Jerome Mayhew MP: speeches

Speeches

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Having heard the semi-reassurance of the Minister, I will not move amendment 40. Clause 24, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. — (Nesil Caliskan.)

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 39, in clause 23, page 13, line 9, at end insert— “(3) The memorandum of understanding must be published at the same time as the Rail Strategy. (4) The memorandum of understanding must be laid before both Houses of Parliament for a period of two months before it can come into force.” This amendment would require the memorandum of understanding to be published at the same time as the Rail Strategy, and laid before Parliament for two months before it can come into force.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I can beat that. The clause appears necessary, and it is not one that His Majesty’s Opposition will object to. Question put and agreed to . Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill . Clause 20 Competition duty of ORR

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Thank you, Mrs Hobhouse; I am grateful for that guidance. Amendment 36 is a bench-marking amendment. It is absolutely crucial to keep GBR honest in the future when it comes to value for money, in particular for the taxpayer. I will certainly press it to a Division. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the Minister for her intervention, but it needs to be much clearer than that, because we are talking about the general duties of GBR. GBR will be able to rely on the definition and say, “We’ve satisfied our general duty under clause 18(2) because we have improved railway service performance as defined by the Minister,” which is reliability and the avoidance of passenger overcrowding. That is clearly wholly unacceptable and does not support the significant improvement that we all wish to see in the provision of passenger services. We think that amendment 32 is important, since the Government are not showing a customer focus and are being overly led by an engineering mindset. It feels like they have chucked in a passengers’ council, which can be ignored because it has no enforcement powers, and then lip service is paid to the experiences of the passenger. We already know that Great British Railways as an organisation is dominated by Network Rail. It is an organisation with about 41,000 members of staff, to which is added every six weeks or couple of months another operating company of 2,000 to 4,000 staff. It is quite apparent where, without intervention, the dominating culture will come from. We have to focus on improving customer experience as a whole, and it is for that reason that I will press the amendment to a vote.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is good to see you back in your place, Mrs Hobhouse. Something happened during our short recess: I was in the Tea Room, at the right end, but down at the wrong end I heard someone singing “Happy Birthday”. It occurred to me that today is the Minister’s birthday. [Hon. Members: “Hear! Hear!”] We are not going to sing, but I think we should all take the opportunity to say happy birthday to the Minister. What better activity could one choose for their birthday than for all of us to be together, like one big happy family? I know that the icing on the cake will be clause 17, which requires the Secretary of State to set a target to increase freight on the railways. The Government tell us that this should be a measurable target that establishes the goal, as an amount or percentage, for how much growth is sought—although that is not specified in the Bill, like so much else. Great British Railways must have regard to the target when carrying out its statutory functions, and it should also have regard to any freight growth target or strategy set by Scottish Ministers. This appears to be good news for the rail freight sector, and it will be a relief for it that it has been mentioned in the Bill—I believe that this is a relatively late inclusion. However, the duty is merely for GBR to “have regard” to the freight target, and we have explored such wording in the debates on other clauses. It requires that GBR only considers the target, not delivers it, which undermines its effectiveness as a statutory growth driver. The Rail Freight Group, in its written evidence to the Transport Committee, set out: “To succeed and grow rail freight customers and operators will need to be assured that…a. they can secure access to the network in a fair, consistent and timely way for their services, including those on new routes and to new destinations as they arise…b. that the costs of rail remain competitive when compared to road freight…c. that the network remains reliable and fit for purpose for freight trains (for example, to handle heavy or high gauge container trains)…d. that there is independent oversight and a right of appeal if freight is unfairly treated or disadvantaged…e. That they can invest in rail freight assets (wagons, terminals, locomotives etc) with the confidence that they will have a long term use of those assets.” It went on to say: “The current provisions in the Bill provide some positive elements in support of these requirements, but also increase the risk in others. Overall, the Bill is not sufficient to assure rail freight of the key points ahead as currently presented.” The main takeaway from the Rail Freight Group is that it does not feel that the target can be met, however