Shabana Mahmood MP: speeches

Speeches

• 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill (Allocation of Time) · Hansard source

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  I will not give way, given the time.

• 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill (Allocation of Time) · Hansard source

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  I will be brief in my remarks. I regret the approach taken by the official Opposition. They know full well that this is a very tightly constructed Bill that takes forward a specific set of recommendations made by the independent reviewer of terrorism and state threats legislation. It will be fully scrutinised by this House and the other place. The reason for moving quickly, as the hon. Lady well knows, is because we need the wider power to designate bodies, which we will debate in due course, so that we can move quickly, given the threats the country faces. The need for speed, I believe, is made by recent events, and I think the Government are doing the right thing. I ask her to think again. Of course, if we must divide then so be it, but I would have expected better from someone with her experience.

• 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  That conduct would not be caught. Again, I point the hon. Member to proposed new section 17B, where the combination of subsection (6)(b) and subsection (4) ensures that the work of NGOs is not caught by the tests set out. We have had specific advice on that point from the Office of Parliamentary Counsel, I have discussed it at length with the Attorney General’s Office, and Law Officers have had a look at it. We believe that the way in which the Bill is constructed does not catch humanitarian activities. It is not intended to do so, and we have made it clear in the explanatory notes that it will not do so. Our reading of how the Bill is constructed means that it will not do so. Let me move on to the third offence in clause 2, which is of obtaining a material benefit from a designated body. An individual is outlawed from receiving a payment or a gift from a designated body either on their own behalf or on behalf of someone else. The very act of making the agreement would also constitute a crime even if no money were exchanged and no service were provided. That would cover a hacker hired to carry out a cyber-attack, a criminal gang commissioned to conduct arson attacks on British soil and a gang recruiting thugs to do their state-directed dirty work. Those two offences—assisting and benefiting from a designated body—would carry prison terms of up to 14 years alongside the sentences they may receive for any other illegal activity conducted, with sabotage and espionage offences carrying life sentences. To trigger the offences of assisting a designated body and of obtaining benefit from a designated body, an individual must know that they are aiding a body that has been designated or, crucially, ought reasonably to know that they are doing so. Ignorance is therefore not a defence. If a reasonable person should have been able to surmise who would benefit from such an attack, the individual will be prosecuted despite their professed ignorance. The new powers are significant—

• 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  Let me be very clear: it is the former of the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s points. On the construction of knowing or “ought reasonably to know”, obviously the “ought reasonably to know” is both a subjective test of what was known and then an objective test as to what it is reasonable to surmise based on that knowledge. We think that captures exactly the kind of activity that I hope all of us in the House can agree should meet the test for criminal sanction. Let me make progress quicker than perhaps others might have wanted. As I have noted already, the genesis for the Bill comes from the excellent work of Jonathan Hall KC, whom I thank for the work he has completed. In May 2025, he made further recommendations regarding gaps in our state-threats legislation. The Government have accepted all his recommendations in full, and we will legislate for them all in due course, but, in the interests of the pace at which we are required to bring this vital legislation forward, that will not happen in this Bill. As was set out in the King’s Speech, there will be further national security legislation in this Session. Every day, our intelligence agencies and their law enforcement colleagues make this country safer for their presence. They do so, however, facing a rising challenge. The threat from terrorism is growing and, at the same time, we face foreign powers acting with greater hostility than we have seen at any time since the cold war. In the face of the growing threat, it is essential that we equip those we expect to protect us with the tools they need to do the job at the moment that they need them the most. The need for the Bill is therefore great. It gives us a new and powerful tool to tackle hostile states and those who act on their behalf. I end with a request to the House. We do not just require this Bill; we require it as quickly as possible. For that reason, the Government have promised to fast-track the legislation through both Houses. While we must debate it fully and rigorously, and I know that we will, I hope we can work together in the pursuit of a shared ideal, and one that is greater than our political differences: our solemn duty to protect our country. I hope that, today, the whole House can unite around the first and most sacred responsibility of us all. With that, I commend the Bill to the House.

