Jerome Mayhew MP: speeches

Speeches

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Would you accept that the Committee is flying blind substantially on a lot of this, because we do not have the MOUs or a lot of the information that is core to the successful running and governance of GBR at the moment? Peter McDonald: In the case of Wales, the heads of terms for the MOU were published in December. We are now working closely with Department for Transport officials on the detail. We are optimistic that we can jointly publish a full draft in early March. It is important for us to do that, because, similar to the Scottish Government, we have a pre-election period ahead of the devolved elections, and we would not want that to lose momentum in this important process.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I am grateful that we got a little more time to explore that. At the moment, we are in control period 7, so that takes us— Darren Caplan: To 2029.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q What is missing from the Bill, from your perspective? Malcolm Brown: I think the references to the building blocks of the long-term rail strategy and the rolling stock and infrastructure strategy are key components that will actually help give greater colour to the Bill. At this point, a number of us are looking at this and trusting in the fact that they will come, and will come in a timely manner, and that that will allow us to get on and invest. This is not just investing for investing’s sake; this is taking Rob’s plant in Goole and actually pouring work in there that will employ people in the local area. It is that type of thing that will break the log jam that we have just now, and let us get on with things.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q A recurring theme of this evidence today is the saga of the missing memorandum of understanding and/or draft licences. We have not seen 19 and counting documents that will form a crucial part of the governance of GBR in the future. Have you any idea about those? Have you seen a draft of the MOU? Do you know what is going to be in it? Bill Reeve: We are working with colleagues in DFT on the heads of terms for that and on what the principles will be. Since the Bill submission last year, that has clearly been a key priority for us. Again, we have had good constructive discussions, working through in detail, as we should. Thus far, we are pleased with those discussions.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q It is interesting that you indicate that the guidance is a last resort, not a first resort. It does not say that on the face of the Bill. Do you think it should? Bill Reeve: I think that would be a matter of convention and expectation. It is not the sort of thing you would rush to do when there are other ordinary means of engagement to be used first.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you for that. Mr Caplan, you represent RIA. Please explain to the Committee what RIA is and how important your organisation is. Darren Caplan: We represent rail suppliers in the UK—all around the country, large and small. They can be companies like Siemens and Angel, and they can be SMEs—60% of the supply chain are SMEs and they are our members. There are about 640,000 jobs in the UK rail industry, and about half of those work in the supply chain, so it is quite a lot of jobs. Around £40 billion of GVA is rail, and half of that is from the supply sector. Around £14 billion of Treasury revenue comes in from our sector, and half of that is from the supply sector, so it is a really important sector, covering building, maintaining, reviewing, infrastructure, rolling stock, signalling and so on—it is the full gamut of the rail industry. The point you picked up on, Mr Mayhew, is really important, and I am happy to expand on that. I have in front of me the Bill’s clauses and provisions. Schedule 2 is the one we are concerned about, and it is really significant. It says: “The Secretary of State must provide the ORR and Great British Railways with a statement, in relation to a funding period, indicating the amount of financial assistance that the Secretary of State reasonably considers may be made available to Great British Railways by the Secretary of State…for the purpose of funding the activities of Great British Railways during the funding period.” That period is five years. It says, “must provide”. Then, three pages later, on page 64, it says: “If the Secretary of State proposes to vary the financial assistance to be provided…the Secretary of State must notify Great British Railways of the proposed variation…The Secretary of State must notify the ORR if…the Secretary of State considers that the proposed postponement, withdrawal or reduction is likely to have a material impact on the ability of Great British Railways to carry on the activities specified”. That is “provide” versus “notified”. It says they must “provide” the budget for a five-year period, but later it says they just have to “notify” if they want to change what they do. That is hugely significant, because it means that you can set up a five-year budget and decide that you want to change it once in that control period, or every month if you want to. That is highly political, because a future Secretary of State can decide what they want to do coming into a new control period. The future is less certain under the Bill than it is currently. We have had control periods for the last 30 to 35 years— we are now in CP7. Under the Bill, the future version of funding assistance for rail will be less certain than it is now. The Bill also only talks about postponing, withdrawing or reducing, and not increasing. At no point does it talk about funding going up; it is all about reducing it. For my fellow witnesses, when they are looking at where they are going to invest, they will say that there might be £45 billion invested over five years, but that could come down—if you do not know for certain, why should you do it? My final point is that rail is a very certain industry: you know what you need to spend in five years—you know the renewals you need to do, and you know the rolling stock you need to get, maintain or refurbish—so why can you not commit to a five-year spending envelope? It is very simple.