Torsten Bell MP: speeches 2025

Speeches

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  This is an important clause whose role is to set out the criteria for the Pensions Regulator to approve each transfer to a superfund, having dealt with the authorisation of superfunds separately. Those include that the superfund has been authorised by the regulator and that the ceding employer scheme has no active members; we are talking about closed defined-benefit schemes. The clause also sets out onboarding conditions, which are designed to ensure that members’ benefits are well protected. Superfunds are secure, but not as secure as an insurance buy-out. Schemes with sufficient funds to buy out benefits with an insurer may therefore not enter a superfund. Other onboarding conditions require that the trustees of the ceding scheme make the assessment in the interests of scheme members that the transfer to a superfund will make it more likely that the members’ benefits will be paid in full, and that the capital adequacy threshold is met—which is the main answer to the earlier question from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North. Those and other measures, alongside a known and up-front capital buffer, will ensure that there is a very high probability that members’ benefits will be paid. Affirmative regulation-making powers will allow greater specificity about the onboarding conditions, including the financial metrics of the capital adequacy threshold and the information that must be provided to the regulator to satisfy the onboarding conditions. I commend clause 58 to the Committee.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 215, in clause 58, page 68, line 1, at beginning insert “that it is reasonable to expect”. This amendment adjusts the onboarding condition in relation to the capital adequacy threshold. The Regulator now needs to be satisfied, as at the time it decides the application, that it is reasonable to expect that the threshold will be met immediately following the superfund transfer (rather than that the threshold definitely will be met at that time).

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under you today, Ms Lewell. As we come to the first clauses dealing with superfunds, I start by setting out the background. Superfunds provide a route for employers to secure the liabilities of closed defined-benefit schemes that are unable to afford insurance buy-out. Their purpose is to better protect members from potential losses in the event of employer insolvency, and to release employers to focus on and invest in their core business, helping to drive economic growth. Superfunds already operate within the framework of pensions legislation and the interim guidance issued by the Pensions Regulator. That interim regime has enabled us to learn what works well, but it is now time to put the regulatory framework for superfunds on a permanent footing. Clause 51 provides an overview of part 3 of the Bill and sets out the structure and content of the legislative framework for superfunds. Clause 52 defines a superfund scheme as a “trust-based occupational pension scheme” that is “not supported by a substantive employer covenant” but by a “capital buffer” made of private capital instead. Clause 53 sets out that superfund sections are to be treated as separate schemes, meaning that any potential failure would be contained within that section. Clause 54 prohibits unauthorised superfund activities. Clause 55 allows the Pensions Regulator to authorise superfunds if it is satisfied that they are likely to meet the ongoing requirements set out in chapters 4 and 5 of the Bill. It will enable the regulator to assess the superfund’s organisation, staff, plans, policies and procedures to ensure that it has robust governance and continuity arrangements. Clause 56 makes it clear that the Pensions Regulator must make an authorisation decision within six months of receiving a completed application, with the potential to extend that period by up to three months. The new legislative regime will protect scheme members and enhance the confidence of stakeholders and market participants.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will answer the hon. Lady’s question directly, and then come to the amendment more broadly. The best way to think about this amendment is that it asks us to remove one of the core framings of the superfund regime, which is that it is not replacing buy-out, where that is available, to trustees. The amendment enables trustees to do what they like, including moving to a superfund even if they could have moved to an insurance buy-out. That is not the policy intention of this Government, nor was it the policy intention of the previous Government. It also does not align with most of the responses to the consultation. As I said earlier, the job of the legislation is to provide clarity regarding the overall framework, which is that superfunds exist for those schemes that are not able to afford an insurance buy-out. Within that, it is for trustees to make wider judgments, as they do all the time. Directly to the hon. Lady’s question, trustees’ duties to take the decisions that deliver the best outcomes for their members, as a short hand, is totally unaffected by this. This is just a constraint on what the superfund regime is there for, and not because we do not want to see arbitrage between an insurance regulatory regime and a superfund’s regulatory regime. I hope that provides some clarity.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  One of the new features of a superfund regime is that there is a responsible body for the superfund that carries out key parts of its operations. Clause 61 sets out a clear framework of policies and procedures that the responsible body of a superfund must ensure is in place, so that the pension scheme is managed and administered effectively and members’ benefits are protected. The clause will operate alongside the requirements for an effective system of governance and internal controls, which the scheme trustees are already subject to under the Pensions Act 2004. It places an overarching obligation on the responsible body to ensure that the appropriate governance-related policies and procedures are in place across the operating model of the superfund as a whole, to ensure that the responsible body upholds the same standards as scheme trustees in the interests of scheme members. This is in recognition of the greater potential for conflicts of interest than would be seen in a traditional defined-benefit scheme. The clause further requires the responsible body to ensure that the superfund meets prescribed conditions as to its structure, including but not limited to its compliance with tax legislation. The detailed structural requirements for superfunds will be set out in regulations, following consultation and in response to innovations in the market. Clause 62 sets out the management documents that must be prepared and maintained as part of the ongoing requirements for an authorised superfund. The documents include a business plan, a governance manual, a continuity strategy, and a fees and expenses policy. That suite of documentation is designed to ensure the good management of superfunds, and it builds on the requirements and learnings from other authorisation regimes, such as master trusts and collective defined-contribution schemes. Question put and agreed to. Clause 61 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 62 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 63 Duty to monitor financial thresholds Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  This is the last grouping that covers the superfund regulatory regime. Clause 88 allows regulations to extend the superfund regime, with or without modification, to structures that share similar characteristics to superfunds. To fall within scope of the power, the structures must hold defined benefit liabilities and not be supported by a substantive