Sarah Sackman MP: speeches 2026

Speeches

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  That reflects the clause as drafted and the intention behind it, from speaking to our judicial leadership. In my experience, I have certainly found our judicial and tribunal leadership to be progressive, reforming and more open to cultural change, scrutiny and improvement than perhaps might previously have been the case. I welcome that, because it is as it should be. The hon. Member is right, of course: tribunals are different. They are meant to be informal and feel different from going to the High Court, which is all terribly alienating to the ordinary person who is untrained. A tribunal is supposed to involve a relatively cost-neutral and more relaxed process so that the individual can participate in it. Our proposals do not cut against that, but bring the judiciary across England and Wales into the notion of unity, with a lot of the benefits of being under a single leadership—sharing best practice and deploying judges across different jurisdictions—being enhanced, so that everyone can benefit without bleeding out the differences that rightly exist in our different courts and tribunals. Question put and agreed to . Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill . Schedule 3 Leadership of tribunals Amendments made: 72, in schedule 3, page 68, line 4, after “may” insert “, subject to the following provisions of this section,”. This amendment is intended to clarify that the Lord Chief Justice’s general power under section 7A(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (inserted by the Bill) to delegate functions relating to tribunals is qualified by subsequent subsections of that section. Amendment 73, in schedule 3, page 68, leave out line 5. This amendment would remove redundancy in the drafting of new section 7A(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (inserted by the Bill). Amendment 74, in schedule 3, page 68, line 9, at end insert— “(1A) A function of the Lord Chief Justice may not be delegated under subsection (1) to a person who— (a) is a judge, or other member, of the Upper Tribunal or First-tier Tribunal only by virtue of the person being a relevant Scottish office-holder or a relevant Northern Ireland office-holder, and (b) is not a Chamber President, or a Deputy Chamber President, of a chamber of the Upper Tribunal or of a chamber of the First-tier Tribunal.” This amendment, together with amendment 75, would prevent the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales delegating functions relating to tribunals to a person who is a judge of the Upper Tribunal or First-Tier Tribunal only because the person holds a particular judicial office in Scotland or Northern Ireland. Amendment 75, in schedule 3, page 69, line 6, at end insert— “(8A) For the purposes of subsection (1A)— (a) a person is a ‘relevant Scottish office-holder’ if the person is— (i) a judge of the Court of Session, (ii) a sheriff in Scotland, (iii) the President of Employment Tribunals (Scotland), (iv) the Vice President of Employment Tribunals (Scotland), or (v) a member of a panel of members of employment tribunals (whether or not a panel of Employment Judges) established for Scotland; (b) a person is a ‘relevant Northern Ireland office-holder’ if the person is— (i) a Lord Justice of Appeal in Northern Ireland, (ii) a puisne judge of the High Court in Northern Ireland, (iii) a county court judge in Northern Ireland, (iv) a district judge in Northern Ireland, (v) the Chief Social Security Commissioner, or any other Social Security Commissioner, appointed under section 50(1) of the Social Security Administration (Northern Ireland) Act 1992, or (vi) a Social Security Commissioner appointed under section 50(2) of that Act (deputy Commissioners).” See the explanatory statement to amendment 74. Amendment 76, in schedule 3, page 69, line 21, after “may” insert “, subject to the following provisions of this section,”. This amendment would make a change to the drafting of new section 7B of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (further delegation of functions of the Lord Chief Justice) corresponding to the change made by amendment 72 to the drafting of new section 7A of that Act. Amendment 77, in schedule 3, page 69, line 25, at end insert— “(1A) A function of the Lord Chief Justice may not be further delegated under subsection (1) to a person who— (a) is a judge, or other member, of the Upper Tribunal or First-tier Tribunal only by virtue of the person being a relevant Scottish office-holder or a relevant Northern Ireland office-holder, and (b) is not a Chamber President, or a Deputy Chamber President, of a chamber of the Upper Tribunal or of a chamber of the First-tier Tribunal.” This amendment would impose a limitation on the power to further delegate a function of the Lord Chief Justice under new section 7B of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 corresponding to the limitation imposed in relation to new section 7A of that Act by amendment 74. Amendment 78, in schedule 3, page 69, line 28, leave out from “to” to end of line and insert “a person appointed as— (a) Deputy Head of Tribunals Justice, or (b) Chamber President of a chamber of the Upper Tribunal.” This amendment would enable functions of the Lord Chief Justice under paragraph 1(1) or 2(1) of Schedule 2 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 that are delegated to a senior judge to be further delegated to the Deputy Head of Tribunals Justice. Amendment 79, in schedule 3, page 70, line 2, at end insert— “‘relevant Scottish office-holder’ and ‘relevant Northern Ireland office-holder’ have the same meaning as in subsection (1A) of section 7A (see subsection (8A) of that section);”. This amendment is consequential on amendment 77. Amendment 80, in schedule 3, page 70, line 7, leave out “(1)(b),” and insert “(1)— (a) in the words before paragraph (a), after ‘may’ insert ‘, subject to the following provisions of this section,’; (b) in paragraph (b),”. This amendment would make a change to the drafting of section 8 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (Senior President of Tribunals: power to delegate) corresponding to the change made by amendment 72 to the drafting of new section 7A of that Act. Amendment 81, in schedule 3, page 70, line 8, at end insert— “(2A) In subsection (1A)— (a) for ‘paragraph 1(1) or 2(1) of Schedule 2’ substitute ‘any of the provisions listed in subsection (1B)’; (b) for ‘a Chamber President of a chamber of the Upper Tribunal’ substitute ‘a person appointed as— (a) Deputy Head of Tribunals Justice, or (b) Chamber President of a chamber of the Upper Tribunal’. (2B) After subsection (1A) insert— ‘(1B) The provisions are— section 7(7); section 7(8B) and (9); paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 2; paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 2; paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 3; paragraph 7(1) of Schedule 3; paragraph 2 of Schedule 4; paragraph 5(1) and (3) of Schedule 4; paragraph 5(5) to (8) of Schedule 4; paragraph 5A(3A) of Schedule 4.’” This amendment would insert provision amending section 8 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 to enable the Senior President of Tribunals to delegate to the Deputy Head of Tribunals Justice or an Upper Tribunal Chamber President certain functions to which subsection (1) of that section does not currently apply. Amendment 82, in schedule 3, page 70, line 9, leave out sub-paragraph (3) and insert— “(3) For subsection (2) substitute— ‘(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to functions of the Senior President of Tribunals under any of the following— section 29B; section 29D; section 46; paragraph 3 of Schedule 5; paragraph 2 of Schedule A1 to the Employment Tribunals Act 1996.’” This amendment is consequential on amendment 81. Amendment 83, in schedule 3, page 70, line 21, at end insert— “18A After section 8 insert— ‘8A