well-intentioned it might be, if the Bill’s current wording remains. Rail Forum, in its written evidence to the Transport Committee, said: “From Rail Forum’s perspective there is nothing specific in the Bill that will guarantee improved travel for passengers. Improvement is predicated on the goodwill of GBR and others driving things in the ‘right direction’. In our view the key to improvement is culture change within those organisations coming together to form GBR. Creating GBR from Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd (NRIL) will not signal the need for change and creates a risk that the current Network Rail culture will be seen as the norm and hence the status quo will prevail.” We have discussed this a bit. The Minister has taken the view that this cultural change does not exist. If he continues with that belief, he will condemn this nationalisation experiment to almost certain failure. The vast majority of the wider sector agrees that organisational culture is the single most important ingredient for the Bill to get right, yet time and again the Government have resisted amendments suggested by the Opposition and the Liberal Democrats to drive an improvement in culture and focus on the right things. Having set the target for GBR, the clause uses very weak language for what comes next: just “have regard to”. It is too weak. Amendment 262, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer), who is not a member of the Committee but drafted this amendment along with a couple of others that we have already debated, seeks to highlight his constituents’ concerns about the negative impact that level crossings can have on communities. He is right to stand up for his constituents and that freight is one more part of the jigsaw when we look at the juxtaposition between the needs of the railway—whether it is passenger services or, as in the case of this amendment, rail freight—and the knock-on consequences for the wider economy of a community whose economic and social heart is bisected by a level crossing. He is right that those three sometimes competing issues need to be balanced, which is the intention of amendment 262. Amendment 219 in my name would leave out “have regard to” and insert “take into account in all relevant decisions and demonstrate that it has taken into account”. That is a stronger line to take and makes it easier for freight organisations to hold decision makers to account. They need to have the power to challenge the historic approach of freight being secondary to passenger travel. Accommodation is needed for both in a sector where we all hope that both passenger and freight will grow, but we need to recognise that it is a capacity-limited structure and that there will therefore have to be some compromise. Historically, freight has always played second fiddle to passenger travel. We need accommodation for both, and the new wording would strengthen the hand of freight to ensure that its proper position is maintained by GBR. I will seek to divide the Committee on that amendment if the opportunity arises. Amendment 149, in the name of the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage, would require a national freight strategy, including electrification of freight routes and infrastructure improvements. It is unobjectionable, and in fact quite good. I would support it should the hon. Member press it to a vote. Amendment 220, which is in my name, would strengthen the accountability of the Secretary of State by adding a new subsection that states: “The Secretary of State must take into account the rail freight target in all relevant decisions and”— importantly— “demonstrate how the target has been taken into account.” The key word there, of course, is “demonstrate”. It would keep the duty high in the mind of officials and make it easier for independent rail freight operators to hold the Government to their duty. Without that strengthening, the clause would achieve very little. We go through the whole process of having this rail freight target—“Isn’t that wonderful? We’ve done a great job. We as policymakers think this is excellent”—and then the delivery organisation just has to “have regard” to it and can leave it on the shelf. As currently drafted, it looks as though the clause is a last-minute bung to the loud rail freight sector. We all heard the oral evidence from Maggie Simpson of the Rail Freight Group. She is, without doubt, the doughtiest of campaigners on behalf of the members of her organisation. She is very effective, but it was clear to me that clause 17 was a late accommodation for her advocacy, but it is only half cocked. That explains why, while Maggie Simpson was trying not to sound too churlish in relation to what the Government have done so far, she nevertheless went on to say it is still deserving of criticism. This amendment seeks to improve further what the Government have started. In relation to the rail freight target, new clause 47 requires an annual report on rail freight. It would create “an annual reporting and oversight mechanism, requiring GBR to set out how freight access, performance and corridor capacity are being supported, and requiring the ORR to publish an independent assessment”. That would strengthen the clause, which the Rail Freight Group says does not go far enough—I have already set out its quote in relation to that. Once more, we are back to the accountability of a new nationalised industry. You get what you measure, and without requirements for GBR to report, there is a serious risk of getting lost in the weeds. The decision to nationalise is the Government’s; it is a political decision based on their ideology, but we have to accept that it does remove market forces. Some people say there are negative elements of market forces, but there are undoubtedly positive elements as well; we just need to be open-eyed about it. If we remove market forces as a driver of competition, efficiency and innovation, then they need to be replaced by duties in the legislation or accompanying documents. The duty to replace the incentives with cumbersome regulations and control is an inevitable consequence of the decision to nationalise. That is what new clause 47 is intended to achieve.