employer covenant. The clause could be used, for example, to address schemes that provide benefit security through something other than a capital buffer, such as an insurance product. Clause 89 is designed to ensure that superfund schemes, despite their special characteristics, fit within the legislative framework applicable to occupational pension schemes. Superfund schemes present particular issues because there is no traditional employer and it will not necessarily be obvious, when the scheme is established, who its eventual members will be. The intention, however, is for them to be regulated as occupational pension schemes and to be structured in a way that works with the relevant legislative frameworks. Clause 90 makes two specified amendments to legislation in consequence of part 3. The first amendment clarifies how the employer debt legislation will apply where a superfund pension scheme is sectionalised. The second amendment will remove the requirement for a certificate of broad comparability when trustees transfer to a superfund after a scheme comes out of PPF assessment. In such circumstances, trustees will still be required to consider whether the transfer was in the interests of members, and the test in clause 59 will need to be satisfied. This will provide protection for transferring members. Clause 91 enables transitional provision to be made in relation to a superfund that is already operating under the regulator’s interim regime, which I mentioned earlier. Clause 92 provides definitions for key terms. The Secretary of State may by affirmative regulations amend the definition of “superfund group”. This will provide the flexibility to deal with variation in those group structures and ensure that appropriate entities are captured within the regulatory regime. I commend clauses 88 to 92 to the Committee. Question put and agreed to. Clause 88 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 89 to 92 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 93 Alienation or forfeiture of occupational pension Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  We now come to the clauses relating to information and reporting requirements for superfunds. Clause 73 requires the trustees of a superfund to notify the Pensions Regulator if certain events occur that might indicate the need for further investigation by the regulator—for example, a material deterioration in the investment performance of the scheme. Clause 74 requires the superfund trustees to regularly update the Pensions Regulator on the financial position of the superfund. This will enable effective monitoring by the regulator. These regular reports are additional to existing valuation and reporting requirements under the existing defined-benefit scheme funding framework. Clause 75 allows the regulator to request information from the responsible body of a superfund to monitor its compliance with ongoing requirements that the regulator may specify. Similar powers to request such returns exist in the master trust and CDC authorisation regimes. Clause 76 allows the regulator to appoint someone to prepare a report about a suspected breach of the requirements. This provision is similar to both section 71 of the Pensions Act 2004 and the FCA’s arrangements for the procurement of a report by a skilled person. As in the 2004 Act, the responsible body—the “person” issuing a notice—must bear the cost of the report. Clause 77 requires the responsible body of a superfund to provide information to the superfund trustees to enable them to comply with relevant legislation, including their obligations to report under clause 74. This is about making sure that trustees have access to information that the responsible body may hold. Members should note that civil penalties apply to the responsible body for breaches of clauses 73, 75, 76 and 77. I commend clauses 73 to 77 to the Committee. Question put and agreed to. Clause 73 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 74 to 77 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 78 “Event of concern” and “period of concern” Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Before a 2022 High Court ruling, it was widely accepted that the Pensions Ombudsman had the status of a competent court, so that a Pensions Ombudsman determination alone would be sufficient for a pension scheme to recoup an overpayment from a member’s pension. The ruling called that into question. Clause 93 simply reinstates the original policy intent that the ombudsman’s determination in pension overpayment dispute cases is sufficient. That is what was debated in Parliament when the ombudsman was established in 1931. Without this legislation, a large additional burden would be imposed on an already stretched county court system. Turning to clause 94, being diagnosed with life-limiting illness can cause unimaginable suffering for a person and their loved ones. Those nearing the end of their life should be able to access the financial support that they need at that difficult time. I am pleased that we are now able to introduce this clause to amend the definition of terminal illness in the Pension Protection Fund and financial assistance scheme legislation. Terminal illness is currently defined as where a member’s death from a progressive disease can be reasonably expected within six months. Clause 94 extends that to within 12 months. These new arrangements may enable a few more affected members to claim a payment, but they will mostly enable members to receive payments at an earlier stage of their illness. That small change could make a big impact for affected members at a very difficult time. Clause 95 covers another aspect of the Pension Protection Fund: its levy. Improved scheme funding of the PPF means that it is far less reliant on the levy than it was previously. For the 2025-26 financial year, the levy has been set at £45 million, its lowest rate. However, the current legislation restricts the PPF board from increasing the levy by more than 25% of the previous year’s levy. That has made it risky for the PPF to reduce the levy significantly, even when it is not needed, because it could take several years to restore it to the previous levels if required. Clause 95 gives the board greater flexibility to adjust the levy by amending the safeguard. The new safeguard will be to prevent the board from charging a levy that is more than the sum of the previous year’s levy and 25% of the previous year’s levy ceiling. Clause 96 focuses on pensions dashboards. Current legislation does not allow the PPF to provide to pensions dashboards information about the compensation that people can expect, or for the display of that information. The clause expands the scope of pensions dashboards to include information relating to compensation from the PPF and financial assistance from the financial assistance scheme, and it could benefit around 140,000 people. I commend clauses 93 to 96 to the Committee.