Delegation: supplementary (1) Where a function is exercisable, in a particular case, by the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals, acting jointly— (a) so far as the function is exercisable by the Lord Chief Justice, it is to be treated for the purposes of section 7A as a relevant tribunal function and may be delegated under that section, and further delegated under section 7B, accordingly (including to the Senior President of Tribunals); (b) so far as the function is exercisable by the Senior President of Tribunals— (i) it is to be treated for the purposes of section 8 as a function the Senior President of Tribunals has in that capacity and may be delegated under section 8 accordingly, but (ii) it may not be delegated under that section to the Lord Chief Justice. (2) Where a person (“the delegator”) has a power to delegate a function under section 7A, 7B or 8— (a) any requirement that the delegator may exercise the function only with the concurrence of another person (“P”) does not prevent the delegator from delegating the function to P, and (b) if the delegator delegates the function to P, any such requirement is to be disregarded so far as the function is exercised by P. (3) In this section “the Lord Chief Justice” means the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales.’” This amendment would insert provision intended to clarify the effect of delegation powers under the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, inserted or amended by the Bill, in cases where the function being delegated is exercisable jointly with, or with the concurrence of, the person to whom it is delegated. Amendment 84, in schedule 3, page 75, line 6, leave out “senior judge” and insert “person who holds high judicial office”. This amendment would enable functions of the Senior President of Tribunals to be exercised during any vacancy or incapacity by a holder of high judicial office in Scotland or Northern Ireland (as well as in England and Wales). Amendment 85, in schedule 3, page 75, leave out lines 12 and 13 and insert— “‘high judicial office’ has the same meaning as in Part 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (see section 60(2)(a)of that Act);”. This amendment is consequential on amendment 84. Amendment 86, in schedule 3, page 88, line 9, at end insert— “32A In Schedule 8 (tribunals and inquiries: consequential and other amendments), in paragraph 41, omit sub-paragraphs (3) and (6) (which insert into the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 provision repealed by this Act).” This amendment would repeal provisions of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 which insert into the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 provision repealed by the Bill. Amendment 87, in schedule 3, page 92, line 38, at end insert— “Agriculture Act 1947 43A In Schedule 9 to the Agriculture Act 1947 (constitution etc. of tribunals etc.), in paragraph 15A (which provides for a member of the First-tier Tribunal to act as a member of the Agricultural Land Tribunal)— (a) in sub-paragraph (1), for ‘the Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘the appropriate office-holder’; (b) after sub-paragraph (1) insert— ‘(1ZA) In sub-paragraph (1), “the appropriate office-holder” means— (a) in relation to a member of the First-tier Tribunal who exercises functions wholly or mainly in Scotland or Northern Ireland, the Senior President of Tribunals; (b) in any other case, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales.’ Lands Tribunal Act 1949 43B In section 1 of the Lands Tribunal Act 1949 (which makes provision including provision about selecting a surveyor for the purposes of section 58 or 106 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845)— (a) in subsection (6), for ‘the Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘the appropriate office-holder’; (b) after subsection (6) insert— ‘(6ZA) In subsection (6) “the appropriate office-holder” means— (a) in relation to the determination of compensation to be paid in respect of land in England or Wales, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales; (b) in any other case, the Senior President of Tribunals. (6ZB) Section 7A of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (Lord Chief Justice: power to delegate) applies to any function of the Lord Chief Justice under subsection (6) as it applies to a relevant tribunal function within the meaning of that section. For provision enabling the delegation of any function of the Senior President of Tribunals, see section 8 of that Act.’ Rent Act 1977 43C In Schedule 10 to the Rent Act 1977 (rent assessment committees), in paragraph 5A (which provides for a member of the First-tier Tribunal to act as a member of a committee in Wales)— (a) the existing text becomes sub-paragraph (1); (b) in that sub-paragraph, for ‘the Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘the appropriate office-holder’; (c) after that sub-paragraph insert— ‘(2) In sub-paragraph (1), “the appropriate office-holder” means— (a) in relation to a member of the First-tier Tribunal who exercises functions wholly or mainly in Scotland or Northern Ireland, the Senior President of Tribunals; (b) in any other case, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales.’” This amendment would insert provision amending provisions of the Agriculture Act 1947, the Lands Tribunal Act 1949 and the Rent Act 1977 so as to confer on the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales certain functions currently conferred on the Senior President of Tribunals. Amendment 88, in schedule 3, page 93, line 12, leave out paragraph 46 and insert— “46 In section 9 (assistance for transaction of judicial business)— (a) in subsection (1), in the Table (judges deployable to certain courts), in column 1 of entry 4A (the Senior President of Tribunals), after ‘Senior President of Tribunals’ insert ‘, if not an ex-officio judge of the Court of Appeal’; (b) omit subsection (1ZA).” This amendment would enable a holder of the office of Senior President of Tribunals who is an ex-officio judge of the Court of Appeal to act on request as a judge of the Crown Court (like all other judges of the Court of Appeal). Amendment 89, in schedule 3, page 93, line 29, at end insert— “Mental Health Act 1983 48A In Schedule 2 to the Mental Health Act 1983 (Mental Health Review Tribunal for Wales), in paragraph 5 (which provides for certain members of the First-tier Tribunal to act as members of the tribunal)— (a) in sub-paragraph (1), for ‘the Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘the appropriate office-holder’; (b) after sub-paragraph (1) insert— ‘(1ZA) In sub-paragraph (1), “the appropriate office-holder” means— (a) in relation to a member of the First-tier Tribunal who exercises functions wholly or mainly in Scotland or Northern Ireland, the Senior President of Tribunals; (b) in any other case, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales.’ Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 48B In section 33 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 (acquisition order where landlord cannot be found)— (a) in subsection (2)(a), for ‘the Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales’; (b) after subsection (3) insert— ‘(4) Section 7A of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (Lord Chief Justice: power to delegate) applies to the function of the Lord Chief Justice under subsection (2)(a) as it applies to a relevant tribunal function within the meaning of that section.’ Local Government Finance Act 1988 48C In Part 1 of Schedule 11 to the Local Government Finance Act 1988 (the Valuation Tribunal for England), in paragraph A18A (power for member of First-tier Tribunal to act as member of the Tribunal)— (a) in sub-paragraph (2)(a), for ‘the Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘the appropriate office-holder’; (b) in sub-paragraph (9), after paragraph (a) insert— ‘(aa) “the appropriate office-holder” means— (i) in relation to an FTT member who exercises functions wholly or mainly in Scotland or Northern Ireland, the Senior President of Tribunals, and (ii) in any other case, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, and’. Social Security Act 1998 48D (1) Section 15A of the Social Security Act 1998 (functions of Senior President of Tribunals) is amended as follows. (2) For the heading substitute ‘Confidentiality in the First-tier Tribunal’. (3) In subsection (1), for ‘The Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘The appropriate office-holder’. (4) After subsection (1) insert— ‘(1A) In subsection (1), “the appropriate office-holder” means— (a) in relation to the First-tier Tribunal in England and Wales, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales; (b) in relation to the First-tier Tribunal in Scotland or Northern Ireland, the Senior President of Tribunals.’” This amendment would insert provision amending provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983, the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987, the Local Government Finance Act 1988 and the Social Security Act 1998 so as to confer on the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales certain functions currently conferred on the Senior President of Tribunals. Amendment 90, in schedule 3, page 94, line 1, at end insert— “49A The Crime and Courts Act 2013 is amended as follows.” This amendment is consequential on amendment 92. Amendment 91, in schedule 3, page 94, line 2, leave out “the Crime and Courts Act 2013, in”. This amendment is consequential on amendment 90. Amendment 92, in schedule 3, page 94, line 3, at end insert— “50A In Schedule 13 (judicial appointments), omit the following provisions (which insert into the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 provision repealed by this Act)— (a) paragraph 30(3); (b) paragraph 43; (c) paragraph 44(2); (d) paragraph 45(2) and (4); (e) paragraph 46(2) and (6); (f) paragraph 47(4) to (6), (8), (9), (11) and (12). 50B In Schedule 14 (deployment of the judiciary), in paragraph 12, omit sub-paragraph (2) (which inserts into the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 provision repealed by this Act).” This amendment would repeal provisions of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 which insert into the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 provision repealed by the Bill. Amendment 93, in schedule 3, page 94, line 3, at end insert— “Wales Act 2017 50A (1) Section 63 of the Wales Act 2017 (cross-deployment of tribunal members and judges) is amended as follows. (2) In subsection (1), for the words from ‘if’ to the end substitute ‘— (a) in England and Wales, if the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales asks the member to do so and the President of Welsh Tribunals agrees to the request being made; (b) in Scotland or Northern Ireland, if the Senior President of Tribunals asks the member to do so and the President of Welsh Tribunals agrees to the request being made.’ (3) In subsection (2), in the words after paragraph (b), for ‘the Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘the appropriate office-holder’. (4) After subsection (2) insert— ‘(2A) In subsection (2), “the appropriate office-holder” means— (a) where the tribunal member exercises functions wholly or mainly in Scotland or Northern Ireland, the Senior President of Tribunals; (b) in any other case, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales.’” This amendment would insert provision amending provisions of the Wales Act 2017 so as to confer on the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales certain functions currently conferred on the Senior President of Tribunals. Amendment 94, in schedule 3, page 94, line 3, at end insert— “Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 50A In the Schedule to the Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 (authorised court and tribunal staff: legal advice and judicial functions), omit paragraph 40 (which inserts into the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 provision repealed by this Act).” This amendment would repeal provision of the Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 which inserts into the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 provision repealed by the Bill. Amendment 95, in schedule 3, page 95, line 4, at end insert— “Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 54 The Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 is amended as follows. 55 (1) Section 32 (judicial agreement to certain regulations) is amended as follows. (2) In subsection (1)(a)— (a) omit the ‘or’ at the end of sub-paragraph (i); (b) at the end of sub-paragraph (ii) insert ‘, or (iii) relevant tribunal proceedings in England and Wales;’. (3) In subsection (1)(b)— (a) in sub-paragraph (i), after ‘First-tier Tribunal’ insert ‘in Scotland or Northern Ireland’; (b) in sub-paragraph (ii), after ‘Upper Tribunal’ insert ‘in Scotland or Northern Ireland’; (c) in sub-paragraph (iii), after ‘employment tribunals’ insert ‘in Scotland’; (d) in sub-paragraph (iv), after ‘Employment Appeal Tribunal’ insert ‘in Scotland’. (4) After subsection (2) insert— ‘(3) In this section, “relevant tribunal proceedings” means proceedings in— (a) the First-tier Tribunal, (b) the Upper Tribunal, (c) employment tribunals, or (d) the Employment Appeal Tribunal.’ 56 (1) Schedule 3 (practice directions for online proceedings) is amended as follows. (2) In Part 2 (proceedings in the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal), in paragraph 7 (giving practice directions)— (a) in sub-paragraph (1), for ‘The Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘The Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals, acting jointly,’; (b) after sub-paragraph (1) insert— ‘(1A) The Lord Chief Justice may give practice directions under paragraph 5 in relation to proceedings in a Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal whose business involves only the application of the law of England and Wales. (1B) The Senior President of Tribunals may give practice directions under paragraph 5 in relation to proceedings in a Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal whose business involves only the application of the law of Scotland or Northern Ireland.’; (c) in sub-paragraph (2), for ‘The Senior President may not give practice directions’ substitute ‘Practice directions may not be given under sub-paragraph (1), (1A) or (1B)’; (d) in sub-paragraph (4)— (i) omit the ‘and’ at the end of paragraph (a); (ii) after paragraph (a) insert— ‘(aa) the Lord Chief Justice, if the business of the Chamber to which the directions relate involves the application of the law of England and Wales, and’; (iii) in paragraph (b), after ‘Tribunals’ insert ‘, if the business of the Chamber to which the directions relate involves the application of the law of Scotland or Northern Ireland’; (e) in sub-paragraph (6)— (i) for ‘the approval of the Senior President of Tribunals if’ substitute ‘any approval’; (ii) for ‘sub-paragraph (4)(b)’ insert ‘sub-paragraph (4)(aa) or (b)’. (3) In Part 3 (proceedings in employment tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal), in paragraph 11 (giving practice directions)— (a) in sub-paragraph (1)— (i) for ‘The Senior President of Tribunals’ substitute ‘The Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals, acting jointly,’; (ii) for ‘any proceedings’ substitute ‘proceedings in the Employment Appeal Tribunal’; (b) after sub-paragraph (1) insert— ‘(1A) The Lord Chief Justice may give practice directions under paragraph 9 in relation to proceedings in employment tribunals in England and Wales. (1B) The Senior President of Tribunals may give practice directions under paragraph 9 in relation to proceedings in employment tribunals in Scotland.’; (c) in sub-paragraph (2), for ‘The Senior President may not give practice directions’ substitute ‘Practice directions