Victoria Collins MP: speeches

Speeches

• 23 Apr 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  Over the Easter weekend, a 6-acre site in the Chilterns national landscape saw a massive unauthorised development. Despite swift action from Dacorum borough council to issue a temporary stop notice and an injunction, the work continued, with the police powerless to stop it and the council without the resources. What will the Minister do through cross-departmental work to uphold the rule of law and protect our precious landscapes?

• 11 Feb 2026 · Police Grant Report · Hansard source

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  I would like to highlight one case from Flamstead, where David, who was a toolman and a tradesman, had his van broken into 10 times. On the 10th time, he called the police while the thieves were there, but it still took officers many days to arrive, and he has now decided to retire because it is too expensive to keep going. Does my hon. Friend agree that that is why it is so important to have a frontline community service from the police?

• 12 Jan 2026 · Social Media: Non-consensual Sexual Deepfakes · Hansard source

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  For over a week, Grok has generated illegal sexual abuse material—non-consensual images of women and children—without restraint on X, which took the disgraceful step of putting it behind a paywall. That is abhorrent, and those images are illegal. Unlike the Conservatives, we very much welcome the action being taken and absolutely want to work together to stop this illegal, abhorrent use of AI technology. That is why the Liberal Democrats have called on the National Crime Agency to launch a criminal investigation into X and for Ofcom to restrict access immediately. We also called for Reform MPs to donate their earnings from X to those charities working for those victims of sexual exploitation. Where there are loopholes around AI creation of these horrific images, we are pleased to hear the Secretary of State announce the establishment of a criminal offence to create, or seek to create, such horrific content and the work to criminalise nudification apps. Regulatory gaps, however, are not the only problem; enforcement is failing, too. While other countries have acted decisively to ban X, Ofcom has taken over a week to start an investigation and lacks the resources to take on these tech giants. What has become clear is that with the pace of technology, the Government must look to future-proof online safety from new harms and harmful features. The Liberal Democrats have long been raising the alarm. We tabled amendments to raise the age of data consent, proposed a doomscroll cap to curb addiction and called for public health warnings on social media. Protecting women and children from online abuse cannot wait, so will the Government support our calls on these actions? This matters in real life—to my constituent who was harmed by strangulation in a nightclub following online videos, and to the victims of sexual abuse and violence, which often starts online. Given the pace of change, does the Secretary of State have full faith in Ofcom’s ability to enforce the Online Safety Act? Will she meet me because, unlike the Conservatives, I would like us to work together on this important issue and discuss the action needed on AI chatbots and emerging technologies? This is a moment for the House to act together. Inaction sends the message that abuse online is acceptable, and we must prove otherwise.

• 6 Jan 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill · Hansard source