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. I thank all Members for their patience. The new clause amends part 1 of the Pensions Act 2008. It is essential to address a current gap in the pension system to ensure that employers share timely and accurate data with pension schemes, beyond the current one-off requirement for employers to provide that information to schemes at the point when the employee is enrolled into the scheme. Improving data records will help to improve member communications and will support pension schemes to operate more efficiently and effectively. Poor data contributes to wasted administration costs because it often requires manual interventions to verify identities and match records, which is especially important to facilitate the small pots framework that we have discussed previously. Finally, the new clause extends the relevant pre-existing compliance provisions in the Pensions Act 2008 to these new duties, ensuring that the regulator will have suitable enforcement powers. In summary, the new clause supports better governance through improved data quality. Question put and agreed to. New clause 20 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill. New Clause 22 Additional powers for certain scheme managers “(1) Scheme regulations may make provision for the purpose of conferring any power or powers falling within subsection (2) or (4) on a specified scheme manager for a scheme for local government workers in England and Wales. (2) Scheme regulations under this section may make provision conferring on the scheme manager (in relation to carrying out its functions as a scheme manager)— (a) any specified power or powers of a local authority under Part 6 of the Local Government Act 1972, or (b) any power or powers corresponding to one or more of the powers of a local authority under that Part. (3) The power to make provision by virtue of subsection (2) is not exercisable if, or to the extent that, the scheme manager already has the powers of a local authority under Part 6 of the Local Government Act 1972 (otherwise than by virtue of scheme regulations under this section). (4) Scheme regulations under this section may make provision conferring on the scheme manager (as part of its functions as a scheme manager) power to provide any administrative, professional or technical service for any other person who is a scheme manager for a public service pension scheme. (5) In subsection (4)— (a) ‘public service pension scheme’ means a scheme for the payment of pensions and other benefits to or in respect of persons of a description set out in section 1(2) of PSPA 2013, and (b) ‘scheme manager’ (in the third place it appears) means any person who is, for the purposes of PSPA 2013, a scheme manager for any such scheme. (6) The power to make provision by virtue of subsection (4) is not exercisable if, or to the extent that, the scheme manager already has the power to provide services referred to in that subsection (otherwise than by virtue of scheme regulations under this section). (7) Scheme regulations under this section may amend or modify any Act passed before or in the same Session as this Act. (8) In this section ‘specified’ means specified in scheme regulations under this section.”— (Torsten Bell.) This new clause enables regulations to confer additional powers specified in subsection (2) or (4) on a specific scheme manager. Most but not all of the scheme managers already have those powers, so the intention is to enable the others to be given any of the powers that they do not already have. Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill. New Clause 23 Sections (Validity of certain alterations to salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) to (Powers to amend Chapter 1 etc: Great Britain): interpretation and scope “(1) The following provisions of this section have effect for the purposes of this section and sections ( Validity of certain alterations to salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes ) to ( Powers to amend Chapter 1 etc: Great Britain ). (2) ‘GB scheme’ means an occupational pension scheme that was a salary-related contracted-out scheme in England and Wales or Scotland; and for this purpose an occupational pension scheme was a salary-related contracted-out scheme in England and Wales or Scotland at any time if the scheme was contracted-out at that time by virtue of satisfying section 9(2) of the Pension Schemes Act 1993 (as it then had effect). (3) ‘Scheme actuary’, in relation to a scheme, means— (a) the person for the time being appointed as actuary for the scheme under section 47 of the Pensions Act 1995 (professional advisers), or (b) if there is no person so appointed, a fellow of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries appointed by the trustees or managers of the scheme to carry out the functions of the scheme actuary under section ( Validity of certain alterations to salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes ). (4) ‘Section 37(1)’ refers to section 37(1) of the Pension Schemes Act 1993 (prohibition of alterations to rules of contracted-out schemes in certain circumstances). (5) ‘Regulation 42’ refers to regulation 42 of the Occupational Pension Schemes (Contracting-out) Regulations 1996 (SI 1996/1172) (requirements for alterations to rules of contracted-out schemes). (6) An alteration purporting to have been made to the rules of a GB scheme is a ‘potentially remediable alteration’ if— (a) by virtue of section 37(1) and paragraphs (1) and (2) of regulation 42 (as they had effect at the time), the alteration could not be made unless the requirements of paragraph (2)(a), (b) and (c) of regulation 42 (as they then had effect) had been met, (b) it was treated by the trustees or managers of the scheme, after it was purportedly made, as a valid alteration, (c) no positive action has been taken by the trustees or managers of the scheme on the basis that they consider the alteration to be void (and so of no legal effect) by reason of non-compliance with the requirements of paragraph (2)(a) and (b) of regulation 42, and (d) it is not excluded from the scope of remediation under sections ( Validity of certain alterations to GB salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes ) and ( Validity of certain alterations to GB salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases ) (see subsection (8)). (7) In subsection (6)(c) ‘positive action’, in relation to a purported alteration, means— (a) notifying any members of the scheme in writing to the effect that the trustees or managers consider the alteration to be void (by reason of non-compliance with the requirements of paragraph (2)(a) and (b) of regulation 42) and that the scheme will be administered on the basis that it has no legal effect, or (b) taking any other step in relation to the administration of the scheme, in consequence of the trustees or managers considering the alteration to be void, which has (or will have) the effect of altering payments to or in respect of members of the scheme. (8) An alteration purporting to have been made to the rules of a GB scheme is excluded from the scope of remediation under sections ( Validity of certain alterations to GB salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes ) and ( Validity of certain alterations to GB salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases ) if any question relating to the validity of the alteration, so far as relating to the requirements of paragraph (2)(a) and (b) of regulation 42— (a) has been determined by a court before this section comes into force in legal proceedings to which the trustees or managers were a party; (b) was in issue on or before 5 June 2025 in legal proceedings to which the trustees or managers were a party, but has been settled by agreement between the parties at any time before this section comes into force, or (c) was in issue on or before 5 June 2025 in legal proceedings to which the trustees or managers were a party, and remains in issue when this section comes into force.”— (Torsten Bell.) This new clause is intended to form part of a new Chapter 1 in Part 4 to address issues arising from the decision of the Court of Appeal in Virgin Media Ltd v NTL Pension Trustees. This decision called into question the validity of past alterations to salary-related contracted out occupational pension schemes. It appears that a number of schemes were purportedly altered without the prior actuarial confirmation required (under regulation 42(2)(b) of the Occupational Pension Schemes (Contracting-Out) Regulations 1996) being given. In other cases inadequate records mean that the current trustees or managers of some schemes cannot tell whether the necessary confirmation was given. The new Chapter will provide for the retrospective validation of such alterations where certain conditions are met, dealing with Northern Ireland pension schemes separately. The new clause also provides that alterations whose validity was in issue in legal proceedings commenced on or before 5 June 2025 are outside the scope of remediation under the new Chapter. That was the date on which a published ministerial statement indicated that the Government proposed to take retrospective legislative action to address issues arising from the Virgin Media case. Brought up, and read the First time.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Chapter 3 sets out the criteria for approving superfund transfers. The clause protects the integrity of the superfund regime that we are aiming to put in place through the Bill by making it clear that the penalty for committing an unauthorised superfund transfer may be a fine, imprisonment for up to two years, or both. I commend the clause to the Committee. Question put and agreed to. Clause 57 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 58 Approval of superfund transfers