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Mr Morris, you have just been referred to. At the moment, you have a control period of five years where the funding is locked down and there is a degree of forward certainty. Under the Bill, that certainty will be removed. It is not giving you more certainty for the future; it is giving you less. How important to the supply chain is certainty about the control period? Rob Morris: Certainty is very important. We have invested something like £340 million, and we are currently investing in a new Goole facility for rail and train manufacture and a train command and control systems R&D and manufacturing facility at Chippenham. To continue with investment not just in facilities, but in skills and rolling stock for the future, we need certainty about the financing or funding over the control periods. It is not just about renewals, which are currently included, and which are there to stop the infrastructure from falling over; it must also be about enhancements and rolling stock and the maintenance of that. From our perspective, we would echo what Malcolm said about the 30-year long-term strategy. For all those elements I have talked about, we must recognise that strategies have to be reviewed. I would suggest that that be done every five years for all of those and that funding is made available on a five-year basis, so that the supply chain has absolute clarity on where it can invest and how it can support GBR. GBR spend will be 50%-plus, we expect, within the supply chain, so what it does not want is for the supply chain and the investors to fall over.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q There is reference, obviously, to a long-term strategy for rail in the Bill, but how long that is is not defined. Let us give the Minister a helping hand: for the ROSCOs and for the supply chain, what do you mean by “long-term”? What is helpful, and what is just too far in the future? Malcolm Brown: As a general rule, a 10-year horizon is something that we can work with. With the nature of infrastructure—not just rail, actually, but other infrastructures too—for this type of asset, that, while it is not whole life, gives a clear look forward. When you extend that, clearly the level of accuracy, if not certainty, gets less. That is perfectly okay; we are used to dealing with that. That is how infrastructure actually works. We do not need to have 100% knowledge of something that is going to happen in 35 or 40 years, but what you want to have for look-through is, “Okay, we know what is going to happen in 10 years, and therefore, on a probability basis, this is what we will assume to do in 30, 35 or 40 years.”

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you both, as ever, for coming to give oral evidence; it is very helpful. Mr Burnham, I am going to focus on you. It is difficult, isn’t it? You have a national rail network, where you have to have a degree of national organisation, but you have devolved areas as well, which rightly have ambitions for an increased level of control, as I believe you do for rail. There will inevitably be a degree of tension between them. Part of the Bill’s job is to do its best to get that balance right. Inevitably—I speak as the shadow Minister—it will be very hard to be perfect, but we need to do as much as we can to get the Bill as good as we can by design at this stage. I will start with the Bee Network up in Greater Manchester, which you have organised on the basis of concessions let by you, the mayoralty. The benefit of that is that the fare box is kept locally and it is operated privately. It does not have to be; you could run those concessions through a wholly owned subsidiary. I accept that. That approach of keeping the fare box local does not work with GBR because the fare box stays with GBR. Even if you have a greater level of devolvement, it feels a bit like it is going to be GBR in Greater Manchester, just painted yellow. Is that what you wanted from the Bill, or did you have aspirations for a bit more control? Andy Burnham: Thank you very much for the question. I agree with the way that you have presented it. There is a tension to be resolved, but I believe it can be resolved. It is really important that you have mentioned the Bee Network, because I am responsible for running the tram and bus systems, so the backbone of the public transport system is under our control. We have to move to a world where the railway emerges from its railway silo and sees the bigger picture—the integration of public transport across all modes. I would encourage the Committee to think about that, because that change is coming. You will know, Ms Barker, that Liverpool city region will also soon embark on putting buses under public control, and I think the model we are creating will become something of a norm around the country. I think it is possible to go further, as you say, and my evidence for that is TfL Overground: an arrangement was reached between the Government, the railways and TfL on an integrated, fair offer. I believe that is entirely achievable in Greater Manchester, where the railways come into the capped system. Actually, the rest of the Bee Network adds value to the railway, because no longer will it be the case that you buy a ticket in somewhere like Buxton or Glossop and your travel runs out at Manchester Piccadilly; in a capped system, people can have their onward travel all included under that daily cap. That is what operates in London, and I see no reason why it cannot operate in Greater Manchester—indeed, we will insist that we get the same. Isn’t it all about revenue sharing, hopefully in relation to passenger growth? We have a plan to bring eight rail lines into the Bee Network, starting with two this year, and it is a plan that has been agreed with the rail industry. This is potentially a win-win for everybody, because the arrival of the capped Bee Network system gives people more reason to use the railways, so we think that we can increase patronage on those rail lines. It has to be a real partnership with the railway, which is why we are encouraging the Committee to go beyond the idea that we are just consultees who can be listened to or not. Meaningful partnership is what will build the right railway and the right public transport solution in our city. It is much more than painting the trains yellow, although I do want to see yellow trains all over Greater Manchester with bees on them.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Does anyone else on the panel disagree with that assertion? Michael Roberts indicated dissent.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Neither of which we have seen. Michael Roberts: Correct, and I think the Committee would want the reassurance of understanding what content covering this aspect will be in those documents, as it considers whether the Bill is appropriately written. Alex Robertson: I agree with a lot of what has been said, particularly the point that accessibility must be a top priority of the railway in the future. How you achieve that is the question we are looking at now. As Michael said, the business plan, the long-term rail strategy and GBR’s duty to consult us and others on those, and to do so transparently, are where you will make sure that the railway focuses on the things that are most important to passengers.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I turn now to the Bill, rather than the broader situation. There are huge powers in the Bill for the Secretary of State or the Department for Transport, in relation to setting out the long-term strategy, intervening in fares and their structure, and giving guidance and direction. Those are the key areas, but there are a number of others. Are you a bit concerned that there is going to be some backseat driving going on? Keith Williams: From the Government?

