Jerome Mayhew MP: speeches

Speeches

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I am grateful that the Minister is being very generous. In my opening remarks, I asked him to give me some real-world examples of when injunctive relief might be required. Could he not forget to provide those?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I beg to move amendment 12, in clause 7, page 4, line 30, after “functions” insert— “where the Office for Rail and Road, in carrying out its functions under section 69A of the Railways Act 1993 (as inserted by section 74 of this Act), has deemed Great British Railways to be in breach of its statutory functions.” This amendment would restrict the Secretary of State’s ability to give directions to Great British Railways to circumstances where the Office for Rail and Road has deemed Great British Railways in breach of its statutory functions.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  It is not a perfect analogy, because GBR is at least intended to be more akin to a business—a nationalised business—but my hon. Friend is entirely right that where we have two organisations in competition, each one thinking that it runs the railways, that is a recipe for confusion at the least, and disaster at the worst. This is not an idle concern, because it has happened before. We all remember the Virgin West Coast franchise debacle in 2012, when the slightly arm’s length process of franchising did not go well, causing a communal panic in the Department for Transport. The phrase, “Something must be done to prevent this from ever happening again,” was no doubt repeated many times. The result was that more and more micromanaging took place by the Department for Transport in the setting of franchises. The Department no longer talked only about outcomes that needed to be achieved, leaving how companies went about that entirely up to them, which is the appropriate way to draft a franchise agreement. Instead, that devolved into mechanisms of how a franchise should be operated. We had that mission creep, and I fear that under the Bill we might get exactly the same approach with GBR. It will be set up with the best of intentions, and perhaps in the first two or three years all will run smoothly and the directing mind in practice might well be GBR, but then something will happen, because something always does happen in the real world, with lots of people doing their best but sometimes making mistakes, and there will be a collective gasp from the Department of Transport, because it will feel like it is on the hook, so “Something must be done to ensure that this doesn’t happen again.” We have designed into this mechanism a structure that allows the removal of GBR’s operational independence, and it does so without any reference to actions of last resort by the Government—the Bill is silent on that. We talk about the Secretary of State, but we all know that officials in the Department for Transport will be advising the Secretary of State on what he or she should be doing in a particular circumstance, and there will be a power grab. Without amendment, the clause will absolutely allow for that. We should be alive to the real-world experience that we all have and take this opportunity to strengthen its wording in order to design out that issue and ensure that there is proper accountability—with GBR accountable to the Secretary of State and, through the Secretary of State, to Parliament—and that operational independence stays with what will be a nationalised business, rather than creating a railway version of NHS England, as my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East mentioned a moment ago. I have tabled two amendments to address this issue. Amendment 12 would limit directions to circumstances in which the Office of Rail and Road assesses GBR to be in breach of its statutory functions. It could be argued that the Secretary of State should have an emergency lever; that is fair enough, because bad things happen. One of our great complaints before the election, although I am beginning to hear it from Labour Ministers as well, was, “We pull the levers but they’re not attached to anything—we have no power.” When we form the Government after the next election, we will want to have levers that are attached to something, and I accept that it is necessary to have an emergency lever to pull should a significant unforeseen event occur—another pandemic, perhaps—and an intervention be required. However, amendment 12 would still allow the Secretary of State to intervene in emergency scenarios, as the ORR would deem that such events make it impossible for GBR to conform to its business plan targets. Clause 74 sets out the ORR’s power to monitor GBR’s performance. Elsewhere in the Bill, we shall argue that the ORR needs more teeth to hold GBR to account, and this provision limiting the potential for the Secretary of State to intervene until such time that an independent regulatory body has recognised that GBR has not been able to fulfil its functions will be an important safeguard. Amendment 11 would put the words “last resort” on the face of the Bill, and would provide that a direction may be made only after the removal of GBR’s chief executive officer. The intention behind the amendment is to treat GBR as a business, which I think we all agree is what it is intended to be—albeit a nationalised one. Where there is a board of non-executive directors, they can question the executive team, and they can challenge decisions and require the chief executive to explain and defend the direction of the company. However, when push comes to shove, and the decision is made that the organisation is moving in the wrong direction, the weapon available to the chairman is the removal of the chief executive officer. If GBR is operating on a day-to-day basis with oversight from the Department for Transport—the Secretary of State—and concerns arise as to its direction or performance, the sequence of severity of the response should not start with guidance from the Secretary of State and then mandatory directions. They might be the final requirement, because we all need those levers, but surely they should come only after the chief executive has been challenged and then removed, just as in the private sector with an arm’s length majority investment.