Jerome Mayhew MP: speeches

Speeches

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to see you in your place, Sir Alec. Amendment 241, in my name, is important, as so many of these amendments are. We heard in both oral and written evidence that lots of people are concerned about the need for this amendment, which addresses the concerns of many in the non-Great British Railways sector, whether Trainline, open access operators, freight operators or the whole supply chain. The amendment seeks to require GBR expressly to act in a fair and non-discriminatory manner. We had some discussion about that before lunch, but I reiterate the argument that I made. I will seek to press the amendment to a Division if the occasion demands it, but it would send a terrible message to investors in the independent sector if the Government voted down an amendment that merely asks GBR to operate in a fair and non-discriminatory manner. Amendments 3 and 4 clarify that the research, advice and standards published by Great British Railways are related to aspects of the parts of the railway and railway services that are managed by Great British Railways. Many independent entities, such as freight, open access and the supply chain, as well as other networks, are not managed by or part of GBR. Those entities need to be free to publish their own standards and manage their own innovation and research. The current drafting of the clause is a clear overreach. I suspect that that may be unintentional, so I ask the Minister or his officials to have a think about that. Additionally, other cross-sector and national standards, such as those managed by the Rail Safety and Standards Board or the British Standards Institution, may be directly legally applicable to GBR itself under, for example, the Railways (Interoperability) Regulations 2011 and the Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 2006. To avoid conflicts of interest, those cannot be published or managed by GBR itself, so the Minister needs to explain how clause 3 does not involve a conflict of interest. Has he—or, it is probably gentler and kinder to ask, his team—researched those apparent contradictions? If he or they have, perhaps he could set out how those conflicts are addressed in the current wording. Amendment 5 would leave out clause 3(2) and insert in its place: “(2) Great British Railways’ function under subsection (1)(a) includes making strategic plans as to the future provision of railways infrastructure in Great Britain and implementing those plans. (2A) Decisions about access to, and use of, railway infrastructure for the operation of trains will be made by the Office for Rail and Road.” This would be quite a big change, because it would address head on the structural conflict of interest that has been identified by very many commentators. The role of the Office of Rail and Road is a key concern for the non-GBR part of the industry, which is, after all, 60% of it. By “the role of the ORR”, I do not mean its safety role, which remains almost entirely unchanged; I mean its economic regulator role. This is not an issue of ideology. Some play has been made about base views on whether nationalisation or privatisation are better or worse than one other, but let us leave that to one side—we have had our fun for the moment. This is a fundamental issue of fairness of procedure, which is necessary irrespective of the ownership structure of the organisation. We all know that Great British Railways will be the dominant operator. That position brings it structural advantages in any event, but it will now be the referee on access as well. That is a direct and obvious conflict of interest, and it is a very odd approach because it is so clearly unfair. The alternative is to use an independent structure. We would use the ORR because it already exists and does not have to be created, it already has a reputation for independence, and its remit and direction are set by the Secretary of State, so it cannot be a loose cannon. I accept in part the arguments put forward by the Minister in response to questioning on Tuesday. I recognise that the Government own the infrastructure and the taxpayer has invested many billions of pounds in the railway over time, and I accept that they should decide how those funds are best used. The issue is how the Government look after taxpayers’ money. Is it via a player-referee—GBR—or is it via the Office of Rail and Road, which is itself a governmental organisation, has its remit set by the Secretary of State and is given direction? It is not as though we would be handing the keys to a stranger; we would just be demonstrating the application of a fair and non-discriminatory process by an overtly independent organisation that is itself an arm of the state. Amendment 5 aims to ensure that the Office of Rail and Road continues to make decisions about access. It is a common theme of the Opposition amendments throughout that we want to ensure that the Bill does not create a GBR with that structural conflict of interest that acts as referee and player. I intend to press the amendment to a Division, should the opportunity arise. Finally, I turn to amendment 6, which would leave out clause 3(3). Subsection (3) is a very broad regulation-making power for the Secretary of State to confer further functions on GBR. It is unrestricted. It reads: “The Secretary of State may by regulations confer on Great British Railways such other functions relating to railways or railway services as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.” Could it be any more widely framed? I do not think so. As long as it is something to do with railways, it takes power away from primary legislation and gives it to the Secretary of State to do as he or she will. It is a blank cheque for the Government and, by extension, for GBR. There are no details given as to why it is needed, and no reason why the powers have not already been considered. We know that the Government have gone off half-cocked with this legislation. By Tuesday’s count, 19 serious documents relating to how GBR will work in practice have yet to emerge. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s justification for subsection (3). Why are the Government so keen to give such overarching powers to the Secretary of State? Sir Alec, are we also going to deal with new clauses 15 and 20 tabled by the Liberal Democrats?

