Jerome Mayhew MP: speeches 2026

Speeches

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Do the Government want private investment in the railway to continue? Keir Mather: Absolutely. It is fundamental that that investment continues, both on the— [ Interruption. ] Sorry— I will just say this very briefly and then let you come back. On the rail freight point, where we have a target in place allowing us to boost the amount of goods moved by train, it might create more capacity for open access to work on the network, but the infrastructure delivery and the long-term rolling stock strategy that accompany this legislative piece of work also offer the private sector a real opportunity to play in the future of our railway, as I see it.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you, all three of you, for agreeing to give oral evidence today. I will start with Mr Brown, who represents Angel Trains: first of all, can you say a little bit about Angel Trains? Malcolm Brown: Yes, by all means. Angel Trains is a ROSCO—a rolling stock operating company. We own circa 4,000 passenger vehicles in the UK, and we provide the bridge between private sector finance and the actual rail industry. In the last 10 years, we have invested about £1.9 billion in new rolling stock in the UK, and we invest about £80 million a year in refurbishing and maintaining trains across the network.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Okay, but nothing yet. Let us move on to clause 10, which gives the Scottish Ministers power of guidance over GBR. Some people have expressed concern that there could be so much political control over future GBR that it will be hard to work out whether the guiding mind is Ministers or GBR. What is your take on that? Bill Reeve: I do not imagine that the guidance will be used then. Ordinarily, I would imagine that we would start with the use of our strategies, our statement of objectives and our normal means of engagement. It is important to remember that, whereas currently we spend £1 billion a year on Network Rail in Scotland, and it is for the ORR to enforce its delivery obligations under the delivery plan to the current funding arrangement, that role is being removed from the ORR. What you see reflected in the Bill is something to address what would otherwise be a complete accountability gap. We would welcome the fact that we will have stronger accountability mechanisms under these provisions than we have had hitherto, given the very substantial amount of funding that we fund the railway infrastructure in Scotland with.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q So if you have a degree of certainty for the next 10 years and a forward look for, say, the next five after that—the Minister is right here, so shall we say 15 years for a long-term strategy? Is that what you are suggesting? Malcolm Brown: No, I am not. I am suggesting that the strategy should give various date points—10 years, 15 years, 30 years. I do not think we should exclude it saying, “Here is a vision for what we wish our rail industry to look like in 30 years,” while accepting that that will actually change. It has to change; it has to morph and adapt to the market.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I am just going to interrupt you. That is a different point from the one that I am asking about. I am talking about the cost of planning and implementing renewals and about having a degree of certainty looking forward regarding when that money will be spent. If you always have a minimum of, let us say, 24 months for planning and commitment to funding, does that make it easier for the supply chain to commit resources, and therefore cheaper? Darren Caplan: These guys can talk to that specifically, but I assume so, because you are planning out your workforces, your investment in partner machinery, your overall business plan, the apprentices you are going to take on and innovation—all these things can be planned in advance. If you know, you will get a better cost.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q What you have shown us in your smuggled-in prop—

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Where is the incentive to carry on and accelerate that process in this Bill? Where is the incentive for GBR? Malcolm Brown: I cannot comment. I presume it is going to be in one of the building blocks. My concern is that we have a group of people who are trying to design trains for a hobby, when we have manufacturers such as Siemens in the UK, which have global platforms for trains. Yes, we adapt and customise them for the UK, but we get all the benefits of the manufacturing experience of a global manufacturer with the economies of scale that that provides as well. We do not need bespoke custom-built trains in the UK.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Right. Actually, I am slightly surprised, because this is an unusual process; it was a Tony Blair innovation that we got rid of. We did not think it had much purpose, but we will find out in the next few minutes, won’t we? We have heard lots of evidence, and some clear, consistent themes have risen out of it. If you have read the Transport Committee’s report on this issue from a few weeks ago, as I am sure you have, you will know that the sector is giving the Government a few messages very loud and clear. We will discuss those a little bit, but the secret question is: So what? What are you going to do about it? That is what I hope you will come back to. A level playing field is fair and without discrimination. There is a structural conflict of interest between GBR as the holder of the ring and GBR as an operator—for example, in the relationship with open access, with freight and with independent retailers. Each one of those—they are sectors, not individual organisations—has profound concerns about a structural conflict of interest that has been deliberately built into the Bill. Combined with that, there is an appeals process that is not worthy of the name. We can say that it is robust, but we all know that it is not. It is very, very tightly defined. It relates only to areas of law; there is no appeal on the merits at all. GBR is judge, jury and gamekeeper, as well as participant—that is a slightly mixed metaphor, but you get the point. With the defenestration of the Office of Rail and Road as an economic regulator, the independent arbiter of the relationship with GBR is now gone. You have