Stephanie Peacock MP: speeches

Speeches

• 3 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am going to answer the question. It is largely—not exclusively—about where teams tend to be full time. It is not a perfect cut-off, and the Liberal Democrats have made a perfectly clear argument, but there has to be a cut-off somewhere and we believe, as the shadow Minister’s Government did, that the top five tiers is the best cut-off. I want to respond to the shadow Minister’s points about the women’s game and how it could be brought into scope. Karen Carney’s review of women’s football recommended that it be given the opportunity to grow and self-govern rather than move immediately to statutory independent regulation. We are not saying in any way that it should be brought into regulation; we are simply giving that option so that we would not have to return to primary legislation. For those reasons, I ask the shadow Minister to withdraw the amendment.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 3 is about the owners of football clubs, who play a pivotal role in the sport. Without their efforts and investment, English football would not be the success it is today. Owners have an immense responsibility to not just their club, but fans, local communities and businesses in the surrounding area. Although current league rules outline a requirement to declare who controls a club, there are concerns with their application. That applies particularly when clubs are owned or controlled by offshore entities or complex company structures. Fans have also expressed concerns about the opaque nature of who owns their clubs. They deserve to know who has ultimate responsibility for the club they support, and the clause ensures just that. The clause signposts to schedule 1, which defines when a person is an owner of the club. The clause also defines a club’s ultimate owner or owners. The ultimate owners of a club are those who have the highest degree of influence or control over the activities of the club. When a club applies for a provisional operating licence, it has to identify its owners and ultimate owners to the regulator in a personal statement. Defining the ultimate owners of a club and requiring clubs to declare them will be a crucial step to improving transparency and accountability in the game. Schedule 1 defines owners for the purpose of the Bill and equips the regulator to apply that definition in different real-life circumstances. It is crucial that owners are suitable so that the sport is placed on a more sustainable footing. An ownership chain may be long and complex, with many links; to ensure clubs have sustainable custodians, the regulator needs to identify the human being with actual control at the very end of the chain—rather than the holding companies or other legal structures, which are just links along the way. That is why, under the Bill, the definition of an owner focuses on identifying individuals, except where clubs are owned by registered societies. Registered societies are specific legal structures defined in clause 91; they must be run as co-operatives or for the benefit of the community. When used for ownership of football clubs, they are typically one-fan-one-vote organisations where control is split equally among hundreds or thousands of members. That is why ownership chains can end with registered societies, without needing to identify named individuals behind them. The Bill’s definition of an owner draws heavily on precedent from other legal regimes where ownership can be complicated or opaque, including the “persons with significant control” regime in the Companies Act 2006. The Bill’s definition is designed to capture those who have significant shares or rights, or other forms of significant influence or control over the club. It also includes owners who meet one of these conditions at arm’s length, such as via a trust or a similar body. That approach means that owners cannot simply evade regulation by creating ever more complicated ownership structures. Having a clear definition of an owner means that owners can be identified, tested and held to account as custodians of the club. Clause 4 is about officers and senior managers. The Bill will introduce two key things: transparency for fans and accountability for decision makers at clubs. The clause defines an officer and a senior manager of a club for the purpose of the Bill. Those definitions have been drafted in recognition of the existing legislative precedent, including the Companies Act 2006 and the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, as well as the definitions currently used in the football industry. The clause’s purpose is to appropriately define the people who run, or have a significant level of direct influence, over the day-to-day running of a club. Officers of a club are subject to legislative requirements, including the owners and directors test. The regulator may take enforcement action against a senior manager— a subset of officers who carry out specific management functions at the club. If a club commits a relevant infringement connected to a senior management function carried out by that individual, the individual can be held liable. I commend the clause to the Committee.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a fair question, but there was exactly the same cut-off under the previous Bill.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  As the hon. Gentleman will know, the FA is the national governing body of the English Football League, and that is why it is specified.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will attempt to respond to the various questions from the Opposition spokesperson, my hon. Friends the Members for Portsmouth North and for High Peak, and the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East. The Opposition spokesperson broadly welcomed the provisions, but he asked some specific questions. He made points on financial regulation, and I think he used the word “banking-style”. The Bill draws on precedent from a range of previous regulation. Some elements are from financial regulation. A previous amendment of his dealt with financial sustainability, and the Bill, as drafted, is all about that. We would not term it as “banking-style”, but it does draw on previous legislation and existing regulation. The hon. Gentleman broadly welcomed the provisions on owners and directors. He mentioned that it has been four years since he was elected to this place, and in 2023, he asked the then Sport Minister to strengthen the ownership test, so I am really pleased that he welcomed the changes that we have made. He also said that he would prefer this to have been implemented without legislation. Of course, we all would, but we are where we are, and that is why both parties stood on a manifesto to introduce a football regulator Bill. The Opposition spokesperson made some broad points on the owners and directors test, and we will have a further debate on that when we come to part 4. ODTs have to be applied clearly and consistently. If the owner has appropriate financial resources and meets other aspects of the test, our ODT would not prevent multi-club ownership. Concerns around multi-club ownership are to do with conflicts of interest and competition, which is why the leagues and UEFA have rules around multi-club ownership. Clubs competing in those competitions will be required to abide by any applicable rules, but we can come back to that point on part 4 when we will debate this issue at length.