Jerome Mayhew MP: speeches

Speeches

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Minister refers to the booking app also offering the ability to ask for assistance. Will he undertake to provide access to that data so that independent retail operators can provide a similar service in their booking systems?

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The principle the Government continue to establish is important for the relationship between the state and the ORR when it comes to safety-related duties. I recognise the Government’s work to ensure that the clauses protect the ORR’s independence in many regards, rather than encroaching upon it. The protection of that independence is vital. When it comes to the relationship between Great British Railways, the ORR, the Department for Transport and Ministers, as well as the various devolved Governments and mayoralties —not forgetting the fact that passengers count—the Opposition have thought long and hard about how we can ensure that the ORR maintains its standards of excellence as a regulator. I want to take this opportunity to review the safety record of the railways overseen by ORR as the safety regulator since its inception in 2004. The ORR publishes masses and reams of data as part of its continuing mission to provide transparency and oversight. By most key metrics, safety has improved significantly, with the UK being praised as one of the safest railways, if not the safest railway, in Europe. We really should stop and consider that achievement, whether it relates to nationalised or privatised parts of the industry. Government Members criticise privatisation, but it has not impinged on safety, and that is quite an achievement. It is vital that the ORR can continue its strong work in delivering not only a safe railway but a transparent one. The ORR has consistently worked by acting as a critical friend to the franchise operators and Network Rail. In the new age of GBR, it is important that the Secretary of State, who will direct both the ORR and GBR, should be mindful not to create an environment in which the ORR feels it cannot be critical of GBR and its actions. Committee members will struggle to find many sectors where stakeholders praise their regulator, but it is right that Ministers should get out of the way of the work of the ORR, because its oversight work is the difference between life or death. I acknowledge that that is the Minister’s intention in clause 21. Clause 22 sets out the duty of the ORR to have regard to Scottish Ministers’ guidance, and clause 22 mirrors that, enabling Scottish Ministers to give guidance except on the safety-related issues I have mentioned. I have a query about clause 22—I am not leading up to some devastating amendment—in respect of the dispute resolution process, if one exists, between the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers. Under clause 21, the Secretary of State must consult Welsh Ministers—that creates a clear direction for the conversation—but there does not appear to be an equivalent provision in clause 22. I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify that seeming contradiction and expand further on what happens in a situation where the guidance issued by the Scottish Minister contradicts that issued by the Secretary of State, or perhaps the other way round. Would that be covered by the memorandum of understanding, which of course we have not yet seen? Or is a tightening of statute on the horizon that we are not yet aware of? The Minister might not be able to whip an answer out of his back pocket, but perhaps he can clarify that issue once he has consulted his officials. Naturally, Scotland has had oversight of Network Rail for many years, so the working relationship between the ORR and GBR north of the border is not likely to change, but, similarly to my concerns about clause 21, protecting the ORR’s independence is important to the entire smooth functioning of the railways. I know the Minister would not wish to speak for Scottish Ministers, but I would very much appreciate it if he could outline the dispute resolution mechanism between the Secretary of State and devolved Ministers. The Minister will be delighted to hear that, beyond that query, we do not oppose clause 22.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am very grateful.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  This is one of the more important clauses, so I look forward to discussing it with the Committee. It sets out the general duties of Ministers, GBR and the Office of Rail and Road. In other words, it sets out the things they must seek to achieve when carrying out their functions. GBR will have freedom to consider which duties are relevant and what weight to place on each duty, but should be able to demonstrate how it has had regard to its duties. Subsection (1) sets out to whom the general duties apply. In addition to GBR, they apply to the Office of Rail and Road, the Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers and Welsh Ministers when they carry out their railway functions. There is an exception for the ORR’s safety-related functions and train driver licensing functions. No doubt the Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but I assume that is because when it is exercising its safety functions, the intention is for safety to be the priority and to not be second guessed. The ORR should not have to weigh it against other duties. The Bill does not change the current safety regime and the official Opposition wholeheartedly agree with that position. There is also an exception for the functions of the Office of Rail