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the Minister for setting out his defence of the Bill. The problem with his argument is that, because the Government have gone off half-cocked, the Committee is not in a position to assess whether he is right or wrong on the nature of the KPIs, or even on where they should be, because we have not been furnished with any draft copies of the documents to which he refers. In those circumstances, I feel obliged to press the two new clauses to a vote. Question put and agreed to. Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the Minister for his brief explanation of the clause. Under clause 3, the Committee was able to discuss the principles of the future structure of GBR, but clause 4 is the first instance of one of the open wounds that the Bill might create. The devolutionary functions of the Bill seemingly reopen aspects of the West Lothian question by failing to provide clear lines of power between the devolved nations, regions and Whitehall. The elephant in the room is the future surrounding England and Wales projects. We know from the evidence we heard that the Welsh railway is very different from, for example, the Scottish railway; 80% of all rail travel in Wales is cross-border, so it includes elements of English travel, as we can tell by Labour’s recent announcement that East West Rail and the Hull to Liverpool lines are being classified as England and Wales projects. Some members of the Minister’s party in Wales might think that is a bit of a stretch at the very least. The Government’s position has consistently been based on the fact that infrastructure is not subsequent to Barnett consequentials in Wales, and therefore should not be allocated to Cardiff Bay. However, the Minister’s own Labour party colleague in the Senedd, Cabinet Secretary for Economy Rebecca Evans MS, said: “Wales will have missed out...as a result of the incorrect classification of HS2 as an England-and-Wales project.” That was Labour’s position when it sat on the Opposition Benches, and it is seemingly still the position of the Labour Government in Cardiff. Is it still the position of the Minister and of Labour? Clause 4 allows the Scottish and Welsh Governments to maintain their nationalised railway structures within ScotRail and Transport for Wales. It is prudent that the Government maintain their and GBR’s final say in these matters, as set out in subsection (2). However, much of the relationship is predicated on the memorandum of understanding, which is missing in action and is not explicitly established in the clause. It is important to ensure that the Government are thinking clearly about the nature of the relationship they wish to maintain with the devolved nations, as this framework will exist within the future memorandum of understanding—which none of us has seen. That will be particularly important should the Wales Act 2017 be amended at some stage, given that Welsh devolved powers are a live political issue. Will the Minister explain Government’s approach to future transport devolution in Wales, given his party’s comments on rail funding?