heard the evidence. What are you going to do about it? Keir Mather : It is a very good question, Mr Mayhew. It goes to the core of the differing ideological perspectives that underlie the debate we have had today on the Bill. Although you see the state seeking to take too much control and giving itself an unfair advantage, our perspective on why this legislation is so important is that passengers—who are ultimately both people who pay for services on the railway and taxpayers who end up funding those services more often than not under this broken rail system, and will do once GBR is established—deserve a good service. We believe that having a unified service with a single guiding mind to bring track and train, passenger services and infrastructure together under one roof, with one point of accountability, is the best way to achieve those aims. You asked me what we are going to do about the concerns raised today. It is my obligation as a Government Minister to address them, to explore ways in which we can allay them further and to progress the work the Department is already taking on through its stakeholder engagement, whether that be on the freight target or the rolling stock and infrastructure strategy, to make sure that stakeholder concerns are heard. On the principle of fairness and transparency as it relates to ticketing and third-party access, it is worth making the point that GBR is, by public law principles, obligated to have regard to fair and transparent processes as part of how the system works. On access and appeals, that is a real point of contention, which we will explore throughout Committee, but I heard the concerns raised by freight stakeholders and others. I want to take this opportunity to be really clear that the Department’s very firm view is that clauses 60 and 63 are not in contention with each other and that Great British Rail has the ability to decide what constitutes best use of the railway, in a way that not only meets its duties, but balances opportunities for GBR services, rail freight and open access alongside one another. The clauses provide an opportunity to appeal on the basis of whether that has been followed, through the ORR, but also a robust process, once that allocation has been determined, to figure out whether GBR has been compliant with the law, as of course we always expect it will be. Overall, this is a point of ideological difference that exists between our two parties. Labour believes fundamentally that you need one point of accountability and that the Government need to take a more proactive role in fixing this broken rail system. I am really pleased that this piece of legislation seeks to achieve what I think are very noble aspirations.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q You looked at it when you were with the SRA, back in the day, and you rejected it, presumably. What were the reasons for your rejection of that approach? Richard Bowker: The ’93 Act was not set up that way; it was set up so that the Strategic Rail Authority was responsible for setting an overall strategic plan for the railways and for managing the award and management of franchises, but Railtrack plc, and then Network Rail, was under the regulation of an independent economic regulator. The two worlds were apart. Whereas the regulator had to have regard to our strategies, it did not have to comply with them, so we always had that tension. It was not really for me to change it. That is why I think that, overall, this is a good approach.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q It is not really the directing mind I am focusing on; it is having a level playing field where, for the first time, we are going to have GBR being the directing mind but also an operator. There is a direct structural conflict of interest in the design of GBR as set out in the Bill—that has been the evidence of many people to the Committee today—combined with essentially no right of appeal other than on matters of law. First of all, do you recognise that as a proper concern? Secondly, if so, do you think a partial solution would be to have a mechanism for appeal on the merits to an independent regulator—let us call it something like the ORR? Richard Bowker: On the first point, yes, I recognise the concern. Secondly, personally I would look at clause 18(4) and ask whether we really need to have the capacity duty able to override other duties. As far as the appeals process is concerned, I can see why being able to look at a case on the merits rather than on a strictly legal basis would help enormously. If GBR believes that its access and use policy, its capacity planning and its final decisions constitute a good process, it should not fear that.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Mr Montgomery, will you say whether you agree with that position, as well as answering this final question? In areas of capacity and access, the Bill anticipates the Secretary of State being granted power to change capacity decisions and access agreements without notice. If that is the case, what impact will that have on the ability of open access operators to build a business case for investment in the future? What impact will it have on future investment? Steve Montgomery: I agree with everything John and Maggie said. The challenge we see as a private sector operator is how you get anybody to invest in the industry with the lack of clarity in the Bill. As John alluded to, there is reference by the DFT in the memorandum of understanding on the Bill, but nothing in the Bill itself. That makes it very difficult to go to a board and say, “Look, we want to invest in these things.” What certainty do you have for the future? An awful lot has been made of open access as we have gone through this process. It would take up 1% of overall capacity, but it is held out there, in the commentary, as one of the major plays in the Bill. We think that open access brings the opportunity for competition, which we seem to have lost with some of the wording in the Bill. How do we make sure that there are better services for customers? That is what we all want and what GBR is setting out to do, but how do we make sure that we all have a fair chance when bidding? We have talked about the access situation. GBR can decide not to give access, and the ORR has very limited powers to hear an appeal, so where is the confidence for the private sector investment that the industry continues to cry out for?