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Will the Minister give way?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Where is the reference to persistent, urgent and unforeseen incidents in the Bill?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I beg to move amendment 109, in schedule 1, page 55, line 10, leave out from “may,” to “grant” and insert— “at the recommendation of the Office of the Rail and Road in relation to matters related to safety and standards and, after consultation with the Passengers’ Council,”. This amendment would require the Secretary of State to get a formal recommendation from the Office of the Rail and Road that the GBR licence adequately ensures that licence obligations related to safety and standards are not compromised or undermined. Schedule 1 contains the meat of what we have been talking about. It amends part 1 of the Railways Act 1993 to set out how GBR will be licensed. Paragraph 2 confirms that GBR should never be exempt from holding a licence, and paragraph 3 inserts new section 7B, which will enable the Secretary of State, following consultation, to grant GBR a written licence to operate specified railway assets. The licence must be in writing and will remain in force unless revoked or surrendered. Surrendering the licence will require the Secretary of State’s consent. Paragraph 3 also sets out the process for granting licences to persons other than GBR. The Secretary of State and the Office of Rail and Road will continue to be able to grant licences to persons other than GBR to operate railway assets. The ORR may grant such licences only with the Secretary of State’s consent or under a general authority issued by the Secretary of State. Licences must be in writing and will remain in force unless revoked or surrendered. Surrendering the licence will require the ORR’s consent, much in the same way as it previously required the Secretary of State’s consent. Proposed new section 8A sets out the requirements for the granting of licences by the Secretary of State or the ORR. It provides that a notice must be published outlining the intention to grant a licence, the reasons for doing so, and allowing at least 28 days from the date of publication for interested parties to make representations or objections. There is a duty to consider representations or objections made within the period specified in the notice. Proposed new section 8B gives the Secretary of State the power to set rules for how licence applications must be made. Among other things, that includes the format of the application, the fee payable—different fees may apply—and the requirements for publishing the application. Before making any regulations, the Secretary of State must consult the ORR. Any fees collected by either the Secretary of State or the ORR in connection with licence applications must be paid to the consolidated fund. Paragraph 4 clarifies that a licence granted to GBR may specify when the authorisation it provides takes effect. It allows the licence to include a start date or a mechanism for determining it. Paragraph 5 provides that the licence granted to GBR may include a condition requiring it to comply with the provisions set out in separate document that is prepared by the ORR and approved by the Secretary of State. It might be something such as a code of practice—one of these operating documents that we have been talking about so much—and it may relate to the sale of tickets by GBR or third parties, or to services that GBR provides to the rail industry to facilitate railway operations that are of particular interest to the independent retail sector. The paragraph makes it clear that an approved document may be used to regulate GBR’s behaviour in relation to the sale of tickets by parties other than GBR, in the independent retail sector. Paragraph 6 provides that, before making modifications to a GBR licence, the Secretary of State must publish a notice explaining the proposed modifications and the reasons for them, and must allow the usual period of 28 days for interested parties to make representations. There is a duty on the Secretary of State to consider representations or objections to the notice made within the period specified. Paragraph 7 clarifies that the ORR must consult the passengers’ council before making any amendments to passenger or station licences that relate to functions of the council. The ORR must also send a copy of the modifications to the council as soon as practicable. Paragraph 9 clarifies that any licence under section 8 of the Railways Act 1993 that was in force immediately before the changes made by the schedule come into force will remain so, per the conditions and periods set out in the licence, unless it is revoked or surrendered. Here is the mystery of the missing licence: where is it? We have explored this at some length, and the Minister is going to go away and see what he can rustle up in the Department’s cupboard to point us in the right direction, or at least to give us the direction of travel of the missing licence. In oral evidence to the Transport Committee, Ben