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 241, in clause 3, page 2, line 17, after “including,” insert “acting in a fair and non-discriminatory manner”. This amendment would require equal treatment between GBR and non-GBR services.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The official Opposition, strongly support this amendment because it seeks to increase passenger traffic on the railways, in addition to the welcomed inclusion of an objective to increase freight. We agree with it so strongly because it is almost identical to our amendment 35, which I shall also speak to. Amendment 35 would add a specific requirement to subsection (2) paragraph (b) of clause 18—the duties clause—for GBR Ministers and the Office of Rail and Road, “to increase the number of passenger journeys”. This directly addresses the concern raised by the Campaign for Better Transport in the evidence received by the Committee. It is an essential amendment to ensure that GBR has a key focus and aim to increase passenger numbers—something that is essential for a railway. It would ensure that the dominant culture of GBR is not one where passengers are seen as creators of damage to infrastructure. That is not a loose accusation that I have made; I have been listening to the industry for over a year now. The core structure of GBR is Network Rail. I know that I am bound to be corrected if I get this even a couple out, but I believe that Network Rail has about 41,000 members of staff. Network Rail is the central body to which train operating companies have been added at a rate of about one every six weeks or two months over the last period. An oft-repeated criticism of the culture of Network Rail has been that it sees passengers as a necessary irritation in the correct functioning of the railway. Sir Alec, if your organisation is engineer focused, the condition of the infrastructure is what is most important to you. Passengers demand lots and lots of trains, but lots and lots of trains damage the infrastructure. There is a concern in the wider sector— I am merely passing it on—that the culture of Network Rail has historically been one in which it wants to limit the number of trains to what it considers to be acceptable, so that it has a nice steady state of repair of the infrastructure. If that is the dominant culture that pervades GBR, now that it is bringing everything together, that will be a disaster for passenger services, because there would not be an automatic incentive to focus on an increase in passenger journeys, which is why amendments 133 and 35 are so important. New clause 42—to go into the detail a little—would require the Secretary of State to set, publish and keep under review a passenger growth target. It would also require GBR to have regard to that target when exercising its statutory functions. In oral evidence to this Committee, Ben Plowden, chief executive of the Campaign for Better Transport, said: “It is welcome that there is a duty to promote the interests of passengers and disabled people in the Bill. We think there is a case for strengthening that duty so that it aligns with the duty in relation to freight, which is to promote the use of the network for passengers and disabled passengers. There should also be an equivalent duty on the Secretary of State to set a passenger growth target, as she is required to do in relation to freight, so that, as we picked up on a minute ago, GBR does not end up being incentivised not to grow the network in order to meet its crowding and reliability duties, for example. It seems to us that giving it a statutory incentive to increase passenger use over time would be very helpful to build on the existing duty in the Bill.” –– [ Official Report, Railways Public Bill Committee, 20 January 2026; c. 24, Q49.] That organisation was not alone, because John Thomas from ALLRAIL said: “I think a passenger growth target is really important. At the moment, the duties for GBR only include improving performance. You can improve performance, as we saw during covid, by cutting the number of services, but that is not necessarily in the best interest of customers. We think a balance between a performance target and a passenger growth target is really important.” –– [ Official Report, Railways Public Bill Committee, 20 January 2026; c. 47, Q78.] Finally, we heard from Rob Morris of Siemens. He said: “What we seem to be missing in the Bill at the moment is the ambition for passenger growth, how that will improve the railway and the levels of investment that need to go with it.” –– [ Official Report, Railways Public Bill Committee, 20 January 2026; c. 64, Q122.] It is unclear to me why, if the Bill can require a target to increase use of the railway network for freight, the same obligation is not applied to passenger services. The inconsistency suggests a deliberate choice not to mandate passenger growth. And why would GBR care about passenger growth? After all, if it will be dominated by Network Rail, there is at least a risk that its culture will be one of avoiding damage to infrastructure, in excess of looking after growing the number of passengers. In written evidence to the Transport Committee, Rail Forum said: “From Rail Forum’s perspective there is nothing specific in the Bill that will guarantee improved travel for passengers. Improvement is predicated on the goodwill of GBR and others driving things in the ‘right direction’. In our view the key to improvement is culture change within those organisations coming together to form GBR. Creating GBR from Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd…will not signal the need for change and creates a risk that the current Network Rail culture will be seen as the norm and hence the status quo will prevail.” These are not arguments made up by a cunning Opposition to wrongfoot the Government. This is the Opposition doing our job properly and reflecting the concerns of the wider sector—not just from one organisation but from multiple organisations, right across the sector. They identify the drafting as a problem and the culture as potentially a problem unless the legislation makes it clear that it is a duty of GBR to increase passenger numbers.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Correct me if I am wrong, but my recollection of Sir Andrew Haines’s oral evidence is that he gave an example of the experience not just on continental Europe, but in Scotland, where a steady-state period of electrification resulted in significant reduction of the cost per mile when compared with the stop-start approach in England. Does the hon. Gentleman agree?

