Sarah Sackman MP: speeches 2025

Speeches

• 25 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I was just checking that my eyes are not failing me. It is good to see consensus break out across the Committee on these issues. For what it is worth, both as a Government Minister and a Committee member, I think it is excellent that we have had this debate on definitions. All members of the Committee have an interest in ensuring that where the words “coercion”, “pressure” and “dishonesty”, which run through all the relevant amendments, appear in the Bill—whether in relation to the eligibility criteria or the criminal offences—they operate as intended and with the breadth to capture the range of behaviours they are seeking to safeguard against. I will be brief because we have rehearsed a number of these issues before. Indeed, my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge has stolen my thunder in many respects and said a lot of what I was going to say. In relation to the definitions of coercion, pressure and dishonesty, to which the various amendments relate, it is important to note—and this is the Government’s view—that including a statutory definition would risk overcomplicating the issue and inadvertently narrowing the protections that the criminal offences in the Bill are intended to provide. At the moment, the Bill does not include a statutory definition for any of those terms. As a consequence, they carry their natural meaning, as construed by the courts, and therefore have, in practice, a broad meaning.

• 25 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I hope to be brief, given it is the witching hour. This new clause would require the voluntary assisted dying commissioner to establish within six months of their appointment a disability advisory board. The advisory board must include representation from disabled people and disabled people’s organisations. Within six months of its appointment, the advisory board must report to the Secretary of State and the commissioner to advise on the implementation of the Act for disabled people. We anticipate that the advisory board’s annual report will be separate from the commissioner’s, and that in time this may be subject to a level of integration between the two bodies. Practical arrangements for the advisory board would require further consideration, but the Government can see no workability reason why this should not go ahead.

• 25 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member is right. Section 1 of the Equality Act 2010 refers to taking into account the impact of public administration decisions on socioeconomic disadvantage. The previous Labour Government brought that provision in under that landmark Act, but it was never brought into force. She is right that the Government are looking to do that. The question is: what is appropriate for the Bill that we are considering right here, right now? From the Government’s point of view, the voluntary assisted dying commission will be subject to the Equality Act, as it stands, and it is right that there is no need to specify the carrying out of an equality impact assessment in the Bill. That assessment will, at the appropriate time, contain whatever the Equality Act requires of that public decision maker. I do not think that we need to pre-empt, through this vehicle, things that have not yet happened in other areas of legislation. The other point is that, leaving over for the regulations and guidance that the voluntary assisted dying commission is anticipated to produce, to take into account what needs to be taken into account in order to fully understand the regime and how it is operating, can all be developed by what will ultimately be an expert body in this field, should Parliament decide to vote for it. The question in the context of the amendments is: what do the Committee and Parliament say needs to go in the Bill right now? The Government’s position is that the amendments are neither necessary nor workable in our current legal regime. Amendment 451 seeks to further specify what is included in the commissioner’s annual report under the promoter’s amendments to clause 34. Under amendment 451, the report must contain information on where there have been complications in the procedure, and we assume that to mean the procedure relating to the self-administration of the approved substance, as I think was clarified earlier by my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West, who referred to clause 9 in that regard. The commissioner’s report would also be required to include analysis of a specified list of matters, including the diagnosis and prognosis of persons seeking assistance, concerns raised by family members or the multidisciplinary panel, and demographic data, including socioeconomic data and information on protected characteristics. The Government have worked with the promoter on her amendments 455 and 456. Under amendment 455, the commissioner’s annual report would be required to include information about the application of the Bill to persons with protected characteristics and any other descriptions of persons specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State. That is the point: the regime can evolve as appropriate when we know what it looks like and how it is operating. It can even go further than some of the categories that Members have described. That may include persons from different demographics and socioeconomic backgrounds, as proposed by the amendment. The amendment would also require the commissioner to consult, when preparing an annual report, with the chief medical officers for England and Wales and others who appear to the commissioner to represent the interests of persons who have protected characteristics and who the commissioner deems appropriate.