may not be given under sub-paragraph (1), (1A) or (1B)’; (d) in sub-paragraph (5), for the words from ‘of—’ to’ the end substitute ‘of the Lord Chancellor’; (e) after sub-paragraph (5) insert— ‘(5A) The President of the Employment Appeal Tribunal may not give practice directions without the approval of— (a) the Lord Chief Justice, and (b) the Senior President of Tribunals. (5B) The President of Employment Tribunals (England and Wales) may not give practice directions without the approval of the Lord Chief Justice. (5C) The President of Employment Tribunals (Scotland) may not give practice directions without the approval of the Senior President of Tribunals.’; (f) in sub-paragraph (6), for ‘sub-paragraph (5)(a)’ substitute ‘sub-paragraph (5)’; (g) in sub-paragraph (7)— (i) for ‘sub-paragraph (5)(a)’ substitute ‘sub-paragraph (5)’; (ii) for ‘the approval of the Senior President of Tribunals if’ substitute ‘any approval’; (iii) for ‘sub-paragraph (5)(b)’ substitute ‘sub-paragraph (5A), (5B) or (5C)’.” This amendment would insert provision amending provisions of the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 so as to confer on the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales certain functions currently conferred on the Senior President of Tribunals. Amendment 96, in schedule 3, page 95, line 4, at end insert— “57 In Schedule 5 (employment tribunal procedure rules: further provision)— (a) in paragraph 3, omit sub-paragraphs (3) and (6) (which insert into the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 provision repealed by this Act); (b) omit paragraph 28 (which inserts into the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 provision repealed by this Act).”— (Sarah Sackman.) This amendment would repeal provisions of the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 which insert into the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 and the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 provision repealed by the Bill. Schedule 3, as amended, agreed to . Clause 19 Lay justices’ allowances Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  That is true. We should be doing what is set out in this good clause and I have nothing more to add. Question put and agreed to. Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 20 Special provision when Crown Court sits in City of London Question proposed , That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I think that, for once, consensus reigns.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have heard that argument, but I do not accept it. I do not think the provision makes it less fair. But I accept that there is work to be done, which does not necessarily need to be reflected in the Bill, to support litigants in person, and to examine the approach and the structure to legal aid, to narrow the gap for those who do not have access to it. That way we can reduce the number of people who have to navigate the system without legal representation. I will not repeat the arguments that I made earlier. For those reasons, I commend the clause and schedule 2 to the Committee. Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for Chichester for tabling the amendment. As she acknowledged, there has been fruitful cross-party working on the issue. I am really pleased to see the progress that we have made, both as a matter of open justice, because timely justice must be fair and transparent, and, candidly, because technology is our friend here and is enabling progress. It must be robust and tested, because the ability of AI to enable redactions where needed has to be properly studied, which is why we have initiated an AI study. But I am pleased with the progress that we have been able to make and that, as a Parliament, we will continue to make.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Lady raises a valid point. All sorts of work needs to be undertaken about the use of social media in courtrooms, whether by juries or other participants, and where that is and is not appropriate, particularly in the context of reporting restrictions that are put in place for a good reason. But on this point, we think that the amendment is not needed. We can continue to make progress informed by an evidence base. For those reasons, although we are in real consensus on the principle of this, I urge the hon. Member for Chichester to withdraw her amendment.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to all the Members who have spoken for the points they have raised. Without repeating myself, they have focused on a number of areas. The first is the concern around access to justice under the new process. We had a good debate on the question of the availability of legal aid in an earlier sitting. As I have said, the Government are committed to fair and accessible routes to legal aid. There are mechanisms such as passporting for those on universal credit. An example given was that the vast majority of prisoners do not have an income. The real picture is that the vast majority of them, unless they have personal wealth, do access legal aid and therefore would be represented and supported by those who are able to give legal advice in what are, of course, high-stakes situations. As I mentioned in the earlier debate, a hardship mechanism is available where the matter necessitates greater complexity and expenses. I recognise that, where there are litigants in person, there is more to do, and part of the implementation and delivery of these reforms will involve looking at what support can be given to those who find themselves in that position. At the moment, litigants in person in the Crown court on appeal to the Court of Appeal are given targeted information and forms that allow them to formulate grounds of appeal and that make it user-friendly and intelligible to a lay person. That sort of thing will have to be put in place if a permission stage is extended to the magistrates court. The points that have been made are valid, but I also want to present a realistic picture of the fact that the majority will continue to access legal aid. As I said earlier, the Department has committed to review the position once we know what the final shape of the Bill looks like to ensure that we are not creating a problem in respect of access to justice. However, in the event that there are litigants in person, we also know that we need to strengthen support for them more broadly across the system, not just in the context of these reforms. That will be a vital feature of the implementation. The second issue raised was about the trade-offs between the efficiency savings versus the introduction of a permission filter to match the sort of permission filter that already exists in the Crown court. While I recognise that the current volume of appeals, in the context of the volume of work that the magistrates undertake, is small, that will grow as the volume of work that the magistrates undertake grows. The sorts of appeals where success is achieved are precisely the ones that will not be prevented by this appeal test, because it is a low bar; all that has to be shown is reasonable arguability, and a court can identify that straightforwardly. It is not as if, all of a sudden, a huge risk to access to justice is created. However, what is permitted is the filtering out of wholly unmeritorious appeals, the volume of which may grow as the overall volume of cases within the magistrates court expands.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will say two things to that. Obviously, that report—as is typical from the Law Commission—is non-partisan, but it predates the reforms we are proposing in the Bill, which will inevitably increase the volume of cases we are talking about. It goes back to the point that, where we have finite resources, if the permission stage filters out only a relatively small number of cases—in fact, that is how I anticipate it will work—then that is all to the good, because even those take up a disproportionate amount of Crown court resources that we can ill afford to have directed to wholly unmeritorious appeals. That is what we are getting rid of. The other thing is that this test is focused on specific grounds, much in the same way as exists in Crown court appeals. The treatment of that appeal can be directed towards the issue that has been the cause of the appeal, rather than having the whole thing looked at again, which is currently the case.