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q You agree that it is very, very narrow. John Larkinson: Absolutely, yes.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you all for coming in person or, Emma, for joining online. I am going to focus on clause 18 of the Bill, which is on the general duties of Ministers, GBR and the ORR. In particular, I will jump straight to clause 18(2), which sets out the functions and how they should operate those functions. Paragraph (c) states that one such function is “to promote high standards of railway service performance”, itself defined in clause 18(3): “‘railway service performance’ includes, in particular, performance in securing each of the following in relation to railway services— (a) reliability…and (b) the avoidance or mitigation of passenger overcrowding.” My question about that definition of service performance, which is very narrow, is for everyone, but I will start with you, Emma. Are you concerned that the focus is primarily on reliability and overcrowding? What about comfort, heating, wi-fi, food, frequency, cost and all the other good stuff—and disability access? Emma Vogelmann: I completely agree that accessibility really needs to be explicit in the requirements set out in the Bill. This is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to make sure that we are not making the same mistakes of the past in having accessibility not explicitly enforceable and not having it in the Bill as much as possible. Disabled passengers already experience accessibility being deprioritised in the name of efficiency and other considerations. We absolutely agree that it needs to be considered. Ben Plowden: I certainly echo that point from Emma about accessibility. The broader point is that in the absence of any duty on GBR to grow passenger demand over time, which we might come back to, one can imagine a scenario in which, in meeting those two specific duties on passenger service standards, GBR might be incentivised to improve reliability on a route by reducing service frequency and then to deal with the crowding duty by pricing people off the network.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q The second issue I wish to draw out is the fair treatment of other fare providers. At the moment, a number of independent retailers have very good tech that facilitates passengers using the railway. In the new environment, Great British Railways will be the holder of the data—the holder of the ring—but it is also intending, perfectly reasonably, to be part of the game as well: it will have a retail operation, so it will be directly competing in that retail market. This issue has been considered in other state-owned organisations, such as SNCF, where it was recognised that there was a structural conflict of interest; as a result, the retail side of SNCF is a stand-alone, independent organisation. The Government have chosen not to do that. Do you not think that that is surprising? Would it be beneficial to have GBR retail carved off as a stand-alone? Ben Plowden: The Government’s own documentation acknowledges the benefit that independent ticket retailers have brought to customers in terms of competition, ease of buying tickets and so on. The Government intend managerially to separate GBR’s ticketing and retail operation from its commercial and operational arm. It seems to us that if the Government are not willing to set up a stand-alone ticketing operation, as SNCF has done, it is important to hold GBR to the same standards as the independent operators in terms of how it does fares and ticketing. It will be required to comply with ORR guidance on ticket retailing, but that is simply about how it engages with the other retailers. Clearly, it should operate on the same terms as the independent retailers, and there should be independent regulatory oversight to make sure that GBR does not use its position as the core ticketing provider essentially to crowd out the other suppliers.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q What if the Government refuse to carve it off, as has been done in other international examples? The Bill does not require a level playing field. Would you support improving the Bill by expressly stating that GBR must provide a level playing field on data and access for all retailers? Ben Plowden: We would. In particular, it should be subject to the code of practice on retailing that the ORR issues, rather than simply guidance on how it deals with its relationships with the other retailers.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Yes, from Government rather than GBR being the director. Keith Williams: No, the way I see it is that, actually, there is a good segregation of functions within the system now that were not there previously. Again, if you look back to 2018, the failure of the system was in part brought because every decision went back to Government. The Secretary of State finished up having total responsibility for the timetable fiasco that happened in 2018. That is when we came to the review. One of the clear things we wanted to do was to get a segregation of functions, which I think the Bill successfully does. It holds good to the review in that respect. Government are responsible for strategy—and hopefully longer-term strategy than we have seen in the past—then they hand the operation down to the people who can run it in the interests of passengers and customers, with strong regulation, safety and a public ability to react when things go wrong. I think that system is very good. I come from a business background and in some ways it echoes what I see in business: a board sets the strategy and then passes the management down to the CEO and the people who run the business. I am not concerned about backseat driving to that degree.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Given those enormous constraints, can you sit before the Committee and say that this is a strong appeals process? John Larkinson: Using words like “strong” is quite difficult in the context of it being an appeals process that is designed to fit with the underlying model, which is a directing mind for GBR. Therefore, as you correctly say, our ability to override a GBR decision is very narrow indeed. I agree with your description—it is a very narrow role.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Mr Brown, there are very few references in the Bill to value for money driving competition. In fact, the competition remit of the ORR is specifically excluded for large sections of the operation of GBR, and the Secretary of State has no ability to grant provision of service contracts to private companies—it has to be to a GBR or a subsidiary of GBR. How can operations of GBR be challenged on value for money for taxpayers? Do you think they have the balance right here? Richard Brown: Do I think what, sorry?