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am sorry; I have just finished.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the shadow Minister for his amendment, and I appreciate the intent to ensure that the regulator offers value for money. That is precisely why the regulator has a regulatory principle encouraging it to be as cost-efficient as possible. There are also countless other safeguards in place to ensure value for money, and we referred to those in earlier debates. For example, the regulator will be required to lay its annual accounts before Parliament, and the Comptroller and Auditor General, for scrutiny. The regulator will also be subject to pay remit guidance, in the same way as central Government Departments are, to ensure that pay rises are justifiable. That will ensure value for money without sacrificing important operational flexibility for the regulator. On the other hand, a maximum salary for the CEO, fixed in legislation, would leave the regulator unable to adapt to market changes and could leave it unable to recruit and retain the expertise that it needs to effectively regulate. I understand that the amendment seeks to limit the CEO’s salary to no more than the current salary of the Prime Minister. There would be no way to update that if the salary changed in the future, or even with inflation. It is not a practical constraint to impose.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. Government amendments 61 to 63 are technical amendments to schedule 2 that support our proposed changes to the distribution models put forward in other Government amendments. We will get into more detail on our changes to the distribution mechanisms later in the Committee’s proceedings, as they should be discussed in the context of the part of the Bill to which they relate. However, these are amendments to schedule 2, which we are currently discussing. The primary goal of our changes is to move from a binary, winner-takes-all model to a staged regulator determination, where the regulator will be empowered to design its own solution, drawing from proposals submitted and extensive evidence. I will not elaborate further now; I have met the shadow Minister and the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, I believe, to speak about this. We will be debating it later; it is just the way that the Committee’s proceedings have fallen that means that these technical amendments come now. I would like to reassure Members that these changes have been proposed after extensive engagement with the stakeholders most heavily invested in the process and following significant scrutiny of the Bill throughout its passage. We believe that the changes will strengthen the mechanism, making it more likely to deliver a distribution solution that works for football. The primary function of Government amendments 61 to 63 is to make the board of the regulator, rather than the expert panel, responsible for the design of distribution orders. Both the decision to trigger the process and the design of the final distribution orders are important regulatory decisions that will have a significant impact on the financial landscape of football. The regulator may face criticism or challenge over decisions of such magnitude, and needs to be accountable for them at the highest level. These amendments enable this. First, amendment 61 removes an exemption to the functions exercisable by the board of the regulator, so that decisions regarding distribution orders can now be undertaken by the board. The amendment is intended to improve the coherence of legislation and to reflect the increased responsibility of the regulator in the design of a potential distribution order. Government amendment 62 ensures that the board directly takes these important decisions itself, by specifying that it can only delegate those decisions to a committee of the board and not to another entity. That reflects the previous design of the backstop, which we will speak to later. As stated, the decisions at this stage are crucial to secure the financial future of football and to ensure that the regulator can deliver its objectives, particularly regarding sustainability. It is right that these decisions are taken directly by the board. Government amendment 63 removes the requirement for the CEO of the regulator to establish a committee of the expert panel to undertake the final proposal stage of the distributions mechanisms. Again, that reflects the change from the previous mechanism. It is slightly odd to discuss this outside the backstop, but we will be able to debate that in more detail later on. For the reasons that I have set out, I hope that Members will support these amendments, and I commend them to the Committee.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  We do not believe that the changes are significant enough to lead to a significant increase in costs.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to once again, and possibly finally for today, serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy—but we will see. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East for all his work in the all-party group and for his long-standing interest. I completely appreciate his points. I would say that the regulator will have a number of ways to safeguard heritage, including to be able to prohibit competitions, and require consultation on matchday operations. Clause 8 encourages the regulator to engage with both players and fans on relevant matters. The regulator has a tightly defined scope and purpose focused on protecting and promoting the long-term financial sustainability of the game for the benefit of fans and local communities. It will not intervene on sporting competition matters, such as the footballing calendar. To address the point by my hon. Friend for Sheffield South East about the FA cup and replays, I remember that just as the previous Bill was published, it was in the news and a real debate. I completely appreciate that one could argue that it is very much part of the heritage of the game, but it is also a competition matter, and therefore it is out of scope of the Bill. I will take away the comments by my hon. Friend, and I appreciate Members from across the House for putting theirs on the record. Question put and agreed to. Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. — (Vicky Foxcroft.)