• 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  I do not think that the activities that the hon. Lady mentioned are caught by the Bill. We have been clear in the explanatory notes to the Bill—I refer her to paragraphs 37 and 43—that diplomatic activity, and indeed humanitarian activity, will not be caught by any of the Bill’s measures. We do not want to create a regime with lots of exemptions as that would enable hostile states to try to play games with our legal framework by dressing up front organisations. I reassure her that the measures in the Bill will not apply to any humanitarian organisation going about its business as a humanitarian organisation. If there is any doubt, I refer hon. Members to subsection (6)(d) of proposed new section 17B, which makes it clear that anything that has essentially been approved by the UK, or is part of an agreement to which the UK is a party, will not be caught. If humanitarian organisations are concerned, I urge them to talk to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office—as the hon. Lady well knows, that happens regularly in the humanitarian sector. The combination of all those provisions will ensure that the activity that she wants to see continue, as I do, will not be caught by the Bill’s measures. I understand that there is some consternation from the Opposition about what I might be intending to say in the rest of my speech. If that is so, let me say first that we might not have needed an unnecessary vote on the programme motion, but I will make quick progress as I explain the thinking behind the measures. Clause 1 also introduces a new designated body condition. Under the National Security Act, it can be difficult to secure a prosecution, as a link must be proved that runs all the way from the individual to a foreign power, but through the designated body condition more organisations will be brought to justice. On the so-called support offence, clause 2 sets out new offences related to those new designated bodies. Again, it amends the National Security Act, adding new sections 17A to 17C. The first offence is supporting a designated body, which covers inviting or expressing support and arranging, managing or addressing a meeting in support of a designated body. The offence will be triggered when the reason for the supportive act is to prejudice the safety and interests of the United Kingdom in what is known as a prohibited purpose test, echoing the National Security Act. Let me say again that it should be noted that there will be occasions when individuals and organisations have to engage with some designated state actors. The new designation regime will ensure that diplomats can work on behalf of this country and that humanitarian organisations can continue their lifesaving work. The second offence is to assist a designated body. It will become an offence to materially assist a designated organisation. That includes both directly assisting such an organisation and assisting a proxy organisation acting on its behalf.

• 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  I do not agree with the hon. Lady’s construction of proposed new section 33G, but I am sure that we can pick up that point in Committee, when we do line-by-line scrutiny. The Bill is intended to be read alongside all our other pieces of international and human rights legislation, and the Bill is compliant with our domestic and international human rights obligations.

• 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  The combination of what we already have on the statute book in the National Security Act and this Bill means that all aspects of that activity will be covered. It obviously depends on how the activity presents. The Bill closes the loophole where a designated body is responsible. Where proxy groups are responsible, they will be caught by the measures in the Bill, and that activity will be liable to both prosecution and conviction. Jonathan Hall KC examined whether tools available in our current terrorism legislation might be emulated or adapted to address state threats. He determined that we could not use the existing terror legislation to proscribe a state entity. He memorably described that as “shopping in the wrong department.” He said: “For the Secretary of State to have or purport to have power to prohibit the existence of foreign State entities would be well beyond what Parliament could have intended” when it passed the Terrorism Act. He went on to conclude that applying the power to a state entity would “appear to overstep the boundaries of the principle of non-intervention at international law.” Instead, he proposed a new regime: a power equivalent to proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000, but specifically designed to tackle state and state-linked organisations. Through this legislation, we seek to bring that new power into law. I will now take the House through the Bill in some detail. Clause 1 introduces a power for the Home Secretary to designate a body. It will insert new section 33A into the National Security Act 2023. Such a designation will be possible if the Home Secretary believes that a body is, or has been, involved in foreign power threat activity and that designation is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. The definition of a body is purposefully wide; it cannot be targeted at individuals, but it can be targeted at a wide range of organisations, including foreign intelligence services, mercenary groups, front companies and criminal networks. The power to designate is of critical importance.

