Shabana Mahmood MP: speeches

Speeches

• 13 Jul 2026 · High Streets Organised Crime Unit · Hansard source

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  The Government have not opposed stronger closure powers. In fact, the Government are currently consulting on a planned increase in closure orders, from six months to 12 months. We will be bringing forward legislative measures very shortly and are also looking at the separate regime in relation to closure notices, none of which was acted on when the hon. Gentleman and his party were in government.

• 13 Jul 2026 · High Streets Organised Crime Unit · Hansard source

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  That is precisely what this new national crackdown is designed to do. The additional money will put more officers on the street to raid dodgy shops and other premises. We are also providing funding for trading standards and His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, because we know that this multi-layered problem requires assistance from other professionals. Immigration enforcement will also receive additional funding as part of this crackdown. We are determined to make sure that our high streets are safe places for communities to use.

• 13 Jul 2026 · High Streets Organised Crime Unit · Hansard source

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  I am not aware of the hon. Gentleman’s correspondence, but I will chase that up when I get back to the Department later this afternoon and ensure he receives an appropriate response. He will of course know that there is a live investigation at the moment, so I cannot comment on any of its details, and certainly not on the operational details, but I will make sure he is updated in an appropriate way, given that he is the local Member of Parliament.

• 13 Jul 2026 · High Streets Organised Crime Unit · Hansard source

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  Let me assure the hon. Gentleman that this is a national crackdown led by the National Crime Agency. I have provided funding for all forces, regardless of the type of area they represent, and they can bid for the enhanced activity funding in their areas. I would encourage him to talk to his force about what it is doing to make sure that it gets its share of that money.

• 13 Jul 2026 · Violence against Women and Girls · Hansard source

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  No woman should be afraid of coming forward to report domestic abuse, regardless of their immigration status or, indeed, any other status here. Let me make it very clear that they should do so, unafraid of the impact that might have on their immigration status. We will support all victims of violence against women and girls, regardless of their status in this country.

• 13 Jul 2026 · Violence against Women and Girls · Hansard source

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  Those comments are a disgrace, and I hope that all Members across the House, regardless of their party political persuasion, will take a unified stance on all instances of violence against women and girls, threats, abuse, the creation of explicit sexual images and, indeed, those who break the law. Let me say that message clearly from the Dispatch Box, and I hope it is shared across the House.

• 13 Jul 2026 · Violence against Women and Girls · Hansard source

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  We have made the landmark commitment to halve the levels of violence against women and girls in a decade, and already we are taking action. We will prevent children from taking, sharing and viewing nude imagery on their smartphones and tablets. We have invested £53 million to tackle the highest harm perpetrators. And we have protected more than 1,000 victims through domestic abuse and protection orders. Our ambition is clear, and there is much more work to be done.

• 13 Jul 2026 · Violence against Women and Girls · Hansard source

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  I recognise the strength of feeling and the experiences of all these victims and survivors of the most appalling abuse. I am pleased that justice was sought through the criminal justice system in this case, because too often victims do not come forward at all. The hon. Lady will know that the Ministry of Justice is focused on ensuring that we do not run out of prison places in this country. Over the 14 years of the Conservative Government, only 500 places were added to the whole of the prison estate. It is a crisis that I directly inherited when I came into government, and I know how precarious the number of prison places in this country has been. I hope she will agree that, for all victims and survivors, the most important thing is to make sure that we never run out of prison places in this country again.

• 13 Jul 2026 · Violence against Women and Girls · Hansard source

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  I recognise that rape and other sexual offences can have a devastating impact on victims, as can the process leading up to an investigation and, hopefully, a charge—and those rates are far too low. I am happy to arrange a meeting for the hon. Gentleman with the Minister for Policing and Crime, my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon West (Sarah Jones), to discuss the specific issues in Sussex, but all forces are implementing Operation Soteria, which is designed to help officers and prosecutors to build the strongest case possible through tools, training and guidance. I have, of course, also asked all the forces across the country to establish specialist rape and sexual offences teams by the end of this Parliament.