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank all hon. Members for the consensus around these amendments. We will return to the question of indexation shortly with some of the new clauses. I also want to correct the record. In the exciting debate on the Pensions Ombudsman, I mentioned 1931 but meant 1991. It is not quite as old as I suggested, so I am glad that is now noted. Question put and agreed to. Clause 93 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 94 to 96 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 97 Amendments of Pensions Act 2004 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  These new clauses deliver proposals that are contained in the final report of the pension investment review by adding a new chapter in part 2 of the Bill. Clause 38 set out the requirements for master trusts and group personal pensions to demonstrate that they have sufficient scale, and this new chapter merely supports that delivery. There are too many default arrangements without scale in some schemes, and this fragmentation does not benefit savers. To prevent further fragmentation, new clause 15 allows for regulations to be made to restrict the creation of new non-scale default arrangements. This is not a ban on new default arrangements; there will be circumstances where they will be in savers’ interests. However, any new non-scale default arrangements will need to obtain regulatory approval before they can accept any moneys into them. We must also deal with the existing fragmentation, and new clause 17 requires a review to be established jointly by the DWP and the Treasury on non-scale default arrangements. This review will look at the scale of the issue and why action has not been taken to consolidate these non-scale default arrangements where it would benefit savers for that to take place. We anticipate that the review will commence in 2029, once the value for money and contractual overrides are in place. They will provide the tools needed for providers to take action before the review commences. Those tools will help to reduce fragmentation. The FCA and the Pensions Regulator will be required to provide information and assistance to the review. Once the review has been completed, it will be required to publish its findings, and these will inform further steps to support consolidation.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The first reassurance I can give is that this part of the Bill requires only one regulatory framework, because it all sits within the Pensions Regulator and within the defined benefit part of the landscape, as I am aware the hon. Member for Aberdeen North knows. On the hon. Member’s wider point, which is relevant to many parts of the Bill, I absolutely agree and will offer a two-part reassurance—we will also come to a new clause later that directly gets at this issue. I entirely agree that having two regulatory regimes is no excuse for having different consumer experiences across the two halves of the regime. To address that, I have made sure that the Bill supports the same outcomes, and have stress tested that considerably, but also made it clear that, as a Government policy agenda, our goal is that that should be the case, full stop, including in some areas where it has not been historically. That is absolutely what we need to keep working towards. We should all have that in our heads. When it comes to the regulations, it is also our clear intention that the FCA and TPR should be working very closely together, as we discussed with the value for money regulations, for example. Question put and agreed to. Clause 58, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 59 Special provision for certain schemes coming out of assessment period Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  This group of clauses introduces requirements for superfunds that concern funding and investment. Clause 63 places a duty on the responsible body of a superfund to protect members’ benefits by having robust policies and procedures in place to monitor the financial thresholds. Clause 64 defines those financial thresholds, which are key components of the regulatory regime and follow the example of the Solvency II supervisory ladder of interventions, tailored to the unique characteristics of superfunds. That means that there is a series of clear and known consequences, both positive and negative, that could happen in superfunds as a direct response to changes to their funding levels. The financial thresholds are designed to protect the security of members’ benefits. When certain thresholds are breached, there are mandatory actions that must be taken to protect members. Government amendment 222 is minor and technical, and seeks to provide certainty and clarity to the operators and administrators of superfunds that they can use the buffer funds both to invest the buffer in the hopes of generating growth, and to pay expenses, fees and—importantly, for the Treasury half of my job—any taxes that are owed. Clause 65 requires that arrangements must be made to transfer capital buffer assets to the scheme’s trustees in specific circumstances. That is the important protection, because it is the capital buffer that provides the equivalent of the employer covenant protection that we see in traditional defined-benefit schemes. The release of the buffer to the trustees as part of an approved response plan—which we will come to in clause 81—is fundamental to the protection of members’ benefits. Clause 66 ensures that the capital buffer cannot be released to anyone other than the scheme’s trustees, except where the liabilities of the scheme have been satisfied, or where the release is a permitted profit extraction. It is important that permitted profit extraction takes place only when the security of the scheme has been materially improved, above the superfund’s initial capital adequacy requirements, which are obviously significant. Clause 67 requires the responsible body of the superfund to have an investment strategy for the capital buffer, prepared in accordance with any requirements specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State. Clause 68 requires the responsible body of the superfund to appoint an appropriately qualified, independent person to verify the valuations of the capital buffer at least once a year. Question put and agreed to. Clause 63 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 64 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 65 Capital buffer: compulsory release to trustees Amendment made: 222, in clause 65, page 73, line 2, leave out “for market value consideration” and insert “— “(a) in the ordinary course of the investment of the capital buffer, or (b) in payment of fees, expenses, taxes or other charges incurred (in each case) in connection with the management or administration of the capital buffer”. —(Torsten Bell.) This amendment clarifies the circumstances in which the capital buffer is regarded as “released” for the purposes of Part 3. Clause 65, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 66 to 68 