• 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his contribution. The Bill seeks to create the legal framework by which designations will be made in future. The Bill will hopefully be approved quickly by Parliament, and I will seek to move forward with designations as quickly as possible, to deal with the threats that I am discussing in the House today. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman would agree that the fact that I have spent some time considering the different nature of the threat posed by these three states in particular shows that we are very alive to the ways in which they use their unique positions to pose a threat to us in the United Kingdom. He is right about the way in which Iran operates; it is different from how Russia and China operate. The Government have to be alive to the different type of risks posed by these three countries in particular. At the moment, those countries account for a large proportion of the hostile activities that are monitored by our security services, but those activities are not exclusive to those three countries. On matters of oversight, I will repeat my starting position. I do think that our current framework is robust and has stood the test of time. Of course, things change, and we would review the framework all the time anyway. I repeat my general offer—I suspect that I am making it to the whole of the ISC, given how well represented it is in this debate—of a conversation to pick up any concerns that its members have. The Minister for Security and I will make sure that we consider any additional proposals fully, but I am mindful that we do not want a position in which the Government cannot act quickly, or to over-regulate what is necessarily an Executive function, as speed is often of the essence. With that understood, a sensible conversation is always welcome. In relation to Iran, Members will be aware that two men await trial under the National Security Act for the surveillance of Jewish sites. While investigations remain ongoing, the police are exploring potential links between Iran and the spate of arson attacks directed at our Jewish community in London. Faced with this intolerable hostility, our nation has bolstered its defences. The National Security Act, brought forward by the previous Government and supported by Labour, rightly commanded support from both sides of the House. It has given our authorities new tools and provided the legal underpinning for a series of complex and sensitive investigations, and it has secured important convictions, including of two men for gathering information and conducting surveillance to assist the Chinese state. In addition, the foreign influence registration scheme has been in force for close to a year. Russia and Iran are placed on its enhanced tier. Anyone now conducting activity on behalf of those states faces a clear choice: identify themselves and register their activity, or face the prospect of prison. Sanctions remain a vital tool in our action against hostile states. The UK now has more than 550 sanctions against Iranian-linked individuals and organisations, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in its entirety. Through measures like these, we have made this country a harder target. However, as we improve our defences, our adversaries respond and change their behaviour to pose new threats to our country. That has been particularly evident in the rising use of proxy groups—criminal gangs, professional enablers and front companies that do the bidding of a foreign power, against the interests of this country, in exchange for money. There has long been a desire to ban state-linked organisations from operating in this country, and to target those who facilitate them. That is why the Government made a manifesto commitment to deal with state-backed domestic security threats in the same way that we tackle terrorism. The question was how to create the right legal power to do so. My predecessor, now the Foreign Secretary, tasked Jonathan Hall KC, the Government’s independent reviewer of terrorism and state threats legislation, with answering that question.

• 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  Both the National Security Act 2023 and the measures we are debating today will ensure that we have the strongest suite of measures available to us to take action against those who come after people on our soil, including dissidents from other regimes and people to whom we have given sanctuary. Transnational repression will be caught by the measures in this Bill.

• 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time. The first responsibility of a state is to protect its citizens. The security of our nation is the basis upon which our democracy, our prosperity and our way of life depend. If a state cannot guarantee the safety of its people, every other promise it makes rings hollow. Today we debate a relatively short Bill, but its brevity should not be mistaken for unimportance; it is essential to meeting the sacred responsibility of protecting this country and our fellow citizens. This Bill comes at a time when the need is great. We live in an increasingly dangerous world—one in which many of our old assumptions no longer hold. The boundaries between war and peace have blurred; the tactics employed by hostile actors have become more sophisticated, more deniable and more insidious; and the threat has grown in scale. The director general of MI5 recently revealed that the number of individuals under investigation for state threat activity had grown by more than a third in the space of a year. After many years in which the Security Service was focused overwhelmingly on counter-terror work, it must now also respond to threats from foreign powers that are greater in number than at any time in a generation. The nature of the threats posed by foreign powers will be known by many in this House. We have seen physical threats against individuals and property; we have witnessed attempts to interfere in and influence our democracy; and we have experienced cyber-attacks targeting both the state and the private sector that disrupt critical infrastructure and compromise sensitive data. The source of these state threats has come predominantly, although not exclusively, from three countries: Russia, China and Iran. I should emphasise that the threats from each present differently, both in scope and nature, and I will take each in turn. The Russian state, as we know all too well, is responsible for deaths on British soil. What began with the murder of Alexander Litvinenko was repeated in Salisbury with the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal. The Russian state’s wanton disregard for human life was evident in the risks it was happy to pose to British citizens, which led, tragically, to the death of Dawn Sturgess—an innocent British woman killed by the Russian state. Putin’s Russia has also sought to influence our politics, as demonstrated by the guilty plea by Nathan Gill, Reform UK’s former leader in Wales, who accepted bribes for peddling pro-Kremlin narratives. Russia is also a prolific and malevolent force in cyber-space. A recent targeting of politicians, journalists, universities and civil society organisations was disrupted by our security services in December 2025, resulting in the sanctioning of eight Russian cyber-intelligence officers. As you know, Madam Deputy Speaker, our approach to China is nuanced: we will co-operate where we can and challenge where we must. There are areas on which we will engage with China, including the economy, the environment and, indeed, on certain shared security challenges. Choosing not to engage with China is no choice at all. However, national security is the first duty of Government, and China does pose real national security threats to the United Kingdom. We have seen cyber-attacks, foreign interference, and espionage targeted at our institutions. Just days ago, MI5 and fellow Five Eyes members issued an alert warning of the threat posed by China’s military intelligence services. The Hong Kong police force has also encouraged transnational repression on our soil against a community to whom we are proud to have given sanctuary.