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Minister will not be wholly surprised that I do not agree with his analysis. I intend to press amendments 219 and 220—and, in the fullness of time, new clause 47—to a Division, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw amendment 262. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Amendment proposed : 219, in clause 17, page 9, line 30, leave out “have regard to” and insert “take into account in all relevant decisions and demonstrate that it has taken into account”.— (Jerome Mayhew.) This amendment would require GBR to take into account the freight target when making all relevant decisions and to show how this has been taken into account. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It may well do, in short answer. The Minister makes a valid point: having a single point of contact for this may well have a benefit. Of course, it could be the Office of Rail and Road as opposed to GBR, but the real problem, which we will come on to in a few hours—or days—is the drafting of clause 63, which concerns the capacity duty and the very onerous level that open access operators will have to get above in order for GBR to consider that there is sufficient excess capacity to allow for new services. As clause 63(2) states: “Great British Railways must exercise the functions so as to ensure that it retains sufficient capacity over GBR infrastructure to allow for…the operation of GBR passenger services and of railway passenger services that it expects will in future be GBR passenger services”. That is a bar, I suggest, that no open access application could ever get over. GBR gets a get-out-of-jail-free card. No one likes competition. When I ran businesses, I did my best to avoid competition as much as I could. The inclination of GBR will be no different. It will not want to be shown up by competition. It will not want its market to be pinched by competition. All it will have to do is look at clause 63 and say, “There you go. At some stage in the future we might think about having something there,” and Bob’s your uncle. Then what can the open access operators do? They could say, “That is a terrible decision. We’re going to appeal it. Even though the bar is so high in legislation that it is almost impossible to appeal, we’re going to the ORR because clause 67 says that any organisation that is disgruntled at such a decision has a right to appeal.” Look at what the appeal duty provides for: organisations can go to the ORR, and there is an appeal akin to judicial review in the High Court, meaning that there can be no appeal at all on the application’s merits, which cannot be reopened. No evidence regarding whether there is a good business case can be considered—just whether there has been an error of law, or whether an organisation properly constituted could have come to that decision without irrationality. That is what the judicial review principles mean. Furthermore, organisations have to put in their application for judicial review within three months of the commission of the event against which they are complaining. It is incredibly onerous, and perhaps the single biggest problem with the drafting of the Bill is a combination of those two issues. That was a very enjoyable aside, but I need to get on to the amendments—you are probably relieved to hear that, Mrs Hobhouse. Amendments 237, 37, 238, 239 and 240 essentially all serve to apply the ORR competition duty to GBR functions, to serve the passenger rather than the organisation of GBR. That is what we need to focus on time and again: this organisation is to serve the passenger, not itself as an organisation. The amendments would keep alive the role of open access operators as challenger brands to GBR, forcing GBR to up its game and stay honest, just as we have seen with the nationalised operator on the east coast main line. Just because there would be competition, that does not mean that GBR would wither and decline. As we have seen on the east coast main line, competition drives increased performance and results from all organisations when properly applied. Competition is always uncomfortable. I complained about it many times in my previous business career. Many businesses, including my own, would have loved to be able to regulate it away. All the more reason for the Government to stand up to GBR in the interests of passengers. The Minister was quite right to say that it is a positive step that GBR will have oversight of the whole network. However, we want to see the ORR’s competition powers in these areas restored as a way to ensure that GBR, while having a reasonable duty to look at and balance the needs of the network as a whole, does not unfairly discriminate against other operators because we have GBR as referee and player. That is clearly a