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q We heard evidence earlier today from Maggie Simpson of the Rail Freight Group, and she was very concerned. She said that her members are very concerned, and that that has fed into the ability to take investment decisions, which require a degree of certainty. She was very concerned about clause 63 and its relationship with clause 60. She was also concerned about the ability of the Secretary of State to take unilateral decisions about non-GBR infrastructure without notice and without consultation. We heard that those approaches, together with an effective inability to appeal, meant that investment for rail freight, but also for open access—other rail users—was put in doubt. Do you think she is overreacting? Richard Bowker: It is not for me to say whether she is overreacting, but I absolutely understand the concern, because rail freight in particular involves a lot of private capital. You have to have a degree of confidence and assurance that if you have access rights, you will be able to maintain them, so I understand that. I think the Government are right to create a directing mind. We have seen too many examples of timetabling processes that have gone wrong for precisely that reason—it is about balance.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q In other similar organisations, such as SNCF in France, the decision was taken to recognise the structural conflict of interest, and set up the retail arm of SNCF as a standalone organisation, presumably to prevent or reassure investors that there would be no cross-subsidising. First, do you think that would be a better solution in the United Kingdom? Secondly, if we got that through, could you explain or provide more details to the Committee on what impact it would have in real life? I have in mind, for example, LNER currently being able to offer a full refund with one click on its website, and that service and facility not being made available to independent retailers even under the current system. Can you elaborate on quite how important that is for the independent sector? I would then like Catriona Meehan to come in with her views, too. John Davies: When we talk about the need for the right kinds of protections for retailers, we are pointing at something that is not theoretical—these are risks that are with us today. You point at the example of delay repay, where independent retailers are prevented from supporting customers who have purchased their tickets through them by submitting their claims directly. It also occurs with things such as loyalty schemes, retailer inability to offer customers pay-as-you-go fares, and our ability to offer assisted travel. Independent retailers are not permitted to have access to a very significant amount of propositions around rail travel that are a very meaningful part of the market. Catriona Meehan: I completely echo all of John’s points. For us, it is a concern that there would not be proper separation, which could lead to a degree of self-preferencing. You mentioned SNCF and the separation there, which is an example that we think works well. It is not perfect, of course; there are things that could be improved, but a colleague on the previous panel from ALLRAIL mentioned that EU markets are moving the other way: they are liberalising rather than nationalising. It is interesting to look at why it has happened and why there is a need for it. FRAND principles were mentioned. We are also seeing that in other markets. Omio operates across 46 markets globally, so we have a lot of experience in other markets. Obviously, the UK is very important through our partnership with Uber trains, but we should also talk about the wider sector of independent rail retailers. Unless we have proper safeguards and assurances in place, we are not sure exactly how GBR will not self-preference. That is not exactly clear to us right now.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  My apologies.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I turn to Mr McDonald. It is very different in Wales. The vast majority of the Welsh railway crosses the border with England, as opposed to Scotland, where there is more of a discrete railway—if I can put it like that. I think only the core valley railway is wholly within the gift of Welsh Ministers. Bearing that in mind, and that there will then have to be consultation with the Secretary of State on the vast majority of railways that affect Wales, do you think the Bill has the right line between consultation and decision making for Welsh Ministers, since it affects so much of their railway? Peter McDonald: Yes I do, in terms of the legislation. However, I do not think we can come to a full judgment on this. This may also pre-judge your second question, because we do not have the full memorandum of understanding in front of us. It is only when we see that full package that we can make a judgment about whether the degree of consultation and partnership is sufficient for Wales.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  That is amazing. Rob Morris: One thing I would say to support the figures that Darren mentioned earlier is that we have had a particularly sluggish start to this control period, which is actually prolonging that and impacting on skills and capabilities in the industry, which might add additional costs to remobilise.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Do the Government want private investment in the railway to continue? Keir Mather: Absolutely. It is fundamental that that investment continues, both on the— [ Interruption. ] Sorry— I will just say this very briefly and then let you come back. On the rail freight point, where we have a target in place allowing us to boost the amount of goods moved by train, it might create more capacity for open access to work on the network, but the infrastructure delivery and the long-term rolling stock strategy that accompany this legislative piece of work also offer the private sector a real opportunity to play in the future of our railway, as I see it.