Siân Berry MP: speeches 2025

Speeches

• 4 Mar 2025 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  T7. Expanding UK airport capacity has a very shaky case for economic benefits, because business is not increasing its use of air travel, and the UK sends three times as many tourists out by plane as we welcome in. Will the Chancellor urgently publish her evidence of any net benefits to the economy from airport expansion so that it can be carefully examined?

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I forgot to make a point earlier about the common practice with penalty notices of offering a person the ability to pay less if they pay sooner, but if they exercise their right to appeal, they lose that discount. That is how penalty notices are often presented. The Minister assured us that people will be able to state in appeals that they are subject to hardship, but that practice effectively negates the point of appealing. Could Ministers introduce a prohibition on offering that kind of fake discount on penalty notices for early payment, so that everybody can exercise their right to a review based on hardship?

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under you, Sir Desmond. I have two quick questions for the Minister. I associate myself with the comments about ongoing scrutiny and consultation. I am pleased that the most consequential of these potential new regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure, but it seems like a lot to not go through a huge amount of scrutiny beforehand. I want to ask about why subsection (2)(c), which relates to whether somebody might suffer hardship, is excluded from the consultation required under clause 37(5). Subsection (2)(f) is also excluded, which is about whether there might be cumulative hardship as a consequence of things done under this law or other laws. The people affected by that, and those who represent people who might face hardship, ought to be consulted on that as well. Is it because the definitions of hardship are scrutinised and well established elsewhere, and we will draw on those definitions when making the regulations, or do we need additional information in this clause or assurances from Ministers that this will happen? Finally, I want to ask about the meaning of the word “Schedule” in subsection (2)(f).

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have more serious questions about this part of the Bill than I have had about any other. I question the additional penalty notices: what goals do they have and will they be achieved? I can see that Ministers seek to go beyond simply recovering lost funding, when it comes to issues of error or fraud that results from personal misunderstandings and so on, and that they want to be able to act more quickly and efficiently on slightly more organised defrauding of public bodies. However, I do not see how the Bill helps with the biggest fish, who are taking huge amounts of public money, potentially through fraudulently obtaining contracts, fraudulently setting out work that they did not do, or fraudulently stating the quality of the work they will do or the materials they will use. At the end of chapter 5, the Bill states that if a person has received a fixed penalty, they cannot now be prosecuted. I wonder whether these fixed penalties will be just the cost of doing business for the biggest, most commercial fraudsters, while being potentially disproportionate towards people who may be taking smaller amounts away from the DWP in particular. We received written evidence from the charity Turn2us, whose representatives are worried about the way that the Bill as a whole does not seem to create a clear enough distinction between fraud and error. Turn2us highlights that it might act as a deterrent to people who are more vulnerable, or older, or who would worry excessively about falling foul of these regulations and being accused, on the balance of probabilities, of doing fraud if they make a mistake. There is already stigma attached to claiming things from the Government, which may deter people. On Second Reading, and to some extent during the Committee evidence sessions, we discussed examples of people sharing tips and potentially their own personal experience online, in a way that encourages other people to make misrepresentations towards the Government. These penalty notices are not as well drawn as the measures already considered by the Committee in terms of their potential harms. They are fixed penalties, and the Minister is setting the amounts to try to strike a balance between the poorest people and the highest-level, most organised criminals. I foresee in my future casework people coming to me whose lives started to spin out of control when they were given this kind of penalty notice on top of having to pay back money they had received. The repayment amounts will have been calculated according to what they could afford, but these fixed penalties have fixed deadlines and interest attached. Somebody could make a mistake in the process of dealing with the authorities and be subject to the additional £300; then, if they do not pay that, there are further penalties attached. I worry that this chapter is not very well put together in terms of safeguards on how it might affect people. I might get reassurances in this debate about what the Bill is intended for; of course, if somebody is out there giving intentionally fraudulent bad advice, all the people who they give advice to will not be brought into a mass fixed penalty issued as a result of the investigation. We will avoid that. However, there has already been creeping use of repayments by the DWP in relation to recovering money from people when official error has been made. As stated in the written evidence that we received from the Public Law Project, assurances were made that the DWP does not “have to recover money from people where official error has been made, and we do not intend, in many cases, to recover money where official error has been made.” –– [ Official Report, Welfare Reform Public Bill Committee, 19 May 2011; c. 1019.] That was said to a previous Bill Committee when this process was introduced in legislation, but it is now more or less default practice for the DWP to recover money when official errors have been made. We all, as MPs, have many examples in our casework of people who have got into terrible trouble due to unexpected claims for overpayments made as a result of official error. I have serious concerns about these clauses. I would like to hear more from Ministers about who they are really aimed at, and about whether they will be effective against the big players, or just create potential harm for people who are the smaller fry involved in these kinds of operations.