• 25 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Harris. I will speak first to lead amendment 382 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, and then to consequential amendments 383 to 387 and 389, on which the Government have worked with the Bill’s promoter. As the Committee will know, the Bill currently requires the relevant chief medical officers to submit an annual report to the relevant national authority. The amendments would require that the monitoring, investigation and reporting functions under clause 34 are carried out by the voluntary assisted dying commissioner, as opposed to the chief medical officers for England and for Wales, as currently drafted. The functions are to “monitor the operation of the Act, including compliance with its provisions and any regulations or codes of practice” that are developed; to investigate and report on “any matter connected with the operation of the Act”, including those that have been referred to the Secretary of State or Welsh Ministers; and to “submit an annual report”. The Secretary of State or Welsh Ministers would be required to lay the commissioner’s annual report before, respectively, Parliament or the Senedd, and issue a formal response.

• 25 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger. I will turn first to the lead amendment, amendment 450, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for York Central. As clause 34 stands, the chief medical officer must submit an annual report on the operation of the Bill. Under amendments tabled by the promoter, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, that would be the responsibility of the commissioner. Amendment 450 would require the chief medical officer to produce an annual equality impact assessment that assesses access to both assisted dying and palliative care for those with protected characteristics, and by socioeconomic status and geographical location. The amendment seems intended to ensure that monitoring and reporting considers the impact of the Bill on vulnerable groups. Protected characteristics are defined by reference to section 4 of the Equality Act 2010, which means that the report would need to consider the characteristics of age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation. The term “equality impact assessment” is not defined in the amendment or elsewhere in the Bill. While equality impact assessments are produced routinely by Government and other public bodies in order to discharge the public sector equality duty, it is not clear what type of assessment amendment 450 would require, so, in practice, there may be difficulties for the chief medical officer in understanding whether the duty has been discharged. Impact assessments are not within the purview of a chief medical officer and should be undertaken by those who are appropriately qualified to carry them out. In addition, “socioeconomic status” and “geographical location” are also undefined in the amendment and are not defined elsewhere in the Bill. Socioeconomic status and geographical location are not of themselves protected characteristics under the Equality Act, so are not required to be considered as part of the public sector equality duty. It is not clear, therefore, what the assessment of those factors is intended to involve.

• 25 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I suggest that those are ultimately policy choices, first for the promoter, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, and then—if the regime is voted on and passed—for the commissioner. In reality, a lot of the data that one will collect when one has due regard to the differential impact on these protected groups will in practice have a large degree of overlap with other aspects of socioeconomic disadvantage, as is so often the case in equality impact assessments.

• 25 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is right that the commissioner, in their role of scrutinising the operation and workability of the assisted dying regime, could, under the powers conferred by the Bill, look at a range of factors, and indeed at whatever they deemed relevant to discharging that exercise. The question is: what is appropriate to be defined within primary legislation? The Government’s position is that, given that all public bodies are governed by the Equality Act, due regard to all those protected characteristics would be included. However, what is not defined within amendment 450 is socioeconomic status or geographic location. If, down the line, the commissioner wanted to look at those things, they could look at them.

