Tom Hayes MP: speeches 2025
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Speeches
- 6 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source
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I will take only one intervention.
- 6 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source
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I am sure that if we cast our minds back to 2019, we will all remember the awful case where 39 Vietnamese migrants died in the back of a trailer in Essex. Reading reports of what people found when they opened the lorry, and hearing about people dying in excruciatingly painful ways, makes us all realise that everything we are doing is about trying to stop harm to vulnerable people and save lives. Does my hon. Friend agree that this group of clauses will make it easier for data held by DVLA on UK-registered trailers to be shared with our law enforcement and police, and that as a consequence we might be able to avoid more misery and loss of life in such excruciating circumstances?
- 6 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source
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I note that clause 34(3) sets out the requirement for an authorised person only to take biometric information from a child under the age of 16 “in the presence of a person aged 18 or over who is— (a) the child’s parent or guardian, or (b) a person who for the time being takes responsibility for the child.” Does the Minister agree that we ought not to disapply the requirement for consent on such tests for children who are under the age of 16?
- 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source
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It is a pleasure to speak under your chairpersonship, Dr Murrison. I want to take on a principled point that I have heard levelled by the hon. Member for Stockton West and other Conservative Members today and on Second Reading, which is that the Border Security Commander cannot command. It is really important to address that point. From 2018 to 2023, we saw the number of small boat arrivals increase from 299 to 29,500. That is a hundredfold increase. As I understand it, some of the explanation given by the Conservatives is that the matter became very complicated, and we were seeing an increase in organised crime activity. To their credit, that was reinforced by the director general of the National Crime Agency, Rob Jones, who said “The problem that I focus on is the organised crime element, which needs concurrent effort in a number of areas, designed to undermine the business model that supports organised immigration crime. That means tackling illicit finance; the materials that are used in smuggling attempts and the supply chain that supports them; the high-value targets based overseas who are involved in supplying materials and moving migrants”. –– [ Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 29, Q28.] Those were just some of the things he highlighted. If we acknowledge that the present Government face a more complicated situation, we should agree that it will involve a suite of tools. As Rob Jones said, “There is not one thing that you can do to tackle these problems”. –– [ Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 29, Q28.] Sarah Dineley, the deputy chief Crown prosecutor, concurred with her colleagues and said: “I do not believe that there is one single measure that would impact so significantly that it would reduce migrant crossings to zero.” –– [ Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 30, Q28.] Jim Pearce, the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for organised immigration crime, highlighted the same point. If the situation is so complex and there is a need for the suite of tools that are being strengthened by this Bill, surely there is a need for greater co-ordination. Greater co-ordination will surely help to fix some of the strategic challenges that our immigration system and asylum system have faced in recent years. To co-ordinate is to command, and it is crucial we accept that point. If we do not, we will not be able to tackle the backlog we face, we will not be able to implement the measures in the Bill and we will not be able to secure our borders. Amendments have been tabled in relation to aspects of the Border Security Commander role, but I am not entirely certain whether the Conservative party supports the role of Border Security Commander at all. On Second Reading, we heard colleagues asking what Martin Hewitt is doing with his time. I would welcome the hon. Member for Stockton West explaining whether the Conservative party does in fact support the role of Border Security Commander and Border Security Command. We heard clearly from those who gave oral testimony, who are operationally focused, experienced and expert in their field, about the necessity of such a command. Indeed, Enver Solomon, the chief executive of the Refugee Council, summed it up well when he said that “the Border Security Command is an understandable response.” –– [ Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 5, Q1.]
- 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source
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This is my third Bill Committee, and so far I am really enjoying it. In all three Bill Committees, I have sensed something interesting; my understanding of what the Conservative party has been does not quite coincide with what it is today. It feels peculiar to hear Conservative Members asking for this role to have so many teeth and being so prescriptive about writing that into primary legislation. As I understand it, Conservatives typically used to try to minimise the amount of detail in primary legislation, in order to give the arms of the state the freedom to do their duties and enact their responsibilities properly. That is particularly important when we are living through a time of significant volatility. The complications surrounding our immigration and asylum system are manifold, so we need to give this role significant flexibility in order that the Border Security Commander can co-ordinate command. I am struck by what seems to be almost an existential challenge at the heart of modern Conservative thinking.