• 26 Feb 2025 · Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 2 Report · Hansard source

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  I thank the Deputy Prime Minister for, in particular, her comments about the way in which residents were treated. There have been strong recommendations for a review of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. My former role involved listening to and trying to support the many local community organisations that were dealing with the enormous gaps in the humanitarian response that had been left by the local authority; the problems continued for weeks. Can the Deputy Prime Minister tell us when we will hear about the timing and the format of that review of the Act?

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I want to ask a couple of questions of clarification. Minister Western, are you open to a negative eventual human rights verdict on this? Many witnesses have said they need answers from the code of conduct, and we know that rights around data protection, privacy and discrimination are engaged by this. If, once we have seen the details of the code of practice, there is a negative verdict on any of those, are you open to changing or withdrawing parts of the Bill, for example by bringing reasonable suspicion to the front of the process instead of the end? Andrew Western: We would need, at that point, to take advice—legal advice, primarily—if there was that level of concern around any human rights impact. I would not want to second-guess, but certainly, in the instance where those views have been put forward and the legal advice suggested that they were valid, then clearly we would need to take appropriate action to ensure that the Bill is legal and satisfactory.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Sorry, Chair, the second question I asked about the percentage of error was not answered. What percentage of error do you think would be acceptable, in terms of innocent people being targeted for investigation? Andrew Western: I am not prepared to put a percentage on it. We would have to see what came out. We have done two previous trials on this and we are fairly confident in the mechanisms that are in place. That has underpinned some of the assumptions we have made. We are committing through this process to a test and learn phase so that we can keep errors as minimal as possible. Ideally, I would not want to see any errors at all, but ultimately we have structured this so that, were something to come back as a false positive, as it were, it would not lead to an immediate decision, because it would be passed to a human investigator for further investigation.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Those are errors that might be mistaken for fraud, given their outcome of people paying less or— Richard Las: Potentially. But it goes both ways, often. Sometimes people overpay as well. Joshua Reddaway: If you are looking at a particular case, normally the first thing you detect is that it is wrong—the transaction is not correct. You then have to take it to a certain level before you can work out, on the balance of probabilities, what it is. In tax world, is it evasion or avoidance? Then you go down a different route, depending on how you are dealing with it. Obviously, if you want to go for a prosecution, you have to have much more evidence and you have to be beyond reasonable doubt to go there. I think the reason why PSFA often deals with both is that it is at that earlier stage of dealing with prevention, and it is not always clear which one you are dealing with; besides which, we want to stop error as well. My job is to definitely try to stop both, through audit and accountability. I think where it does not make sense for PSFA to get involved is where that fundamental responsibility for correcting the control environment belongs with the Departments. So if you see that as a, “They have done that triaging; they now think that it’s fraud,” you need an enforcement capability and you go down that route, but I would be very disappointed if that meant in that triage process that an error was not being dealt with. Does that explain?