• 25 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Bear with me one moment, Sir Roger. I have just had a message, and I want to see whether it is relevant to what I want to say. Forgive me.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I was introducing amendment 504, which amends clause 24(1) to ensure that a person is not guilty of an offence by virtue of providing assistance in accordance with, or performing a function under, the Bill—for example, by undertaking the first or second assessment or providing the approved substance. The effect of the amendment is to ensure that a person is not guilty of an offence by virtue of assisting a person seeking to end their own life in accordance with the Bill. The phrase “in accordance with” the Bill is key. For example, where someone accompanies a person to the appointment at which they will self-administer the substance, the amendment would carve out any criminal liability for the accompanying person. As originally drafted, the wording would have limited the protection offered by subsection (1) to the far narrower situation of the medical professionals providing assistance under clause 18. The amendment will give effect to the policy intent of the hon. Member for Spen Valley of applying that protection to all those who provide assistance in accordance with, or by performing a function under, the Bill. Subsection (2) clarifies that the clause does not override other ways in which a court may find that a person is not guilty of an offence. Clause 24(3) inserts proposed new section 2AA into the Suicide Act 1961. As amended by amendment 505, that new section ensures that it is not an offence under the Suicide Act to perform a function under the Bill, or to assist a person seeking to end their own life by doing anything under the Bill. That is for the same reasons that I set out in relation to subsection (1). The new section also provides a defence to the offence of encouraging or assisting suicide, where a person reasonably believes that they were acting in accordance with the Bill, and that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing the offence. Taken as a package, the effect of these amendments is to make the Bill legally workable. To do that, it is necessary to ensure that those who assist a person to use the lawful route are not then subject to criminal liability for doing so. Clause 24 clause, taken together with amendments 504 and 505, gives effect to that. Let me address some of the issues raised by Opposition Members. There was a question as to whether there is any overlap between offences under the Bill—we will come to some of those offences in due course with clauses 26 and 27—and offences that remain on the statute book under the Suicide Act. The short answer to the question from the hon. Member for Reigate, although I know she has written to my Department, and I will ensure that she receives a full written answer, is that it would remain an offence under the Suicide Act 1961 to encourage suicide, including an assisted death under this Bill. To the extent that any overlapping offences remain, that is not an unusual approach to drafting in the criminal law. However, the effect of the clause is that it would remain an offence under the 1961 Act to encourage someone to commit suicide. Where a person’s “encouragement”—the hon. Member focused on that term—is such that it amounts to what the courts would understand to be pressure or coercion, that could be an offence under clause 26, which we will come to. As I said, it is not unusual to have a degree of overlap in criminal offences. Again, what someone is charged and prosecuted with falls to the prosecutor, depending on the specific circumstances of the case and what would be most appropriate in that scenario. I also want to address the scenario that the hon. Member for East Wiltshire posited, about whether a pharmacist who acted in a way that amounted to gross negligence manslaughter would benefit from immunity under clause 24(1) as amended. Again, with the important caveat that it will depend on the particular facts of the case, the offence of gross negligence manslaughter is committed where a death is the result of gross negligence in what would otherwise be a lawful act or omission on the part of the defendant, and where the defendant owes a duty of care to the victim—there are a number of actors within the Bill’s process who owe a duty of care to the person applying for assisted dying. Let us assume for a moment that, in the hon. Member’s scenario, we do have gross negligence manslaughter on the particular facts; in those circumstances, the Government are content that the pharmacist could not be properly said to be performing a function under the Bill, or in accordance with the Bill, so clause 24(1)—the carve-out from criminal liability—would not apply. I think that that covers most of the questions that were posited earlier.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I intend to be brief. New clause 24 and amendments 514 to 516 create stand-alone criminal offences relating to the falsification or destruction of documentation where a person acts with the intention of facilitating the provision of assistance to another person to end their own life under the Bill. That reflects the policy intent of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley that those who falsify documents with the specific intent of facilitating another to end their life should be subject to a higher maximum penalty than those offences in clause 27. Amendment 514 agreed to. Amendments made : 515, in clause 27, page 16, line 31, leave out from beginning to “an” and insert “A person who commits”. This amendment is consequential on amendment 514. Amendment 516, in clause 27, page 16, line 36, at end insert— “(6) Proceedings for an offence under this section may be instituted only by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.”— (Kim Leadbeater.) This amendment provides that proceedings for an offence under this clause may be brought only by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions. Clause 27, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 28 Prescribing, dispensing, transporting etc of approved substances

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Dowd. My remarks, as ever, will focus on the legal and practical impact of the amendments to assist Members in undertaking line-by-line scrutiny. In exercising our duties to ensure that legislation that is passed is legally robust and workable, the Government have worked closely with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley to reflect her intent. Clause 24, as amended by amendments 504 and 505, will mean that individuals who assist a person to end their life in accordance with the terms of the Bill are not subject to criminal prosecution. Currently, it is a criminal offence under section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 for a person to do an act that is “capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another person” and intended “to encourage or assist suicide or an attempt at suicide.” That offence attracts a maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment. Amendment 504 would amend clause 24(1) to ensure that a person is not guilty of an offence— [ Interruption. ]

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will address the point about injunctions, which we have touched on at a number of junctures in our debate. In terms of applying for an interim injunction in a civil case, a very well-established test is the American Cyanamid test, which all the lawyers in the room would have learned at law school. The first of those tests is, “Is there a serious issue to be tried?” Someone does not have to establish to the civil standard—