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 69 Key functions Question proposed , That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Just to clarify, there is significant support from the industry for clause 59 in general terms. This is in part because of the successful rescue of the Debenhams pension scheme out of the Pension Protection Fund assessment—it had not entered the PPF; had it done so, there would have been a significant cut in members’ benefits—by the currently sole operating superfund, Clara Pensions. PPF assessment following employer insolvency is designed to ensure that member benefits are protected. Some schemes that come out of PPF assessment are too well funded to stay in the PPF, because they could achieve better member outcomes than might be offered by the PPF. The clause amends the onboarding conditions in these instances, to allow trustees of a scheme in PPF assessment to seek to secure their liabilities with a superfund at less than full benefits, but more than would otherwise have been secured through a buy-out that was available, given the level of their assets at that point. Based on the evidence from the PPF’s purple book, we anticipate that, on average, five in 10 so-called PPF-plus schemes could benefit each year. [ Official Report, 27 October 2025; Vol. 774, c. 1WC.] (Correction) Trustees can continue to buy out the level of benefits that the scheme can afford with an insurer, but this clause provides them with the option of entering a superfund, where they consider doing so to be in the interest of members. Clause 60 specifies that an application must be made in the manner and form specified by the Pensions Regulator. The approval process enables the regulator to protect schemes and their members during the application process, and aligns with the regulator’s systems and processes and its experience with other authorisation and supervisory regimes. I commend clauses 59 and 60 to the Committee. Question put and agreed to. Clause 59 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 60 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 61 Governance and structure

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Amendment 215 simply clarifies the policy intent behind the clause. It reflects the reality that pension schemes’ funding is fluid and difficult to predict. Amendment 216 makes the clause clearer and ensures consistency with amendment 215. Amendment 217 introduces a power to enable the Government to consult industry and the regulator on an appropriate timeframe in which to assess whether the technical provision threshold has been met. Amendment 218 is consequential to amendment 217. Amendment 219 allows the Secretary of State to make special provisions to modify or disapply the onboarding conditions, which we have just been discussing, in subsection (2) in the instance of a merger, division or restructuring of superfund sections. Amendments 220 and 221 set out parliamentary procedures for the powers introduced by amendments 217 and 219 respectively. I hope that hon. Members feel able to accept these amendments. Amendment 215 agreed to. Amendments made: 216, in clause 58, page 68, line 3, leave out “there is a very high likelihood” and insert “it is reasonable to expect”. This amendment adjusts the onboarding condition in relation to the technical provisions threshold for consistency with the change made by Amendment 215. Amendment 217, in clause 58, page 68, line 5, leave out from “period” to end of line and insert “specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State;”. This amendment allows for regulations to set the period by reference to which the onboarding condition relating to the technical provisions threshold is assessed. Amendment 218, in clause 58, page 68, line 22, leave out paragraph (b). This amendment is consequential on Amendment 217. Amendment 219, in clause 58, page 68, line 32, at end insert— “(5A) The Secretary of State may by regulations modify subsection (2) in its application to a superfund transfer of a kind described in section 53(3) (merger of sections etc).” This amendment allows for regulations to make special provision about how the onboarding conditions apply (or do not apply) in relation to a superfund transfer within clause 53(3) (under which a restructuring of sections within a superfund can itself be treated as a superfund transfer). Amendment 220, in clause 58, page 68, line 42, at end insert— “(7A) Regulations under subsection (2)(d) are subject to the negative procedure.” This amendment provides for negative parliamentary procedure to apply to regulations made by virtue of subsection (2)(d) as amended by Amendment 217. Amendment 221, in clause 58, page 68, line 43, at end insert— “(8A) Regulations under subsection (5A) are subject to the negative procedure.”— (Torsten Bell.) This amendment provides for negative parliamentary procedure to apply to regulations made by virtue of the provision inserted by Amendment 219.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Members for Torbay and for Horsham for the amendment. It is sensible to discuss one of the key questions in the design of superfunds policy. My main reassurance is that this exact option, or options in this space, were part of the extensive consultation on superfunds. That is important to understand. They were in the consultation, and a wide range of views were expressed in the responses, many of them pointing to the clear practical difficulties of providing the legislative test to assess whether a scheme could afford an insurance buy-out in future, as opposed to its exact position at the time of the assessment. For reasons I will come on to, that does not mean that it is not important to look ahead to whether a scheme is likely to be able to buy out in the future, but we have taken the view, following the consultation, that that should not be the test on the face of the Bill. That is because, when it comes to projections looking ahead, both the cost of an insurance buy-out and the scheme funding levels can fluctuate significantly. Forecasts ask for more judgment to be exercised compared with an assessment of what the buy-out market is offering at the time it is carried out. It is about the current funding levels. Clause 58 already states that schemes can transfer a superfund only when they are currently unable to secure members’ benefits with an insurer. I will offer two elements of reassurance to the hon. Member for Horsham. First, we need to be clear about the role of the legislation, which is as I just set out, and the role of the trustees, who are the ones who would approve a transfer to a superfund. Trustees will absolutely be looking ahead and thinking about the kinds of issue that the hon. Member highlighted. Do they wish to see a superfund transfer or a buy-out transfer in future? Is it plausible that they would get one? They will be relying on the guidance of the TPR and the clear intent in the legislation, which is that superfunds will provide an additional option, not replace the core approach of most defined-benefit schemes’ goal, which is an insurance buy-out. I therefore do not support putting the proposed test on the face of the Bill. Also, as the hon. Member for Aberdeen North pointed out, there are issues with the drafting of the amendment, which requires trustees in legislation to do what they will, in practice, be doing anyway. The second point of reassurance I can offer is that the Bill sets out a power to substitute another condition to replace this condition, if needed. We will consult the industry to assess what, if any, further requirements might be added to satisfy members before the regime comes into effect. I hope that on that basis, the hon. Member will be happy to withdraw his amendment.