• 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  Let me first associate myself with the right hon. Gentleman’s tribute to the excellent work and service of all those in our United Kingdom intelligence community, wherever they serve, and indeed all those who serve and put their lives at risk in order to keep the rest of us safe. I also pay tribute to the tremendous work done by the Intelligence and Security Committee—one of Parliament’s most august Committees—to provide vital scrutiny of our legal frameworks in this important area. I must say to the right hon. Gentleman that, personally, as someone who signs warrants every day that are subject to both Secretary of State decision and judicial decision, I think that we have a legal framework that is sufficiently robust to provide oversight, without getting into the operational choices that must be made. Of course, these matters are always kept under review, and I take that review process seriously. If there are proposals that he wishes to make, I would be happy to discuss them with him.

• 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  I disagree with the right hon. Gentleman almost entirely. The Executive have a responsibility to protect and maintain this country’s national security, and we have to move when we see that hostile actors are employing new methods to put our people and interests at risk. We have seen an increase in hostile activity from those who are not directly related to foreign powers, but have a relationship with them. That is why we are bringing forward the designated body condition in the Bill. It rather sounds as if he questions the basis for us having counter-terror legislation, or this legislation, at all. I disagree with him on that. I think we have a suitable legal framework, under both the Terrorism Act 2000 and this new Bill, to deal with all the threats that this country faces, including those that are emerging as new ways for people to put our citizens at risk. Let me turn to the threat posed by Iran. We are debating this Bill in the shadow of a recent surge in hostile activity by the Iranian state. In just a single year, MI5 has tracked and disrupted over 20 potentially lethal Iranian plots. These have targeted dissidents, media organisations and critics of the Iranian regime, and they pose a real and enduring threat to our Jewish community here at home.

• 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  The right hon. Gentleman is right. It is incumbent on all parliamentarians to reflect on the platforms we appear on, and what those platforms are seeking to do. There will always be a balance to be struck with freedom of speech and other matters, but where activities lead people to fall foul of the law, they will be pursued with the full force of the law—whether that is this Bill, the National Security Act 2023, or any other part of our criminal legislation framework. On the attacks on the Prime Minister’s home, let me just say, factually, what happened in the criminal justice system. It was not part of the prosecution’s case that there was any additional direction of that activity. That was not part of the evidence. I would not want to let that stand without making that clear about the prosecution.

• 8 Jun 2026 · Illegal High Street Trading · Hansard source

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  First, I welcome my hon. Friend’s important work in this area. Greater Manchester is one of three hotspot areas selected for an enhanced operational crackdown in addition to the nationwide campaign. I cannot comment on specific dates due to operational sensitivities, but the public can expect to see the start of a major offensive against dodgy shops beginning this year.

• 8 Jun 2026 · Illegal High Street Trading · Hansard source

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  It is always a pleasure to appear before the Home Affairs Committee, and I thank the right hon. Member and her Committee for their work on this important area. She will know that the money we announced recently will fund work by trading standards, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and immigration enforcement. If we pick up cases of forced labour, that will engage our modern slavery obligations. That money is part of a full-spectrum response to a complex issue. I saw some of the counterfeit goods when I joined the police on a raid at the end of last week. It is a real problem, and the Government are ensuring that we fund every aspect of how we fix it.