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I find that highly implausible; the likelihood is that the CPS will apply the appropriate charging decision to fit the facts as they have arisen. If they have arisen within the context of this legal regime, for someone acting nefariously, dishonestly or coercively about assisted dying, the charge under this clause would be the appropriate one. I find it implausible that the other scenario would arise. As I said, the CPS is well versed in applying the appropriate charging decision to the appropriate crime on the facts of the crime. I will not speculate or hypothesise on what that might be.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  In light of the hon. Gentleman’s remarks, I do not have anything further to add, other than to note what he has said.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, coroners have a duty to investigate and certify deaths that are reported to them. That duty is triggered when they have a reason to suspect that the deceased died a violent or unnatural death, the cause of death is unknown, or the deceased died while in custody or otherwise in state detention. There are also regulations made under the powers of the 2009 Act that require medical practitioners to notify such deaths to the coroner. Clause 29(1) disapplies the coroner’s duty to investigate in the case of an assisted death that has been carried out in accordance with the Bill’s provisions. In practice, that would mean the assisted death would instead be certified by an attending practitioner—the doctor who has attended the patient—and scrutinised by an independent medical examiner working in the NHS. Therefore, the attending practitioner and medical examiner, rather than the coroner, would certify the cause of death. It would remain open to anyone—such as a family member or a medical practitioner who has interacted with the deceased and has concerns—to report a death to the coroner if they had concerns that it had not occurred in line with the provisions of the Bill. Amendment 522 would remove the disapplication of the coroner’s duty to investigate in relation to assisted deaths, essentially reversing the Bill’s current provisions. Consequently, given that assisted deaths are inherently unnatural, the amendment would require that the coroner has a duty to investigate each and every assisted death and then certify the cause of death. To answer the hon. Member for East Wiltshire’s point, the bereaved family would, as I have said, be able to raise any concerns with the medical examiner, and the coroner’s duty to investigate would be triggered if they suspected that death had not occurred in line with the process prescribed. It is important to note that medical examiners follow their own structured process of investigation. They review medical records, consult practitioners involved in the case and then apply the criteria set out from the Notification of Deaths Regulations 2019 to determine whether the death meets the threshold for a coroner referral. In doing so, they would proactively speak to family members, thereby providing the opportunity for any concerns to be raised; if there are any, they would make the referral to the coroner. I hope that assists the Committee.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am not going to answer that question directly, because I will not get into hypotheticals, which would be a test. I understand the question the hon. Gentleman is asking. As I said, the policy intent here—the policy of including the specific offence within the context of this new legal regime and the signal that doing so would send to all those participating in this regime by attaching the severest penalty of life imprisonment to the offence created under subsection (2)—has been a matter for the Bill’s promoter. The Government have worked with her to create a workable regime. I will not proffer on my feet a hypothetical factual scenario that would be caught by this offence, but would not be caught under other offences that exist in our criminal law. The point is that overlapping criminal offences exist in our criminal law. That is not unusual. The CPS is well versed in dealing with that. The charging decisions will be for the CPS, with the consent of the DPP. Satisfying the purpose of having criminal liability—to catch those who perpetrate what would be, in any view, a heinous crime, and to deter such crime—would be discharged by the drafting that we have here.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I do not consider that through this amended form of the Bill—if the Committee chooses to vote that way—we will have created an opportunity that could be exploited in that way. The hon. Gentleman said earlier that there has not been consultation on that point, but there has been close working of highly experienced Government lawyers with the promoter to reflect her policy intent. What the clause interlocking—and indeed overlapping, as I have acknowledged—with the Suicide Act does is prescribe new forms of criminal offence and liability that will capture criminal behaviour, which is ultimately what the measure is about. Tellingly, the punishment attached to the clause 26 offence is the same as the maximum punishment for murder, that of life imprisonment, which is indicative of the gravity of the offence that would be caught.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  That is a good example. One knows from charging decisions that often, on indictment, one might have multiple offences to capture the totality of the criminal behaviour. Some of those may be made out, some of them may not. What the Government have sought to do here, working with the Bill’s promoter, is to reflect her policy intent: to convey the gravity of the offence in this wholly new legal regime. As the right hon. Gentleman pointed out earlier, we are sanctioning and decriminalising conduct that has previously been criminal, while ensuring that this offence captures what would be criminal under the new legal regime. From the promoter’s point of view, it is important to signal that the Government have worked with her on this, and the Government’s position is that the result, in this amended form of the Bill, gives both some satisfaction to her policy intent and is compatible with how our criminal law routinely works, so it is workable from the point of view of the CPS.