Jerome Mayhew MP: speeches

Speeches

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you both for attending to give oral evidence. This section is about independent rail retailers. I am going to start with what the Competition and Markets Authority said about this. I am quoting it. It is saying that it is “important to give the right signals from the outset that TPRs will be competing on a level playing field with GBR—to encourage that competition and investment which will benefit passengers directly”. That is what the CMA says. Mr Davies, do you agree with the position that the CMA has taken? If you do, do you think the Bill as currently drafted gives a level playing field between GBR and independent retailers? If not, why not, and what would you do to fix it? John Davies: Yes, we agree with the view that the CMA has expressed on giving the right signals from the outset for how the reformed rail industry should work as far as retail is concerned. They also highlighted the risk of this structure giving rise to the actual or perceived risk that GBR will self-preference its own retail operation. There is relatively little about the structure of the reformed rail industry in the Bill, but I think the relevant point is that the creation of GBR will bring together online retailing in a single website and app. This creates a conflict of interest, because GBR will define and operate the future retail market, it will set its economic terms and it will also compete in it. It is not just the CMA that has recognised these challenges and risks. The Government’s own Railways Bill impact assessment registered this point in terms of the competitiveness of the ticket retailing market—it could be questioned by potential investors who might be concerned that GBR will use its unique position to take actions that put its retail competitors at a disadvantage. However, I should also note that we are encouraged by some of the words of Lord Peter Hendy, who said in a December interview with Simon Calder that there ought to be a level playing field. We look forward to understanding more about how that will be provided, because we have not seen any of the detail on that just yet.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q You are saying that schedule 2— I think you referred directly to paragraph 7(4)—increases risk and uncertainty for the supply chain, and that, as with any business, you price risk. That draft might be a Treasury draft, and I do not want to blame DFT—it may have been imposed, and who can possibly lift up the secrets of the boudoir in government—but do you agree that the outcome of that draft is that it increases risk and uncertainty, and that gets priced into the contract, so either investors will withdraw because they have no certainty, or if they remain, the cost to GBR and therefore to the taxpayer inevitably increases? It reduces, rather than increases, value for money; do you agree with that statement? Darren Caplan: Yes, absolutely—

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I am going to cut you short. You say absolutely. What about the other two? Rob Morris: That is absolutely correct. Malcolm Brown: It is fundamental economics.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q You make an important point that enhancements should be included in this, not just maintenance. Coming back to the question, the Bill introduces for the first time an ability for the Secretary of State to change the funding settlement within a five-year period and without notice. You would agree that that is a backward step in certainty for the supply chain? Rob Morris: Absolutely. Although we are based in the UK, we are a global company. If there is uncertainty here in the UK, we will cut off investments because we are in competition with a global market.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Is there not a bit of a problem then, Mr Burnham? That is not what is in the Bill. At the moment, the Bill has a duty to consult, but it does not give the level of power to mayoral combined authorities that you were just identifying. In your answer, you said that you will insist on getting more. Well, you will not get more powers under the Bill, as currently drafted—those powers are not given to you. What do you say about that, and how do you think it should be changed? Andy Burnham: I do not think it can be justified any more that there is one transport arrangement for London, but that arrangement is not available to everywhere else— [ Interruption. ]

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q The question I asked had absolutely nothing to do with ideology or the unification of track and train; it is a fundamental question of fairness. The Government have decided that this is the route they want to go down. I may disagree with that, but that was not my question. Having decided to go down this route, it must be the Government’s intention to be fair and to treat participants in the rail sector that are not being nationalised—that is 60%, by the way; correct me if you have secret plans to nationalise the rest of it as well, because so far you have not told me or anyone else—fairly. The Bill has designed in a structural conflict of interest, as we have heard many times from all sorts of different people. Given that the Government have taken that decision, my question has nothing to do with ideology—it is practicality. What are the Government planning to do to reassure that 60% that they will not be steamrollered by a GBR that says, “We are the masters now. We can do what we like and there’s no effective right of appeal, so suck it up.”