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  We turn now to chapter 5, which is concerned with “events of concern”—events that require closer regulatory scrutiny. These are events such as breaches of financial thresholds, an unauthorised extraction of capital or a material risk of insolvency. An “event of concern” will result in a “period of concern”, which will end once it has been resolved by the regulator or the superfund winds up. Clause 78 sets out the list of circumstances in relation to a superfund that give rise to an event of concern. Subsection (4) provides an affirmative power to adjust the period and circumstances of financial thresholds not being met. This is because different risks may emerge as the market evolves and further events of concern may be needed. Clause 79 requires a relevant person to notify the Pensions Regulator when an event of concern occurs or is likely to occur. Members may find it helpful to note that this provision replicates existing measures for defined-contribution master trusts. Clause 80 requires the superfund or the trustees to produce a response plan to address the event of concern. The response plan must be approved by the Pensions Regulator. If it is not satisfied that the response plan is sufficient, it can request a new plan. Clause 81 specifies the required content of any response plan. Government amendment 223 is technical. It ties the direction-making powers of the regulator explicitly to the requirements placed upon a given member of the superfund group or trustee of the superfund scheme in clause 80. Clause 80(1) requires the submission of a response plan to an event of concern, while clause 80(3)(b) requires the revision of any response plan if the regulator is not satisfied. Government amendment 224 clarifies the limits of the regulator’s powers to direct superfunds to take corrective action during the event of concern. Clause 82 lists the specific powers that will be granted to the Pensions Regulator during periods of concern to ensure the timely and effective resolution of any event of concern. A member of the superfund group must comply with a direction given to them by the regulator. Clause 83 grants the regulator the power to make a direction to pause only if it is satisfied that doing so is necessary to protect the interests of superfund members. Members should note that this direction-making power is standard and reflects those in the regulator’s master trust and CDC authorisation regimes. Clause 84 allows the regulator to issue a fixed penalty notice to a person if it considers they have failed to comply with some of these requirements. The penalty must not exceed £100,000. Clause 85 allows the regulator to issue an escalating penalty notice for failure to comply with a requirement, if it has already issued the person a fixed penalty notice under clause 84 in respect of that failure. The penalty is to be determined according to regulations and must not exceed £20,000 per day. Clause 86 enables the regulator to withdraw authorisation from a superfund if it considers that the superfund has failed to comply with its ongoing requirements. Superfund pension schemes are defined-benefit occupational pension schemes and will be subject to the employer debt provisions under section 75 of the Pensions Act 1995. Superfunds will include a statutory employer. If that employer becomes insolvent or the scheme enters wind-up, a debt will be triggered from the employer in the normal way under section 75 if the scheme cannot secure member benefits through an insurer buy-out. That is an additional protection that matches how that is carried out in traditional defined-benefit schemes. Clause 87 enables employer debt to be paid, or partly paid, by funds released from the capital buffer rather than directly by the statutory employer itself. Question put and agreed to. Clause 78 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause s 79 to 81 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 82 Regulator’s direction-making powers during period of concern Amendments made: 223, in clause 82, page 84, line 9, leave out “if no response plan has been approved” and insert “if a person has failed to comply with section 80(1) or (3)(b) (requirement to propose response plan or revised response plan)”. This amendment limits the direction-making power in clause 82(1)(c) so that it can only be exercised where a person has failed to produce a response plan or a revised response plan as required by clause 80. Amendment 224, in clause 82, page 84, line 16, at end insert— “(1A) A direction under subsection (1)(c) may not require the provision of financial support to the superfund scheme.”— (Torsten Bell.) This amendment provides that the direction-making power in clause 82(1)(c) cannot be used to require a person to provide financial support to the superfund scheme. Clause 82, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 83 to 87 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 88 Power to extend superfunds legislation to similar structures Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 97 introduces the schedule of amendments that are being made to the Pensions Act 2004. These amendments extend the regulatory functions of the Pensions Regulator to include superfunds and other matters in the Bill. Amendments 229 to 239 ensure that a similar effect is achieved in relation to the guided retirement, value for money, scale and asset allocation provisions, and the small pot measures. I particularly draw Members’ attention to paragraph 16 of the schedule, which amends section 127 of the Pensions Act 2004 to extend the duty of the board of the pension protection scheme to superfund schemes. It is important that members of superfunds receive the same protection as members of other occupational schemes. Paragraph 18 of the schedule amends section 224 of the Pensions Act 2004 to require that superfunds’ actuarial reports, produced in years between triennial valuations of scheme assets and liabilities, must be sent to the Pensions Regulator. This is an additional requirement for superfunds, which will allow for greater oversight by the regulator of their funding positions. Question put and agreed to. Clause 97 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill . Amendments made: 229, in schedule, page 100, line 16, leave out “Part 2 or 3 of” and insert— “Chapter 1, 2, 3A or 5 of Part 2 of, or any provision of Part 3 of,”. This amendment confines the application of section 13 to specific Chapters of Part 2. The reference to Chapter 3A is to the Chapter referred to in the explanatory statement to NC15. Amendment 230, in schedule, page 100, line 27, at end insert— “(1A) Before paragraph (da) insert— ‘(dza) sections 28A to 28F of the Pensions Act 2008 (scale and asset allocation);’” This amendment ensures that the powers of the Pensions Regulator to inspect premises conferred by section 73 of the Pensions Act 2004 are exercisable in relation to the Regulator’s functions under the new scale and asset allocation measure inserted in the Pensions Act 2008 by Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Bill. Amendment 231, in schedule, page 100, line 31, leave out “(value for money)”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 232. Amendment 232, in schedule, page 100, line 31, leave out “Chapter 1” and insert “Chapters 1, 2, 3A and 5”. This amendment ensures that the powers of the Pensions Regulator to inspect premises conferred by section 73 of the Pensions Act 2004 are exercisable in relation to Chapters 2, 3A and 5 of Part 2 of the Bill. The reference to Chapter 3A is to the Chapter referred to in the explanatory statement to NC15. Amendment 233, in schedule, page 100, line 32, leave out “(superfunds)”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 232. Amendment 234, in schedule, page 101, line 16, leave out “any” and insert “or by virtue of any”. This amendment, which relates to Amendment 235, ensures that functions under regulations made under the provisions mentioned in section 80(1)(c) are also captured by that provision. Amendment 235, in schedule, page 101, leave out line 22 and insert— “‘Chapter 1, 2, 3A or 5 of Part 2 of, or any provision