• 8 Jun 2026 · Illegal High Street Trading · Hansard source

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  Dodgy shops are blighting our high streets—we all see them in our constituencies—so this Government have announced a new high street organised crime taskforce, investing £30 million in law enforcement action. That will fund more officers and a nationwide unit based in the National Crime Agency, and will strengthen powers to tackle these criminals.

• 8 Jun 2026 · Immigration Rules: Economic Impact · Hansard source

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  The employment statistics that the hon. Lady has just used run from January 2020 to December 2025, so I congratulate her on exposing the track record of the Tory Government.

• 8 Jun 2026 · Immigration Rules: Economic Impact · Hansard source

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  Under the previous Government, net migration hit record highs after they lowered entry requirements and opened our borders. My definition of what is best for the UK economy is one where migration is controlled and where there is investment in skills and training for our home-grown workforce, not an overreliance on overseas recruitment.

• 8 Jun 2026 · Immigration Rules: Economic Impact · Hansard source

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  This Government have increased routes at the very top end of the skills spectrum, such as through our global talent visa, to make sure that we are attracting talent from all over the world. We have a good track record in doing so and will continue that. There is work to do with our university sector to make sure that students recruited to this country are on good courses and making a contribution, and obviously we want to make sure that we use the best of that global talent in the future. The changes we are making are not about students—students do not come to attain indefinite leave to remain in our country—but for other parts of the migration system. I will make sure, however, that my hon. Friend gets a meeting with the migration Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Dover and Deal (Mike Tapp) to discuss these matters in more detail.

• 8 Jun 2026 · Immigration Rules: Economic Impact · Hansard source

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  We have to remember that currently in our country we have more than 1 million young people who are not in employment, education or training, and the hon. Lady and all Members should want us to turn that around and make sure that there are employment opportunities and a positive economic future in their own country for those young people in many of the sectors that she describes. We are the Government who have formalised that link between migration and skills reforms to make sure that companies are investing in the domestic workforce first and foremost before recruiting from abroad.

• 8 Jun 2026 · Immigration Rules: Economic Impact · Hansard source

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  No one disputes the tremendous contribution that international workers make to our NHS. The picture the hon. Gentleman describes is replicated in constituencies across the country, and we will always welcome that contribution. Overseas recruitment in the NHS is falling primarily because the NHS is leading by example and doing what we want all employers to do: look first at domestic recruitment to ensure that the skills and expertise of the health service are home-grown. I believe that those two systems can go hand in hand, but we have to make changes at the same time.

• 8 Jun 2026 · Immigration Rules: Economic Impact · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is absolutely right. At a point when we have over a million young people not in employment, education or training, it is imperative that we make progress in this area. We would be letting our young people down if we did not take this opportunity to ensure that we are investing in our domestic skills workforce. That is a cross-Department priority and the Home Office is playing its full part.

• 8 Jun 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  I believe that we in this House have a duty to protect the children of this nation, but there can be little doubt that collectively we have failed to keep pace with the changing threats they face. Nowhere is that more apparent than in the horror of online sexual exploitation and abuse, but we have begun to change the story. Today, we laid down the gauntlet to tech firms. We have told them that they must block nudity on children’s phones. We know the tech is there; we know there is a way. The question is: do they have the will? The tech firms now have three months. The clock is ticking. If they do not introduce these controls, we will legislate and force them to do so. This is a landmark moment in the protection of children in this country, so if I may, I will end by paying tribute to the woman who has pushed for this harder than anyone else, my hon. Friend and former colleague in the Home Office, the Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips). The children of this country will be safer as a result of her work.

• 8 Jun 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  I very much thank my hon. Friend for her question, and she is absolutely right. Let me clarify for the House that this involves the taking of those images. We will also follow through on the threat to legislate, and the Department is working at pace on the content of the legislation and the appropriate vehicle in the second Session.

• 8 Jun 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman is right that it can ruin lives. The Government have already held different platforms to account, and the hon. Gentleman will know about our row with Grok and the action we forced as a result. We are alive to the online environment and what that means for deepfake images and nudification apps—areas where we have already taken action. The action today on device-level controls to block nudity for children is a game-changing moment because it will prevent children from becoming sex offenders before they even know what sex is, and from being victims of sextortion. It is the right way forward.