Plowden, chief executive officer of the Campaign for Better Transport, said: “I think the licence will be critical. There are various references in the documents that the Government published to a ‘streamlined licence’, so I would be quite interested to see what that means relative to the current licence that applies to Network Rail. I think the Government are going to consult on the draft licence, so we will all have a chance to look at it. The other point I would make is one I made earlier, which is that the licence will be one of many documents the Government will produce in the next year to 18 months. There is the long-term rail strategy and GBR will produce its business plan. There will be the access and use policy; the new periodic review process; and MOUs with Ministers in Scotland and Wales. There will be guidance on partnerships with mayoral combined authorities, and guidance on the right to request full rail devolution. There is a huge amount still to come. Understanding how the licence intersects with those other documents and processes is going to be critical, because between them they will add up to the set of arrangements that determine whether GBR is successful or not for passengers. We have to see the licence in the context of all the other things that will be guiding, directing and shaping what GBR does, how it invests, and what it does operationally.” That is the experts in the industry repeating what the Opposition have been arguing repeatedly today and last week. More accurately, it is the other way around: we have been listening to the industry in a way that the Government have not, and have been expressing the deep concerns in the sector that the current proposals are half cocked. Huge chunks of the direction, guidance and memorandums are simply missing, including the licence that the schedule is designed to address.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  That is a perfectly fair challenge, but amendment 11 would not require the CEO’s removal by the Secretary of State if those KPIs are not met; it would be a necessary first step to demonstrate that the KPIs are not being met, and then there would be a discretion. I suppose the hon. Member is really arguing that my safeguard is not quite as strong as it could be. Nevertheless, it would be a step in the right direction, and it would not require the removal of the chief executive. New clause 4 would give the Secretary of State the power to dismiss the CEO of GBR on the grounds that a KPI has not been met and—this is an important bit, which the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage might recognise gives the new clause some weight—GBR has failed to act on guidance that has been issued by the Secretary of State under clause 9. It is sequential. First, the chief executive is given guidance from the Secretary of State. Most chief executives worth their salt would take notice of official guidance given by their 100% shareholder, but if for some reason they fail to act on the guidance and they are still missing their KPI, then the power to dismiss would be exercisable. In my submission, that is a good approach. Clause 7(2)—the “interference clause”—anticipates minor direction changes, which is exactly the kind of direction that should not be issued and is contrary to the explanatory notes. We are told that the powers in the clause will be used only as a last resort, but subsection (2) states: “A direction under this section may provide, in particular, that a function is only to be exercised— (a) after consulting the Secretary of State, or (b) with the Secretary of State’s consent.” The clause is not an emergency lever. It is quite clear from the drafting that the circumstances in subsection (2) cannot apply to a last-resort emergency lever. It is saying, “You can carry on doing things, but we need to have oversight in the nitty-gritty.” It is truly an interference clause. Is it the Government’s intention that directions issued under clause 7 will be, as described in the explanatory notes, used as a “last resort” emergency brake, or do they intend—this is the case as the Bill is drafted—that the Secretary of State will give himself or herself the power to intervene in day-to-day management, even down to the level that individual decisions will not be taken until there has been consultation with the Secretary of State or the Secretary of State has consented to them? Clause 7(5) needs improvement. It requires publication by the Secretary of State, but anticipates no role for Parliament in that oversight. The organisation Rail Forum said: “We agree that this is desirable to ensure GBR remains arm’s length and is allowed to manage its own affairs.” That is important. The industry itself is saying that GBR needs to be operationally independent and to manage its own affairs. Amendment 14 would correct that issue. It would require the Secretary of State to lay any decision before Parliament—the right place for primary scrutiny. Rail Forum supports the amendment. It says: “This is essential to ensure that normal Parliamentary process is not bypassed.” Amendment 16 would mean that decisions on fares imposed on GBR by the Secretary of State can be assessed against passenger growth and affordability. Such a direction would have a huge impact on the financial position of GBR, because decisions on fares and passenger growth and affordability are central to revenue. It is crucial that decisions are made on proper evidence and in line with the objects of GBR.