designed, structural conflict of interest. We need to have the ORR focusing on competition and holding the ring. Amendment 237 deals with funding, amendment 37 deals with access, amendment 238 deals with railway closures, and amendments 239 and 240 deal with advice to the Secretary of State and amendment 240 also deals with advice to the Secretary of State. I know all Members will have read those amendments, so I will not take the Committee through them one by one in the interests of time. Amendment 38 would insert “and deliver value for money” after “competition” in clause 20, page 11, line 27. We do not need the Office of Rail and Road just to fight the cause of competition; it is also about value for money for the taxpayer. We have already heard that about 50% of all money spent on the railways at the moment is taxpayers’ money, not farebox money. It is therefore crucial that the ORR should have a duty to ensure that GBR delivers value for money. The general duty, as set out in clause 18, is to have regard to the “efficient use” of public funds. That is clearly insufficiently strong. In the absence of other private passenger operators, whether via open access or a devolved concession, which would be equally powerful as a comparator for GBR’s performance, against what will GBR’s efficiency and performance on value for money be measured? Amendment 38 would correct the language in clause 20. I have not made it up myself; it has been considered and approved of by the sector as a whole—people standing up for passengers. On amendments 37, 41, 42 and 43, Rail Forum said: “Again, this is desirable to ensure some competition.” I have spoken to all my amendments, but I would also like to speak about amendment 210, which is in the name of the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage. The amendment also removes the exemption of the ORR’s duty to promote competition in regard to GBR’s access process. It is a variation on a theme. We are all pushing in the same direction because we are trying to stand up for passengers, and I hope the Government will too.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 36, in clause 18, page 10, line 41, at end insert— “(5) In this section, Great British Railways must make an assessment of the effect of procuring services from businesses in the private sector in meeting its duties under subsection (2)(f).” This amendment would require GBR to assess whether procuring services from the private sector would help it meet its value for money duty.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 33, in clause 18, page 10, line 23, at end insert— “(g) in the manner best calculated to increase the number travelling by railway, (h) in the manner best calculated to contribute to economic growth, (i) in the manner best calculated to increase private sector investment and involvement in the railways and railway services, (j) in the manner best calculated to remove or reduce the need for public subsidy of the railways, (k) in the manner best calculated to increase levels of passenger satisfaction as monitored by The Passengers’ Council, and (l) in the manner best calculated to improve efficiency and productivity in the delivery of railway services.” This amendment gives Great British Railways additional duties to promote passenger growth, economic growth, and increased private sector investment in the railways.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Let us go straight into amendment 36, which would require GBR to benchmark the cost of its activities against similar provision through the use of the private sector. That is important, because if competition is removed, there is literally no benchmark against which to judge the effectiveness and efficiency of the organisation. Without comparison, where is the value in clause 18(2)(f), which says: “taking into account the costs that will need to be met from public funds and the need to make efficient use of those funds,”? What benchmark will the organisation have if it does not cross-reference against alternative providers? The amendment would require GBR to assess whether “procuring services from…the private sector” would help it to meet its value for money duty. I should make it clear for Labour Members who are considering supporting this amendment that it would not require GBR to choose a private sector provider, but it would require it to benchmark against the private sector. Procuring from the private sector could enable access to specialist expertise, innovation—dare I say that?—and competitive pricing, helping to deliver better value for money and more efficient outcomes for taxpayers. Will the Minister listen to the concerns of the industry and support this amendment, which seeks to make GBR an organisation that cares about passengers and taxpayers at the same time? Amendments 42 and 43 would amend clause 31, on the provision of railway passenger services, which we will get to in due course. The clause currently allows the Secretary of State to award a licence only to a public-sector company. It cannot be in the best interests of the taxpayer to exclude even the consideration of alternative providers based on their ability and value for money. This is one of the most blatant examples of political ideology trumping pragmatism. The amendments would grant maximum flexibility to a future Secretary of State and Scottish and Welsh Ministers to make an award to the organisation, public or private, that is best placed to undertake the operation. It seems obvious that