and Road under the Competition Act 1998. When the ORR acts as a concurrent competition regulator with the Competition and Markets Authority, as we previously discussed, both bodies should be applying the same duties, otherwise there really would be confusion. I am going to go through the clause in some detail. It will take some time, but it is an important part of our consideration. The duties listed in subsection (2) require GBR and the sector bodies to consider the following. Subsection (2)(a) provides that they must “promote the interests of users and potential users of the railway”— that is passengers and potential passengers—including the needs of disabled people. Subsection (2)(b) provides that they must promote the use of rail freight. This duty, combined with the rail freight target in clause 17, recognises the importance of freight to the economy and the environment. Subsection (2)(c) provides that they must promote “high standards” in railway performance. Subsection (3) then defines “performance” as meaning “(a) reliability (including punctuality), and (b) the avoidance or mitigation of passenger overcrowding.” That definition is wholly inadequate, as we have discussed at some length on previous days. Subsection (2)(d) provides that they must ensure that railway service providers, such as GBR, devolved operators, freight operators and open access operators can plan, invest and make decisions about their own business. We will come on to consider that point in more detail. Subsection (2)(e) provides that they must run the railway “in the public interest”—so far, so good—which is defined in subsection (3) as including social, economic and environmental interests. Subsection (2)(f) requires them to make efficient use of public funds—that is, to carefully manage the amount of public subsidy required to run the railway. Taken together, the functions in clause 3, which are what GBR must do, and these duties, which are what GBR must think about, demonstrate GBR’s purpose—those are my words. We have put that together into a purpose clause, which I look forward to voting for when we consider the new clauses. The functions under clause 18(2) contain nothing about growing passenger numbers, increasing private sector investment in the network or encouraging open access. Apart from scattered references elsewhere to discounting schemes or the passengers’ council, clause 18(2)(a) is effectively the only substantive accessibility duty in the Bill. It reads as a bit of a bolt-on, rather than a clear, integrated obligation. Subsection (2)(d) is meant to provide certainty for operators, but in practice it offers little reassurance to manufacturers or the wider supply chain. Without statutory planning cycles, which we have discussed, procurement obligations or long-term fleet strategies, which, again, we have discussed, the duty is too vague to give industry the confidence needed for investment. How can GBR be confident in achieving the purposes of clause 18(2)(d) given the ability of the Secretary of State to direct at whim, issue guidance, set the rail strategy and so on? For business, it would be impossible to know when a decision has been taken, since each one can be second-guessed by the Department for Transport. Businesses cannot even take for granted the funding allocations in the control period either, because, for the first time in 30 years—I stand to be corrected; we are in CP7, so 30 to 35 years—inter-year control period funding can be changed without notice on the whim of the Secretary of State. Subsection (3) gives only a narrow definition of “railway service performance”—punctuality, reliability and overcrowding—but omits other core standards such as cancellations, journey time, customer experience, wi-fi, mobile phone connectivity, accessibility, disruption handling and information provision. There are probably a few others as well. This limited list weakens the duty and leaves major aspects of service quality outside the statutory framework. There is no explanation for that. Why are some core elements of the customer experience included in the Bill, establishing the precedent that it is the appropriate place for them to be considered, and then—deliberately, one assumes—are many factors of profound importance to the travelling public and their experience of the railways omitted? Amendment 34 aims to achieve some housekeeping on the drafting of the Bill. Clause 18(2) does not make it clear which of the three bodies has which responsibilities —it simply refers to “they”. That is a recipe for confusion and potential buck-passing. We have three organisations or groups, each with combined duties under this clause. They are, of course, Great British Railways, the Ministers and the ORR. It is not clear which one, in a given situation, is responsible under the clause.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am interested to hear the Minister’s strong hints that the memorandum of understanding may be much more advanced than we had previously been led to believe. The intention of amendment 39 was to flush out the MOU—it sounds like it may well have already achieved its purpose. Taking the Minister’s words at face value, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Clause 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 24 Memorandum of understanding: Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 262, in clause 17, page 9, line 24, at end insert— “(1A) Any proposals by the Secretary of State and Great British Rail about how they intend to meet the target under section must include an assessment of the impact of those proposals on level crossings.”