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I just want to clarify that if someone’s financial situation gets better, you withdraw the payment, but if you saw from the data you are collecting that their situation had got worse and they were starting to face difficulties, you would not seek to send someone in to try to increase the payment. Andrew Western: I am not sure that I fully understood the question, so please come back in if needed. It is clearly the case that if somebody has been receiving benefits that they are not entitled to, for whatever reason, they could end up in a worse financial position as a consequence. That is necessarily the case for two principal reasons. One is that in universal credit all overpayments are reclaimed regardless of the circumstances behind them. That was the policy enacted by the previous Government. The other reason is that they may no longer receive benefits that they previously believed themselves to be entitled to. For instance, if it comes to light that you have £18,000 in your account and there is no mitigating circumstance for that, it would be the case that you would be worse off in overall terms because you would no longer receive that benefit.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q To follow up on that point, the Bill is called the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill. Do you feel like there is enough built in to identify and deal with errors? As you say, systemic things may be uncovered that are causing errors or losses that are not in fact fraud. Does that get fed back? Would you like to see more in the Bill that systematises that? Joshua Reddaway: Interesting. The reason we always talk about error and fraud together is because it is often really difficult to differentiate between them when you are doing prevention. So, in my job, I am more interested in fraud and error together because I am more interested in how to correct that and stop the money going out. If you are in Richard’s job, as I am sure he will tell you in a second, he is going to be more interested in the one that you can prosecute—to an extent. Richard Las: I am happy to jump in from an HMRC perspective. It is important to understand what the driver is—I think that is absolutely right—and to be able to distinguish between fraud and error. We have estimates for fraud and error in terms of the tax system, which we publish every year. We generate those estimates for a lot of different activity, but partly they are the result of our own inquiries, so we are analysing what we do and what we see. We make a judgment—is it fraud, is it error?—and we work out what is going on. Absolutely, you have to look at the underlying reasons, so if there is an error, a repeated error, you ask what is going on there—what is the cause of it? Certainly, as we develop our business in HMRC—especially with people filing online—we are very much looking to prompt people so that they can get the right answer. Those of you who do self-assessment hopefully will see that yourself—“Are you sure? Is this information correct?” That really does help in reducing errors—the simple errors that people might make, because it is complicated.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Disabled people who receive direct payments have expressed some concern that there can be underspends and that these can build up. They have asked for a particular account to be ringfenced for that, and essentially not looked at in relation to these measures. Is that feasible? What is your lead time for knowing that you would need to do it? Would it need to go into the Bill initially? Eric Leenders: It would always be within the gift of a consumer to open a separate account. They can then ask for the benefit to be paid into that account. There might be a risk, from a wider perspective, that potentially attorneys and landlords might no longer want to receive benefits directly because of the potential admin burdens through this Bill. I flag that as a consideration. I do not think it is necessarily a show-stopper but certainly it is something that I think from a vulnerability perspective we need to be alive to, because that might be an additional responsibility on a vulnerable person, for example, to pay the rent.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Do you have anything more to say about what the unintended consequences of the Bill might be? Jasleen Chaggar: We are really concerned about the unintended consequences of the Bill. We appreciate that there has been an effort to tackle fraud and error, which is a serious problem, but we also have to consider the adverse and unintended consequences. One of those is the algorithmic error that can occur when automated systems are used on a population-wide scale. If the algorithms are scanning the bank accounts of 10 million people, an error rate of just 1% will result in 100,000 cases where innocent people are wrongfully investigated. We are also really concerned about the human backstop element. The DWP has assured us that there will be human involvement in any investigations on the back of receiving this data, but when you receive such a deluge of information from the banks, that calls into question whether the human involvement will be meaningful. The impact assessment acknowledges that by saying that we might have to slow down the rate at which we receive all this data from banks. We are very concerned about the false positives, and about the devastating effects that they would have on the lives of the individuals who are wrongfully investigated. Benefits recipients, who are already subjected to burdens in terms of documentation requirements, will find themselves subjected to an investigation by the DWP. We have heard from dozens of disability rights and elderly rights groups about the anxiety and stress that this will cause. Also, when benefits recipients are under investigation, they can find that their benefits are suspended, meaning that they will not have the money to pay for food, medical bills or heating bills. So the equality impact also has to be considered, and we have not actually seen an equalities impact assessment for the Bill either, which is a concern.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q To follow up directly on that, the Government have not really been clear yet which further benefits might be added to the workload in future. Are you happy that this is left open in the Bill? Daniel Cichocki: I do not think we take a view on the scope of individual benefits for which this is applied. The key principle for us is that where there are changes to the eligibility criteria, we are required to check that there is proper public consultation around those changes and an appropriate implementation period for any of those changes, and that those changes are not too frequent. As an industry, we have to build a system to run these checks every time, and every change will have to be built and tested. For us, it is more about the principle of the frequency and appropriateness of the changes. The broader debate around what is in scope is not one we have taken a view on.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Are there any other issues in your consumer duties, particularly your duties towards vulnerable account holders, that you have raised with the Government? The Minister has helpfully asked you that question in general terms, but I thought there may be other issues. Going back to Daniel’s earlier comment, can you clarify that you do not yet have a clue regarding the volume of requests? Have you been given some sort of estimate by the Government? Daniel Cichocki: Let me take that first. The Government set out two broad criteria pertaining to the eligibility verification measure: the capital check and the check against abroad fraud, through assessment of transactions abroad. It is difficult at this stage, because the industry has not undertaken any detailed collective analysis of the criteria against the current book of customers. That work has not yet been done. We anticipate it being done through the development of the code of practice, but key for us is understanding exactly what criteria we will be required to run, and then banks can start to build an assessment of how that looks against their current book. That detailed work has not yet taken place.