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you both for coming to give evidence. I will be fairly brief—I always say that, but never am. Mr Reeve, I will start with clause 8, which is on the potential powers for Ministers in Scotland to give directions to GBR. On the face of it, that all looks good: they have to consult the Secretary of State, and she or he has the power to overrule the Scottish Minister. Do you think that the Bill has the balance of responsibilities and powers right there? Bill Reeve: There has to be a balance, because we are trying to secure the ability of our Ministers to have a proper accountability mechanism and proper direction for implementation of our strategies and of our very substantial funding of the infrastructure. Equally, our network is not an island; clearly, if a direction in Scotland were to have a material impact on matters south of the border, which would not be the intention, that provision is there; I can understand that. There were constructive discussions between our Ministers and officials about how we strike that balance so, broadly, we are content with the arrangements, noting that an MOU is also required by the Bill to flesh out a little more how that will work in practice.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q First, I apologise for taking so long during the Division. I am also a Whip, so I had to stay in the voting Lobby. It is something to get used to again when you come back to the House. I am picking up fag ends, because it sounded as though the Minister was discussing very similar issues to those that I was discussing before we left. It was rather frustrating, Mr Burnham —the Division bell went when you were about to deliver a hammer blow against the Government on your disappointment about what is not in the Bill and what should be in it. You used to say that you wanted more autonomy for the Bee Network. I have heard your answers—it is clear that your position on that has not changed. You want to have more autonomy, but the Bill does not provide it at the moment. You have a duty to consult, which is okay so far as it goes, from GBR, and then thereafter, once it has consulted with the mayoralties, it only has a duty to have regard to what it is that you have said or requested. In your combined evidence, what would be a better form of words more accurately to reflect the relationship that you think should exist between the national and the regional? Mr Burnham, because we were halfway through a conversation, perhaps we could start with you, then move on to Tracy. Andy Burnham: Thank you. I do not know about coming back, but what I do know is that in my 16 years here, there were enough Tory MPs around that there was no double-jobbing, I do not think, from my memory. We will move on. I think that it is about a meaningful role. I do not think autonomy is actually what we are asking for here today, any of us. Tracy Brabin: No. Andy Burnham: What we are saying is that we want a meaningful partnership, which is about more than just being consulted and then ignored—which, if we are honest, does happen to us as mayors with the rail industry. Even though I am chair of the Rail North Committee, we sometimes have to work very hard to make the railways listen to what democratically elected mayors and leaders say. It is a different relationship, and I would say that I strongly feel the railways need culture change. We need to get back to a railway that serves people and places, not a quite adversarial section of transactional arrangements that can be very complex. It feels to us sometimes that the railways have lost sight of that.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Moving on to access decisions and charging, on your reading of the Bill, does the ORR have enough power to hold GBR to account? If your answer, as I suspect it might be, is that it does not, what changes need to be made to improve the Bill? Maggie Simpson: On capacity allocation in particular, as well as the points I have just made about the appeals function, we have a conflict between two clauses in the Bill. The capacity duty in clause 63 sets an incredibly powerful requirement in law for GBR to keep capacity for its own trains and any trains it wants to run in the future. We have sought assurance from the Department for Transport on how that duty and clause 60, on the infrastructure capacity plan, work together. The Department has told us that its intention is for the capacity duty to be subservient to the infrastructure capacity plan, where an assessment is made of the best use of the network, but that is not what the law says. We would like to see it clarified that the value-based assessment of what is the right use of capacity on the network is done first, and that GBR is then able to assure the capacity afterwards.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you both for attending to give oral evidence. This section is about independent rail retailers. I am going to start with what the Competition and Markets Authority said about this. I am quoting it. It is saying that it is “important to give the right signals from the outset that TPRs will be competing on a level playing field with GBR—to encourage that competition and investment which will benefit passengers directly”. That is what the CMA says. Mr Davies, do you agree with the position that the CMA has taken? If you do, do you think the Bill as currently drafted gives a level playing field between GBR and independent retailers? If not, why not, and what would you do to fix it? John Davies: Yes, we agree with the view that the CMA has expressed on giving the right signals from the outset for how the reformed rail industry should work as far as retail is concerned. They also highlighted the risk of this structure giving rise to the actual or perceived risk that GBR will self-preference its own retail operation. There is relatively little about the structure of the reformed rail industry in the Bill, but I think the relevant point is that the creation of GBR will bring together online retailing in a single website and app. This creates a conflict of interest, because GBR will define and operate the future retail market, it will set its economic terms and it will also compete in it. It is not just the CMA that has recognised these challenges and risks. The Government’s own Railways Bill impact assessment registered this point in terms of the competitiveness of the ticket retailing market—it could be questioned by potential investors who might be concerned that GBR will use its unique position to take actions that put its retail competitors at a disadvantage. However, I should also note that we are encouraged by some of the words of Lord Peter Hendy, who said in a December interview with Simon Calder that there ought to be a level playing field. We look forward to understanding more about how that will be provided, because we have not seen any of the detail on that just yet.