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you, all three of you, for agreeing to give oral evidence today. I will start with Mr Brown, who represents Angel Trains: first of all, can you say a little bit about Angel Trains? Malcolm Brown: Yes, by all means. Angel Trains is a ROSCO—a rolling stock operating company. We own circa 4,000 passenger vehicles in the UK, and we provide the bridge between private sector finance and the actual rail industry. In the last 10 years, we have invested about £1.9 billion in new rolling stock in the UK, and we invest about £80 million a year in refurbishing and maintaining trains across the network.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Okay, but nothing yet. Let us move on to clause 10, which gives the Scottish Ministers power of guidance over GBR. Some people have expressed concern that there could be so much political control over future GBR that it will be hard to work out whether the guiding mind is Ministers or GBR. What is your take on that? Bill Reeve: I do not imagine that the guidance will be used then. Ordinarily, I would imagine that we would start with the use of our strategies, our statement of objectives and our normal means of engagement. It is important to remember that, whereas currently we spend £1 billion a year on Network Rail in Scotland, and it is for the ORR to enforce its delivery obligations under the delivery plan to the current funding arrangement, that role is being removed from the ORR. What you see reflected in the Bill is something to address what would otherwise be a complete accountability gap. We would welcome the fact that we will have stronger accountability mechanisms under these provisions than we have had hitherto, given the very substantial amount of funding that we fund the railway infrastructure in Scotland with.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q So if you have a degree of certainty for the next 10 years and a forward look for, say, the next five after that—the Minister is right here, so shall we say 15 years for a long-term strategy? Is that what you are suggesting? Malcolm Brown: No, I am not. I am suggesting that the strategy should give various date points—10 years, 15 years, 30 years. I do not think we should exclude it saying, “Here is a vision for what we wish our rail industry to look like in 30 years,” while accepting that that will actually change. It has to change; it has to morph and adapt to the market.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I am just going to interrupt you. That is a different point from the one that I am asking about. I am talking about the cost of planning and implementing renewals and about having a degree of certainty looking forward regarding when that money will be spent. If you always have a minimum of, let us say, 24 months for planning and commitment to funding, does that make it easier for the supply chain to commit resources, and therefore cheaper? Darren Caplan: These guys can talk to that specifically, but I assume so, because you are planning out your workforces, your investment in partner machinery, your overall business plan, the apprentices you are going to take on and innovation—all these things can be planned in advance. If you know, you will get a better cost.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q What you have shown us in your smuggled-in prop—

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Where is the incentive to carry on and accelerate that process in this Bill? Where is the incentive for GBR? Malcolm Brown: I cannot comment. I presume it is going to be in one of the building blocks. My concern is that we have a group of people who are trying to design trains for a hobby, when we have manufacturers such as Siemens in the UK, which have global platforms for trains. Yes, we adapt and customise them for the UK, but we get all the benefits of the manufacturing experience of a global manufacturer with the economies of scale that that provides as well. We do not need bespoke custom-built trains in the UK.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Right. Actually, I am slightly surprised, because this is an unusual process; it was a Tony Blair innovation that we got rid of. We did not think it had much purpose, but we will find out in the next few minutes, won’t we? We have heard lots of evidence, and some clear, consistent themes have risen out of it. If you have read the Transport Committee’s report on this issue from a few weeks ago, as I am sure you have, you will know that the sector is giving the Government a few messages very loud and clear. We will discuss those a little bit, but the secret question is: So what? What are you going to do about it? That is what I hope you will come back to. A level playing field is fair and without discrimination. There is a structural conflict of interest between GBR as the holder of the ring and GBR as an operator—for example, in the relationship with open access, with freight and with independent retailers. Each one of those—they are sectors, not individual organisations—has profound concerns about a structural conflict of interest that has been deliberately built into the Bill. Combined with that, there is an appeals process that is not worthy of the name. We can say that it is robust, but we all know that it is not. It is very, very tightly defined. It relates only to areas of law; there is no appeal on the merits at all. GBR is judge, jury and gamekeeper, as well as participant—that is a slightly mixed metaphor, but you get the point. With the defenestration of the Office of Rail and Road as an economic regulator, the independent arbiter of the relationship with GBR is now gone. You have heard the evidence. What are you going to do about it? Keir Mather : It is a very good question, Mr Mayhew. It goes to the core of the differing ideological perspectives that underlie the debate we have had today on the Bill. Although you see the state seeking to take too much control and giving itself an unfair advantage, our perspective on why this legislation is so important