• 3 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup for his amendment. I note the irony of him saying he does not want to oppose the Bill for the sake of it, given our discussion today and the fact that the Bill began its life under his Government. I completely understand the intent to ensure that we do not end up with an overstaffed regulator that is not delivering value for money. That is exactly why there are appropriate controls over the regulator’s expenditure. Proportionality is key to the point about costs. We will have a further debate today or on Thursday about the regulatory principles, which are really important, but the operational cost estimate is between £77.4 million and £106.8 million over 10 years. That was based on the impact assessment signed off by the previous sports Minister, the right hon. Member for Daventry. Those costs have not changed—with the caveat, of course, that that is an estimate.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his comments. To take the final one first, taxpayers will not be bailing out failing clubs. This is not going to save every single club; to make it very clear, it was never intended to do that. The provisions in the schedule ensure that the regulator has the necessary structures in place to function effectively and efficiently, with appropriate accountability as a public body, which is an issue that we have debated extensively. It ensures that an agreed and transparent process is adhered to when establishing a governance framework, including its board, committees and expert panel. We have made provision for the regulator to appoint a board observer from the Football Association, and as the national governing body for English football, they will get an insight into the operation of the regulator without having voting powers. Ultimately, the regulator will be accountable to Parliament. As we have spoken about throughout this debate, it will be operationally independent and free from undue political or industry influence. The provision in this schedule is central to creating that framework, and I commend it to the Committee.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  That is quite okay, Sir Jeremy. I have done a lot of talking today. I thank the hon. Member for Cheltenham for moving the amendment and for giving us the opportunity to discuss it. I will explain why we are not able to accept it, but it is important to say first that the safety, wellbeing and welfare of everyone taking part in sport is absolutely paramount. I am very aware of this issue—I participated in a debate on it in the Chamber in September 2023, and I care greatly about the subject—and the hon. Gentleman, and indeed other Members across the House, spoke very movingly, giving a number of examples of the terrible experiences that footballers and their families have had. I pay tribute on the record to the work of Football Families for Justice in supporting ex-players and their families. I commend it for its excellent work. Again, I echo the shadow Minister’s comments, as he made an important point about directing people to the fund and making it clear that the money is available. The Government absolutely agree that this area requires further work, and we have committed to looking at these issues. I do not believe these measures are appropriate for this Bill, but I am fully aware of the importance of prioritising player welfare and ensuring that former players and their families have the support they need. National governing bodies are responsible for the regulation of sports and for ensuring that appropriate measures are in place to protect participants from harm, including head injuries. The Government expect national governing bodies to take the health and safety of players as a top priority. The Secretary of State and I recently met a small group of affected families and ex-footballers, including individuals associated with Football Families for Justice, to discuss player safety and welfare for those suffering with dementia. We heard, at first hand, about players’ experiences and the views of the group on how safety and welfare could be improved at all levels of the sport. We are considering what is required, including how to support football to come together to address the problems raised. We are committed to supporting the families and football authorities to come together to address those issues, and our officials are in the process of arranging meetings to further explore the issue. That has hopefully outlined how the Government and I care very much about these issues. I will briefly say why we do not feel we can accept these measures. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Caerphilly (Chris Evans) for tabling them, and I thank the hon. Member for Cheltenham for introducing them—he spoke very powerfully. The regulator will be a specialist regulator with a precise focus on financial regulation, corporate governance, fan engagement and heritage, as we have heard throughout today’s debates. It will be aimed at addressing the main issues that came out of Dame Tracey Crouch’s fan-led review. We have heard at length, in this House and the other place, about the importance of a tight regulatory scope focused on the market failures that the industry cannot address itself. Even if we wanted to accept this change, we feel it would open the door to other amendments, and indeed to scope creep, which we do not want. But that is certainly not in any way a reflection of how seriously we take this issue—we take it very seriously. We look forward to meeting and working with campaigners, and indeed with everyone in football, to come to a solution on this issue.