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the Minister, who is doing his job in highlighting some of the practical challenges that the amendment might entail. The important bit is not so much the strategy; I think what my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge is trying to get at is that, when Network Rail or GBR assesses the function of a level crossing, it also needs to take account of the impact on the society in which it is based: for instance, cutting a town in two or stopping vehicular access for multiple periods during a day. Does the Minister not agree that, if GBR did not consider that—it was not in the list of considerations that the Minister mentioned a moment ago—it would not be doing its full job?

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is quite right that we need to look at modal interoperability. Does she agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge that a level crossing in a conurbation has a negative impact on road use and, in some instances, cuts one side of a town off from the other? Is he right, as I suggest he is, that that should be part of GBR’s consideration?

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The usual procedure applies again. Clause 16 requires both GBR and the Office of Rail and Road to “have regard to” a number of different requirements, such as the long-term rail strategy, the statutory transport or rail strategies published by the Welsh and Scottish Governments respectively, the mayoral combined authorities and the Mayor of London. There is a key political question within this clause: why has the Minister chosen to apply a duty on GBR and the ORR to only “have regard” to those strategies? In practice, that means only that GBR and the ORR will consider transport plans, not that they must, or even should, follow or prioritise them. That seems a slightly unusual position for the Government to take, given their keen approach to oversight of GBR in other clauses, such as 7 and 9, where it looks like they wish to maintain their role as key stakeholder over that of the devolved Governments and the mayoral combined authorities. The weak obligations are shared, whereas the strong obligations are kept primarily to themselves. It is a surprising approach, particularly given that clauses 7 and 9 effectively strip GBR of operational independence. I recognise that the Scottish Government and, to a lesser extent, the Government in Wales have their own clauses to guide and direct, but the mayoral combined authorities certainly do not. I wonder whether this clause is directed at overweening powers demanded by certain mayors, but I could not possibly look into the depths of the psychology of the Labour party as it struggles with its issues at the moment. It is very noticeable, as Mayor Andy Burnham said to us last Tuesday in oral evidence, that there is a substantial difference between the Government’s proposed treatment under the Bill of mayoral combined authorities and that of Transport for London. There does not appear to be any rationale for that deliberate divergence—or at least not one that the Government have identified. As other mayoral combined authorities come online, the Bill provides no formal mechanism for their wishes to be respected. Members of the Committee who were in the oral evidence session will remember that Andy Burnham said he would “insist” on greater authority in that area. The Bill as currently drafted does not provide that avenue for him or for others, so those looking for advancement in the future might like to consider their voting strategy on this clause. After all, page 33 of the Labour manifesto states: “Mayors will have a role in designing the services in their areas.” Can the Minister outline the mechanism for existing and future mayoralties to be put on a statutory footing, and for their local transport plans to be given greater consideration from GBR and the ORR? There is one other question regarding this clause. It relates to subsection (3). What does GBR do if the strategy of a mayoral combined authority or Transport for London conflicts with that of the Secretary of State? How are potential conflicts between strategies resolved, and who will be the arbiter? Will it be the Secretary of State, or will there be an independent structure? With that in mind, the clause should be strengthened to ensure that GBR and the ORR respond more clearly and act under greater requirements. That is where amendment 26 comes in. It would replace the very weak “must have regard to” with “must seek to achieve”. That change seems small on the face of it, but it would strengthen the requirement on GBR and the ORR to engage and work with mayoral combined authorities, the Welsh and Scottish Governments and the Mayor of London. Will the Minister support this modest proposal to strengthen that relationship? The clause currently restricts the duty of mayoral combined authorities and the Mayor of London. It is silent on other strategic authorities, yet the same arguments apply to areas that are not yet or will never be mayoral combined authorities when identifying regional needs for current