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  I wish you and everyone else in the Chamber a happy new year, Madam Deputy Speaker. It is a pleasure to finally address the long-awaited Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill. As has been pointed out today, it is significant. The National Cyber Security Centre reported that nationally significant cyber-incidents had more than doubled since the previous year. The past year’s surge in cyber-attacks on targets ranging from supply chains to hospitals to critical infrastructure has made one fact clear: there is no economic or societal security without cyber-security. Cyber-attacks cost the UK economy £14.7 billion annually. There have been attacks on companies such as Jaguar Land Rover and Marks & Spencer. More important, however, is the impact on the real economy. Thousands of jobs and businesses are hanging in the balance, and our public services and our private data are also being impacted. As the Minister mentioned this morning, the NHS Synnovis ransomware attack resulted in more than 11,000 postponed appointments and procedures. It has even been linked to one patient’s death, which was attributed to the delay that the attack caused. This matters. We must do all that we can to upgrade protection and our security, because jobs, the economy and lives depend on it. Our economy—imagine it, if you will, as a house—is under attack. The Liberal Democrats welcome the Bill’s intent to upgrade our home security; the addition of data centres, managed service providers and large load controllers means that we are building stronger fences, and that companies with a master key to all our doors have stronger security. Also, the wiring has been upgraded, and the alarm system is being given an upgrade; there is increased incident reporting. However, the Bill leaves the back door wide open by leaving out key sectors. Our alarm system is not sure when it is supposed to ring, and the companies that have the keys to our doors, and are using our house, are asking for simplicity, clarity and support, so that they can do their job properly. While no single piece of cyber-security legislation can act as a silver bullet, those are gaps that we must address. We are failing to take the whole-economy approach mentioned by the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western). We are leaving out the public sector and economically significant sectors, such as retail and manufacturing. The Bill’s stated aim is to protect organisations “that are so essential that their disruption would affect our daily lives.” —[ Official Report , 12 November 2025; Vol. 775, c. 26WS.] However, the Government apparently do not consider their own public services, provided by local authorities, to be essential enough for protection. The £10 million Redcar council incident proves that voluntary schemes are failing local authorities, but after the Bill is passed, Government institutions and councils will still lack statutory protections and ringfenced funding—and all the while, council budgets are getting tighter. I have no doubt that members of the public whose data, be it from the electoral roll or from social care records, sits in these systems would object to the public sector’s exclusion from the Bill. As has been mentioned, we are also talking about a potential mandatory digital ID system for the whole country. The Government have already said that it would be built with home-made technology. Where will the cyber-protection be in that? What is more, leaving out sectors such as retail and manufacturing would mean that the JLR and M&S cyber-attacks remained out of scope. These are significant sectors. They involve major employers and major parts of our supply chains, and they handle significant amounts of personal data. The Bill marks a failure of ambition. The Government claimed in response to a letter that we sent on this topic that they “do not need to wait for or rely on legislation” to implement cyber-security requirements in the public sector, and will instead use the Government action plan to ensure that the very same requirements in the Bill will be applied to the public sector. Why must we have this two-tier approach? Why leave out economically and socially significant sectors, such as the public sector? Does the Minister agree that we need mandatory cyber-security standards for those absent sectors of our society, governance and economy? If we are serious about national resilience, about protecting citizens’ data and about aligning with our European partners, let us vote on the issue in primary legislation in this Chamber, so that the issue has the full transparency and accountability that it demands. A further critical gap in the Bill is the failure to embed security by design, and a lack of clear accountability. This should be board-led, to ensure that each lock, door and window of our house is built securely. In 2019, the NCSC published design principles, and last October the Government launched a secure-by-design framework, which was seen as core to their cyber-security standard. However, the Bill not only excludes Government from critical national infrastructure but abandons that key principle, and fails to include the words “by design”, which matters, particularly as ISC2 research suggests that skills shortages are the No. 1 challenge for compliance with cyber regulation in the UK, with 88% of respondents experiencing at least one cyber-security breach as a result of skills shortages. This is also a missed opportunity for our economy and our cyber-security sector. Prioritising security by design would provide the baseline protection that our critical infrastructure so desperately needs. What consideration have the Government given to ensuring security by design? Effective regulation does not just mean future-proofing; it must be workable. While we welcome expanded incident reporting, the current definitions risk creating a significant regulatory burden. Over-reporting will overwhelm, rather than strengthen, our cyber-security systems. Those who are coming to upgrade our security systems are not being given clear directions. The definition of a “reportable incident” is so broad that it could extend to every phishing email. How will the NCSC feasibly manage the administrative burden when the alarm may be ringing non-stop? Other critical terms lack clarity for industry, including “managed service provider” and the criteria for “digital critical suppliers”, as has been highlighted by techUK and others. These are not just technical details to be ironed out later; they are the difference between a Bill that works and one that does not, and industry needs clarity on how to comply. Will the Minister work with us and with industry to tighten those definitions, so that the Bill is workable, and will he consider the best way to ensure simplicity and effectiveness in incident reporting? What is being done to support home-grown cyber-security in the UK? What is being done to defend us from hostile foreign interference? With one of the latest defence contracts going to Palantir, what is being done to support UK tech? Would the Government support a digital sovereignty strategy, as suggested by Open Rights Group? The Bill is yet another missed opportunity to support our domestic tech sector, at a time when we should be building UK cyber-security capabilities and creating highly skilled jobs here at home. How can we claim to be serious about national resilience when the very infrastructure protecting our critical systems could be entirely outsourced abroad? Supporting UK tech and businesses is not just about the providers in the Bill; it is about the thousands of small and medium-sized enterprises that form the backbone of our economy. For the few SMEs and start-ups that are directly affected by it, the Bill creates a regulatory thicket of overlapping rules, different timelines and multiple bodies. Cyber-security is complicated, and for this legislation to work, it must be simple and easily implementable for UK SMEs. What support will there be for those SMEs and start-ups? It would be remiss of me not to mention the wider cyber-crime landscape. SMEs make up 99.8% of UK businesses, and are often the most vulnerable link in cyber supply chains. The NCC Group confirms that manufacturing, retail and leisure, dominated by SMEs, were the sectors most targeted for ransomware in 2024. That is why the Liberal Democrats are calling on the Government to establish a digital safety net for SMEs—a nationwide first responder service that would provide free-at-the-point-of-use support for small businesses that have been victims of a cyber-attack. Australia is already doing that, providing person-to-person support during and after attacks. If Australia can do it, why can’t we? On top of all that, the biggest threat is actually fraud, which costs the economy hundreds of billions a year. Two thirds of all fraud begins online, much of it through social media companies with no liability. That is why the Liberal Democrats are calling for social media platforms to be made financially liable for fraud on their sites, which would create a clear line of accountability for criminal activity. Moreover, fraud is a cyber-security issue; it exploits weak systems and inadequate protections. Families lose life savings, elderly people fall victim to sophisticated phishing, and small businesses shut down. The Bill protects infrastructure, but by leaving the back door open, it ignores the billions of pounds of savings lost and the livelihoods upended through online fraud. The Government must address that in their long-awaited fraud strategy. We cannot protect systems but abandon our businesses and our people. The Bill is progress, but it is not the finish line. The cyber-threat is real, evolving and urgent. The Liberal Democrats will work constructively to strengthen the Bill through amendments, but we must ensure that we do not leave the back door open, and that we future-proof our security. We owe it to our businesses, our families and our national security to get this right.