of Part 3 of, the Pension Schemes Act 2025’”. This amendment extends the offence in section 80 of the Pensions Act 2004 to false or misleading information provided in connection with the Pensions Regulator’s functions under or by virtue of Chapters 1, 2, 3A or 5 of Part 2 of the Bill. Chapter 3 of Part 2 is already covered, as it amends existing legislation already mentioned in section 80(1)(c). The reference to Chapter 3A is to the Chapter referred to in the explanatory statement to NC15. Amendment 236, in schedule, page 101, line 25, leave out “any” and insert “or by virtue of any”. This amendment, which relates to Amendment 237, ensures that functions under regulations made under the provisions mentioned in section 80A(2)(c) are also captured by that provision. Amendment 237, in schedule, page 101, leave out line 31 and insert— “‘Chapter 1, 2, 3A or 5 of Part 2 of, or any provision of Part 3 of, the Pension Schemes Act 2025’” — (Torsten Bell.) This amendment extends the civil penalty provisions in section 8A of the Pensions Act 2008 to false or misleading information provided in connection with the Pensions Regulator’s functions under or by virtue of Chapters 1, 2, 3A or 5 of Part 2 of the Bill. Chapter 3 of Part 2 is already covered, as it amends existing legislation already mentioned in section 80A(2)(c). Amendment 238, in schedule, page 102, line 10, after “legislation” insert— “— (a) after paragraph (d) insert— ‘(ea) Part 1 of the Pensions Act 2008 in relation to the scale requirement in section 28B or the asset allocation requirement in section 28C,’;” This amendment ensures that the scale and asset allocation provisions in Chapter 3 of Part 2 can be the subject of a Regulator code of practice under section 90 of the Pensions Act 2004. Amendment 239, in schedule, page 102, line 12, leave out “Part 2 or 3 of” and insert— “Chapter 1, 2, 3A or 5 of Part 2 of, or any provision of Part 3 of,”.— (Torsten Bell .) This amendment confines the references in section 90(6) of the Pensions Act 2004 to specific Chapters of Part 2. Schedule, as amended, agreed to. New Clause 11 Sharing of database where FCA makes corresponding rules “(1) This section applies if the Financial Conduct Authority makes rules, in relation to persons regulated by it, that correspond to value for money regulations. (2) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for the purpose of enabling or facilitating the use of the database mentioned in section 11(2)(d) for the publication or sharing of information— (a) that relates to persons to whom the rules made by the Financial Conduct Authority apply, and (b) that corresponds to metric data, including provision conferring functions on a person appointed as mentioned in section 11(2)(d). (3) Regulations under subsection (2) are subject to the negative procedure.”— (Torsten Bell.) This new clause, intended to be inserted after clause 17, allows for the same value-for-money database to be used for FCA-regulated schemes as for schemes regulated by the Pensions Regulator. Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill. New Clause 12 Interpretation of Chapter ‘(1) In this Chapter— “the appropriate authority” , in relation to the making of regulations, means— (a) where the only pension schemes to which the regulations apply are FCA-regulated pension schemes, the Treasury; (b) where the only pension schemes to which the regulations apply are not FCA-regulated pension schemes, the Secretary of State; (c) in any other case, the Treasury and the Secretary of State acting jointly; “the appropriate regulator” , in relation to a pension scheme, means— (a) in relation to an FCA-regulated pension scheme, the FCA; (b) in relation to any other pension scheme, the Pensions Regulator; “approved main scale default arrangement” , in relation to a pension scheme, means a main scale default arrangement in respect of which the pension scheme is approved under section 28A or 28B of the Pensions Act 2008; “consolidating” a non-scale default arrangement into an approved main scale default arrangement means ensuring that any assets held subject to the non-scale default arrangement are instead held subject to the approved main scale default arrangement; “the FCA” means the Financial Conduct Authority; “FCA-regulated” , in relation to a pension scheme, has the meaning given in subsection (2); “main scale default arrangement” , in relation to a pension scheme, has the same meaning as in section 28A and 28B of the Pensions Act 2008; “money purchase benefits” has the same meaning as in the Pension Schemes Act 1993 (see section 181 of that Act); “non-scale default arrangement” , in relation to a pension scheme, means an arrangement— (a) which is not an approved main scale default arrangement, and (b) subject to which assets of the scheme must under the rules of the scheme be held, or may under those rules be held, if the member of the scheme to whom the assets relate does not make a choice as to the arrangement subject to which the assets are to be held; “operate” , in relation to a default arrangement, has the meaning given in subsection (3); “pension scheme” has the meaning given by section 1(5) of the Pension Schemes Act 1993; “the provider” of a pension scheme means— (a) in relation to an FCA-regulated pension scheme, the person mentioned in subsection (2)(b); (b) in any other case, the trustees or managers; “the trustees or managers” , in relation to a pension scheme, means— (a) in the case of a scheme established under a trust, the trustees of the scheme, and (b) in any other case, the persons responsible for the management of the scheme. (2) A pension scheme is “FCA-regulated” if the operation of the scheme— (a) is carried on in such a way as to be a regulated activity for the purposes of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, and (b) is carried on in the United Kingdom by a person who is in relation to that activity an authorised person under section 19 of that Act. (3) The provider of a pension scheme “operates” a non-scale default arrangement or main scale default arrangement if any assets held for the purposes of the scheme are held subject to the non-scale default arrangement or main scale default arrangement.’— (Torsten Bell.) This new clause makes provision about the interpretation of the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory statement to NC15. Brought up, and read the First time.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 92, in clause 38, page 41, line 8, leave out “of the totality”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 94.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank my hon. Friend. She is right that it is important that we think through how to line up the value for money work with the question we are now turning to on contractual overrides. I will come back to distinguish between the data that comes through the value for money process and the actual formal assessments themselves, which is what is referred to in the amendment. We agree that the value for money data is vital for ensuring consumer protections, and it is why the implementation of the contractual override mechanism is already being timed so that it is in conjunction with the value for money framework. The very keen can read that in the road map we set out in June, which gets into exactly those questions. To go into a bit more detail—and I appreciate that my hon. Friend already knows this—the data for the value for money assessment will be available ahead of the formal assessments, and it is on that basis that people will be able to go ahead with some forms of contract override—for example, when they are moving members within parts of the individual providers, so they would have all the information that they require. My hon. Friend raised a specific question about when people are being transferred between schemes. Should that always wait for the full value for money assessments? I will give her another commitment that I will take that away and consider it. There may be some circumstances in which that information is available, and we do not wish to unduly constrain providers, but it is a reasonable point for us to be discussing. As I say, she is right to raise the point about the interaction between the value for money data, including its visibility to other people, and the contractual override. If she is happy to withdraw the amendment, I will consider whether we can provide further clarity on the point on Report.