asked about wider opportunities that the Government will support to offset some opportunities that young people might lose as a result of the ban. There are exemptions for both education services and music streaming. Really importantly, on the day that we announced the social media ban for under-16s, we announced 180 youth hubs across the country. That means more than £500 million spent on arts, music and culture opportunities for young people, right across England. There was a series of contributions from Members with that point in mind. My hon. Friend the Member for Clapham and Brixton Hill (Bell Ribeiro-Addy) raised very important points about concentration. I will not speak overtly about an individual company, but I will flag that I understand from the relevant Department that a supplier contract for the NHS federated data platform will be reviewed in line with standard contract management processes this year, on the question of its extension. I am sure that her contributions will be regarded in that context. I normally hold the hon. Member for Caerfyrddin (Ann Davies) fondly in my mind in our parliamentary debates, so I was sorry to hear her take a more political, point-scoring approach to questions of online safety. I was sad that she called putting the voices of Welsh kids and families at the heart our decisions “dilly-dallying”. Thousands of young people and families in Wales contributed to the decision on a social media ban. This is a historic decision for the people of Wales, whose voices fundamentally shaped it. That is not tiptoeing; it is running fast but together towards the solutions that matter. On the hon. Lady’s particular questions, we are preparing legislative options alongside securing significant progress on blocking children from taking, receiving and sharing nude images. We have already secured more progress than any other country on this question. On her point on proactively dealing with national security concerns, the British Government are building capabilities, not least through the Security Institute and across our intelligence agencies, that are unparalleled in terms of ensuring that our national security is a priority on questions of technology. On when this Government will face up to tech platforms, I gently suggest to the hon. Lady that again and again this Government have taken the side of people, not platforms—of British families, including Welsh families, not foreign tech billionaires. I would encourage her to join us in that mission. My hon. Friend the Member for Alloa and Grangemouth (Brian Leishman) raised concerns about a particular data centre. I am not fully abreast of the plans on that particular site, but I am very conscious of the concerns he raised. I simply point out that, in theory, there are ways in which data centre investors ought to make sure that what they are doing supports our important clean energy and power goals. In particular, I reflect on the fact that in Lanarkshire there are significant sites that have pulled forward clean energy generation in solar and battery as a result of data centre investment, rather than instead of or in trade off with it. Again, we are focused on ensuring that both those aspirations are met, as they are in north Wales where our data centre investments are pulling forward the future of small modular reactor nuclear in this country. The hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Bobby Dean) and the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for North Shropshire (Helen Morgan), raised an important point about pension funds under allocation to British equities, in particular to British technology and AI equities. That has been a huge focus for the Government, not least through the Mansion House reforms and the increased deployment pace at the British Business Bank, which is now deploying more than £2 billion a year in this area, but also through the half-a-billion sovereign AI fund, which is focused on building deep British capability. The point the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington raised about the balance of power is central. In response to the ask for a sovereignty strategy, we are not only talking about it—we are delivering it. We have defined the single most important question: where does Britain stand on the balance of power? Do we have strategic leverage to secure ongoing access to critical inputs? There are three tests we are focused on. The first is having enough critical inputs—NVIDIA graphic processing units, for example—to be able to play our way in the world. The second is having a diverse set of sources so that we have bargaining leverage in that context; one of the first things I did was meet SambaNova, Cerebras and Groq to diversify our engagement with chip companies. The third really important test is, where British strengths and economics allow, to build full-fat British capability. We have done that with our hardware plan—more than £1 billion supporting companies such as Fractile, OLIX, Salience Labs and others. That is the crux of our sovereignty strategy: a clear definition, a clear plan across every part of the stack on AI, and delivery alongside that. My hon. Friend the Member for Mansfield (Steve Yemm) brought a deep degree of expertise on technology to this debate and asked the central question: do we shape technology in the artificial intelligence revolution, or is it the other way around? His point about stronger competition, which was also raised by the shadow Minister, is important. The CMA has been acting in an area of collaboration between the previous Government’s aspirations on digital competition and this Government’s. I look forward to the enforcement of remedies across both mobile and business software when it comes to AI. My hon. Friend also raised questions about online safety. I hope he feels that the significant actions that the Government have taken—banning social media for under 16s, being one of the first countries to bring AI chatbots into regulatory scope to make sure that they are not producing illegal content, and banning romantic chatbots—have been pioneering and show that we are always on the side of the British public. My hon. Friend the Member for Poole (Neil Duncan-Jordan) raised incredibly important points about how we ensure that the security of AI is central to the questions we ask in public policy. Across every aspect of Government, we are building a Labour vision for that. We are building state institutions that will last the test of time and ensure that we are kept safe from some of the risks of AI.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Role of Big Tech in Society · Hansard source