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Yes, I do. This is why we have to get this right. As I say, we are firmly committed to improving transparency across the system and making a success of it, but those changes have to be balanced against the operational realities and the financial realities in which our court system operates. Proposed new section 108S of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, to be inserted by schedule 2 to the Bill, will already provide the power for the rules of court to provide free transcripts to any person the Secretary of State directs. The amendment is therefore not required, as the intended effect will already be achieved under the current drafting. We have taken significant steps to strengthen transparency, including expanding transcript provision, so that all victims who want them will be able to request free transcripts of Crown court sentencing remarks directly relevant to their case from as early as spring 2027. That is a meaningful step forward for victims. In cases of public interest, Crown court sentencing remarks are already published online, and broadcasters are able to film sentencing remarks in the Crown court with the agreement of the judge. We are focused on driving improvement for the longer term, exploring how technology, including AI, can reduce the cost of transcript production in future and make it more widely available. That is why we are undertaking a study into the use of AI transcription in court hearings. All this work will provide this Parliament and future Parliaments with an evidence base for future decisions about how transcript provision could be expanded in a way that is operationally sustainable and delivers real-world benefits for victims, including in the magistrates court, over time, as recording capability expands.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is context specific, which is exactly why we have a study: to test the level of accuracy. Accuracy is really important; we do not want a lot of judicial time to be taken up reviewing the accuracy of transcripts before they can be put out. That would not be a good use of judge time, which should be spent running trials and getting them concluded. In some contexts, most obviously in family law, redaction is really important.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that clarification. I was pretty sure that that was what he must have meant and that it was not his intention to suggest that we should, essentially, allow and uphold all appeals as an automatic right. I understand, though, his intention to debate the merits of the permission test in the Bill. I should make one point about the consequence anticipated in the amendments, in terms of appeals being directed automatically to a jury trial. To be clear, that is not how appeals currently operate, whereby a judge sitting with magistrates rehears the case on appeal in the Crown court. The effect of the amendments together could mean that we would see large numbers of appeals of conviction being allowed and sent to the Crown court for a retrial by jury, absent any permission test or filter. That could mean, for example, that low-level summary-only offences, such as being drunk and disorderly, are added to the Crown court caseload and, by extension, the backlog, which would only increase the waiting times for the more serious offences, which we want to get on with more expeditiously. I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s correction, but we take issue with not just the effect of the amendment but the fact that it would mean that appeals would go to a jury trial, because that would extend the right to, or access to, a jury trial, which we do not want to encourage in this context. I anticipate that the intention was to expand the grounds for permission, so that instead of applying a test, any application for permission would be allowed. This would essentially remove the permission filter and return us to the status quo, where there is an automatic right to a rehearing on appeal, absent any filter for the merit of an appeal.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to see you in your place, Dr Huq. I thank the hon. Members for Blackburn (Mr Hussain) and for Bexhill and Battle, and my hon. Friend the Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell), for tabling the amendments in this group. I will come to the amendments, but first I will take the opportunity to set out the rationale for the clause and schedule 2. The existing position for criminal appeals from the magistrates court is this: when an appellant wishes to appeal a conviction or sentence in the magistrates courts, they proceed to a full rehearing of their case in the Crown court. They do not have to state why they wish to challenge their conviction or sentence, nor produce any grounds for appeal. They simply lodge an appeal and obtain a full rehearing in the Crown court. In many cases, there is no justifiable reason for that, yet the impact on victims and witnesses, who are often required to go through the ordeal of a second trial, in the Crown court, can be significant. Indeed, we heard from victims in the Committee’s evidence sessions that going through a trial was so traumatic that they would have probably dropped out if the case had been appealed to the Crown court. Part of the evidence that persuaded Sir Brian Leveson to make recommendations 21 and 22 in his report, in respect of appeals, was that “many minor sexual assaults that were dealt with in the magistrates courts or the youth courts, which could include rape, almost automatically went to appeal to the Crown court, on the basis that the victim would not turn up the second time and be prepared to go through the whole process again.” –– [ Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 9, Q11.] This situation is unique in our criminal justice system. Magistrates courts are the only criminal court in which there is an automatic right to appeal without filter. In every other criminal court, including the Crown court, the appellant must obtain permission to appeal, they must provide their grounds, and the court has the opportunity to review appeal applications to determine whether there are sufficient grounds to warrant reconsideration. The purpose of the clause and the provisions in schedule 2 is to bring magistrates courts appeals in line with other criminal appeals processes, and thereby reduce the number of unnecessary hearings that progress to the Crown court. That has the dual benefit of reducing the burden of appeals on victims and witnesses, and ensuring a sensible use of court resources, reserving Crown court time for the most serious cases. Let me be clear on the data. Of all the cases in the magistrates court, which we know can be hundreds of thousands, only 1% get appealed to the Crown court. This to me is indicative of a system that generally commands confidence. I understand the concerns about access to justice, but to be clear, the right to appeal in magistrates courts remains. Defendants will still be able to appeal a conviction or sentence in magistrates courts, but with a straightforward permission stage, as already exists elsewhere, so that appeals with arguable grounds continue to receive a full appeal hearing. Appellants will retain the ability to seek a judicial review of a refusal of permission in the High Court, and applications to the Criminal Cases Review Commission remain possible where there have been alleged miscarriages of justice. The clause also mandates the recording of trial and sentencing proceedings to support the evidential record for appeals. This is a significant step in making our courts more transparent and open to scrutiny, and it provides an opportunity to go further than in the current criminal procedure rules. The clause is proportionate and targeted. It will filter out unmeritorious, weak applications, helping to increase efficiency across the criminal courts and reduce the burden of appeals, which we know is born by witnesses and victims, while maintaining fairness and access to justice. Amendment 63 was tabled by the hon. Member for Blackburn; I seek your guidance, Dr Huq, on whether it has actually been moved.