• 8 Dec 2025 · Digital ID · Hansard source

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  This debate has shown a clear consensus that this is not the right scheme. We are pushing back on the fact that this is essentially a mandatory digital ID for anyone who wants to work in this country. What choice or control is left in that scenario? As Liberal Democrats, we believe in upholding freedom. This digital ID erodes long-held civil liberties, and the seemingly changing use of immigration enforcement and the slippery slope does not uphold freedom. As Liberal Democrats, we believe in individuals having more control, as do many of our supporters. This does not give individuals more control; indeed, it gives the Government more control. We have heard loud and clear across the Chamber today about the attack on civil liberties. The Government said that this is not about checking papers, but that is exactly what is being introduced. They talked about the right to work and someone needing to check papers, so it is about checking papers. The Resolution Foundation says that 91% of the working-age population will be employed at some point in their life. This is essentially mandatory for the whole population. The slippery slope—the mission creep—has been mentioned today. The right to rent has been mentioned in Government papers. I am sure that what the hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Tony Vaughan) said came from a good place, but the fact that we are talking about whether the police can check these things shows that there is a slippery slope before digital ID has even been implemented. Whether digital ID will be for 13-year-olds has been discussed. There is a terrible hypocrisy in the fact that there is a massive discussion nationally about the impact of smartphones on young people, yet the Government are saying, “Actually, we should give them all digital ID,” when it is clear that that ID will be on a smartphone. Civil liberties are important. The right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) talked about a two-tier Britain. The hon. Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell) said that some will use digital ID for good and some will use it for ill. The hon. Member for Salford (Rebecca Long Bailey) talked about the many countries in which digital ID has not helped to tackle illegal immigration. So what is it for? Leon from Tring in my constituency says: “The idea of a ‘Papers Please’ Britain is appalling.” He says it insults our history and undermines civil society. Claude from Markyate says it is a curb on our freedom and privacy. How exactly will this system stop illegal working? How can the Minister guarantee that it will not undermine fundamental freedoms under this Government or the next? He cannot. Once Pandora’s box has been opened, it cannot be closed again. Digital inclusion is so important to so many citizens. As hon. Members across the House have said, it is not only about having the choice not to be online; it is about skills. Access to telecoms has been mentioned: in my constituency, just 30 miles from London, we have some of the worst data access in the country. Of course, there is also the cost. My hon. Friend the Member for North Norfolk (Steff Aquarone) tabled an amendment to the Data (Use and Access) Bill for the right to non-digital ID. The Government rejected that amendment because, as the Minister of State, Department for Business and Trade, the hon. Member for Rhondda and Ogmore (Chris Bryant), assured us, people would be able to use physical ID “in every circumstance”. Where is that option in this scheme, under which people have to have digital ID to work? Where is the choice in that? Where is the alternative “in every circumstance” that does not require digital ID? The hon. Member for Alloa and Grangemouth (Brian Leishman) talked about inequality. That is very important. My hon. Friend the Member for Tiverton and Minehead (Rachel Gilmour) asked the important question about how the scheme will help her constituents, who are some of the most digitally excluded in the country. The hon. Member for Bradford East (Imran Hussain) talked about how it will impact BAME communities. All of those are essential questions that raise the big question: why are the Government pushing ahead with it? It is such a shame that the Government have undermined and halted progress on e-government, which could be improving our public services. Today’s debate and the cross-party consensus that this proposal has eroded trust are fundamentally important. We have seen flip-flopping and retrofitting of a policy that was first announced as being about immigration, and then suddenly in the Chamber came out as “Oh, no: this is about improving public services.” No one is buying it. That is why almost 3 million people have signed this petition; that is why we are all here today; and that is why there were not enough seats in this Chamber. People realise that this is a retrofitted policy undermining any progress on online government. A quite important point is that we already have voluntary online services that need improving. They are not doing very well. The gov.uk wallet definitely needs improving, and the gov.uk One Login—a voluntary system at the moment—has many flaws. Should we not be spending money on that? The Government have already invested £100 million in it. There are systems that need improving; the Government should do that, rather than spend £1.8 billion on a system that clearly does not have the support of our citizens or many MPs across the House. I respect the efforts of the hon. Member for South Derbyshire (Samantha Niblett) and many others to talk about service improvement, but we can modernise without mandating, and that is essentially what this is. What are the Government doing to improve systems such as the Government One Login? Why are the Government conflating digital ID and e-services? That will not improve our public services. As my hon. Friend the Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough (Tom Gordon) and the hon. Member for Bridgwater (Sir Ashley Fox) highlighted, this is the “anti-Midas touch”. I am so angry about that, because the Government have undermined progress in improving our services and increasing trust in them, which are both so important. This debate has highlighted the importance of trust in data. Cyber incidents have increased by 50% since last year. A 2025 Department for Science, Innovation and Technology survey highlighted that almost 300,000 British businesses have been victims of cyber-crime in the past 12 months. The Legal Aid Agency has had cyber leaks, the armed forces have been affected, and as the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) mentioned, police in Northern Ireland had their personal details released. How can we trust the Government with our data at this point? One of my constituents, Jamie, from Wheathampstead says: “My concern is with the broader principle of trust. I simply do not have confidence that any government, now or in the future would implement digital IDs in a way that is safe, proportionate and free from mission creep”. That reflects the Government’s track record in oversight and protecting their own systems as critical national infrastructure. Yet as I understand it, public administration is not within the scope of the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill. Given the Government’s proposals on digital ID, that is quite an oversight. A cost of £1.8 billion has been projected. My hon. Friend the Member for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe (David Chadwick) and many others said that this figure will rise. As my hon. Friend the Member for Eastleigh (Liz Jarvis) mentioned, this comes at a time when our public services are breaking and when a Budget has just asked many people to pay more in tax, pushing up that bill by £67 billion in the next several years. With around 10 million taxpaying families paying more, how can the Government justify this £1.8 billion cost when their IT projects have already cost the taxpayer more than £31 billion overall? This will just add to that. All this is to say nothing about the impact on business costs. Who will pay for smartphones for those who need them? Who will pay for data for those who need it? And who will pay when citizens cannot work because this failed system does not work for them? That brings me to my final questions and closing remarks. Will the Minister set out the data security protocols that would apply to this system, including whether a digital ID would be treated as part of the UK’s critical national infrastructure? Will he look at publishing a digital exclusion impact assessment before any further steps are taken? Can he clarify the status of the gov.uk One Login and confirm how much of taxpayers’ money has already been spent on that? The Government have no mandate for these proposals. Across this Chamber today, we have seen Members of different parties and from across the UK speak up, and nearly 3 million people signed the petition—as I said, that is just those who are able to sign it. At a time when millions are struggling with the cost of living crisis, £1.8 billion being spent on digital ID cards is wasteful and indefensible. That money should be spent on fixing GP waiting lists, not funding Blair-era fantasies. Digital ID is not about empowerment in this sense, but about control. Today, we have heard about the end of end-to-end encryption and the end of trial by jury, and this is the worrying next step. Mandatory digital ID crosses a red line and hands the state more power over citizens while stripping people of their freedoms and choice. That is something that the Liberal Democrats cannot and will not accept.