- 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source
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I am wondering about the intent behind that question. Is the hon. Member concerned about the availability of prison spaces?
- 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source
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I have two quick points. First, the hon. Member talked about whether the Border Security Commander could somehow command or direct the activities of our international partners. I would highlight that this Government have strengthened and created the new international arrangements that have made it possible for us to start to secure and securitise our borders. It is important not to pretend that the history of what has happened did not happen; we should realise that we need to have close international ties. Secondly, I am listening closely to the hon. Member’s suggestions for how the role could be improved. Is he proposing these amendments because the current office holder, Martin Hewitt, is not discharging the office in the way that he would like? Could he comment on whether he thinks that Martin Hewitt is doing a good job or a less-than-good job, and whether he thinks that the Border Security Commander role, as it is currently being discharged, is satisfactory?
- 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source
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It is not about Martin Hewitt’s professional competence or his ability as a person to do the role; it is about the role itself. Based on how the role has been configured, does the hon. Member believe that the present office holder is discharging the role well, with the responsibilities given, or is he proposing these measures because he believes that somehow the role is lacking?
- 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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I draw attention to what Sarah Dineley, the head of international at the Crown Prosecution Service, said in her testimony: “I will start with how we rebuild relations with key allies.” –– [ Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 38, Q41.] That implies that relations with key allies have been strained and need rebuilding. She then said: “I have talked about our network of liaison prosecutors.” –– [ Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 38, Q41.] She then talked about how there is regular engagement and said that engagement events with overseas prosecutors have increased in recent months. Does the Minister agree that one of the reasons we have had an asylum backlog in recent years, and our asylum system has been described as a disaster, a meltdown and worse in oral testimony, is that we strained our relations with key allies?
- 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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It is a pleasure to serve under your chairpersonship, Mr Stuart, as I should have said earlier. Is the hon. Gentleman saying that the proposed sentence for the facilitation of small boat smuggling and criminal activity is too high? Did I hear that correctly? Please do correct me if I am wrong.
- 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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Does the hon. Gentleman agree with what Rob Jones, the director general of operations at the National Crime Agency, said in his oral testimony last Thursday? He said: “We are not looking to pursue asylum seekers who are not involved in serious and organised crime. That is not what we do. This is about tackling serious and organised crime and being as effective as we can be in doing that.” –– [ Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 35, Q35.] If we read the tea leaves, it is almost as if the hon. Gentleman is saying that there is an intent to pursue asylum seekers. Moreover, the NCA’s remit is already to be laser-focused and go after those gangs, as he recommends.
- 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source
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Q In that case, I will use the rest of my time. Are you familiar with the—
- 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source
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But inevitably the counterfactuals would have an impact on the fiscal burden carried by the state. Karl Williams: Indeed, yes. The counterfactuals we did think about were different levels of stay rates and different rates among different wage profiles. Migrants earning more as they go through the system clearly does happen to some extent, whether through out-migration or through career progression. In conducting that analysis, we stuck to the fiscal profiles used by the OBR, because, as you say, the data quality is fairly poor. That was the best there was, without trying to construct our own estimates for ingoings and outgoings as migrants progress over their life course in the UK. The OBR models it by age, so it captures the different wage contributions that you make at different points in your life, which will be higher in some points and lower in others. It also captures the different burdens of, for example, healthcare in old age. I am glad that you have raised the quality of the data. We have repeatedly pointed out, as have the Governor of the Bank of England and the Office for National Statistics, that the labour force survey is very broken. In that report and in previous reports, we have always pushed the point that we need better data. Everyone needs better data. This is one area where there is broad consensus, whether you are restrictionist or want more migration or whatever else. I understand that the reference here is to Denmark and the Netherlands.
- 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source
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Q My questions are speculative. First of all, are you familiar with a report by the Centre for Policy Studies called “Here to Stay?” Professor Brian Bell: Yes.