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  I do not know if the hon. Member is wilfully misinterpreting what I am saying or not. I have made it very clear that there will be a benchmarking exercise. I have given a number of examples of other regulators whose salaries are much higher and were so under the previous Government. Senior pay controls allow the Government to ensure that senior pay is set at an appropriate level to enable the public sector to recruit, retain and motivate the best people, while also ensuring value for money for the taxpayer. That means that if the regulator sought to set the CEO’s salary above £150,000, it would need approval from the Chief Secretary to the Treasury. For the reasons that I have set out, I hope that the hon. Member will withdraw his amendment.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  I absolutely agree, and the Liberal Democrat spokesperson puts an important point on the record. We expect a significant benchmarking exercise to be undertaken in determining the appropriate level of remuneration for the CEO of the regulator. That should be consistent with other regulators of a similar size and regulatory remit. We believe that an arbitrary constraint would be problematic. Safeguards are also in place already requiring approval for any public sector salary that exceeds £150,000, as per the senior pay controls process.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is not for us to say. It is an independent regulator. The hon. Gentleman outlined how different regulators have wildly different numbers of staff. We do not think that we should set a cap.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will address some points on amendment 121 and then respond to the hon. Gentleman’s questions. The Government recognise it is vital that the regulator is transparent and able to be held accountable by Parliament and others. That is why, for the expert panel, the legislation already sets out a number of requirements to publish decisions and give reasons for them. Transparency in decision making is important, but it is also important that individual panel members can act without fear or favour and that ultimately the regulator as a whole stands behind the decisions it makes. It will also be necessary in some instances for details to remain private for commercial, personal or other sensitive reasons. We absolutely agree that transparency around the regulator’s processes and decisions is important, particularly in football, where fans often complain of being out of the loop. That is exactly why the Bill already contains extensive publication and consultation requirements and the regulatory principle encouraging the regulator to be transparent. However, the amendment goes further and risks undermining the operation of the expert panel. Some details may be commercially sensitive, as I have outlined. Equally, individual panel members should not necessarily be singled out for their contributions to decisions; the panel as a whole makes decisions and is held accountable as a whole. I am at risk of comparing apples with oranges, but we spoke earlier about the Select Committee. In this place, we will have minorities on Select Committees, and I do not believe that those Members who do not agree have their names published. I acknowledge that I am not comparing like with like, but I make a gentle point about how members should be able to make decisions without fear or favour. The hon. Member asked some specific questions about the expert panel. For the panel to take a decision, it must form a committee of at least three members. If that decision is appealed, three new members will be needed to form a committee to take a new decision, so the minimum number of members required for the expert panel is six. There is no cap on the maximum number of members as the regulator should have flexibility to react in the event of a high workload. Obviously, different panels may be required for different issues. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  I know that there have been requests to see the letters that UEFA has sent to the Government. As a matter of course, the Government do not share private correspondence, as it would undermine the ability to have open, honest and frank discussions with key partners. It is worth stating that we wrote to UEFA asking whether it would be content for it to be published, but it confirmed that it would rather communications were kept private. Paragraph 21.26 of “Erskine May” states: “A Minister who summarises a correspondence, but does not actually quote from it, is not bound to lay it upon the Table. The rule for the laying of cited documents does not apply to private letters”. “Erskine May” is fairly clear that the Government are not bound to publish the letter, as I have not quoted from it. I refer the House to my earlier comments on the letter.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 6 sets out the regulator’s objectives, which are its primary aims and also the limits of its statutory remit. As clause 7 sets out, the regulator may act only if the action taken, so far as reasonably practicable, advances one or more of those objectives. I will speak briefly to the objectives, and then we can debate them further. The first objective is club financial soundness—the ability of individual clubs to continue meeting their debts and liabilities even in the face of challenging circumstances, new risks and financial shocks. The second is systemic financial resilience, which relates to the wider financial resilience of English football. That involves issues that, individually, pose a small problem, but that, when aggregated or multiplied, pose a significant threat to groups, clubs and the pyramid as a whole. The third objective is