and future transport. We heard that concern eloquently expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon. I hope that she will be able to expand some of her thinking on this in a moment. We have heard examples from the west country where local government reform is floundering, as it is around the country, including in Norfolk where I am a Member of Parliament. It is already delayed until 2028. That is perhaps just the first of further delays as well, as this Government lose steam. There is no idea where, when or even if it will go ahead. There are also many areas that will never have a mayoral combined authority because of the structure of their local government settlement. We do have local transport authorities, though, which are the base level of local government that has responsibility for local transport co-ordination. It seems like a very significant omission that the Bill currently only relates to mayoral combined authorities. That is the lowest level of regional government to which it deigns to provide any form of requirement for co-operation with the ORR and GBR. Why is that? Where there is, for sound local reasons, no mayoral combined authority, why are the Government designing out the ability of local government representatives, the local democrats, to co-operate and co-ordinate with the ORR and—more importantly in this instance—GBR? What happens to their interest? There is simply no explanation as to why these large authorities, which will be the local transport authorities in their own right, have been excluded from consideration. That leads me neatly on to amendment 218, which adds them to the list. New clause 33 requires the Government, or rather GBR, to set out a long-term rolling stock leasing framework. The clause would require the Secretary of State to publish a long-term rolling stock leasing framework, and require GBR to comply with that framework. It mandates a minimum 15-year lease, save in exceptional circumstances. That is because the longer the lease, the better the value for money for the taxpayer. Longer leases lead to lower costs, which will lead to more UK investment, more trading and better value for taxpayers, as the industry and supply chain are able to plan ahead and produce effective business plans. There is a consequence to the leasing’s being done by the public sector, rather than the private sector: the Government will have to consider the impact of the cost of leasing on the national debt. That is, after all, the logical consequence of their political decision to nationalise the railways—the operating companies. There is a cost that comes with it, and that is moving from the private sector balance book on to that of the public sector. The Government need to own the financial consequences of their political and ideologically driven decision, and that is one of them.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for his intervention, and for standing up for the jobs in his constituency, which is something we all need to do. I cannot speak for the actions of the Government before I was even elected as a Back-Bench MP, but we are certainly looking to improve. I would be the first person to say that the status quo ante was capable of improvement. Privatisation did bring many benefits to the railways, particularly in encouraging innovation and focus on the customer, leading to the increase in passenger numbers, which I have already spoken about in previous sittings, but was it perfect? Of course not. As has been trailed by the Government, this is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to redesign and improve our approach to the railways, and I think that taking a long-term approach to rolling stock investment and creating this framework would be taking advantage of that opportunity to try to improve predictability for the supply sector—for Alstom, but also for Siemens and other manufacturers as well. New clause 36 would require GBR to publish and keep under annual review a 15-year rolling stock investment framework that sets out future needs for new and existing trains. That includes—this is important—not just the replacement of trains but refurbishment, digital upgrades, decarbonisation and accessibility improvements. It would establish how private investors could finance rolling stock and related upgrades, promote energy-efficient technologies such as battery, hydrogen and hybrid traction, and set expectations for competitive, innovative and, importantly, predictable procurement. The framework must align with GBR’s business plan and control period funding, which are two very sensible requirements, and it must also provide transparency on procurement volumes and timelines, explain changes to plans and show how private investment will be used to reduce whole-life costs, improve train quality and support jobs in the UK rail supply chain. The Government have thrown the sector into a period of uncertainty—that is inevitable with large-scale redesigns like the ones we are going through at the moment. My concern is that the way in which they have chosen to do this, through a process of drifting nationalisation before knowing the