is that passengers—who are ultimately both people who pay for services on the railway and taxpayers who end up funding those services more often than not under this broken rail system, and will do once GBR is established—deserve a good service. We believe that having a unified service with a single guiding mind to bring track and train, passenger services and infrastructure together under one roof, with one point of accountability, is the best way to achieve those aims. You asked me what we are going to do about the concerns raised today. It is my obligation as a Government Minister to address them, to explore ways in which we can allay them further and to progress the work the Department is already taking on through its stakeholder engagement, whether that be on the freight target or the rolling stock and infrastructure strategy, to make sure that stakeholder concerns are heard. On the principle of fairness and transparency as it relates to ticketing and third-party access, it is worth making the point that GBR is, by public law principles, obligated to have regard to fair and transparent processes as part of how the system works. On access and appeals, that is a real point of contention, which we will explore throughout Committee, but I heard the concerns raised by freight stakeholders and others. I want to take this opportunity to be really clear that the Department’s very firm view is that clauses 60 and 63 are not in contention with each other and that Great British Rail has the ability to decide what constitutes best use of the railway, in a way that not only meets its duties, but balances opportunities for GBR services, rail freight and open access alongside one another. The clauses provide an opportunity to appeal on the basis of whether that has been followed, through the ORR, but also a robust process, once that allocation has been determined, to figure out whether GBR has been compliant with the law, as of course we always expect it will be. Overall, this is a point of ideological difference that exists between our two parties. Labour believes fundamentally that you need one point of accountability and that the Government need to take a more proactive role in fixing this broken rail system. I am really pleased that this piece of legislation seeks to achieve what I think are very noble aspirations.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q You looked at it when you were with the SRA, back in the day, and you rejected it, presumably. What were the reasons for your rejection of that approach? Richard Bowker: The ’93 Act was not set up that way; it was set up so that the Strategic Rail Authority was responsible for setting an overall strategic plan for the railways and for managing the award and management of franchises, but Railtrack plc, and then Network Rail, was under the regulation of an independent economic regulator. The two worlds were apart. Whereas the regulator had to have regard to our strategies, it did not have to comply with them, so we always had that tension. It was not really for me to change it. That is why I think that, overall, this is a good approach.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q It is not really the directing mind I am focusing on; it is having a level playing field where, for the first time, we are going to have GBR being the directing mind but also an operator. There is a direct structural conflict of interest in the design of GBR as set out in the Bill—that has been the evidence of many people to the Committee today—combined with essentially no right of appeal other than on matters of law. First of all, do you recognise that as a proper concern? Secondly, if so, do you think a partial solution would be to have a mechanism for appeal on the merits to an independent regulator—let us call it something like the ORR? Richard Bowker: On the first point, yes, I recognise the concern. Secondly, personally I would look at clause 18(4) and ask whether we really need to have the capacity duty able to override other duties. As far as the appeals process is concerned, I can see why being able to look at a case on the merits rather than on a strictly legal basis would help enormously. If GBR believes that its access and use policy, its capacity planning and its final decisions constitute a good process, it should not fear that.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Mr Montgomery, will you say whether you agree with that position, as well as answering this final question? In areas of capacity and access, the Bill anticipates the Secretary of State being granted power to change capacity decisions and access agreements without notice. If that is the case, what impact will that have on the ability of open access operators to build a business case for investment in the future? What impact will it have on future investment? Steve Montgomery: I agree with everything John and Maggie said. The challenge we see as a private sector operator is how you get anybody to invest in the industry with the lack of clarity in the Bill. As John alluded to, there is reference by the DFT in the memorandum of understanding on the Bill, but nothing in the Bill itself. That makes it very difficult to go to a board and say, “Look, we want to invest in these things.” What certainty do you have for the future? An awful lot has been made of open access as we have gone through this process. It would take up 1% of overall capacity, but it is held out there, in the commentary, as one of the major plays in the Bill. We think that open access brings the opportunity for competition, which we seem to have lost with some of the wording in the Bill. How do we make sure that there are better services for customers? That is what we all want and what GBR is setting out to do, but how do we make sure that we all have a fair chance when bidding? We have talked about the access situation. GBR can decide not to give access, and the ORR has very limited powers to hear an appeal, so where is the confidence for the private sector investment that the industry continues to cry out for?