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  The right hon. Gentleman raises an important point, and I am personally interested in how we rest more agency and control in the hands of the British public and the British state when it comes to data. There are clear rules and regulations about both privacy and individual data consents that apply, but I want to go further still by building infrastructure that equips individuals to have greater control over their data. In response to my hon. Friend the Member for Poole’s points, through the AI Security Institute we have the best capability in the state to keep evaluating, understanding and mitigating risks. Through the AI Economics Institute, we have a deeper understanding of the impact of AI on jobs than pretty much any other country. We want to go further on that, including looking at a range of economic levers to mitigate some of the risks. Through sovereign AI we are investing in British capabilities, through the Alan Turing Institute we are investing in national security-relevant AI, and through labs that were funded just this morning we are making sure that British capability, rather than foreign capability alone, determines the future of AI.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill · Hansard source

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  I would be delighted to.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill · Hansard source

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  As I say, I agree with much of the right hon. Gentleman’s diagnosis. Let me state in more detail the reasons for objecting on the mechanism. First, the provisions for information sharing are deeply discretionary for UK regulators. Secondly, the subjects in which they can pursue that information sharing are restricted to significant matters of national security and domestic crime prevention in the UK. Official Report , 8 July 2026; Vol. 789, c. 6WC. (Correction). Thirdly, the way that the amendment is drafted risks creating undue uncertainty in law. If this is the only regime where there is a specific and explicit reference to fair trial in the legislation, it calls into question how other information-sharing regimes are interpreted, such as under section 114 of the Online Safety Act 2023. In other words, drafted as it is, the amendment could invite legal challenge where a regulator exercises its discretion not to disclose this in other regimes, as there is no explicit exclusion. For those reasons, while I totally agree with the right hon. Gentleman’s diagnosis and his objective, I am afraid that the amendment in question risks undermining the objective.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill · Hansard source

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  Given the specificity of his question, I will suggest that I come back to my hon. Friend. The broad thrust is that through our investment control legislation and procurement legislation, there are a series of responsibilities on Departments to look at it. [ Interruption. ] Given your encouragement, Madam Deputy Speaker, I shall move on. Finally, I will respond to the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), who raised a very important point. The most important thing to say is that I share his diagnosis, although for reasons mostly of technical drafting, I disagree with his prescription—I hope he will take that in the spirit in which it is intended. His amendment risks creating undue uncertainty in law for many other areas where we do not have an explicit requirement. While I share his diagnosis and his objective, I hope that we can work together to consider how best to give it effect, including through the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office’s overseas security and justice mechanisms for information sharing. I thank all hon. Members for their consideration.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill · Hansard source

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  I will not, because I am testing the patience of Madam Deputy Speaker— [ Interruption. ] With your permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will give way.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time. It has been a privilege to take this vital piece of legislation through the House. I thank everyone who has played a role in getting the Bill to this stage, including the noble Baroness Lloyd of Effra, who has been instrumental in driving the policy in this Bill and leading its passage in the other place. I also thank my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology; the officials who have worked tirelessly since the Bill’s inception; the Bill team, led by Shona Lester; the policy teams, led by Nick Dodd and Liam Harkin; the legal team, led by Alicia Swannell; and my private secretary, Ben Holloway. I also thank parliamentary counsel, the Clerks and the Chairs of the Public Bill Committee, and every Member of the House who served on the Committee, as well as Members who have provided important input today and during all previous stages. This country is subject to daily and unrelenting cyber-attacks. This is no longer the stuff of science fiction, but a daily reality that threatens public services, businesses and even our ways of life. As Dr Richard Horne, the CEO of the National Cyber Security Centre, has said: “The real-world impacts of cyber attacks have never been more evident than in recent months”. The Bill delivers on the Government’s commitment to drive secure growth and make the UK more resilient to the threats we face. It recognises how things have moved on since 2018, with data centres playing an increasingly important role in our digital lives and supply chains continuing to diversify. It also recognises that things will continue to change, with a deliberate, technology-agnostic approach and proportionate powers to enable the Government to close regulatory gaps and respond to imminent national security threats. Since the introduction of the Bill, I have tabled a small number of amendments to refine its drafting and ensure that it achieves its intended purposes. They include designating Ofcom as the sole regulator for data centres, to reduce administrative burdens and strengthen accountability in this key sector. They also include enabling the network and information systems regulators to share vital information with other regulators and public bodies overseeing sectors and vice versa, enabling more co-ordinated and strategic oversight without unnecessary business burdens. They also updated the definition of cloud computing to respond to important feedback from the sector and made several minor and technical corrections to ensure that the Bill can be practically implemented. The version of the Bill before us is an ambitious, practical and proportionate piece of legislation. It is the result of engagement with industry, important regulator feedback, international dialogue and tireless work from officials. I wish Baroness Lloyd the best in moving the Bill forward in the other place, and I commend it to the House.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill · Hansard source