- 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source
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Q If I reframe the question, then, have you seen any evidence to suggest that it may be a pull factor? Sarah Dineley: There is nothing that I have read in any interview provided by a migrant to suggest that that is a pull factor. Jim Pearce: I have a personal view, but I am speaking on behalf of the national police chiefs, and I am not sure that I am in a position to do that. That is probably a question for either Immigration Enforcement or the Home Office.
- 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source
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Q My question is for Mr Williams. In a previous panel, I asked Dr Walsh whether he thought it was difficult to make emphatic assessments of the fiscal burden of migration, given the quality of the data available. You authored a February 2025 report that makes broadly the same points about some of the quality gaps. I would welcome you talking about the gaps in that data, which obviously affects the ability to make emphatic assessments. I also want to ask you about that report. In a previous answer, you raised the importance of counterfactuals. In reaching the overall recommendations and assessments in your report, did you consider counterfactuals such as the fact that migrants might move up the wage and skills distribution and might not always remain on low pay? In the absence of migrant workers, for instance in health and care settings, there would need to be other people who could do their work. Did you consider the economic impact of having nobody in those roles to do that health and care work, and whether that would affect the worklessness in our country? Did you consider whether there could be a reallocation of British workers into higher-skilled and higher-wage jobs as a consequence of those migrant workers? Did you think about the economic impact of potentially more people doing unpaid care because of a lack of paid carers? I ask those questions not because I feel we should rely on migrant workers—I do not—but because your report has been lauded by the shadow Home Secretary and other Conservative Members of Parliament. I want to make sure that if it is being used as a point of reference, the data and the assessments have integrity. If you were to consider those counterfactuals, I wonder whether that would affect your report. Karl Williams: To clarify, we are talking about the report on indefinite leave to remain that came out recently, not the report from last year.
- 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source
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I forgot the name of it. The “Here To Stay?” report? Karl Williams: Yes, that is the one. That is purely about the fiscal impact. There is some analysis, which I can go into in a minute, on the broader economic picture in the previous report, but this report was more tightly focused.
- 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source
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Q Professor Coleman, would you on a level accept the description of being a eugenicist? David Coleman: No.
- 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source
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Q My question is regarding the asylum decisions backlog that the country faces, which we are now starting to move through. As a consequence, of course, some people will have their grants rejected and others will have them accepted. Where the grants are accepted, what would you say to anybody who claims that that could be a pull factor for people to try to access this country? Then, just picking up on your point, Mr Jones, about criminal gangs starting to feel the pressure because of this new suite of tools, would you say that the tools provided for in this Bill, which will have a disruptive effect, could in consequence also have a deterrent effect on the criminal smuggler gangs? Rob Jones: I will take the second question first. Obviously time will tell but, adding to what we are doing already, these tools will rack up the pressure, and that starts to change behaviour. It increases costs and increases friction in the business model. Those things contribute to deterring people from getting involved, and we see that with other areas of criminality. I will allow others to answer the asylum question. Sarah Dineley: I am going to dip out, rather, and say that it is not really a matter for the Crown Prosecution Service, but I can tell you that the Home Office is undertaking a piece of work looking at what the pull factors are for migrants wanting to reach the UK, and at what point they reach the firm decision that the UK is their final destination.
- 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source
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Q I am going to smuggle in a very quick question. Could you comment on the validity of the comparison between the Australian offshore processing immigration approach and the Rwanda scheme? Are they actually comparable, and do you have anything to say about the efficacy of the Australian approach? Professor Brian Bell: As I understand it, the big difference is that in the Australian system, if your asylum application was granted, you were brought to Australia; the system was just offshore processing of the application. That is very different from the Rwanda scheme, where we were essentially washing our hands of any responsibility going forward for those asylum applicants. The Australian model is worth thinking about if you could find countries that would be willing to process the applications, because we are spending—let us be honest—an absolute fortune on housing asylum seekers here while we consider their claims. If you could find a cheaper and more effective way of doing that, while still recognising that we have the responsibility to take those asylum seekers who have claimed asylum in this country, that would be worth considering.