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  That would be rational. Ben Plowden: It would be perfectly rational, and I understand from media reports that that may indeed be what is happening on the west coast main line. It seems to us that you either need to broaden the number of things that GBR must take into account in terms of passenger service standards and/or introduce a growth duty, which would help deal with some of the other issues. Michael Roberts: I believe that the impulse should be to try to improve the passenger experience in the round, including all the things that you mentioned, such as accessibility, as Emma said. My personal view is that the place for that to be expressed in detail, potentially through targetry, is through a combination of the long-term rail strategy and the business plans over five years.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you for coming. Broadly speaking, we are talking about governance and accountability in this session. I am going to dive straight in, Mr Larkinson. On the appeals process as envisaged by the new ORR, we can see from clause 68 that there is to be no appeal on the merits of economic considerations; it is only to be approached on the basis of judicial review in the High Court, which means only an appeal on a matter of law and procedural issues, and a time limit for applications of just three months. First, will you confirm that that is your understanding of the constraints of this particular appeal process? John Larkinson: May I add one thing to that? When an appeal comes to us, there are various things that we can do. For any appeal, we can in effect send the decision back to Great British Railways and ask it to reconsider. In doing that, we could also in effect direct it to look at particular issues. That is the first thing that we could do. On our ability—I think this is probably what you are coming to—to substitute a decision, or in effect to require a different decision, that is extremely narrow indeed. That comes back to the judicial review principles. In my mind, that is because the bar is set very high. It comes back to the broad intent of the Bill, which is to make GBR a directing mind and to give considerable power to GBR. Alongside that, the intent of the Bill is in effect to empower GBR to learn from its mistakes: things are put back to it and it gets a chance to reconsider. What the Bill does not want, however, is for someone else like us to say, “No, the decision should have been this.” It comes from the intent of the Bill, I think.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q If someone goes through the appeals process on that very, very narrow front and is successful in their appeal, the ORR can order only two things to happen. The first is that the decision is sent back to GBR to have a think again, and the second is to substitute a decision, where the failure has been an error of law and there is only one possible alternative in the circumstances. It is in those very, very narrow circumstances that you can substitute your answer, because there is no other answer. John Larkinson: They are very narrow, yes.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I thank both the witnesses for coming. There is a lot to get through and we are short of time. I will start with Mr Williams. You have written a report on the future of railway. You proposed the creation of GBR, but to operate through private concessions as opposed to nationalisation. The Government have now taken a very different view. Please can you set out briefly the pros and cons of nationalisation over what you proposed. Keith Williams: When we did the review, the real focus was on passengers, to be honest. I was asked a number of times: “Is it nationalisation or is it privatisation?” I left that to one side because from my perspective, it was the better running of the railway, which is the structure that is now in place. To some degree, during the course of the review, franchising had been seen to be failing, and that was one of the premises of the review at the beginning. Of course, what happened in the intervening period was that covid came along, and that changed everything, so everything was de facto put back into public ownership. To a large degree, we were agnostic on that. However, if you look at the railway even today, parts of it are run in the private sector and parts of it are run in the public sector. As I see it, public ownership was accelerated through covid and through the end of the franchising, which in my period was due to end in 2029, so it was a long way off. Obviously, that was brought forward because of covid.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q You say that it fits with the description of what the Government want GBR to do, but from the drafting of the Bill we can conclude that the Government want GBR to be the final arbiter. There is no appellate course from a decision by GBR, except in an area of law. It is the judge and jury in this. John Larkinson: That fits again with the idea that things go back to GBR to reconsider; it is all put back in GBR’s court. That is the fundamental design, as I understand it.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I do not mean to confuse you; I seek to clarify whether an appeal on judicial review principles means that someone who is unhappy with a decision cannot have that decision reconsidered—so there is no appeal on the merits. John Larkinson: Judicial review principles are things like irrationality and illegality—it is very, very narrow.