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you for coming along. I think we should ask you the same general questions that we have asked all the other witnesses who have given evidence today. Do you believe that the Bill is a proportionate way of dealing with fraud and error in the DWP? I think that has been put to you, but I want to be clear. Given the position that the Information Commissioner’s Office has more or less laid out—that it will need to see the code of conduct to feel reassured, and I think we have come to that conclusion from the evidence of a number of our guests today—would a sufficient code of conduct make you content with the Bill, or is there something particular in it that needs to go? Jasleen Chaggar: Our view is that the powers will only ever be proportionate if they uphold the presumption of innocence, due process and judicial oversight, and any privacy infringements are set out in law and are necessary and proportionate. We feel that a code of conduct would be insufficient, because it would just defer those legal protections to some other time. Also, if an individual has a problem as a result of the use of the powers, they are unable to enforce their rights through a code of conduct. Setting out the protections in legislation would create a far more rights-preserving framework, with which we would definitely feel more comfortable.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Those are helpful things to know. Did you have any more to say about vulnerable customers? I know we have had some representations from disabled people, for example. Eric Leenders: Certainly. I will just build on Dan’s point regarding change requirements, to give a picture of the timespan involved. Typically, a change would involve the build—IT systems change and training, which is policy and procedures. We would also need to think about communications, including potentially into terms and conditions for the legals that sit around that. We would want to build monitoring systems to ensure that we have conformance and some form of review process. We have a three-line defence model, where the business runs the business, the second line checks the business, and the third line checks the checkers, so to speak. We then repeat that cycle. Putting that in place takes some time, which rather illustrates Dan’s desire for fewer changes and additions, because all of that would need to be considered. The point on vulnerability is very well made. There is a slight health warning in my comments, because the Financial Conduct Authority is due to publish findings from a thematic review imminently, as I understand—within the next couple of months. The broad drivers we adhere to that they identify are around financial resilience—we touched on that point a little earlier—and physical and mental strain. There are potentially some mental strains for individuals who feel they may be under suspicion, particularly where those prove not to be founded. Life events are critical now—key in affordability, typically the driver for financial difficulty, and also capability. There are various measures, but as an industry we typically would work to a reading age of nine to ensure that the UK population understands the communications that they receive. In building out the guidance, it would be very helpful for a period of consultation so that we can get into the detail and forensics around those points.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q It does. Do you think the Bill does enough to deal with that issue? Joshua Reddaway: I am saying I do not think this Bill is about that issue.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q That is helpful, because a lot of people have said it is contingent. I want to ask about one more thing to do with error. You said earlier that you were aiming to reduce the amount of overpayment through these processes, but will that also relate to underpayments? What percentage of error, in terms of innocent people being targeted for investigation by the new powers, do you think is acceptable? Anthony Western: When I talk about reducing over-payments, I mean reducing the value of overpayments rather than the number. Obviously, for a bank account to be flagged, there would have to be something in there to cause that flag. This would not reduce the overall number of overpayments necessarily, but it would reduce the amount of debt that someone might have accrued, were the eligibility verification measure to identify that at an earlier stage. We have seen some horrendous cases, through the carer’s allowance issues that have come to light, involving really significant numbers, because it has gone on for several years. That is the sort of thing we would be able to stop as a result of this—I am really sorry, Siân, but I cannot remember the rest of your question.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Okay. Even with that title? Joshua Reddaway: Even with that title.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Yes. Would you care to comment on the eligibility-verification powers more specifically? Alex Rothwell: I can see why there is concern. People have complex lives—perhaps it is not as straightforward as how much capital is in a bank account at a particular time. I think the powers need to be exercised very carefully. I am reassured by the opportunity to test and learn from the process through oversight, but I do recognise the concerns. Kristin Jones: I used to be in charge of international assistance when I was at the Serious Fraud Office. One of the difficulties is that whereas other countries have a central bank register or building where you can tackle that and find out all the accounts and individual holes, here we do not. It is more tricky to try to verify financial information because there is no central register. Alex Rothwell: We were speaking before about whether it is flexible enough to cover future events. The way that we use cash or funds is changing in terms of digital currencies and so on, and the way that people hold value is changing.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I want to go back to the question on proportionality. The previous witness emphasised that she was concerned that the eligibility-verification powers might go beyond proportionality and risk additional intrusion. When you are commenting, are you commenting on those powers as well, or mainly on the other parts of the Bill? Alex Rothwell: In terms of search warrants and physical access?

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Yes. The other powers that you mentioned already exist and are being transferred to a new place where things are conducted. Eligibility verification in the form that it is written is quite novel. Alex Rothwell: Does His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs not have the ability to conduct those inquiries?

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  As inquiries, but the difference is that we are talking about routine use. Alex Rothwell: More extensive use.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Were those last two comments more about the effectiveness of the legislation? Alex Rothwell: Yes.

• 24 Feb 2025 · Social Media Use: Minimum Age · Hansard source

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  I have met parents from Smartphone Free Childhood, but also young people. This is a big issue in Brighton Pavilion. Has the right hon. Member thought about pushing for the Minister and Members to talk more with young people about where the age limit should lie, rather than trying to come up with a number in the middle of a debate? It is clear from talking to young people that they feel that parts of social media are very toxic, but I also think they are best placed to judge where the limit should lie.