? Keir Mather: I would point to the extremely robust suite of accountability measures that sit within the Bill as it stands. If you look at the legally binding duties GBR has in how it undertakes its work, one of those, which came out in our discussion with the ROSCOs, is to ensure that those who provide railway services can plan the future of their business with a reasonable degree of assurance. GBR is bound to meet a freight target set by the Secretary of State; it is legally bound to meet its duty to promote the interests of freight and, in clause 60, through the design of the best use of the railway as GBR sees it, it must give equal regard to users of the railway. Open access operators and freight are included as part of that mix. However, we also need to think about what this legislation does in the future and how that contrasts with the situation now. The ORR had to turn down a number of open access applications on the west coast because we had insufficient capacity in our rail network. I do not understand how that constitutes fairness or competitive advantage for open access operators—it means that they are locked out of providing services and turning a profit by a rail system that is failing. GBR having the capacity to manage, within one centralised function, capacity on the railway overall allows us to unlock those benefits, in partnership with mayoral combined authorities, but with a robust set of accountability measures to ensure that it is compliant with the law, compliant with its duties, and compliant with the aspirations of the Secretary of State, irrespective of their ideological predilections. Hopefully, that is an adequate answer to your question.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Yes. That is the last 30 to 35 years or so. A control period is a five-year investment cycle. The period is agreed at the start of the CP, or shortly before the start of it, and that funds the maintenance or improvement works. Darren Caplan: Operations, maintenance and renewals.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q It is a very good podcast; I listen to it a lot. Thank you very much for giving oral evidence. I now realise how you get a CBE in this country—you just have to be involved in the railways and they come along. You are certainly the third—probably the fourth—that we have had before us today. I am going to focus on a couple of things. On access and capacity, we have heard a lot of evidence today; I do not know how much you have heard, but it has replicated, in essence, what was put before the Transport Committee a few weeks ago. There is a huge amount of concern in the sector about whether the Bill provides a level playing field between GBR and open access, freight and the like, coupled with a very weak—those are my words—appeals process, which is so narrowly constrained that it only deals with errors of law as opposed to disagreements on the merits. Is it right that there is a real problem with the future of competition in our railways? If you agree with that broad statement, perhaps you could expand on your reasons why. Richard Bowker: I will probably say more about certainty and confidence for investors than competition per se. If I think about my experience at the Strategic Rail Authority, it was a significant frustration that elements of planning in terms of timetable and service were split apart in the way that they were. I think the Government are right to want to create a directing mind—I say directing mind rather than guiding mind. We have a capacity-constrained railway. In places, that is very severe, and someone needs to say, “Right. This is how we think we should allocate capacity.” Having said that, there is a possibility that the pendulum has swung a little far. Probably the biggest issue with that would be rail freight. If you are a rail freight operator, at the moment you have certainty; if you are unhappy with the way that you are treated, you can go to the ORR. As an independent regulator, the ORR can make the final access decision. What is contemplated is a perfectly logical process, starting with an access and use policy, capacity plans and capacity decisions. The problem is that railway timetables are not really like that; they are more dynamic. These things change. We looked at doing exactly this at the SRA, and it is very difficult to do. It changes constantly, so it has to be very agile. Under the Bill as drafted, while the process could work perfectly adequately, the capacity duty in clause 63—and potentially clause 18(4)—seems to say, to me at least, “Yes, GBR has all these duties, but they are subject to the capacity duty.” I can see why that causes tension and concern among freight operators, for example. I am not saying that it cannot work, but until we actually see it work, there is a risk that third-party operators will be concerned.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you. Mr Thomas, in your view, under the Bill, will the railways be regulated in a fair and non-discriminatory manner? I am talking about the relationship between open access—the non-nationalised parts of the railway—and GBR. If not, why do you say that, and how would you suggest it is fixed? John Thomas: First, I will say that the policy intent is quite clear. One of the DFT’s supporting documents to the Bill is quite clear that one of the definitions of a duty on GBR is for it to be fair and non-discriminatory in its decision making. Network Rail’s recent access and use policy document also made it clear that GBR would have to be fair and non-discriminatory in its decision making. However, there is nothing on the face of the Bill to suggest that. It is really important that there is something on the face of the Bill to say that GBR needs to be fair, transparent and non-discriminatory in its decision making. I think that would be in the best interests of customers and communities, and it would give our members confidence to continue to invest, rather than just relying on the taxpayer to make investments. The reason I say no is that there is no such provision on the face of the Bill. Going back to Maggie’s point about appeals, I think it would really help the appeals process if there were provision for GBR to be non-discriminatory in making decisions; otherwise, what are appeals going to be based on? They will be based on GBR’s own policies, and if it can discriminate against other services, what is there to appeal against? In addition, the ORR will lose its ability to hear appeals on the basis of taking into account the benefits of competition for users. We think that is wrong. We think that an open access appeal could never be successful if that provision were taken away, so we advocate adding it back in. The ORR should have a duty to take account of the benefits of competition. Clearly, it has to take into account other matters, as it does currently, including the funds available to the Secretary of State, but if it does not have the ability to take account of the benefits of competition, how is an open access operator ever going to be successful in any appeal?