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The clause, as amended by amendments 506 to 509, creates two stand-alone criminal offences that apply when a person uses dishonesty, coercion or pressure to induce a person to do a particular act. Subsection (1) creates an offence of inducing another person to make a first or second declaration, or not to cancel such a declaration, by dishonesty, coercion or pressure. That offence, as we heard, will carry a maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment, ensuring consistency with the maximum penalty under the Suicide Act. Subsection (2), as amended by amendment 506, creates an offence of inducing another person to self-administer and approve substances provided under the Bill, by dishonesty, coercion or pressure. Amendment 506 replaces “in accordance with” with “under” for this offence. That gives effect to the policy intent of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley that the offence should capture those who induce a person to self-administer a substance that, due to some error in the process, has not been provided strictly in accordance with the processes in the Bill. The amendment therefore ensures that the offence in subsection (2) will operate effectively. Amendment 508 inserts proposed new subsection (4) to establish life imprisonment as the maximum penalty for the offence in subsection (2). That amendment gives effect to the policy intent of my hon. Friend by emphasising that inducing someone to undergo an unwanted assisted death through a legal system established by Parliament is a grave offence warranting the most severe penalty of life imprisonment. Amendment 507 is consequential on amendment 508 and amends subsection (3) to reflect the policy intent of my hon. Friend that the offence in subsection (2) should carry a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, rather than 14 years’ imprisonment. Amendment 509, which a number of Members mentioned, amends the clause to provide that neither of the offences could be prosecuted without the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions. That amendment achieves the policy intent of my hon. Friend that the legislation, first, be consistent with the Suicide Act 1961, which makes the same provision for the DPP’s involvement and where such consent is required; and, secondly, to ensure that spurious prosecutions are not brought, for example, by those who may oppose the process that the applicant for assisted dying is undergoing simply because they oppose it, rather than because of any illegality or criminality. That is the function of having the DPP consent baked into the legislation. To be clear, the terms “coercion”, “dishonesty” and “pressure” remain undefined in the clause. That was an issue that we touched on right back in the early days of clause 1. Without a statutory definition, the terms will carry their natural, ordinary meaning, well understood by the public and the courts alike. I want to pick up on two other points touched on in various speeches. The first has to do with the issue of coercion, coercive control and its subtleties, the way in which that is dealt with and, indeed, the painfully low conviction rates for domestic abuse and coercion. I am not seeking to make a wider political point beyond the amendments that we are discussing, but the hon. Member for Reigate and my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West know that the Government have a mission to halve violence against women and girls. I assure the Committee that, in my capacity as Minister of State in the Ministry of Justice, we are intently focused on addressing that, and ensuring that the criminal justice system plays its part more widely. The offences sit in that context. The other point that I want to address, and touched on earlier, was the one made by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire about our duties to the statute book. It is right that there is a degree of duplication and to acknowledge that, as the Government do in working with the promoter of the Bill to reflect her policy intent. That is not unusual. It is something those in law enforcement, in particular in the CPS, are well versed in. It will be for them to make the appropriate charging decisions, depending on the facts in the particular case. The function of the offence created under subsection (2) and the penalty attached to it affect the gravity that the promoter of the Bill sought to indicate for the offence of inducing someone to undergo something through dishonesty, coercion or pressure, in the context of what we all acknowledge is a new process. If the Bill is passed, there will be a new legal regime for assisted dying. The manipulation of such a new regime to ends that are criminalised under the provision is reflected in that specific offence. To be clear, the degree of duplication is acknowledged, but the Government’s view is that that is neither unusual nor poses a problem for the CPS.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  That is all I intend to say on this matter. I think we have probably ventilated this particular issue as far as we can. Amendment 506 agreed to. Amendments made: 507, in clause 26, page 16, line 9, leave out “or (2)” . This amendment limits subsection (3) to offences under subsection (1). Amendment 508, in clause 26, page 16, line 10, at end insert— “(4) A person who commits an offence under subsection (2) is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life.”— (Kim Leadbeater.) This amendment provides for a maximum penalty of life imprisonment for an offence under subsection ( 2 ).