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Thank you, Dr Huq. Amendment 63 seeks to broaden the test for allowing an appeal from magistrates courts under the new reforms. The amendment expands the existing test so that permission will be granted where there is some other compelling reason. That is a test used in civil proceedings in the Court of Appeal civil division. There is not equivalent test for appeals in the Court of Appeal criminal division, which is what our new process for appeals in the magistrates courts is based on. One reason why a court might hear an appeal due to some other compelling reason is to seek an authoritative binding judgment on a particular issue. A Crown court cannot provide a binding decision as to the law on magistrates courts generally, whereas the High Court can. If the appellant wished to appeal for this reason—in other words, in order to seek a binding judgment on a point of law—they could achieve that by using the existing process of appeals by way of case stated to the High Court. In short, we do not think it would be appropriate for there to be appeals to the Crown court in this context. Instead, we have replicated the existing grounds for appeal in the Court of Appeal criminal division: whether it is reasonably arguable that an appeal will be allowed. An appeal of conviction will be allowed if it is unsafe, which can be the consequence of the incorrect application of the law, procedural irregularities, or the introduction of fresh evidence. An appeal against sentence will be allowed in the same circumstances as in the Court of Appeal: where a sentence is manifestly excessive or otherwise wrong in law or principle. These are well-established tests. We are committed to ensuring that we create a fair appeals system that provides adequate safeguards for summary justice. In the event that appellants feel an incorrect decision has been made in respect of their application for permission, they have the opportunity to seek a judicial review of that decision to the High Court. I remind the Committee that, as I said earlier, the introduction of recording equipment into magistrates courts to accompany the change in the appeals process will increase the ability to scrutinise the decisions of magistrates courts. I hope I have reassured the Committee of our commitment to a fair and accessible criminal appeals process, and I urge that amendment 63 not be pressed to a Division. Amendments 64 to 66, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central, relate to the right to renew an appeal for permission to appear at an oral hearing if the appeal has been refused on the papers. I will deal with these matters sequentially. The right to renew an application for permission at an oral hearing when it has been refused on the papers does exist in appeals from the Crown court to the Court of Appeal. We decided not to replicate the provision for appeals from the magistrates courts. There will be occasions when an oral hearing may be regarded as necessary in order for a Crown court judge to determine whether to grant permission to appeal. For that reason, we have included a provision in proposed new section 108A of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, so that judges can hold an oral hearing if they feel it is necessary or for the purpose of making a determination more expeditiously. However, the key is whether an oral hearing is necessary in the context. We are keen to avoid an influx of applications to renew permission to appeal at an oral hearing where that is unnecessary. That is particularly important when we consider the high volume of cases that our magistrates courts already consider, and the higher volume of cases that we anticipate they will be considering after the other reforms in the Bill come into play. The volume of appeals from magistrates courts to the Crown court will therefore be higher, proportionally, than the volume of appeals from the Crown court to the Court of Appeal. If we include provision for appellants to renew an application for permission that has already been refused, we risk creating a higher volume of unnecessary oral hearings than in the Court of Appeal, thereby placing a significant and unnecessary strain on Crown court time. I understand that the amendment is driven by the desire to ensure that adequate safeguards are built into the process, and I hope my hon. Friend will be reassured that, as I have said, refusal of permission can still be challenged by applying to the High Court for judicial review. The second part of the amendment provides that the grounds of appeal may be based on issues of procedure and fact arising in the trial, as well as on points of law. I want to reassure my hon. Friend that the grounds for appeal as currently drafted in the Bill capture the points raised in the amendment. An appeal of conviction will be allowed if it is unsafe, which can be the consequence of an incorrect application of law, procedural irregularities or fresh evidence. Appeals of sentence could also be successful on the basis that the magistrates court has made a mistake as to the facts of the case or made a procedural error, as long as, by virtue of that mistake, the sentence was manifestly excessive or wrong in law or principle. The amendment would not change that position. For the reasons I have set out, I urge Members not to support amendments 64 to 66. In essence, they are already covered by the Bill. I thank the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle for tabling amendments 54 and 57, which would provide that whenever an appeal against conviction or sentence is made from the magistrates court to the Crown court, the appeal must be allowed, irrespective of whether there is any merit in the appeal. I suspect that was not the intention behind the amendments. If I read them in the spirit that I imagine they were tabled, I think they were designed to remove the permission test, rather than indicating to the Court that it should allow all such appeals.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Grahame Morris) for tabling amendment 67. The speech that the hon. Member for Reigate just made was not only helpful and constructive, as is so often the case, but really compelling. At a societal level, we have been on a journey with regard to how we approach rape and serious sexual violence. There is a recognition that for far too long not only has the court been in danger of becoming a site for re-traumatisation, but frankly the response of our entire criminal justice system has been inadequate to meet what is now widely recognised to be an epidemic of violence against women and girls in our society. Unless we send a message at the very pinnacle of the criminal justice system that that is unacceptable and we cannot tolerate it, and get serious about conviction rates, the amount of charging decisions and the number of cases that come to court, we will not deter people from this kind of behaviour. Her speech setting that out, and some of the work that was done before this Parliament to get here, was very valuable. Let me begin by setting out the rationale for clause 8, and then turn to amendment 67. Far too many victims of rape are dropping out of the justice system because they feel that they