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  That is quite a significant risk, isn’t it?

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q That is an awful lot of money, and that comes down to the meat of it: this Bill changes the relationship between GBR and the supply chain—between GBR and ROSCOs, in your case. Does it provide your company, and companies like yours, with the long-term view needed for the supply chain and, by extension, investors? If not, what is needed to fix the gaps? Malcolm Brown: As has been covered in other panel sessions, the Bill as it stands does not provide a long-term view. It relies on the building blocks that it refers to—we talked about this in other panel sessions—where you have a long-term rail strategy and there is also a promise of a long-term rolling stock and infrastructure strategy. It is those documents that we would look to to provide a long-term view on what is coming up in the industry. Our assets last circa 30 to 35 years, as does the infrastructure, and it is that long-term view that we require, not necessarily to give us certainty, but to give us a clear look-through that allows us to decide whether to invest and the level of investment we will make. In answer to your direct question, we will be looking to the railway strategy, which we presume will come first, and then to the long-term rolling stock and infrastructure strategy.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Other witnesses have strongly argued for an express duty on the face of the Bill that GBR should be fair and non-discriminatory in its approach. Would you agree that that would be helpful in this circumstance as well? John Davies: I think it can only be helpful. There is a need to be certain that the retail part of GBR will compete in the market in the same way as everybody else, that it will do so on equality of terms, and that there will be equality of market access on things like fares, features, products, data services and system access, as well as economic parity, so that there is certainty that GBR’s online retail activity will not be loss-making or cross-subsidised, and that there will be transparency of costs and revenues, so that the ORR can hold it to account.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q So 30% of £40 billion is an increased cost as a result of this process. Rob Morris: Subjectively, yes. I think there will be more accurate figures around that, but it is an inefficient process.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Can you illustrate that with electrification, for example? Rob Morris: Yes—electrification and signalling are both part of the renewals process. The five-year cycle that we currently have—which is often referred to as the boom-and-bust cycle, because that is what it is like for us—adds, let us call it, a subjective cost increase of about 30%, as Darren mentioned.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q So for the people in that space, yes. I am going to move to Siemens now. Historically, during the period of privatisation, rolling stock improvements have been inextricably linked with franchise bids. As franchises have come up for renewal, different operating companies have been in a bidding process, through competition, to make the most attractive proposal to the Department for Transport. Some of that would be in cheques to the Treasury, but a lot of it has been in improving rolling stock infrastructure. My own operating company, Greater Anglia, entirely renewed its rolling stock right across its area as part of its franchise bid. That impetus for improvement of rolling stock is being removed entirely and replaced by GBR, a nationalised bidder. It has various duties. I look at clause 18(3), which we discussed a little earlier, under which it has a duty to improve “railway service performance”, but that is defined as being, in the main, reliability and passenger overcrowding. There is no reference to improved customer experience, to quality of rolling stock and to improved services that would come with new rolling stock. For Siemens, are you concerned that moving to GBR will lead to a reduction in the pace of improvement in rolling stock? Rob Morris: Again, it is about understanding what the ambition is specifically with rolling stock and the funding thereof. My belief is that there is a need for a passenger growth target, which would further fuel the need to make sure that there is a clear approach to modern, carbon-neutral, efficient rolling stock to match a similar infrastructure for the betterment of GBR.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q It has become very command-and-control, hasn’t it? It is top-down, but you are saying that it should be more bottom-up. Andy Burnham: Yes, I think if you end up with a very top-down railway, it is a bit like the phrase I used to hear in the Department of Health: “You can hit the target and miss the point.” Is that not that the risk with the railways, if they become too much like monolithic structures? It has to be a bit of both. If you go back to the old British Rail days, I remember a thing called Regional Railways, which was very separate to InterCity, so that split has always been there in the railways. What we are arguing for in front of the Committee today is to think of the railways in a more place-based context. Railways serve growth in local areas, and there are things that we can bring to the table to support the health and growth of the railways in the future. It