• 13 Jul 2026 · Violence against Women and Girls · Hansard source

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  Let me assure my hon. Friend that this is a cross-Government strategy and commitment. It has been led directly by the Prime Minister himself, who has got Government Departments together, knocked heads together and made sure that everybody is equally committed. I am sure that will not change, regardless of what may happen in the very near future. Let me assure my hon. Friend that this remains a cross-Government strategy, and I hope that it has support across parties as well.

• 13 Jul 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his contribution. The Government have passed new legislation to allow for the designation of the organisations that the Minister for Security referenced earlier, and that includes the IRGC. The designation tool means that it is now brought within the context of the National Security Act 2023, and I do expect that when our laws are broken, prosecutions will follow. He knows that we have had some success with National Security Act investigations; I expect that to continue.

• 13 Jul 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  First, the shadow Home Secretary knows that the issues in relation to Shabir Ahmed and his deportation from this country are exactly the same as those his Government faced when they were in power. There is both a legal challenge and a practical one. I will be dealing with the legal issues later today when we debate the Immigration and Asylum Bill. The Government’s work on the practical hurdles to deportation continue between me and the Foreign Secretary and others in government. On releases from prisons, it was the shadow Home Secretary’s Government who allowed the situation in our prisons to get to a dangerous level. We all but ran out of prison places under his Government; under this Government, we will never run out of prison places again.

• 13 Jul 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  This weekend an event in Suffolk was due to be attended by over 10,000 Muslims. Instead, it ended early, because the police became aware of a credible threat to the lives of those present. They acted with speed and skill, and I thank Suffolk police, Counter Terrorism Policing and the organisers for their swift and effective response. Thanks to their actions, those attending the UK Ijtima in Barham were kept safe. Twelve individuals have now been arrested as part of an investigation led by Counter Terrorism Policing, which described the incident as “extreme right-wing terrorism related”. This investigation is at an early stage, and we are giving them space to pursue their lines of inquiry. I know that the police will provide further updates. We must all stand united against hatred. The actions of a minority do not represent who we are as a country, and we should never be defined by those who plot violence against their fellow countrymen and women.

• 13 Jul 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  That is rather desperate from the shadow Home Secretary. He knows that the position is exactly as was set out in the consultation, which was published by the Government. We consulted on transitional arrangements for those who are already in country, and it is settled policy that the qualifying period will rise from five to 10 years. The implementation of that is being consulted on, and we will have settled policy on that later this year.

• 13 Jul 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  It has been settled Government policy—since last summer, in fact—that the qualifying period will rise from five years to 10 years. The Government are consulting on what transitional arrangements may be needed, and we will come forward with settled policy later this year.

• 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill (Allocation of Time) · Hansard source

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  I will not give way, given the time.

• 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill (Allocation of Time) · Hansard source

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  I will be brief in my remarks. I regret the approach taken by the official Opposition. They know full well that this is a very tightly constructed Bill that takes forward a specific set of recommendations made by the independent reviewer of terrorism and state threats legislation. It will be fully scrutinised by this House and the other place. The reason for moving quickly, as the hon. Lady well knows, is because we need the wider power to designate bodies, which we will debate in due course, so that we can move quickly, given the threats the country faces. The need for speed, I believe, is made by recent events, and I think the Government are doing the right thing. I ask her to think again. Of course, if we must divide then so be it, but I would have expected better from someone with her experience.