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Again, it would depend on the actual facts. However, if they were attempting to perform duties under the Bill, it is highly unlikely that, in circumstances where the facts establish and meet the threshold of gross negligence manslaughter, they could be said to have carried out those duties in accordance with the Bill. They might have been carrying out duties that they thought were what the Bill prescribed, but if they have done that in such a way that it amounts to gross negligence manslaughter, then clause 24(1) would not apply. The hon. Gentleman makes the point about what the pharmacist in that scenario believes they are doing; that belief has to be reasonable, and that is a test that our courts are well used to applying. That is why the amendments introduce the belief that someone is acting in accordance with the Bill. It is not enough that they think they are doing it; it has to be a reasonable belief. That is an objective standard.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Helpfully, the hon. Member has also set out her questions fully and precisely in a letter to me, so I think I know what she is asking and I will try and answer it as best I can. I reiterate, as I and the Minister for Care have said throughout, that the policy choices have been for the promoter—the Government remain neutral. The offence of encouraging or assisting suicide or attempted suicide in section 2 of the Suicide Act is well established. Encouraging someone to go through the assisted dying process under the Bill with the intention of encouraging suicide or an attempt at suicide would therefore remain a criminal offence under section 2 of the Suicide Act. That is what I made clear earlier. What we are talking about will always depend on the particular circumstances of the case. It is the Government’s view that in a scenario—I think this is what the hon. Member for Reigate is getting at—where a family member or friend simply suggests to a person with a terminal condition that the option of assisted death under the Bill is something they may wish to consider, and nothing more, it is unlikely—dare I say, inconceivable—that that would amount to an offence under the 1961 Act. However, if someone encourages a person in a more tangible way, such as encouraging or pressuring them to make the first declaration, that could well amount to an offence under the 1961 Act. Where that encouragement crosses the threshold into what, interpreted in line with their natural meaning, the courts would understand as pressure or coercion, that could amount to an offence under clause 26 of the Bill, which we will come to in due course. I hope that that addresses the hon. Lady’s question. I will set that out to her in writing, and she is welcome to write back if there is any ambiguity. I hope that that assists the Committee. I am going to sit down before anybody else intervenes.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I do not have a lot to add, but I point out that, as the Bill stands, clause 34 requires the chief medical officer to, among other things, submit an annual report to the relevant national authority on the operation of the Act. Amendment 382 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley would make the voluntary assisted dying commissioner responsible for that function instead. Amendment 274 would require that the report under clause 34 contains an analysis of the additional information to be collected under new clause 10 and amendment 273. I remind the Committee of that because we are discussing what information should be gathered, and at what point in the process. There is then the monitoring, reporting and co-ordinating function performed by the voluntary assisted dying commissioner, should those later amendments be passed.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. I will be brief. As we have heard, clause 27 creates various stand-alone criminal offences regarding the falsification or destruction of documentation related to assisted dying. Amendment 510 replaces “wilfully” with “intentionally or recklessly” in subsection (1)(b), to align the wording with that used elsewhere in the clause. The Government have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on the other amendments, to tighten up and improve the workability and operability of the Bill. Amendment 510 agreed to. Amendments made: 511, in clause 27, page 16, line 22, leave out “that person” and insert “a relevant matter”. This amendment and amendment 512 clarify that the offence under subsection (2) relates only to an opinion about a matter relating to a function under the Bill. Amendment 512, in clause 27, page 16, line 23, at end insert— “(2A) In subsection (2) “relevant matter” means a matter relating to any function under this Act.” See the statement for amendment 511. Amendment 513, in clause 27, page 16, line 24, leave out subsection (3) and insert— “(3) A person commits an offence if they intentionally or recklessly fail to comply with an obligation under— (a) section 14(1A) or (2) (notification of cancellation of declaration), or (b) section 17 (recording of cancellations).”— (Kim Leadbeater.) This amendment clarifies the scope of the offence under subsection (3), by providing that the offence occurs where a doctor fails to comply with a notification or recording obligation in relation to the cancelling of a first or second declaration.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that intervention, and that is exactly why I made that point. One of the design features of the commissioner model is the monitoring function, through which they will undertake annual reporting and an assessment of patterns in the practice, should the legal regime come into force. That is exactly how I anticipate it working. The commissioner can also be self-correcting and say, “We need to see more information on this because it is a concern. We have this equalities data”—or whatever data we have collected—“and we need to see more on this aspect, because this pattern is a concern to us or it would help to illuminate how the practice is operating.” That is all I wanted to add, because one has to appreciate the operation of the regime as a whole.