details of its replacement, has exacerbated that uncertainty and extended it over a prolonged period. As the hon. Member for Derby South has already noted, we are already seeing that uncertainty in the supply chain and the manufacturing base. There is uncertainty—that is the problem. This is a shell Bill; it does not have the answers, and it does not give any confidence to industry that things will be better in the future. It relies on a whole raft of provisions in the 19 documents to which we have referred to time and again, but they do not exist. We do not know whether things will get better or worse, and neither does the industry. There is no supporting documentation on how GBR will function in practice. I am not sure the Government even know that yet, and they really ought to have done better than this. New clause 36 would point them in the right direction, and I certainly look forward to pressing it to a Division, should the opportunity arise. New clause 37 would increase accountability by setting out a reporting and accountability framework for Great British Railways. The new clause states: “Great British Railways must publish a business plan each year”, which we have already considered, and it dictates: “The business plan…must include…a summary of activities that Great British Railways intends to undertake during the following year” and “how these activities will support the delivery of the Rail Strategy”. At the end of the year, GBR would be required to produce a second report setting out its progress against the business plan objectives, the first of which is passenger experience—we all know the Government substantially ignore passenger experience at the moment, apart from reliability in short trains, and have just brushed the other aspects under the carpet. The other objectives include “freight growth…accessibility…passenger growth”, which is also ignored by the Government in the Bill as drafted, “integration with housing and local transport” and “the long-term infrastructure and service improvement.” The ORR must assess GBR’s performance against the key performance indicators set out in new clause 2, which we have already debated but not yet voted on. If the ORR finds any material underperformance, it must give notice to the Secretary of State, who must publish a written response. This general approach is very business focused; it simply asks that GBR sets out what it is planning to do at the start of the year, and then having worked through the year, there is a process for GBR to mark its homework at the end of the year. Has GBR done what it said it would do? If it has not, the spotlight is on. It is also being assessed by the ORR, which retains its role as an independent expert adjudicator that is trusted by all parts of the rail sector. Perhaps the best thing is that, in response to that, GBR must also set out what it will do to rectify any underperformance, and it must lay a report before Parliament and make a statement. The new clause would add critical levels of parliamentary and public scrutiny to GBR, allowing both to hold this new organisation to account, which we believe is paramount when such vast amounts of taxpayers’ money will be used. The current Bill is woefully short on accountability. It lacks strong incentives to encourage GBR to perform, to be held to account and to answer for its actions—or lack of action. This all feels a little too comfortable. We have a nationalised industry reporting to officials from the Department for Transport, and it is not focusing on the experience of customers and passengers, passenger growth or all the other imperatives of rail in the future. The Minister will of course tell us that none of that is necessary. However, with the greatest respect, direct experience of running a business tells us that we need to design in strong incentives—this is crucial; it is not primarily a political point but a trying to improve this Bill point—so that GBR is inclined to focus on the right objectives, without having to respond to external direction. These new clauses would help to point GBR in the right direction. I look forward to the Minister’s support.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Minister is touching on a key issue that the railway will have to address if he is serious about achieving a reliable Sunday service, and that is operating a seven-day schedule with a six-day roster. Does the Minister intend finally to address the six-day roster issue and to move working practices on to a seven-day roster?

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I just want to give the Minister some further clarity about what amendment 25 actually does. He is right that it says, “The document issued under subsection (1) must be in force for a minimum of three control periods”, but that should be read in the light of subsection (4), which gives the Secretary of State express power to “keep the rail strategy under review”, and paragraph (b), which says that they “may revise or replace it.” Does he accept that it is quite clear that the amendment, read in conjunction with subsection (4), does not prevent reacting to new events?