we should allow that degree of flexibility to the organisation and the Secretary of State in future. Amendment 98, which is tabled in my name, would require the Office of Rail and Road to consider whether it would be a “more efficient use of public funds” for GBR to procure services from the private sector. It echoes the other amendments in this group but would amend clause 74, which, as everyone will remember, relates to the ORR’s monitoring duties towards GBR. Amendment 236 would also amend clause 74 to require the Office of Rail and Road to assess whether procuring services from the private sector would better enable GBR to meet its value for money duty. New clause 43 relates to a private sector growth target. It would require the Secretary of State to publish a target for increasing private sector involvement in railway services and infrastructure for each financial year, including its involvement in supply chains and open access. Just because we want GBR to be a success, let us not forget that, even once established, it will be a minority interest in relation to the rail sector as a whole. There is not just open access—there are all sorts of other users of and suppliers to the railways—so we can have both duties. They are not mutually incompatible. The new clause would require that the target must be kept under review and that GBR must have regard to it when exercising its statutory functions. The private sector is best at providing us with innovation and efficiencies and should therefore be used to ensure that GBR can be the best version of itself. In more common parlance, we need the private sector to keep GBR honest. The Bill designs the ORR and the Secretary of State out of comparing GBR against a thriving private sector. Surely it makes sense to give the Secretary of State all the tools in the box to allow her to drive efficiency in GBR and cross-check value for money for the taxpayer.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I understand the point the Minister is making about the lack of relationship between those two documents. In the debate on the previous group, he was able to give an indication of the likely timeframe for publishing the Scottish memorandum of understanding. Can he give a similar hint on the Welsh memorandum of understanding? [ Interruption. ] There seems to be a bit of nodding on the Government Benches, but it is entirely up to him, because he decides.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I hope it will be the last, but I fear I will not be. I have some key questions for the Minister. I understand that the memorandum of understanding has not yet been finalised; has the work to scope it out even begun? The Minister should at least be able to answer that. At what stage in the deliberations between the two Ministries has it got to? What is the timeline for a memorandum of understanding under the clause being finalised and therefore made public? How often, if at all, must the memorandum of understanding be reviewed, updated or renegotiated? Or is it a one-stop shop? It currently seems that the memorandums will have no statutory force. Unless I have missed something in the Bill—I always enjoy being corrected when I have missed something—it is not in there at the moment. Is that by design? What legal standing will the memorandums have? They do not appear to have statutory force, and there is very little democratic accountability, as I have mentioned. As far as I can see, the memorandum is essentially a handshake agreement. Not a single member of this Committee is any the wiser about what will be part of the memorandums. Finally, what happens if no agreement is reached on a memorandum of understanding between the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers? The Minister can give evidence about his willingness to reach agreement, but he cannot give evidence on the part of Scottish Ministers. They can be willing to negotiate, but he cannot say with confidence that they will achieve full agreement until such time as that agreement is reached. I stand to be informed by the Minister, but my current understanding is that that agreement has not yet been reached. The lack of oversight is clearly at the core of this issue. Parliament is expected to allow the Secretary of State and her Scottish counterpart to set the tone of the nature of rail operations without any say from this House, beyond this clause. The Government criticise the franchise system, but at least the parameters for its operation were clearly set out. Memorandums of understanding are nothing more than IOUs to the trust of parliamentarians, and we should not willingly give those out. There is a further issue at stake here: the Scottish parliamentary elections. This is a matter of practicalities, as opposed to principles. The pre-election period, or purdah, is rapidly approaching for the Scottish Parliament. My understanding is that it will be coming into force in late March, which is only weeks away. Given that the Minister will be eager to ensure that all the appropriate orders and memorandums are in place as quickly as is reasonably possible, what thought has he given to avoiding a rush job ahead of the election, or to the timetable for the memorandums of understanding being reached with any change of Government in Scotland? This is actually quite a significant question. Is the Minister going to rush it through to get it in before March? What happens if there is a change of Administration north of the border? It is with that uncertainty