safeguarding club heritage and the heritage of English football. Clearly, financial collapse is a risk, but so is the potential for clubs to become unrecognisable to their fans and communities. As we know, the Bill grew out of the fan-led review, which highlighted myriad problems facing football in this country. There are a number of areas where action is needed, but not all the problems are for a statutory regulator to fix. We have been clear about the areas where the regulator would need to act; some relate to issues of sustainability, where we believe that the market has failed, or remains ill equipped, to act. We believe that the three objectives are the right focus. When I talk about the Bill, I always say—and I said it when I opened today—that at a very basic level clubs have to do three things: be a fit and proper owner, have a business plan and consult their fans. Many are doing that, and doing it well, and in that case there will be no need for duplication. At a very basic level, that is what the Bill and the regulator aim to do.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Before speaking directly to these amendments, I want to address the comments made about the chair appointment. I am very aware of the direction that you have given, Sir Jeremy, so I will focus my remarks on the comments made by the shadow Minister and Opposition Members. David Kogan brings with him a wealth of expertise from the sport and media industries. The shadow Minister’s speech had three parts, so I forget when he said this, but he made the point more than once that it is about attracting the right candidate with the right experience, and how that is a challenge. We are confident that David Kogan is the right person. He was found appointable for the role by a panel that included a senior independent panel member who was agreed by the Commissioner for Public Appointments. David Kogan declared his political activity to the DCMS Committee, as the shadow Minister has stated, which endorsed his appointment, adding a further layer of robustness to the appointment process. The donations were declared during the Committee session, as the shadow Minister also stated, and the Committee was sufficiently aware when it published its report endorsing him.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  There were 42 employees as of 1 June; 11 joined having previously been employed by DCMS and two joined having formerly advised DCMS. The answer is due by 6 o’clock today and I will make sure that the hon. Gentleman receives it in writing by then.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman gets ahead of himself; he is somewhat excited this afternoon. That was my second point—I have numbered my points one and two, and I have a third to make. He asked about members of the Committee. It is for hon. Members to declare relevant interests, and when we began the sitting this morning hon. Members did indeed refer to their entries in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I do not want to be drawn any further on the details of the process as that would not be appropriate. I have made all the comments I can within the confines of the topic and the yellow card you very kindly gave, Sir Jeremy. I will therefore move on to talk briefly about the amendments. I will explicitly state that the independence of the regulator is paramount. The Bill is, as the hon. Gentleman said, designed to create an independent football regulator free from any undue political or industry influence. That has always been and continues to be our aim. In the service of that, we have already strengthened the Bill further, now requiring the regulator to establish and maintain a register of relevant interests of members of the board. That already includes the chair, so any further amendment is not necessary. The definition of relevant interests in the Bill is already broad enough to include political donations if they are relevant to the regulator’s functions. The appointment of the chair is subject to the governance code on public appointments, which clearly sets out that any political activity “should not…be a bar to appointment”, as well as the requirements in relation to the declaration of political activity. That point has been well rehearsed; indeed, the Liberal Democrat spokesman made it earlier, as have other hon. Members. The chair of the regulator is already required to undergo a pre-appointment scrutiny hearing, which we have debated at length. Pre-appointment scrutiny is reserved for the most significant roles, including those where demonstrable independence from the Government is required. The chair and other non-executive members of the board would also be bound by the code of conduct for members of public body boards, which sets clear expectations around political impartiality once in a role. I reassure the Committee that the Bill is robust in ensuring the independence of both the chair and board members more widely. The amendments would not in any substantive manner increase the level of protection in the Bill against undue political influence over the chair. I turn to the amendments 118 and 119 about conflicts of interest for the board and the expert panel. I reassure the Committee that the Bill, supported by public law principles and non-legislative measures already in place, already sufficiently makes certain that the regulator will be free from conflicts of interest, irrespective of sector. It is also important that the widest possible range of people are encouraged to apply to contribute their skills and experience so long as any and all conflicts of interest are managed appropriately. That point was well made by my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North. Government