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 26, in clause 16, page 9, line 11, leave out “have regard to” and insert “seek to achieve”.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Starlink.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have listened carefully to what the Minister has said on amendment 25, particularly his comments on the Secretary of State, so I will not press it to a Division. Amendment proposed : 135, in clause 15, page 8, line 25, at end insert— “(3A) The rail strategy must include an international rail strategy to— (a) support the development of new international routes, (b) support operators in introducing and operating any such new routes, and (c) support new and existing operators in using the Channel Tunnel and London St Pancras High Speed. (3B) In meeting the objectives under subsection (3A), the international rail strategy must— (a) consider options to increase rail depot capacity at, and to supplement, Stratford Temple Mills; (b) consider any enhancements that may be required to conventional rail network in the Southeast of England for the purpose of enabling international rail travel; (c) consider options for electrification, changes to gauge clearance, and any other alterations to rail infrastructure as may be necessary to increase the potential for increased rail freight to travel via the Channel Tunnel.”— (Olly Glover.) This amendment would require the Secretary of State to include an international rail strategy as part of the Government’s long-term rail strategy. The international rail strategy would specifically look to support new routes and operators, and increase Channel Tunnel and London St Pancras High Speed rail capacity. Question put , That the amendment be made.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  This is now a common refrain in our deliberations. The Minister says, “Don’t worry. All these things will be taken care of at some future date in documents that have not been drafted and certainly haven’t been shared with the Committee.” With the greatest respect to him, I do not take it on trust that the Government are looking carefully and in sufficient detail at these matters, so I will press the amendments to a Division. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is absolutely right. New clause 33(3)(a) to (d) is aimed at reducing short-term decisions and focusing more on long-term efficiency and savings. I am sure there are many former business people on the Labour Benches—or maybe not, actually— [ Interruption. ] I am glad to hear that there are. There are many former business people on these Benches, and all those who have run businesses will know that predictability of the future is one of the key drivers of economic success and of driving down costs. New clause 33 will help to achieve that for the taxpayer. GBR will also be mandated to produce an annual public report that enables Parliament and the public to properly hold GBR to account. We have heard time and again how light the Bill is on the ability of the public and of Parliament to hold GBR to account; we are the representatives of the people and we are being denied, by design, the opportunity to do that adequately. Yet it will be spending £20 billion-plus each year, about 50% of which, at the current rate, is public money. Why are the Government running scared of public oversight of these operations?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Minister wants flexibility, and he says that is why amendments 123 and 206—tabled by myself and the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage respectively—should not be agreed to. Will the Minister set out the circumstances in which he thinks it would not be appropriate for the organisation to focus on “delivering improved productivity and efficiencies” or on “customer experience and satisfaction”? Why does he need flexibility to ignore those objectives?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  This afternoon is turning into a marathon session, and the only people who cannot take a comfort break are the shadow Minister and the Minister, so far as I can work out; I have my legs crossed. Clause 13 allows GBR to charge people to whom it is providing a service relating to its functions—this is the important bit—“as it thinks fit”; there is no qualification there. The clause will allow GBR to charge for services that it provides that are currently chargeable under the existing rail regime, such as the back-of-house services currently provided by the Rail Delivery Group, from which all passenger operators, private and public, including open access operators, benefit. There is a very significant problem with the wording of the clause, because the difference between now and then is that GBR will be a monopoly provider of those services. If we add the two factors together—first, the fact that it is a monopoly provider and secondly, that it is allowed to charge as it thinks fit, with no qualifying criteria—the result is at least the opportunity for GBR to abuse its position to inflate charges and kill competition. GBR will be in direct competition with competitors that can only buy those services from GBR. We know that that will cause a huge issue for open access operators because they have told us so, as GBR will once again be acting as a player and as the referee. That is a clear conflict of interest designed into the structure that the Bill creates. The clause needs to have much greater protections on the calculation of access charges. The Government use the example of the back-of-house services currently provided by the RDG to explain what would be applicable under the clause. The Rail Delivery Group is a membership organisation consisting of train operating companies, owning groups and Network Rail. The key services they provide are journey information, reservation systems, railcards and working to improve performance, safety and accessibility. The language in the clause as drafted gives Great British Railways carte blanche where no alternative provider of those key services is allowed—a conflict that will lead to abuse and is contrary to the direction of the Competition and Markets Authority, which expressly said that there needs to be a level playing field when dealing with matters of this kind. That is the Government’s Competition and Markets Authority, so who is right here—the CMA, or the Bill as drafted?