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  The hon. and learned Gentleman will be aware from a response I recently gave him that both the complexity of the EU’s AI Act and its interaction with the Windsor framework are under consideration at the moment. The EU has made a proposal and we are working with it on that. I will be happy to engage with him on that particular question in due course.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill · Hansard source

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  I can confirm that the Government will be very happy to engage on this question further with my hon. Friend and the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith). I commend the Bill to the House.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill · Hansard source

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  As ever, I would be delighted to work with the Chair of the Select Committee on a range of technology questions, including this one. I am delighted with the support that this House has shown for the intention and principles of the Bill, and I am grateful for Members’ consistent, principled scrutiny.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill · Hansard source

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  I will give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley in the first instance and then to my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill · Hansard source

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  I will make some further progress. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley for his amendment relating to AI emergencies. I recognise his concerns, as well as those of my hon. Friend the Member for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy. Technology is evolving rapidly, and Government must be equipped to respond. That is why the Bill grants the Secretary of State the power to direct regulated entities if the compromise of their network and information system, or the threat of it, gives rise to a national security risk. This could, for instance, require an entity to cease using and isolate an AI model. These powers are a backstop to an effective cyber-security regime, enabling Government to act swiftly in the face of unexpected national security threats. They are also designed to be proportionate, recognising the need for stability among regulated entities and the importance of proper accountability. While I share my hon. Friends’ concerns, I encourage them to work with the Government on a systematic range of ways in which we can mitigate the risks they have rightly highlighted.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill · Hansard source

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  I am going to make some progress but will try to come back to the Chair of the Select Committee shortly. The Government’s cyber action plan is the overarching strategy to raise public sector standards across Government, including local government. The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government has taken action to strengthen local authorities’ cyber-resilience, backed by £29 million of cyber grant funding, technical support and the adoption of the cyber assessment framework for local government. In that spirit, I take particularly seriously the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham West, Chadderton and Royton (Jim McMahon) on supporting capacity even further with centralised capacity support from the Government Digital Service and other parts of cyber-capability in central Government. The joint election security and preparedness unit, also raised by Members, works to protect UK elections and referendums, co-ordinating across Government on response to threats, including cyber-risks. JESP works closely with the National Cyber Security Centre, producing guidance for organisations involved in delivering elections and electoral infrastructure, particularly local authorities. JESP and NCSC regularly engage with political-party representatives as well. The question of a register of foreign powers has been raised in relation to new clauses 14 and 15, tabled by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer). New clause 14 would require the creation of a register of foreign states that pose a risk to the UK, based on GCHQ advice, for the purpose of exercising powers under part 4 of the Bill. I assure the shadow Minister, as I did in Committee, that the use of those powers will always be underpinned by robust intelligence. That includes, where relevant, information about state actors involved in cyber-threats. As a result, it is unclear what additional support the register would provide to the Secretary of State. New clause 15 would require the Government to report annually on risks posed by foreign powers. Drafting a report of vulnerabilities would simply duplicate existing assessments and risk distracting the Government from more effective measures to protect the UK from hostile foreign actors. The shadow Minister also proposes that information that cannot be included in the report for national security reasons is sent to the Intelligence and Security Committee. I have made it clear to him, both in Committee and more broadly, that the Government value the independent and robust oversight that the Intelligence and Security Committee provides on behalf of Parliament. However, we do not consider that the report described in the new clause sits within the ISC’s current oversight remit, as outlined in the Justice and Security Act 2013 and the Committee’s memorandum of understanding with the Prime Minister. The Government are actively reviewing the Committee’s existing memorandum of understanding and will update the House in due course. New clause 3, tabled by the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted, would require the Government to assess how many entities regulated by the NIS regime are owned, in part or in full, by foreign states, and the risks that they pose. Publishing a review identifying national security risks caused by foreign state ownership would provide valuable insight for our adversaries. Furthermore, conducting an assessment of the ownership structure of every in-scope entity within six months would be disproportionately resource intensive, and would distract the Government from more effective measures to protect our services.