points to a different partnership, but it is a partnership. We want the right to specify timetables, as it is legitimate for us to make those requests, and we want a stronger role over station access. Actually, we think there should be a presumption in favour of devolution. Rather than a right to request, the onus should be the other way around; there should be the right to refuse, which presumes that it should be devolved, if that is possible, but there is still a callback if it cannot be devolved. There is a relevant recent example: the Access for All funding. The Rail North Committee has asked the Department to devolve the Access for All funding, so we do not get the situation that Tracy described a moment ago. Currently, that is not being supported by the Department. We submit lists of stations to the Department as part of our Access for All bid on a regular basis, but we have often had the experience that it comes back with a different prioritisation to the one we sent in. This is really granular, local stuff, and it is mind-boggling to us that you have an infrastructure programme for the railways, and then an Access for All programme at the highest level that is dealing with very local schemes at stations. It is a meaningful partnership, and we are calling for a devolved role, where there can be one. Tracy Brabin: I totally agree with what Andy has said; it is about accountability. I do not think you could expect the Secretary of State to be accountable for the whole of the network. How on earth would they understand the challenges? At Denby Dale, all they need is a ramp, and those sorts of decisions should be made locally. We are building three stations in the next year. Why are they so expensive? In Germany, I think it is £5 million a station, but here they are £50 million. In the ’80s, it was £500,000 a station in today’s money. Surely, if we are working together as a collective for the good of the nation, we could find a way that makes it easier—one where we are more agile in building stations, and where we are part of that conversation around services. Also, it is about where we get then get the revenue from, so that we have a circular pound—the one that goes into the washing machine and comes back out again on the other side—and can build more accessibility on more stations.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q What sort of sums of money are we talking about in the control period? Rob Morris: The overall figure is normally about £40 billion, in terms of renewals and operations maintenance.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q They do not agree, do they? We have heard stark evidence today that the lack of a level playing field and the lack of advanced sight of where this legislation is going are making investment in the railways less likely, not more likely. That is the evidence of the sector that you have heard today. You can put your fingers in your ears and say something different, but that is the evidence that we have heard. Whether it is the access in use concerns, the failure of the appeals process to be anything worthy of the name, or the fact that the proposed powers for the Secretary of State to change without notice access in use, taken in combination, the evidence from multiple witnesses today was that the Bill does not make it easier. Are you going to listen to them, or are the Government going to pursue their dogged insistence that everyone else is wrong and they are right? Keir Mather: If you take something like the rolling stock and infrastructure strategy, the consultations are undertaken in close partnership with the private sector. If you are asking me whether it is going to be easier in the long term, with GBR created, for private sector operators to engage with a level playing field, I think that it will be. I think that it creates a very clear structure of accountability measures, clear metrics by which decisions are taken and robust accountability, if GBR does not meet its obligations under the access regime, to make sure that it does things correctly, especially on the matter of access. I think it is important that we dig into this further, because it came out consistently with the freight operators. GBR has to decide how it meets its capacity duty once it has decided what best use of the railway constitutes. That is a really important safeguard that is built into the Bill. The Secretary of State gives GBR its funding envelope through the business plan, and needs to ensure that GBR will deliver the services that it has said it will. It is therefore very important to have that capacity duty in place, but that is after GBR has made a determination, while balancing its existing duties and its need to promote freight and service providers on the railway, on whether or not those services stack up. I think that the accountability process and appeals process are very clear, and give private operators multiple points to raise concerns, and robust enforcement measures for the ORR to substitute decisions and ask GBR to think again. The point about thinking again is very important, because we want GBR to improve as an organisation, and to become more agile and more responsive to the needs of the private sector, and the appeals process facilitates that.