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you both for coming to give evidence. I will be fairly brief—I always say that, but never am. Mr Reeve, I will start with clause 8, which is on the potential powers for Ministers in Scotland to give directions to GBR. On the face of it, that all looks good: they have to consult the Secretary of State, and she or he has the power to overrule the Scottish Minister. Do you think that the Bill has the balance of responsibilities and powers right there? Bill Reeve: There has to be a balance, because we are trying to secure the ability of our Ministers to have a proper accountability mechanism and proper direction for implementation of our strategies and of our very substantial funding of the infrastructure. Equally, our network is not an island; clearly, if a direction in Scotland were to have a material impact on matters south of the border, which would not be the intention, that provision is there; I can understand that. There were constructive discussions between our Ministers and officials about how we strike that balance so, broadly, we are content with the arrangements, noting that an MOU is also required by the Bill to flesh out a little more how that will work in practice.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q First, I apologise for taking so long during the Division. I am also a Whip, so I had to stay in the voting Lobby. It is something to get used to again when you come back to the House. I am picking up fag ends, because it sounded as though the Minister was discussing very similar issues to those that I was discussing before we left. It was rather frustrating, Mr Burnham —the Division bell went when you were about to deliver a hammer blow against the Government on your disappointment about what is not in the Bill and what should be in it. You used to say that you wanted more autonomy for the Bee Network. I have heard your answers—it is clear that your position on that has not changed. You want to have more autonomy, but the Bill does not provide it at the moment. You have a duty to consult, which is okay so far as it goes, from GBR, and then thereafter, once it has consulted with the mayoralties, it only has a duty to have regard to what it is that you have said or requested. In your combined evidence, what would be a better form of words more accurately to reflect the relationship that you think should exist between the national and the regional? Mr Burnham, because we were halfway through a conversation, perhaps we could start with you, then move on to Tracy. Andy Burnham: Thank you. I do not know about coming back, but what I do know is that in my 16 years here, there were enough Tory MPs around that there was no double-jobbing, I do not think, from my memory. We will move on. I think that it is about a meaningful role. I do not think autonomy is actually what we are asking for here today, any of us. Tracy Brabin: No. Andy Burnham: What we are saying is that we want a meaningful partnership, which is about more than just being consulted and then ignored—which, if we are honest, does happen to us as mayors with the rail industry. Even though I am chair of the Rail North Committee, we sometimes have to work very hard to make the railways listen to what democratically elected mayors and leaders say. It is a different relationship, and I would say that I strongly feel the railways need culture change. We need to get back to a railway that serves people and places, not a quite adversarial section of transactional arrangements that can be very complex. It feels to us sometimes that the railways have lost sight of that.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Moving on to access decisions and charging, on your reading of the Bill, does the ORR have enough power to hold GBR to account? If your answer, as I suspect it might be, is that it does not, what changes need to be made to improve the Bill? Maggie Simpson: On capacity allocation in particular, as well as the points I have just made about the appeals function, we have a conflict between two clauses in the Bill. The capacity duty in clause 63 sets an incredibly powerful requirement in law for GBR to keep capacity for its own trains and any trains it wants to run in the future. We have sought assurance from the Department for Transport on how that duty and clause 60, on the infrastructure capacity plan, work together. The Department has told us that its intention is for the capacity duty to be subservient to the infrastructure capacity plan, where an assessment is made of the best use of the network, but that is not what the law says. We would like to see it clarified that the value-based assessment of what is the right use of capacity on the network is done first, and that GBR is then able to assure the capacity afterwards.