amendments made in the other place have strengthened those protections even further, and beyond doubt. Paragraph 17 of schedule 2 requires members of the board to declare their interests in any matters that fall for consideration by the board, and for that declaration to be recorded. The board member would not be permitted to take part in any discussions related to a matter if they have a significant direct or indirect interest in it. With specific regard to the expert panel in amendment 119, the Bill already places an onus on the chief executive officer to check for conflicts of interest at the point of making an appointment to the expert panel and on an ongoing basis from time to time. The Bill sets out that the chief executive officer must ensure that the expert panel has all the relevant range of skills, knowledge and experience. The amendment might limit the ability of the chief executive officer to do that, as it would restrict the pool of potential members of the expert panel. It may well be appropriate for the expert panel to have expertise in media or broadcasting, but the amendment would outright preclude that, and so might hinder the regulator’s ability to fulfil its objectives. All in all, the Bill contains comprehensive safeguards to examine and manage genuine conflicts of interest appropriately. I therefore urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his questions. On the broad question of why we are making the change, to be quite blunt, it would be easier not to. We have a big majority in this place, but we spoke earlier about parliamentary scrutiny and we genuinely listened to the debate in the Lords, where there was quite a lot of discussion around the mechanism of the backstop. It is important to make it clear right now that the backstop is a backstop. I often quote Dame Tracey Crouch, to whom we all owe a huge debt of gratitude. In the previous Bill Committee, she made a very succinct speech—it is worth reading—about how the backstop should be a backstop. Understandably, a lot of the debate has focused on the backstop—that is not a criticism—but it is genuinely meant to be a backstop. To be quite blunt, it would be easier not to make the change, but we think that it is the right thing to do. I could understand the previous Government’s pendulum arbitration and why it could be successful, but it was more risky, and that prompts more nerves from stakeholders. I am straying into debating the backstop, which I do not want to do because we will debate it later on. On the question about specifying that the board can delegate these decisions to a committee, hon. Members will correct me if I am wrong, but we are not changing the way that the backstop can be triggered— again, we are straying into the backstop. There is a set of criteria for when the backstop can be triggered by a league, and the state of the game report must have been written and the regulator must agree with that. That stays the same. I am straying into a future debate, but I think that the hon. Gentleman was saying—he can correct me if I am wrong—that under the previous mechanism it was pendulum arbitration, where party A would put forward a proposal, as would party B, and an expert panel would decide on one or the other, in a completely binary way. This changes it so that there is informal mediation and then a proposal stage. Because the regulator is more involved in saying, “We like that but go and speak a bit more about this,” or, “Seek some more evidence on that,” it makes sense that they do not then delegate that decision. That is the point that I am making, though it is quite difficult to debate this outside the backstop, as I acknowledged in my remarks. I am happy to take his comments away, and when we come to part 4, I believe, and we debate the backstop and the changes more thoroughly, I am really happy to go into more detail. Amendment 61 agreed to. Amendment made: 62, in schedule 2, page 91, line 41, at end insert— “(da) the function of deciding whether the resolution process should be triggered under section 59; (db) the function of making a distribution order under section ( Distribution orders );”— (Stephanie Peacock.) This amendment provides that the Board may only delegate the functions of deciding whether the resolution process should be triggered under clause 59 or making a distribution order under NC4 to another committee of the Board. Amendment proposed : 119, in schedule 2, page 93, line 2, at end insert— “4A No member may be appointed to the Expert Panel if they currently have any broadcast or media interests or any role in a television or media broadcast that relates to football.”— (Mr French.) This amendment prohibits any person who currently has any interests or roles in a television or media broadcast that relates to football from being appointed to the Expert Panel. Question put , That the amendment be made.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  As I have outlined, a benchmarking exercise will be done thoroughly on that. I am intrigued by the mock outrage from the Conservative party, who did not in any way put in a staffing cap or a salary cap when we were in this room previously. To take some examples of other salaries, they are much higher: at the Financial Conduct Authority, the salary is £400,000, at the Competition and Markets Authority, it is £200,000, and at Ofcom, it is £350,000. This is the current salary now but it was not wildly different under the last Government. I did not see them making these amendments to their Bill.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 61, in schedule 2, page 89, line 29, leave out “sections 61 and 82” and insert “section 82”. This amendment is consequential on the insertion of NC3.