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 44 relates to the provision of information to members about the solution or solutions that they offer them. We discussed the clause earlier with the hon. Member for Aberdeen North. The clause requires schemes to communicate and describe the default pension benefit solutions available and the circumstances for those for whom it would be suitable. Powers are taken to make further provisions in secondary legislation. The key policy behind the clause is to ensure that scheme members are well informed about their pension options. The Bill requires all communications issued by schemes to be in clear and plain language, which will help members to make better decisions regarding their retirement income. The clause allows trustees or managers to request relevant information from their members to determine what an appropriate default solution would be for their membership. Pension schemes will also have the ability, and potentially be required, to gather information from their members to ensure that where a scheme has multiple default pension benefit solutions, the member receives communications about the one deemed most appropriate for them. For example, what wider pension provision people have is important when they think about what is the right solution for them. Amendment 177, 179 to 181, 183, 186, 187, 190 and 192 to 195 ensure that clause 44 operates in relation to qualifying pension benefit solutions, as well as default pension benefit solutions. That change will mean that the same communication requirements will apply irrespective of whether a scheme member is being transferred to another pension scheme to receive a pension benefit solution or staying with the same scheme. Amendments 178, 182, 184, 185, 188, 189 and 191 provide minor language changes to improve consistency across the Bill. Clause 44 is essential for promoting informed decision making among scheme members. Amendment 177 agreed to. Amendments made: 178, in clause 44, page 58, line 3, leave out “the member” and insert “each eligible member of the scheme”. This amendment corrects a minor verbal error. Amendment 179, in clause 44, page 58, line 5, leave out “member’s default”. This amendment ensures that clause 44 operates in relation to qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions. Amendment 180, in clause 44, page 58, line 8, leave out “default”. This amendment ensures that clause 44 operates in relation to qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions. Amendment 181, in clause 44, page 58, line 9, leave out from beginning to “the trustees” in line 10 and insert “Where more than one pension benefit solution is available to the eligible members of a relevant scheme,”. This amendment ensures that clause 44 operates in relation to qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions. Amendment 182, in clause 44, page 58, line 10, leave out “the member” and insert “, each eligible member of the scheme”. This amendment corrects a minor verbal error. Amendment 183, in clause 44, page 58, line 12, after “solution” insert “or qualifying pension benefit solution”. This amendment ensures that clause 44 operates in relation to qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions. Amendment 184, in clause 44, page 58, line 14, leave out “option” and insert “solution”. This amendment makes a clarificatory change to the tag used in clause 44(2). Amendment 185, in clause 44, page 58, line 17, leave out “the default pension benefit solution” and insert “the specified solution”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 184. Amendment 186, in clause 44, page 58, line 18, leave out “member’s default”. This amendment ensures that clause 44 operates in relation to qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions. Amendment 187, in clause 44, page 58, line 27, leave out from “of” to “is” in line 29 and insert “a default pension benefit solution or qualifying pension benefit solution and an explanation that such a solution”. This amendment ensures that clause 44 operates in relation to qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions. Amendment 188, in clause 44, page 58, line 29, leave out “an” and insert “a regular”. This amendment makes the language of clause 44(4)(b) consistent with clause 42(3)(b). Amendment 189, in clause 44, page 58, line 31, leave out “eligible members” and insert “each eligible member”. This amendment makes a minor clarificatory change. Amendment 190, in clause 44, page 58, line 32, leave out “the default pension benefit solutions offered by the scheme” and insert “the pension benefit solutions available to the eligible members”. This amendment ensures that clause 44 operates in relation to qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions. Amendment 191, in clause 44, page 58, line 34, leave out paragraph (b). This amendment is consequential on Amendment 190. Amendment 192, in clause 44, page 58, line 38, leave out from “describing” to end of line 40 and insert “a particular pension benefit solution that the trustees or managers consider to be suitable for the eligible member in question;”. This amendment ensures that clause 44 operates in relation to qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions. Amendment 193, in clause 44, page 59, line 2, leave out “default”. This amendment ensures that clause 44 operates in relation to qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions. Amendment 194, in clause 44, page 59, line 10, leave out “default” and insert “, or in the case of transferable members identifying,”. This amendment ensures that clause 44 operates in relation to qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions. Amendment 195, in clause 44, page 59, line 11, leave out “default”. —(Torsten Bell.) This amendment ensures that clause 44 operates in relation to qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions. Clause 44, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 45 Information etc in connection with selection of benefit solution

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will start with the Government amendments and then turn to new clause 32. The amendments relate to proposed new section 28C and specify more detail about the role of the regulator in over- seeing the granting and withdrawal of approvals under this section, including a penalty-making power where a provider does not comply with the relevant requirements, and a clarification to ensure that subsection (14) on the interaction of these provisions with scheme documentation operates as intended. New clause 32 would require the Secretary of State to conduct an impact assessment—and I appreciate, as I am sure the Opposition will come to shortly, that it is an impact assessment for a particular purpose—before implementing any regulatory or policy change for defined-benefit schemes’ asset allocation. First, let me reassure the hon. Member for Wyre Forest that the Government have no plans to make such changes to defined-benefit schemes’ asset allocation. I reiterate that the reserved powers contained in the clause only relate to defined-contribution workplace schemes. There are no plans to change defined-benefit asset allocations through the Bill. Therefore, the new clause is not considered necessary, and I encourage the hon. Member not to press it. I am sure he will want to make some wider points about the changes in asset allocation within defined-benefit schemes, and their impact on the wider economy.