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q You are saying that schedule 2— I think you referred directly to paragraph 7(4)—increases risk and uncertainty for the supply chain, and that, as with any business, you price risk. That draft might be a Treasury draft, and I do not want to blame DFT—it may have been imposed, and who can possibly lift up the secrets of the boudoir in government—but do you agree that the outcome of that draft is that it increases risk and uncertainty, and that gets priced into the contract, so either investors will withdraw because they have no certainty, or if they remain, the cost to GBR and therefore to the taxpayer inevitably increases? It reduces, rather than increases, value for money; do you agree with that statement? Darren Caplan: Yes, absolutely—

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I am going to cut you short. You say absolutely. What about the other two? Rob Morris: That is absolutely correct. Malcolm Brown: It is fundamental economics.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q You make an important point that enhancements should be included in this, not just maintenance. Coming back to the question, the Bill introduces for the first time an ability for the Secretary of State to change the funding settlement within a five-year period and without notice. You would agree that that is a backward step in certainty for the supply chain? Rob Morris: Absolutely. Although we are based in the UK, we are a global company. If there is uncertainty here in the UK, we will cut off investments because we are in competition with a global market.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Is there not a bit of a problem then, Mr Burnham? That is not what is in the Bill. At the moment, the Bill has a duty to consult, but it does not give the level of power to mayoral combined authorities that you were just identifying. In your answer, you said that you will insist on getting more. Well, you will not get more powers under the Bill, as currently drafted—those powers are not given to you. What do you say about that, and how do you think it should be changed? Andy Burnham: I do not think it can be justified any more that there is one transport arrangement for London, but that arrangement is not available to everywhere else— [ Interruption. ]

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q The question I asked had absolutely nothing to do with ideology or the unification of track and train; it is a fundamental question of fairness. The Government have decided that this is the route they want to go down. I may disagree with that, but that was not my question. Having decided to go down this route, it must be the Government’s intention to be fair and to treat participants in the rail sector that are not being nationalised—that is 60%, by the way; correct me if you have secret plans to nationalise the rest of it as well, because so far you have not told me or anyone else—fairly. The Bill has designed in a structural conflict of interest, as we have heard many times from all sorts of different people. Given that the Government have taken that decision, my question has nothing to do with ideology—it is practicality. What are the Government planning to do to reassure that 60% that they will not be steamrollered by a GBR that says, “We are the masters now. We can do what we like and there’s no effective right of appeal, so suck it up.”? Keir Mather: I would point to the extremely robust suite of accountability measures that sit within the Bill as it stands. If you look at the legally binding duties GBR has in how it undertakes its work, one of those, which came out in our discussion with the ROSCOs, is to ensure that those who provide railway services can plan the future of their business with a reasonable degree of assurance. GBR is bound to meet a freight target set by the Secretary of State; it is legally bound to meet its duty to promote the interests of freight and, in clause 60, through the design of the best use of the railway as GBR sees it, it must give equal regard to users of the railway. Open access operators and freight are included as part of that mix. However, we also need to think about what this legislation does in the future and how that contrasts with the situation now. The ORR had to turn down a number of open access applications on the west coast because we had insufficient capacity in our rail network. I do not understand how that constitutes fairness or competitive advantage for open access operators—it means that they are locked out of providing services and turning a profit by a rail system that is failing. GBR having the capacity to manage, within one centralised function, capacity on the railway overall allows us to unlock those benefits, in partnership with mayoral combined authorities, but with a robust set of accountability measures to ensure that it is compliant with the law, compliant with its duties, and compliant with the aspirations of the Secretary of State, irrespective of their ideological predilections. Hopefully, that is an adequate answer to your question.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Yes. That is the last 30 to 35 years or so. A control period is a five-year investment cycle. The period is agreed at the start of the CP, or shortly before the start of it, and that funds the maintenance or improvement works. Darren Caplan: Operations, maintenance and renewals.