• 17 Nov 2025 · Illegal Waste: Organised Crime · Hansard source

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  In my constituency, a 200-tonne illegal dump has left a farmer with a £40,000 clean-up bill and the risk of criminalisation if he cannot afford to clear it quickly, yet a cross-agency meeting clarified that no single agency takes responsibility for investigating these large-scale incidents on private land. When perpetrators are caught, the fixed-term penalty is a pitiful £1,000—that is for a crime that costs the economy £1 billion. Does the Minister agree that the enforcement gap, where victims shoulder the costs of organised crime while the penalties remain pitiful, is completely unacceptable? Will the Government help to establish a single accountable authority to investigate waste crime on private land and ensure that penalties reflect the true cost of these offences?

• 8 Jul 2025 · Legal Aid: Rural Areas · Hansard source

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  4. What steps she is taking to help provide access to legal aid to people in rural areas.

• 8 Jul 2025 · Legal Aid: Rural Areas · Hansard source

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  From the lack of a rural crime strategy to reduced access to legal aid, our rural communities are being left behind. In Harpenden, one farm alone has reported 56 fly-tipping incidents in five years, with the injustice that the most recent incident is costing the farmer around £40,000. Proper legal support for victims of rural crime could make a world of difference, so how are the Government ensuring fair access for our rural communities, including face-to-face legal aid support?