in mind that we believe the clause ought to have a clear timeframe for the publication of the MOU. The memorandums of understanding should be laid before Parliament for approval. Parliament is being asked to give broad Executive powers as if an international treaty were being negotiated, but this is not an international treaty. Parliament ought to have the right to approve the memorandums to ensure, in particular, that Members whose constituencies are affected by them have a say on behalf of their constituents. That is what amendment 39 would provide, by providing two additions: that a memorandum be published at the same time as the rail strategy, which would give a concrete timeframe for the delivery of that important document, and that it be laid before Parliament for a period of two months before it can come into force. I look forward to the Government’s response.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 237, in clause 20, page 11, line 21, leave out paragraph (c). This amendment removes the exemption for ORR’s functions under schedule 2 from its competition duty.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am aware that we need to make progress in this Committee, so I will not press every amendment to a Division. I am not persuaded by the Minister’s arguments in relation to amendments 32 and 33, but I will not press amendment 31 to a Division. I wish now to press amendment 33 to a vote. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  To give you an advance clue, I intend to press amendments 237 and 37 to a vote. Depending on the outcome of the vote on amendment 37, I may not seek to divide on the others, apart from amendment 38.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I hope I am not going to miss out any of those amendments, Mrs Hobhouse, but it is going to be quite a challenge. Clause 20 concerns the “competition duty” of the Office of Rail and Road; it sounds pretty good when you read that title but the clause gets progressively less and less good once you delve into it. The clause requires the ORR to promote competition in the exercise of its functions, subject to certain exceptions. Exempt activities relate to safety, train driver licensing, the funding of GBR, GBR’s access process and decisions in relation to railway infrastructure, licence enforcement, functions under the Competition Act 1998, and monitoring GBR, where the Government believe that other considerations are equally or more important than the need to promote competition. The Government claim that they want the Office of Rail and Road to have a powerful role to monitor GBR and to promote laudable objectives such as “competition….for the benefit of users of railway services.” On the face of it, that is welcome. It is a sound principle, after all, that monopolies—whether they are public or private—are rarely in the interests of the consumer. It is for that exact reason that we created, over time, arms of the state such as the Competition and Markets Authority to break up anti-competitive monopolies in the private sector, although GBR is another monopoly that the Government are setting up, in the other direction. However, when we dig into the detail of what subsection (1) of the clause exempts from the competition duty, the picture becomes considerably less attractive. Excluding from the competition duty chapter 1 of part 3 of the Bill means that key parts of GBR’s operation, such as the access and use policy and capacity duty—two very important issues—are not covered by the duty of competition. That effectively makes GBR all-powerful over any other operator, be it devolved, open access or freight. That is not competition; that is a designed monopoly. The Minister has said that the Government have taken that decision because they want GBR to be a single controlling mind, but GBR will not be the only operator on the railways. The Minister, just a moment ago, said that there are circumstances in which he would wish open access to flourish and grow, yet the Bill as drafted does not give any confidence to that sector that an operator can put forward a business case and attract investment because such an operator does not know whether there will be fair competition around crucial elements of its business case—elements as basic as whether it will get access to the railways. In the Bill, such competition is specifically, expressly excluded. The exceptions in the clause are key to understanding the true intentions of the Government. Despite the appearance that the clause allows the Office of Rail and Road to promote competition, examination of subsection 1(d) shows that the Office of Rail and Road is required to promote competition unless it gets in the way of the access and use policy, which—as the Committee will discuss later—does not promote competition at all. Elsewhere, the Government appreciate the positive impact of competition. Look at international rail. Lord Hendy took the trouble to write to the Office of Rail and Road in July last year, and said: “The Government firmly believes that the arrival of competition will benefit users of international rail services by expanding the number of stations served (including new markets), encouraging greater differentiation in service provision and promoting competitive prices.” I could not have written it better myself. The Government are clearly sending out extraordinarily mixed messages: competition is good, except when it is against the Government. Those statements cannot both be right, can they?