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q It is a very good podcast; I listen to it a lot. Thank you very much for giving oral evidence. I now realise how you get a CBE in this country—you just have to be involved in the railways and they come along. You are certainly the third—probably the fourth—that we have had before us today. I am going to focus on a couple of things. On access and capacity, we have heard a lot of evidence today; I do not know how much you have heard, but it has replicated, in essence, what was put before the Transport Committee a few weeks ago. There is a huge amount of concern in the sector about whether the Bill provides a level playing field between GBR and open access, freight and the like, coupled with a very weak—those are my words—appeals process, which is so narrowly constrained that it only deals with errors of law as opposed to disagreements on the merits. Is it right that there is a real problem with the future of competition in our railways? If you agree with that broad statement, perhaps you could expand on your reasons why. Richard Bowker: I will probably say more about certainty and confidence for investors than competition per se. If I think about my experience at the Strategic Rail Authority, it was a significant frustration that elements of planning in terms of timetable and service were split apart in the way that they were. I think the Government are right to want to create a directing mind—I say directing mind rather than guiding mind. We have a capacity-constrained railway. In places, that is very severe, and someone needs to say, “Right. This is how we think we should allocate capacity.” Having said that, there is a possibility that the pendulum has swung a little far. Probably the biggest issue with that would be rail freight. If you are a rail freight operator, at the moment you have certainty; if you are unhappy with the way that you are treated, you can go to the ORR. As an independent regulator, the ORR can make the final access decision. What is contemplated is a perfectly logical process, starting with an access and use policy, capacity plans and capacity decisions. The problem is that railway timetables are not really like that; they are more dynamic. These things change. We looked at doing exactly this at the SRA, and it is very difficult to do. It changes constantly, so it has to be very agile. Under the Bill as drafted, while the process could work perfectly adequately, the capacity duty in clause 63—and potentially clause 18(4)—seems to say, to me at least, “Yes, GBR has all these duties, but they are subject to the capacity duty.” I can see why that causes tension and concern among freight operators, for example. I am not saying that it cannot work, but until we actually see it work, there is a risk that third-party operators will be concerned.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you. Mr Thomas, in your view, under the Bill, will the railways be regulated in a fair and non-discriminatory manner? I am talking about the relationship between open access—the non-nationalised parts of the railway—and GBR. If not, why do you say that, and how would you suggest it is fixed? John Thomas: First, I will say that the policy intent is quite clear. One of the DFT’s supporting documents to the Bill is quite clear that one of the definitions of a duty on GBR is for it to be fair and non-discriminatory in its decision making. Network Rail’s recent access and use policy document also made it clear that GBR would have to be fair and non-discriminatory in its decision making. However, there is nothing on the face of the Bill to suggest that. It is really important that there is something on the face of the Bill to say that GBR needs to be fair, transparent and non-discriminatory in its decision making. I think that would be in the best interests of customers and communities, and it would give our members confidence to continue to invest, rather than just relying on the taxpayer to make investments. The reason I say no is that there is no such provision on the face of the Bill. Going back to Maggie’s point about appeals, I think it would really help the appeals process if there were provision for GBR to be non-discriminatory in making decisions; otherwise, what are appeals going to be based on? They will be based on GBR’s own policies, and if it can discriminate against other services, what is there to appeal against? In addition, the ORR will lose its ability to hear appeals on the basis of taking into account the benefits of competition for users. We think that is wrong. We think that an open access appeal could never be successful if that provision were taken away, so we advocate adding it back in. The ORR should have a duty to take account of the benefits of competition. Clearly, it has to take into account other matters, as it does currently, including the funds available to the Secretary of State, but if it does not have the ability to take account of the benefits of competition, how is an open access operator ever going to be successful in any appeal?

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  That is quite a significant risk, isn’t it?

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q That is an awful lot of money, and that comes down to the meat of it: this Bill changes the relationship between GBR and the supply chain—between GBR and ROSCOs, in your case. Does it provide your company, and companies like yours, with the long-term view needed for the supply chain and, by extension, investors? If not, what is needed to fix the gaps? Malcolm Brown: As has been covered in other panel sessions, the Bill as it stands does not provide a long-term view. It relies on the building blocks that it refers to—we talked about this in other panel sessions—where you have a long-term rail strategy and there is also a promise of a long-term rolling stock and infrastructure strategy. It is those documents that we would look to to provide a long-term view on what is coming up in the industry. Our assets last circa 30 to 35 years, as does the infrastructure, and it is that long-term view that we require, not necessarily to give us certainty, but to give us a clear look-through that allows us to decide whether to invest and the level of investment we will make. In answer to your direct question, we will be looking to the railway strategy, which we presume will come first, and then to the long-term rolling stock and infrastructure strategy.