- 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source
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Q Could you comment on that? There is a headline figure that says that, in its analysis, the fiscal cost of those who might be granted indefinite leave to remain in the next four or five years would amount to £234 billion. Professor Brian Bell: That is a speculative number. It is actually extremely difficult to work out the fiscal impact of migration. We are doing it at the MAC at the moment. We can only do it because we have access to data that the CPS could not possibly have. I do not know how you do that kind of analysis without making really very brave—and some may say foolhardy—estimates of what these people are going to do when they are in the UK. To give a very simple example, we currently do not know what dependants do when they come into the country. Let us say we issue a skilled worker visa and a dependent comes in. We will know nothing about what they do because the Home Office, quite fairly, does not pursue finding out about that dependent because they are here legally, but you need to know how much they earn and if they are in a job to work out what their contribution will be over the next 50 to 60 years of their life. I think it is very dangerous to just make broad assumptions about, “Oh, they are going to be like this and they are going to earn this”, and then you can come up with a very big number. I could choose a big group of British people who will also have very big negative effects, because if you just choose people who are low earners and perhaps people who are disabled, you automatically get those numbers because they are entitled to more benefits in the long run, and they do not pay as much tax. I am not particularly sure what that tells us.
- 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source
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Q Would you feel cautious about Members of Parliament emphatically assessing that there would be a fiscal burden of £234 billion over the lifetime, as your report concludes, based on your concerns about data, but also the fact that consideration of some of the counterfactuals I listed—and there could be many more—would impact that overall figure? Karl Williams: The report is very clear about the assumptions we have made at various points and the unknowns. With any modelling exercise, whether you are conducting a fiscal model of an effect of a tax change or whatever else, you have to make reasonable assumptions.
- 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source
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Q So it is not entirely appropriate to compare the Australian offshoring approach to the Rwanda scheme? Professor Brian Bell: I would not have thought so.
- 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source
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Q We hear that, because the so-called Rwanda deterrent never actually happened, it is hard to assess whether or not it was a deterrent, but in a Q&A you published on 25 July, Dr Walsh, you said: “The deterrent impact of the policy would likely have depended on the number of people sent to Rwanda.” You estimated the probability of people crossing the channel in a small boat being sent to Rwanda to be about 1% to 2%. You also said: “There is no evidence that political discussions surrounding the Rwanda policy deterred small boat arrivals.” In fact, from the day the policy was announced to the day it was scrapped, we saw 84,000 people cross the channel. Do you want to say anything about the efficacy of the so-called deterrent? Relatedly, do you agree that it is hard to make emphatic assessments of the fiscal burden of immigration owing to the quality of the available data? Dr Peter Walsh: Yes, I would agree with that last point. The Rwanda policy was never implemented, so it would be unfair to say that it did not have a deterrent effect. Policies of that kind typically have the bulk of their effect once they have been implemented. I cannot remember the source for the 1% to 2% figure. This is a somewhat old research paper, but at the time it was the best estimate we could point to. It was not an estimate that I or colleagues made. Can you see what the source is?
- 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source
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Q Part of the aim of the Bill is to minimise opportunities for crossings, which involves targeting the criminal smuggler gangs that are enabling small boat crossings to take place. Do you agree that enforcement activities against those smuggler gangs will have a deterrent effect—that enforcement activity has value in its own right, but minimising the number of crossings by disrupting the business model will have a deterrent effect? On Enver’s point about the asylum hotel that was at risk of burning down, would you agree that those Government policies directly and gravely put the lives of vulnerable asylum seekers at risk? Enver Solomon: The system meltdown that came about because of the fantastical Rwanda policy and the full provisions of the Illegal Migration Act left people in a state of permanent limbo, in inappropriate accommodation, in very vulnerable situations, in communities where there were high tensions. As a consequence of that, people’s wellbeing was potentially compromised. There is no question about that. We saw that through our work. We saw the rise in stress and in suicidal ideation. There was very clear evidence from our practice about the impact of what was, as we described, a system meltdown. On your point about enforcement, enforcement has a role to play but it has to be one strategy combined with others—one side of a multi-pronged approach. Similarly to the evidence from dismantling drug trafficking, often when you dismantle one set of smugglers or gangmasters, others will reappear and take over that part of the trade. It is very difficult to enforce and prosecute your way out of this challenge. Multiple strategies have to be adopted—
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