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I do not know why I bothered going to the gym this morning, Mrs Hobhouse, because I have been doing squat thrusts every time I rise to speak to a new group of amendments. Clause 23 deals with the memorandum of understanding, about which we have heard so much but know so little, and the relationship between the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers. It sets out the key arrangements between the UK Government and the Scottish Government, stating the intention for the memorandum of understanding to include steps to facilitate the integration of GBR infrastructure and Scottish railway services. The elephant in the room is that is none of that is set out in the Bill. The Opposition believe it is vital for Ministers to outline, at the very least, the broad framework for the basis of the memorandum if they will not commit to provide core elements in the Bill itself. It really is very frustrating: we are paid to come to this Committee to give the Bill line-by-line consideration, set up the function of GBR and improve the relationship among Ministers in Whitehall, Edinburgh and Cardiff, the ORR and the other organisations affected by GBR, yet time and again we get the blank answer, “Oh well, this is going to be sorted out somewhere else.” It is very hard to say with confidence that we have scrutinised the Bill and come to an improved outcome when the Government have not done the work on the detail. This is not the first time Members have heard me say that—

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Does the hon. Gentleman not see the logic of the lobby group for rail freight saying that we should focus on rail freight while the lobby group in favour of the passenger, which I quoted earlier, says that there should be a passenger growth target? Does he not think that those representing passengers are better qualified to express an opinion on passengers than the rail freight lobbyist?

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Will the Minister clarify his argument? I ask because a business plan by its nature looks forward, whereas a report looks backward and marks homework. How can the business plan mark homework?

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  In oral evidence before the Transport Committee, Ben Plowden, the chief executive of the Campaign for Better Transport, said: “We have a question about the difference in the duties between the way that freight is treated and passenger travel is treated: the duty on GBR and Secretary of State in relation to passengers is ‘to promote’ their ‘interests’, whereas it is ‘to promote the use of the…network’ for freight. Our view is that in order to incentivise GBR strongly—once it is set up—to grow the network and to grow passenger demand, there should be equivalent duties about passengers in clauses 18 and 17, so that GBR is required to promote the use of the network for passengers and future passengers, with a corresponding duty on the Secretary of State to set a passenger growth target. Our concern is that otherwise, the risk is that GBR might manage demand as a steady state, achieving its other objectives without necessarily seeking to grow demand by expanding the network or making better use of existing capacity.” Hon. and right hon. Members will recall—although the only right hon. Member has done a runner—that Ben Plowden made a substantially similar point in oral evidence to this Committee. I think he prayed in aid the experience post covid, when all sorts of targets were met, but that was because there were not any trains running. He went on to say to the Transport Committee: “It seems to us that the logic would suggest that if it is important for GBR to have a statutory incentive to promote a growth in freight traffic, it also ought to have a statutory incentive to do that for passenger growth. We know that the expansion and increase in capacity and connectivity in the rail network has huge socioeconomic benefits. Look at the Northumberland line that recently reopened; look at Crossrail. There are huge benefits from expanding network capacity and increasing the number of people who are able to travel by rail. If you look at the Bill, it is interesting that service performance is defined in terms of ‘reliability (including punctuality)’ and ‘the avoidance or mitigation of passenger overcrowding’. There could be a scenario whereby GBR decided that, in order to meet its reliability duty”— and this is the point— “it reduced services to smooth them out and improve reliability, and in order to avoid overcrowding, it then introduced fares that” managed “demand, as has been suggested might happen on the west coast main line in the context of HS2. There might be scenarios where, for perfectly logical reasons, internally GBR might decide that it did not want to increase passenger demand either on a particular route or overall. It seems to us that it would be sensible to have an equivalent duty or pair of duties in the Bill on passenger demand as it has for freight. GBR would need, as we were just discussing, to work out how to optimise that objective versus the other objectives it has set out in the duties and functions.”

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful for the Minister’s explanation. I do not intend to stand in the way of the clause standing part of the Bill. It is quite clear that it should do so in some form. However, I respectfully disagree with the Minister’s assessment of the consequence of the drafting where the duties are joint rather than joint and several and I will seek a vote on the amendment. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  If that is the clear objective of the Government, why are they allowing open access to continue?