are the ones on trial. That needs to stop. Following the Law Commission’s careful consultation, the Bill will stop rape myths and misconceptions entering our court rooms. Clauses 8 to 11 will raise the threshold so that a victim’s past sexual history or previous allegations can be used only when necessary and relevant. The reforms will also prevent the defence from insinuating that victims are lying or motivated only by money just because they claimed compensation or reported a previous offence. We will also allow patterns of domestic abuse, of any type and against any victim, to be shown to the court in cases where they indicate a propensity for further offending. All those measures sit alongside the Government’s wider efforts to improve the victim experience of the justice system. This Government have already implemented special protections for victims’ counselling records. We have commissioned a new project led by Professor Katrin Hohl to bring Operation Soteria into the courtroom. We are rolling out trauma-informed training for not just judges but all court staff, and we have dedicated £6 million, to be invested over the next two years, to deliver independent legal advice for rape victims. Taken together, these measures are transformative. Clause 8 reforms the framework that governs when sexual behaviour evidence about a complainant may be introduced in criminal proceedings. Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 sets out important protections intended to prevent irrelevant or prejudicial material about a complainant’s previous sexual behaviour from being placed before the court. The Law Commission’s consultation found that the current provisions are complex and difficult to navigate, and that they are not being applied consistently across cases. That speaks to the point made by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle about monitoring the new framework, but some of this has been driven by the monitoring of the existing framework, and ensuring, by codifying the test, greater consistency of practice. As a result of that complexity and inconsistency, there are some instances where sexual behaviour evidence about a victim’s previous sexual behaviour is admitted to a court and heard by a jury, despite it having no real bearing on the case. Simplifying the law will help judges to apply a clearer and more coherent test. Clause 8 replaces the existing statutory gateways with a clearer admissibility test. It will continue to be the case that sexual behaviour evidence should not be admitted into the court unless approval is granted by the judge. Judges must consider whether the evidence has substantial probative value. The clause also requires judges to consider a series of statutory factors, including whether the evidence relies on improper inferences, rape myths or misconceptions. These reforms clarify the law, rather than altering the threshold per se. They reflect principles that are already applied by courts but set them out in a more structured way, which will improve consistency and transparency. We will also extend the new threshold to all offence types, not only sexual offences. This is because issues relating to a victim’s past sexual behaviour may occasionally arise in other trials, and complainants in those cases should benefit from the same safeguards and be treated equally. The purpose of the clause is not to prevent a defendant from having a fair trial or to exclude evidence that is genuinely relevant; it is to ensure that decisions about admissibility are based on proper evidential reasoning and not on prejudicial assumptions. For that reason, I commend the clause to the Committee. Amendment 67, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Easington, seeks to exclude from the proposed admissibility threshold any sexual behaviour evidence that took place prior to the charge, but that is connected to the offence. That goes against the purpose of the clause, which as I have said is to ensure that sexual behaviour from a victim’s past is admitted only when it has clear relevance to a significant issue in the case or is important explanatory evidence. That is to prevent evidence that relies solely on perpetuating rape myths and misconceptions from being used against a victim. The amendment, which as we have heard has support from across the combating violence against women and girls sector, would significantly broaden the amount of sexual behaviour evidence that the defence could bring to court without any consideration from the judge, including evidence that neither has substantial probative value nor is important explanatory evidence. Sexual behaviour evidence connected to the event itself could, for example, include any previous sexual behaviour between the same two parties, even though we know that the majority of sexual violence occurs within a relationship. That would allow a huge amount of sexual behaviour evidence to be brought into court entirely unscrutinised and unfiltered by the judge. Insinuating that because a victim has previously engaged in sexual behaviour of the same kind or with the same defendant they are somehow more likely to have consented to the events on trial is a well-known misconception. Whether or not that was the intention of my hon. Friend the Member for Easington in tabling the amendment, the effect would be to perpetuate this narrative, and we cannot accept it. I therefore urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden to withdraw the amendment.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair once again, Ms Jardine. As Members will have heard me say on countless occasions, the pressures on our criminal courts are unprecedented. I do not intend to rehearse arguments that have been made many times in the House. There is a broad consensus that urgent action is required, and it is in that context that I turn to clause 3, which provides for trial by judge alone in cases likely to attract a custodial sentence of three years or less. Clause 3 introduces a new judge-only division of the Crown court—the so-called bench division—to hear less serious cases without a jury. This does not create a separate jurisdiction; one’s case will still be heard in the Crown court if assigned to the bench division. The same appeal route that is currently available from the Crown court will still be available. The clause operates to provide that certain either-way cases defined by the seriousness threshold in the legislation will be tried by a judge sitting alone in a Crown court. The evidence we heard in Committee is that sitting with judge alone saves time. A former Lord Chief Justice, Lord Burnett of Maldon, told us he was convinced that “the time saving will be enormous if the relatively low-level cases are tried by a new constitution.” –– [ Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 76, Q161.] Similarly, Doug Downey, Attorney General of Ontario, said in evidence to us that there is “no question” but that judge-alone cases are “faster”, and that that is borne out by the data there. Let me be clear, as I have tried to be clear a number of times: jury trials will remain in place for the most serious crimes. Indictable-only offences such as murder, rape, armed robbery, grievous bodily harm with intent and arson endangering life will never be heard without a jury. But it remains the case that while jury trials are not at fault for the delays, although jury trials only account for 3% of all criminal trial cases they take up approximately 60% of Crown court hearing time, and the independent review’s findings show that jury trials take twice as long now as they did in 2000. As Sir Brian Leveson told the Committee, trials have become longer and more complex for many reasons, due to the high volume of digital evidence now central to many prosecutions, and the consequence is clear that the delays are rising, and victims and defendants alike are waiting longer for justice. The independent review of the criminal