• 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  That conduct would not be caught. Again, I point the hon. Member to proposed new section 17B, where the combination of subsection (6)(b) and subsection (4) ensures that the work of NGOs is not caught by the tests set out. We have had specific advice on that point from the Office of Parliamentary Counsel, I have discussed it at length with the Attorney General’s Office, and Law Officers have had a look at it. We believe that the way in which the Bill is constructed does not catch humanitarian activities. It is not intended to do so, and we have made it clear in the explanatory notes that it will not do so. Our reading of how the Bill is constructed means that it will not do so. Let me move on to the third offence in clause 2, which is of obtaining a material benefit from a designated body. An individual is outlawed from receiving a payment or a gift from a designated body either on their own behalf or on behalf of someone else. The very act of making the agreement would also constitute a crime even if no money were exchanged and no service were provided. That would cover a hacker hired to carry out a cyber-attack, a criminal gang commissioned to conduct arson attacks on British soil and a gang recruiting thugs to do their state-directed dirty work. Those two offences—assisting and benefiting from a designated body—would carry prison terms of up to 14 years alongside the sentences they may receive for any other illegal activity conducted, with sabotage and espionage offences carrying life sentences. To trigger the offences of assisting a designated body and of obtaining benefit from a designated body, an individual must know that they are aiding a body that has been designated or, crucially, ought reasonably to know that they are doing so. Ignorance is therefore not a defence. If a reasonable person should have been able to surmise who would benefit from such an attack, the individual will be prosecuted despite their professed ignorance. The new powers are significant—

• 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  Let me be very clear: it is the former of the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s points. On the construction of knowing or “ought reasonably to know”, obviously the “ought reasonably to know” is both a subjective test of what was known and then an objective test as to what it is reasonable to surmise based on that knowledge. We think that captures exactly the kind of activity that I hope all of us in the House can agree should meet the test for criminal sanction. Let me make progress quicker than perhaps others might have wanted. As I have noted already, the genesis for the Bill comes from the excellent work of Jonathan Hall KC, whom I thank for the work he has completed. In May 2025, he made further recommendations regarding gaps in our state-threats legislation. The Government have accepted all his recommendations in full, and we will legislate for them all in due course, but, in the interests of the pace at which we are required to bring this vital legislation forward, that will not happen in this Bill. As was set out in the King’s Speech, there will be further national security legislation in this Session. Every day, our intelligence agencies and their law enforcement colleagues make this country safer for their presence. They do so, however, facing a rising challenge. The threat from terrorism is growing and, at the same time, we face foreign powers acting with greater hostility than we have seen at any time since the cold war. In the face of the growing threat, it is essential that we equip those we expect to protect us with the tools they need to do the job at the moment that they need them the most. The need for the Bill is therefore great. It gives us a new and powerful tool to tackle hostile states and those who act on their behalf. I end with a request to the House. We do not just require this Bill; we require it as quickly as possible. For that reason, the Government have promised to fast-track the legislation through both Houses. While we must debate it fully and rigorously, and I know that we will, I hope we can work together in the pursuit of a shared ideal, and one that is greater than our political differences: our solemn duty to protect our country. I hope that, today, the whole House can unite around the first and most sacred responsibility of us all. With that, I commend the Bill to the House.

• 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  I do not think that the activities that the hon. Lady mentioned are caught by the Bill. We have been clear in the explanatory notes to the Bill—I refer her to paragraphs 37 and 43—that diplomatic activity, and indeed humanitarian activity, will not be caught by any of the Bill’s measures. We do not want to create a regime with lots of exemptions as that would enable hostile states to try to play games with our legal framework by dressing up front organisations. I reassure her that the measures in the Bill will not apply to any humanitarian organisation going about its business as a humanitarian organisation. If there is any doubt, I refer hon. Members to subsection (6)(d) of proposed new section 17B, which makes it clear that anything that has essentially been approved by the UK, or is part of an agreement to which the UK is a party, will not be caught. If humanitarian organisations are concerned, I urge them to talk to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office—as the hon. Lady well knows, that happens regularly in the humanitarian sector. The combination of all those provisions will ensure that the activity that she wants to see continue, as I do, will not be caught by the Bill’s measures. I understand that there is some consternation from the Opposition about what I might be intending to say in the rest of my speech. If that is so, let me say first that we might not have needed an unnecessary vote on the programme motion, but I will make quick progress as I explain the thinking behind the measures. Clause 1 also introduces a new designated body condition. Under the National Security Act, it can be difficult to secure a prosecution, as a link must be proved that runs all the way from the individual to a foreign power, but through the designated body condition more organisations will be brought to justice. On the so-called support offence, clause 2 sets out new offences related to those new designated bodies. Again, it amends the National Security Act, adding new sections 17A to 17C. The first offence is supporting a designated body, which covers inviting or expressing support and arranging, managing or addressing a meeting in support of a designated body. The offence will be triggered when the reason for the supportive act is to prejudice the safety and interests of the United Kingdom in what is known as a prohibited purpose test, echoing the National Security Act. Let me say again that it should be noted that there will be occasions when individuals and organisations have to engage with some designated state actors. The new designation regime will ensure that diplomats can work on behalf of this country and that humanitarian organisations can continue their lifesaving work. The second offence is to assist a designated body. It will become an offence to materially assist a designated organisation. That includes both directly assisting such an organisation and assisting a proxy organisation acting on its behalf.