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Government amendment makes further provision concerning the memorandum of understanding between the Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers. I have no objection to it. The Minister is absolutely right that clause 24 is similar in intention to clause 23, but there are huge questions about the role that Welsh Ministers are to have in the governance and management of GBR in their jurisdiction under the memorandum of understanding, and whether the Secretary of State will have any role in the governance and management of Transport for Wales. The Welsh settlement is very different from the Scottish one, in both geography and degree of devolution— I suppose that is how it can be most simply described. The relationship between the Welsh and UK Governments is far more nuanced and complex than the relationship in the case of ScotRail and the management of rail in Scotland. Transport for Wales covers a significant number of cross-border rail services. I stand to be corrected, but I think that as many as 80% of all its services have an element of cross-border movement. This harks back to the former private sector franchise of Arriva Trains Wales, which ran many England-only services and joint England-Wales services. That system of rail service provision persists under Transport for Wales; it is much more blended than is the case in Scotland. I have some examples. Shrewsbury station, which, for the geographically challenged, is in England, is managed by Transport for Wales. From there, it manages services that run exclusively in England, such as Shrewsbury to Manchester. It also runs all manner of cross-border services, such as the Heart of Wales line, of which about 5% is in England, and Aberystwyth to Birmingham, which is 50:50 England and Wales—on it goes. Any memorandum of understanding will have to outline in detail, one assumes, how the allocation of moneys for tickets will be divided. This works both ways. Former Great Western Railway and Avanti services from London to Holyhead and from London to Swansea via Cardiff have significant portions of their routes running through Wales as well as England. Taxpayers in both nations will rightly presume that the value of ticket sales will be distributed proportionately between both railways, as they will both be Government-run, rather than going to the operator whose livery happens to adorn the locomotive. The issue is relatively small in the discussions about Scotland, where I think only 3% of services are cross-border between England and Scotland. In Wales, the proportion is much greater, and I am concerned that there is no clear mechanism for how the allocation of ticket sales is set to be achieved or agreed. Will GBR and Transport for Wales—or, more accurately, the Secretary of State and the Welsh Ministers—come to a profit-sharing or fare-box sharing agreement as part of the memorandum of understanding? This is at the core of the issue of value for money, so it should be an important consideration, and I look to the Minister to provide reassurance that it is in the mix. I have a compounding concern, which I expressed in relation to clause 23, about the timeline of the publication of the memorandum of understanding. Again, a purdah period is approaching: the elections for the Welsh Senedd are in May. I think I am right in saying—my right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston mentioned it—that it was suggested in the oral evidence that the heads of terms have already been agreed, but that is not the same as the memorandum of understanding being agreed, so we need a bit more detail from the Minister, if he is able to give it. There is a big caveat for Wales in particular, where—though I do not want to ruin anyone’s sleep tonight—it is very likely that Labour will be removed from office come May, and that there will be a new Government in Cardiff. It would be improper for a rush job to take place in order to shoehorn through a memorandum of understanding between two like-minded Administrations. I have tabled amendment 40 to clause 24 for the same reason that I tabled amendment 39 to clause 23. Amendment 40 seeks to introduce a degree of control over the timeline for the publication of the memorandum of understanding. In the Transport Committee evidence session on 17 December, Peter McDonald, who is the director for transport, spoke on behalf of the Welsh Government. He spoke in some detail about the future relationship between GBR and the Welsh Government, and how it relies on the memorandum of understanding. Will the Minister take this opportunity to reassure the Committee about the safeguards or timeline the Government have in place? Do they believe it would be helpful to have a clearer timeline, especially considering the electoral sensitivities and, if the opinion polls are to be believed, the likely change of Administration in Cardiff Bay? I have plenty more to say about this, but I am aware that it is getting dark outside and we have been going on for some time. Those concerns are the rationale for amendment 40, which would apply similar requirements to those that amendment 39 would have applied to clause 23. I tried to be understanding with the Minister in not pressing amendment 39 on Scotland to a vote, because of the direction he was able to hint at in his response. I look forward to being similarly reassured in respect of Wales.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 34, in clause 18, page 10, line 12, leave out “They” and insert “Each person or organisation designated under section 18(1)”. This amendment clarifies that the statutory duties apply to those listed in section 18(1), namely Ministers, Great British Railways and the Office of Rail and Road.