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 233, in schedule 1, page 55, line 10, leave out “consultation” and insert “agreement”. This amendment limits the Secretary of State’s powers to set GBR’s licence unilaterally.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Minister is a mind reader; I was just about to ask him to give way. He says he cannot agree to amendment 124 because we need flexibility in the future, but he will see that it refers to “measurable performance indicators for each statutory duty listed in Section 18”, so that flexibility would only run so far as any alteration to the statutory duties set out in his own clause 18, which GBR has no ability to change. The Government do not intend for there to be flexibility, so why does the Minister say he needs it?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Government’s defence is pretty extraordinary. What they are saying is that GBR should be free to charge unreasonable amounts—otherwise there would be no objection to the wording of the amendment, which simply seeks to put the word “reasonable” into the requirement. The Government say that even though this monopoly provider can charge as it thinks fit, there should be no specific right of appeal and that the other operators should rely on the CMA taking an interest or on wider competition law—in other words, after-the-event litigation. We all know that in a business environment we can argue about the chaos at the end, but a business can already have been destroyed by a decision from a monopoly provider—on which there is no right of appeal and which could not be held back until an appeal has been heard. This is an absolute charter for GBR to run roughshod over independent retail operators, open access operators and even rail freight. It is with no hesitation at all that I seek to push for a vote on both the amendments. Question put , That the amendment be made.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I agreed with the hon. Gentleman until that last sentence, because new clause 40, which I will come to in a moment, would require not the removal of subsidy but looking towards it—it is aspirational. It would set GBR’s sights on minimising its costs to the taxpayer, not through penny pinching if that would be the wrong decision, but through growth in its revenue by becoming efficient and doing more for less. Those are all good incentives that a private business inevitably has because of the challenge of competition. New clause 39 would require Great British Railways to focus on other opportunities for funding and on minimising operational costs, just like any other business. The areas of focus under subsection (7) are the revenue opportunities. New clause 40, on non-reliance on taxpayer funding, would make the direction of travel for GBR clearer. It may be—in fact it is almost certain—that it will never achieve it, but it is a noble objective. It should be clear that GBR should aspire to reduce the need for the taxpayer to support the rail sector by making it as efficient and attractive to passengers as possible, thereby attracting more passengers and freight on to the railways. That would create a virtuous circle, rather than the opposite. We should start thinking about that, which is what new clause 40 is intended to achieve. New clause 41, also tabled in my name, would require Great British Railways to publish an annual statement of its financial performance. The new clause builds on the theme, forcing Great British Railways to focus on its financial performance and reduce its reliance on the taxpayer. It may be the skimmed-milk version of new clause 40 that the hon. Member for Birmingham Northfield might find more palatable. It is important that we do everything we can to design into a nationalised structure, where there is no competitive tension, incentives for GBR naturally to seek to achieve efficiency and productivity enhancements. There is a very real need for that, because the taxpayer’s pound can only be spent once, and funds are needed in many areas of Government. Apart from anything else, we need to reduce the tax burden, which this Government have raised to the highest on record, so anything we can do to build a structure that incentivises GBR to reduce its dependence on the taxpayer is a good thing. It also forces public accountability. Finally, new clause 44 would require the Secretary of State to give GBR an annual savings target. Taking all the new clauses together, the intention is to allow GBR to focus on providing genuine value for money for the taxpayer, not just in abstract terms, and to cut away some of the existing inefficiencies in the infrastructure commissioning and decommissioning process, to provide a longer period of certainty for the supply chain so that it can pass on the resultant efficiencies to the taxpayer. That money can be either reinvested in accelerated infrastructure roll-out, rather like the ability of ScotRail electrification to do more for less, or—heaven forbid—used to produce tax cuts for the hard-pressed taxpayer. I hope the Minister will be bowled over by those suggestions, and look forward to hearing his response.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  As I intimated earlier, amendments 119 and 129 are probing and I will not press them to a vote. I was interested to hear the Minister’s apparent position that there is no boom and bust, that the current situation for infrastructure funding is fine and that the evidence from the industry appears not to be—

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I heard what the Minister said, but it flies in the face of the evidence that the industry itself gives him and all of us about the need for certainty towards the end of a control period. All that the amendment seeks is certainty for two years at the start of a control period. How is he going to address that particular issue?