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  It is just as pleasurable to have you in the Chair today as it was last week, Sir Alec. I remind hon. Members that clause 7 gives the Secretary of State the power to issue and publish directions to Great British Railways relating to its railway activities. It also outlines how the Secretary of State must obtain consent from Welsh and Scottish Ministers before giving directions relating to their devolved services, except where powers are used in relation to the access regime. The clause further outlines how GBR will be required to comply with directions, which are mandatory and binding, and intended to be used as a so-called “responsive tool for necessary course correction, rather than as a proactive tool to set requirements on GBR,” or, as further clarified in the explanatory notes, as “a last resort”. Interestingly, although the explanatory notes state that a direction by the Secretary of State is a mechanism of last resort, the clause itself gives no indication to substantiate that. Instead, it suggests that the Secretary of State can act independently of their Welsh and Scottish counterparts’ views, especially as there is a reliance on non-legislative measures. My first question to the Minister is, therefore: why is this supposed last-resort requirement not on the face of the Bill? When dealing with matters relating in particular to the interpretation of devolution, the risk is that any decision taken by the Secretary of State may be disputed by the devolved nations and end up as a political football, which only increases lawyers’ profits. Would it not therefore be prudent to set out in the legislation exactly what is meant? Without a clear breakdown of the procedures and directions, surely we run the risk of granting the Secretary of State a large degree of power with very limited oversight. The clause gives the Secretary of State unrestricted power, other than for operations in Scotland and Wales, to intervene in the running of GBR. That is a step too far. While it is justifiable for the democratically elected Government of the day to set and agree GBR’s strategic objectives, key performance indicators and business plans, after those are set out, the Government’s role should be to hold GBR to account for the delivery of the targets, objectives and strategies, and not to tell it how to do so on a day-to-day basis. A question arises on clause 8(4), and I would be grateful if the Minister could provide clarity on the oversight system outlined in clauses 7 and 8. Subsection (4) states: “Before giving, varying or revoking a direction under this section the Scottish Ministers must consult the Secretary of State.” Presently, GBR must decide whether a decision directly affects devolved services, but the Bill provides no statutory test, which leaves a delivery body making politically sensitive judgments, further increasing the risk of challenge by devolved nations. Clarity for Members, especially those from the devolved nations, will be extremely helpful, so I would be grateful if the Minister would address that directly. Under subsection (5) of both clauses 7 and 8, directions must be published, but there is no requirement for them to be laid before and scrutinised by Parliament—the old trap of creating transparency without consequence. A reporting or laying requirement, perhaps through the Select Committee, would turn publication into genuine accountability. However, I am interested to hear what rationale the Minister has not to allow greater scrutiny of GBR in Parliament. Again, perhaps he will address that directly in his response. That is the rationale behind our suggested amendments to require the Secretary of State to lay directions before Parliament, in order to allow us to scrutinise the decisions in greater detail. There is a fundamental question about leadership and who is the key decision maker. We are told repeatedly by the Minister and others that GBR is the directing mind, but will that really be the case if the clause goes through unamended? If GBR really is the directing mind, what is the necessity for the clause? It is a recipe for decision paralysis, with GBR, given the decision-making structures, undermined by guidance—we will come on to that when we discuss clause 9—and by directions from the Department for Transport in the name of the Secretary of State. Clause 7 really does risk creating the worst of both worlds. We will have the cost of GBR and its oversight structures—we are told in the recently published job application for the part-time chair that GBR will have more than 100,000 employees; it will be an enormous organisation, with its own senior management team—and then we will have the same again, with an overactive Department for Transport second-guessing GBR’s day-to-day working and being able to give guidance and directions as a result of clauses 7 and 8.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  We have debated these two clauses. We have made clear our concerns about the current drafting and have tried our best to improve the Bill through a number of very sensible amendments, the majority of which were supported by the Liberal Democrats. We in our turn have supported some sensible amendments proposed by the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage. I recognise that to vote against the clauses would potentially put a difficult hole in the armoury of the Secretary of State for GBR, so it is with a heavy heart that I do not oppose these two clauses. Question put and agreed to. Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 11 Licensing Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  You are kind to call me to speak again, Sir Alec; I realise that I did not speak to clause 10 earlier. Briefly, I recognise that clause 10 mirrors clause 9, which we have debated substantially, but it is important to note that Scottish Ministers are given a guidance function, whereas Welsh Ministers are not. That reflects the devolution settlement, whereby Scotland funds and controls its rail system in its entirety, whereas Welsh responsibilities are substantially limited to the core valley lines. I repeat our previous arguments about the express need for operational independence for GBR, without constant second-guessing by Department for Transport officials, which my amendment 21 addresses, and about fares, which I discussed in relation to amendment 20. I will press a selection of the amendments to a Division. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I completely agree with my hon. Friend. When one’s children come and ask for something, the wise answer is always to ask first, “What did your mother say?” If we were able to apply that common sense to this situation, I would not be so concerned. What we have instead is stakeholder management culture seeping into the core aspects of GBR functions.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  As I have set out in my series of amendments, the appropriate oversight and control is to remove the chief executive. The Minister must accept that, if the Secretary of State thinks that the organisation is going in the wrong direction, is not listening to guidance or has gone rogue in some way, they have the unfettered power to remove the chief executive officer at any stage. If he does not think that is the case, he should say so now, because if the Secretary of State has the power to remove the chief executive officer and put in place someone who will do his bidding, then none of this is needed, is it?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I echo all the comments made by my right hon. and hon. Friends. I also thank the Minister for facing up to it with a point of order. It was obvious last week that a point of order was on its way. None of us on the Opposition Benches will hold him to his initial, rather quick, response—no doubt I will do something similar during the passage of the Bill—but that does not let the Government off the hook. This is not business as usual for a Department bringing through a Bill of this nature. My right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston, an experienced former Minister, gave two examples of primary legislation that also relied on secondary documentation. In those circumstances, the departmental teams did provide skeleton outlines for Parliament, which is what we are, to consider and do our job properly. I do not want the Minister to rush out a quick affirmative like last week, so I ask him to take time to consider, perhaps discuss with his officials, and reply later today on whether he and his officials are able to commit to some form of briefing—some skeleton outline—on the nature of the licence, at a time when we can collectively discuss and debate it, and see whether it points in the right direction. Clause 11 simply enables GBR’s licensing to be set out in schedule 1, which we will come on to in a moment. That schedule amends part 1 of the Railways Act 1993 and sets out the detailed process by which the GBR licence will be issued and maintained. Both the Secretary of State and the Office of Rail and Road will retain the ability to grant licences to railway bodies other than GBR—for example, open access operators, freight operators and other infrastructure managers such as the core valley lines in Wales. I know we will discuss the contents of schedule 1 and the detail of the licence extensively.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  rose —

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I am wholly unconvinced by the explanation the Minister has given. On many of the clauses and amendments I have put forward, and those put forward in the names of other Members, one can see both sides of the argument; on this one, I think the Government are entirely wrong. They are setting up a structure using another arm’s length non-governmental body, National Highways, that is a byword among us constituency MPs for a lack of accountability and for being a frustrating body to deal with. That is not the right direction for the Government to be going in and I will push the amendments to a Division. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I am grateful to the Minister, though I remind him that we do have 14 sessions; we are not cantering to the last fence. He prays in aid National Highways. We are all constituency MPs. We all know how frustrating it is trying to deal with National Highways. I do not want to make a headline unnecessarily, but my personal view, as a constituency MP, is that trying to deal with National Highways in the interests of my constituents is almost impossible. Why would he choose that as the example to follow when designing accountability for GBR?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I am grateful for Minister’s explanation, but I am not persuaded by it and seek to put amendment 109 to a vote. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  That demonstrates that the current system is working to hold Trainline to account, and that where there are abuses—if what the hon. Gentleman outlined amounted to abuses—effective systems are in position and they have been corrected. The hon. Gentleman’s intervention did not speak to the overriding point: what do the Government want when they are applying this new structure to retail? Do they want a level playing field? Is that their intention, or do they want a systemically biased system in which GBR retail is given an unfair advantage over independent competition? Both answers are credible—it is possible for the Government to form one decision—but they should not pay lip service to a level playing field but, in design, achieve the opposite, which appears to be the case at the moment. In oral evidence to the Transport Committee, Ben Plowden, the chief executive of the Campaign for Better Transport, essentially agreed with Trainline’s position. He said: “We think that because the independent retail market has produced significant benefits for customers in the time that it has been in existence. It is heavily used by rail passengers. The critical question in relation to the Bill, and the other mechanisms that will be in place once the Bill has been passed, is how we ensure that there is genuine fair and open competition between GBR ticket retailing and the independent retailers currently or potentially in the market.” This is a key point: the Government need to stop and think about what their intention is. If it is to have a fair market, the evidence, and all the feedback they are getting from the sector, is that they have not yet achieved that objective. They need to put their money where their mouth is and decide what their objective is. I hope the Minister will be clear in his response as to the Government’s thinking on that. A second concern is that the sector is nervous about the apparent lack of hierarchy and detail in the functions. GBR is assigned multiple duties under the clause, but with no hierarchy, so it paves the way for potential confusion—or, worse, it gives GBR the ability to pick and choose which function it thinks is important in relation to any decision. It can quietly demote the importance of others so that it can serve itself and thereby reduce the power of the clause. Nick Brooks from ALLRAIL said in oral evidence to the Transport Committee: “To lead from your further question: with the very broad powers for the Secretary of State and a certain lack of specificity on what will happen, what we are looking for is more key performance indicators, like in business. I realise it is a governmental entity, but the quantitative KPIs are not really there.” I would go further than that: they are not there at all. As well as amendment 2, which I have spoken to, we have also tabled new clause 3, which sets out GBR retail requirements. As I have said previously, this is a critical issue given the evidence that the Select Committee received, and the oral evidence that we heard on Tuesday, that the Government have built a structural conflict of interest into the Bill as currently drafted. We also heard on Tuesday about international examples where a similar concern has been addressed in a different manner. SNCF is a state-owned railway in France that has unification of track and train. It also has a retail function, through which is competes with the wider market. SNCF, or, I presume, the French Government—I do not want to claim greater in-depth knowledge that I actually possess—have taken the decision to have a structural separation between SNCF retail and SNCF operations, the equivalent to GBR. The very obvious reason why they did that was for fairness and to have a level playing field. We are not talking about SNCF, but an improvement on the current position, which I fully accept is not perfect.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I beg to move amendment 2, in clause 3, page 2, line 15, after “sale” insert— “by promoting a thriving competitive market in the retail ticketing market”. This amendment makes Great British Railways’ duty to promote a competitive retail market explicit and aligns the Bill with the Government’s stated aim of delivering a system where competition drives better outcomes for passengers.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I am grateful for that direction, Mrs Hobhouse, but it is quite hard to talk about amendments if we have not considered what is in the clause. I fully accept and follow your guidance that the decision and debate on clause 3 as a whole comes later, but to address amendments to a clause I have to discuss the clause as a whole.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Thank you. We have this generational change in the organisation of the railways; the Government, with their majority, have taken a political decision to nationalise the sector. We know that nationalisation of the railways has been tried before. They were nationalised in 1950 or 1951—

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I do. I apologise to the Committee; I erroneously thought that we were dealing with amendment 257 in isolation. There is huge interest in this Bill, which will directly affect lots of people. It will affect the employees, of course, as well as Network Rail, the train operating companies, the remaining franchisees and those already in the public sector, freight and open access operators, the mayoral combined authorities, Transport for London, High Speed 1, the huge supply sector, the trade unions and many others—and that is before we even start to consider passengers. This is a generational change in the organisation of the railways, and it is crucial that the Government do not mess it up. One of the key themes that will run through a lot of our conversations over the coming four weeks is accountability, and new clause 38 would address just one small part of that issue by requiring a ministerial statement, once a quarter, on the progress of the setting up of GBR and its becoming fully operational. There is huge public interest in the Bill, which must be successful, so it would be sensible for the Minister to come to the House and make a statement. That would increase transparency, maintain focus and prevent drift. Mrs Hobhouse, can you give me some guidance? Are we going to talk about the clause more widely later, or should I deal with that now?