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q And your combined evidence—again, I am putting words into your mouth, but correct me—is that the Bill as drafted not only does not solve that problem of 30% of increased costs, of the £40 billion every five years, but actually exacerbates it, because it removes what little certainty there currently is. Rob Morris: Your words are correct. Darren Caplan: Yes. Malcolm Brown: I am not in that space, so I could not comment.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q At the moment, all of that is missing from the Bill, is it not? Rob Morris: Yes. Malcolm Brown: If I may, there is a natural life cycle. There is a beat rate to replacing, renewing and then retiring rolling stock. It is lumpy, because you do not replace trains one at a time; it tends to be in fleets. There is not a great deal we can do about that. What would concern me is if we reverted to everything being planned and done by a central organisation. We have tried that before. I refer the Committee to the 2014 National Audit Office report on the DFT procuring IEP. It did not go well, the National Audit Office says. There is a natural tension there just now—the commercial tension of trying to improve rolling stock and always trying to have the next best thing. You talk about Greater Anglia. Apologies, but it is Alstom’s trains that we bought in there. They are a step change that was there before, but we cannot keep replacing every single train every time. We need to refurbish trains. We invested £125 million in the Pendolino fleet on the west coast. That created 100 jobs at Widnes and its own infrastructure there. That was completed on time and on budget. Nobody ever really talks about that, but we can do it. We have given the passenger an environment that is as new. That is a lot more cost-effective than simply going, “We must buy a new train every time we feel like it.”

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Thank you. I rest my case.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am going to put words into your mouth, but please correct me if I am being unfair. In each control period, you get a bell curve of activity. You start with a low level of activity, because people did not know that there was certainty of funding, and then in years 2 and 3 it gears up and you get peak activity in year 2.5, roughly. Then, as you get towards the end of the control period where the medium term funding dries up or is uncertain, you get a drawdown of activity. That is the point that you were trying to make—is that correct? Darren Caplan: It can happen between control periods as well, but the basic point is that over those five years, that money is the same. It can vary a bit between years—you can carry some over—but in that time you spend that money. Our concern about schedule 2 is that you can reduce the amount of money in that period.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Would it be a better system if you had control periods that had a greater certainty looking forward at any one time between the decision when money was tied down—if indeed it is tied down under the terms of the Bill—and the date at which the activity would then take place? For example, for the current control period of five years, if you take the decision on funding for the next control period, let us say two years out, would that be effective in increasing certainty, reducing the need for a bell curve of activity, and thereby reducing costs for the supply sector and, by extension, for the Government and taxpayers? Darren Caplan: Absolutely. If you do the work that you need to do on rail when you need to do it, it is much cheaper than doing it at a later date. It is 30% cheaper to do a renewal when you are supposed to be doing it than at a later date. That is better for the taxpayer, because you can aggregate it. It is also better in terms of passenger experience, because the asset is being maintained when it needs to be.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q 67 Thank you for attending to give oral evidence. Maggie Simpson, we heard from the chief executive of the Office of Rail and Road this morning that the appeals process is very tightly constrained. Is it worth the paper it is written on? Maggie Simpson : We are really concerned about the scope and definition of the appeals function as proposed in the Bill. We know that Great British Railways wishes rail freight to succeed. There are positive provisions for rail freight at the beginning of the Bill, but GBR will be a vertically integrated, incredibly powerful monopoly that, quite rightly, will be very focused on its own trains. This legislation will last for a long time, and the behaviours and actions of people today may not be mirrored in future Administrations or at future times. Our members—businesses across the country that rely on the railways for their supply chains—are really concerned about ensuring that, if things go wrong, they have an effective right of appeal. The provisions in the Bill set an incredibly high threshold—judicial review standards—for bringing an appeal. Even if it is met, the actions that can be taken are such a high bar that it is very unlikely that a decision would ever be overturned, and future Secretaries of State can by regulation, through the negative procedure, set out even more steps and fees. We are really concerned that that is weak. It is a backstop provision; we would only need to use it if things went wrong, but if it is not any use, it will deter people from investing.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Welcome to the Committee, Ms Brabin; I am sorry that we started before you managed to get in. Tracy Brabin: My apologies for being late.