• 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  I do not agree with the hon. Lady’s construction of proposed new section 33G, but I am sure that we can pick up that point in Committee, when we do line-by-line scrutiny. The Bill is intended to be read alongside all our other pieces of international and human rights legislation, and the Bill is compliant with our domestic and international human rights obligations.

• 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  The combination of what we already have on the statute book in the National Security Act and this Bill means that all aspects of that activity will be covered. It obviously depends on how the activity presents. The Bill closes the loophole where a designated body is responsible. Where proxy groups are responsible, they will be caught by the measures in the Bill, and that activity will be liable to both prosecution and conviction. Jonathan Hall KC examined whether tools available in our current terrorism legislation might be emulated or adapted to address state threats. He determined that we could not use the existing terror legislation to proscribe a state entity. He memorably described that as “shopping in the wrong department.” He said: “For the Secretary of State to have or purport to have power to prohibit the existence of foreign State entities would be well beyond what Parliament could have intended” when it passed the Terrorism Act. He went on to conclude that applying the power to a state entity would “appear to overstep the boundaries of the principle of non-intervention at international law.” Instead, he proposed a new regime: a power equivalent to proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000, but specifically designed to tackle state and state-linked organisations. Through this legislation, we seek to bring that new power into law. I will now take the House through the Bill in some detail. Clause 1 introduces a power for the Home Secretary to designate a body. It will insert new section 33A into the National Security Act 2023. Such a designation will be possible if the Home Secretary believes that a body is, or has been, involved in foreign power threat activity and that designation is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. The definition of a body is purposefully wide; it cannot be targeted at individuals, but it can be targeted at a wide range of organisations, including foreign intelligence services, mercenary groups, front companies and criminal networks. The power to designate is of critical importance.

• 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his contribution. The Bill seeks to create the legal framework by which designations will be made in future. The Bill will hopefully be approved quickly by Parliament, and I will seek to move forward with designations as quickly as possible, to deal with the threats that I am discussing in the House today. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman would agree that the fact that I have spent some time considering the different nature of the threat posed by these three states in particular shows that we are very alive to the ways in which they use their unique positions to pose a threat to us in the United Kingdom. He is right about the way in which Iran operates; it is different from how Russia and China operate. The Government have to be alive to the different type of risks posed by these three countries in particular. At the moment, those countries account for a large proportion of the hostile activities that are monitored by our security services, but those activities are not exclusive to those three countries. On matters of oversight, I will repeat my starting position. I do think that our current framework is robust and has stood the test of time. Of course, things change, and we would review the framework all the time anyway. I repeat my general offer—I suspect that I am making it to the whole of the ISC, given how well represented it is in this debate—of a conversation to pick up any concerns that its members have. The Minister for Security and I will make sure that we consider any additional proposals fully, but I am mindful that we do not want a position in which the Government cannot act quickly, or to over-regulate what is necessarily an Executive function, as speed is often of the essence. With that understood, a sensible conversation is always welcome. In relation to Iran, Members will be aware that two men await trial under the National Security Act for the surveillance of Jewish sites. While investigations remain ongoing, the police are exploring potential links between Iran and the spate of arson attacks directed at our Jewish community in London. Faced with this intolerable hostility, our nation has bolstered its defences. The National Security Act, brought forward by the previous Government and supported by Labour, rightly commanded support from both sides of the House. It has given our authorities new tools and provided the legal underpinning for a series of complex and sensitive investigations, and it has secured important convictions, including of two men for gathering information and conducting surveillance to assist the Chinese state. In addition, the foreign influence registration scheme has been in force for close to a year. Russia and Iran are placed on its enhanced tier. Anyone now conducting activity on behalf of those states faces a clear choice: identify themselves and register their activity, or face the prospect of prison. Sanctions remain a vital tool in our action against hostile states. The UK now has more than 550 sanctions against Iranian-linked individuals and organisations, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in its entirety. Through measures like these, we have made this country a harder target. However, as we improve our defences, our adversaries respond and change their behaviour to pose new threats to our country. That has been particularly evident in the rising use of proxy groups—criminal gangs, professional enablers and front companies that do the bidding of a foreign power, against the interests of this country, in exchange for money. There has long been a desire to ban state-linked organisations from operating in this country, and to target those who facilitate them. That is why the Government made a manifesto commitment to deal with state-backed domestic security threats in the same way that we tackle terrorism. The question was how to create the right legal power to do so. My predecessor, now the Foreign Secretary, tasked Jonathan Hall KC, the Government’s independent reviewer of terrorism and state threats legislation, with answering that question.