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  It is very nice to have you in the Chair, Mrs Hobhouse. I think this a conversation among Labour Members, and I do not want to get in the way of a private dispute. I might just sit down and listen to what the Minister has to say.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  The hon. Gentleman is quite right. From 1950, we had the high point of post-war passenger numbers on the railways—about 1 billion passengers. From that period of nationalisation, the number of passengers choosing—I use that word advisedly—to use the railways started a long and seemingly unstoppable decline. It went from 1 billion in the early 1950s all the way down to about 735 million in the period of privatisation—1993. It seemed like that was due to the public changing the way in which they chose to live their lives. The Under-Secretary of State for Transport, the hon. Member for Nottingham South, suggested from her seat on Second Reading that it was obvious that people did not want to use the train so much, even during a period of increasing population, because they were increasingly affluent and they bought more cars. That is a possible explanation. But then something very odd happened. In 1993, the then Conservative Government legislated to privatise the railways. Now, we can debate—and I am sure we will multiple times over the coming days—whether that was a good or a bad thing in principle and whether the way the privatisation was done, through the Railways Act 1993, and subsequently amended was perfect or whether it could have been improved upon, but if we consider that the primary objective of a railway—leaving freight to one side for a moment—is to carry passengers, the data shows that the privatisation of the railways in the United Kingdom was an unqualified success. The seemingly inevitable decline in passenger numbers changed direction immediately. It was not just a slow bottoming out; that long-term decline immediately turned in the other direction, and then continued to grow until covid meant that all bets were off from 2019. Those numbers did not just grow to recover all the lost work of the previous 40 years—they did not go back up to 1 billion customers; they increased to 1.75 billion. That was a period of increased affluence, when the number of cars available to passengers increased enormously. The only explanation for the absolute reversal in passenger numbers is the decisions taken through privatisation—the profit motive and the incentive to focus on passengers rather than on the organisation.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  In which case, I will speak first to amendment 2, as that is first in the grouping, and then proceed to the others. Amendment 2 would make explicit the duty of Great British Railways to promote a thriving, competitive retail market, and align the Bill with the Government’s stated aim of delivering a system in which competition drives better outcomes for passengers. The retail market in the UK is currently one of thriving competition, as we can all recognise, and shows UK tech at its best. Trainline is—I think I am right in saying—a FTSE 250 company, and a tech growth story for the United Kingdom, being Europe’s leading train and coach app. The amendment is therefore key to ensuring that the landscape continues to thrive and that we do not drive Trainline and its competitors out of the country. Members will remember that in written evidence to the Transport Committee, Trainline asked that Committee “to recommend that the Bill be amended to require structural separation of GBR online retail from the rest of the GBR organisation and to publish information that enables the ORR, CMA and other regulators to assess compliance with competition law, subsidy control rules and non-discrimination duties. This should not be left to the Code of Practice alone”— and, by the way, we have not seen the code of practice. Trainline also said: “We ask that the Committee recommend that the Bill include a statutory duty that all retail market participants—including GBR online retail—are treated fairly, equally and non-discriminatorily, and that GBR online retail be subject to the same Code of Practice as all other retailers…We ask the Committee to recommend that these economic parity safeguards, including structural separation of GBR’s online retail business, be written into the legislation and the forthcoming Code of Practice…We therefore ask that the Committee recommends…An explicit ORR power to impose binding orders or financial sanctions if GBR breaches its licence or the Code. ORR’s competition duty should explicitly apply in respect of these functions and GBR’s licence…Provision for an appeal body (for example the CMA or the Competition Appeal Tribunal) to hear merits of disputes…The Code development process must be led by ORR, independent of DfT and GBR. It must ensure full stakeholder consultation, clear timetable, transparent publication of decisions and mechanisms for future amendment.” Members may say, “Well, they’ve got skin in the game, haven’t they? They’re a commercial organisation trying to compete with the future GBR, so it will be in their interest to try to fix the corporate structure in a way that gives them an unfair advantage.” But if we look at what Trainline is asking for, we see it is not seeking to gain an unfair advantage. It is merely asking GBR to create a level playing field. Trainline is not the only organisation making that argument; it is joined by others.