• 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  Both the National Security Act 2023 and the measures we are debating today will ensure that we have the strongest suite of measures available to us to take action against those who come after people on our soil, including dissidents from other regimes and people to whom we have given sanctuary. Transnational repression will be caught by the measures in this Bill.

• 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time. The first responsibility of a state is to protect its citizens. The security of our nation is the basis upon which our democracy, our prosperity and our way of life depend. If a state cannot guarantee the safety of its people, every other promise it makes rings hollow. Today we debate a relatively short Bill, but its brevity should not be mistaken for unimportance; it is essential to meeting the sacred responsibility of protecting this country and our fellow citizens. This Bill comes at a time when the need is great. We live in an increasingly dangerous world—one in which many of our old assumptions no longer hold. The boundaries between war and peace have blurred; the tactics employed by hostile actors have become more sophisticated, more deniable and more insidious; and the threat has grown in scale. The director general of MI5 recently revealed that the number of individuals under investigation for state threat activity had grown by more than a third in the space of a year. After many years in which the Security Service was focused overwhelmingly on counter-terror work, it must now also respond to threats from foreign powers that are greater in number than at any time in a generation. The nature of the threats posed by foreign powers will be known by many in this House. We have seen physical threats against individuals and property; we have witnessed attempts to interfere in and influence our democracy; and we have experienced cyber-attacks targeting both the state and the private sector that disrupt critical infrastructure and compromise sensitive data. The source of these state threats has come predominantly, although not exclusively, from three countries: Russia, China and Iran. I should emphasise that the threats from each present differently, both in scope and nature, and I will take each in turn. The Russian state, as we know all too well, is responsible for deaths on British soil. What began with the murder of Alexander Litvinenko was repeated in Salisbury with the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal. The Russian state’s wanton disregard for human life was evident in the risks it was happy to pose to British citizens, which led, tragically, to the death of Dawn Sturgess—an innocent British woman killed by the Russian state. Putin’s Russia has also sought to influence our politics, as demonstrated by the guilty plea by Nathan Gill, Reform UK’s former leader in Wales, who accepted bribes for peddling pro-Kremlin narratives. Russia is also a prolific and malevolent force in cyber-space. A recent targeting of politicians, journalists, universities and civil society organisations was disrupted by our security services in December 2025, resulting in the sanctioning of eight Russian cyber-intelligence officers. As you know, Madam Deputy Speaker, our approach to China is nuanced: we will co-operate where we can and challenge where we must. There are areas on which we will engage with China, including the economy, the environment and, indeed, on certain shared security challenges. Choosing not to engage with China is no choice at all. However, national security is the first duty of Government, and China does pose real national security threats to the United Kingdom. We have seen cyber-attacks, foreign interference, and espionage targeted at our institutions. Just days ago, MI5 and fellow Five Eyes members issued an alert warning of the threat posed by China’s military intelligence services. The Hong Kong police force has also encouraged transnational repression on our soil against a community to whom we are proud to have given sanctuary.