courts estimates that judge-only trials can reduce hearing time by at least 20% and save Crown court time—a figure that Sir Brian himself describes in his review as “conservative”—and those savings will generate more capacity for jury trials where they are most needed. Critics have said that this measure would produce no time saving at all, but the Committee heard from respected members of the judiciary that that is not the case, and that judge-only trials would save time in practical and important ways, by encouraging more realistic guilty pleas, by avoiding the delays inherent in empanelling and managing a jury, by allowing evidence to begin earlier in the day, and by reducing the disruption caused by juror absence or delay. As I have set out, the application of these changes would apply to cases in the existing backlog where a trial has not already commenced. It is because we must tackle the mounting caseload in the Crown court as soon as we can that we are implementing the measures in this way. The clause allows cases in the current open Crown court caseload where a trial has not yet begun to be considered under the new allocation test. Trials should take place in accordance with the law as it stands, and applying the new regime to cases in the open caseload will help us begin to reduce delay from the outset. This is a practical step to ensure that the courts can make the best use of available capacity. The clause also provides safeguards in the form of reallocation provisions, as we have debated. Cases can, and sometimes do, evolve as they progress through the courts, and the clause makes clear provision for cases to be reallocated to a jury trial where the seriousness increases, even after a judge-only trial has begun. The intention of the clause is not to remove jury trials for the most serious cases in our justice system, and where an indictable-only offence is added to a bench division case, it will always be reallocated to a jury trial. The Government have been clear: we have made the investment in courts that people have been calling for, by uncapping sitting days as well as investment in our workforce through legal aid, but investment alone is not enough. The pressures on the system require structural reform, because it was not designed to withstand the challenges of both the present backlog and the profile of modern criminal trials. We are seeing a growing number of remand cases entering the system, and those cases must be prioritised for hearing in order to meet statutory custody time limits. That in turn pushes other serious cases where the defendant is on bail, including rape and serious sexual offences, further down the list. The consequences of those delays are not abstract. Longer waits mean longer periods in which the accused may remain on bail, which places greater pressure on policing and monitoring, while victims and complainants endure prolonged uncertainty and distress. Persistent delay, as we have learned, also distorts behaviour across the system, encouraging defendants to postpone guilty pleas in the hope that witnesses, and sometimes victims, will lose confidence as cases drift further into the future. That cannot be right. That is not justice, and it is not sustainable. The failings of our system were laid bare, not just by the independent review but by the Committee, when we heard most powerfully from victims of crime themselves. We need a more modern model of criminal justice that serves those affected by these failings, and clause 3 is an important part of delivering that change. I would like to hear from my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington, and hear the debate in Committee, before I set out the Government’s position on new clause 29. It may be convenient, therefore, Ms Jardine, to hear from my hon. Friend at this juncture.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am not going to second-guess how the judges will apply this. As I say, that is for the judiciary and the courts. I am not going to put an arbitrary time length on it; I do not think that is needed. The second point that hon. Members made was that the provision risks becoming too wide-ranging if a future Parliament or Secretary of State wishes to add to the offences. I addressed that point in my earlier remarks. I do not think that that is a real risk. Another point that has been made is that none of this will have much of an impact, because we are talking only about a narrowly defined set of cases. I fully anticipate that while the system gets to grips with the use of this legislation, there will be a very small number of cases to begin with, but these are by definition the lengthiest cases and they take up a large amount of the courts’ time. The savings that we are talking about, which are set out in the impact assessment, may sound modest, but in a system under extreme pressure those small shifts matter. Every case heard by a judge sitting alone—as was deemed appropriate in these sorts of case not just by Sir Brian but by Lord Justice Auld and others—saves valuable Crown Court and jury time that can be deployed to serious cases that need a jury. In the context of the emergency in which we find ourselves, I make no apologies for seeking every little impact. For all those reasons, I commend the clause to the Committee.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Will the hon. Member acknowledge that one of the first things this Government did when we came into power was invest £92 million, focusing primarily on duty solicitors who deal with cases at the coalface, including those involving unrepresented defendants? That money is in play. It is in their pockets. Will he acknowledge that?

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 10, in clause 6, page 16, line 2, at end insert— “( ) in subsection (1)— (i) after ‘imposes’ insert ‘, in respect of two or more offences,’; (ii) for the words from ‘exceed’ to the end substitute ‘exceed— (a) where each of the offences is a summary offence, 6 months; (b) in any other case, the longest term that could be imposed in respect of any one of the offences’;” The effect of this amendment is that, where a magistrates’ court imposes two or more terms of imprisonment or detention in a young offender institution to run consecutively, and the offences in question are all summary offences, the aggregate of the terms may not exceed 6 months.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  In that case I will deal with amendments 30 to 32 once I have addressed amendments 29 and 61, because they all touch on similar issues in relation to clause 4. Much has been said about the policy rationale behind this provision, and whether juries are somehow incapable of following complex trials involving fraud or financial matters. That is not the Government’s contention, although some of the cases that are routinely dealt with in Southwark Crown court, particularly in a modern environment with crypto and complex financial instruments, are indeed highly complex. The primary issue is jury burden, which is a theme that emerged from the independent review of criminal courts, and it has long been identified as a significant issue. As long ago as 2001, Lord Justice Robin Auld said that the “increase in the length of such trials over recent years has become a severe intrusion on jurors’ working and private lives. It cannot be good for them or for justice.” Sir Brian Leveson picked up that theme in part 1 of his review, in which he said that “the personal and financial burden placed on jurors, particularly those involved in lengthy trials, is significant.” He also said that “serious and complex fraud trials…place more significant burdens on court resources and jurors’ time.” There is evidence of the financial strain on jurors who sit in lengthy trials, particularly those who are self-employed or who have caring responsibilities. In addition, under the current system, the companies that jurors work for cannot claim back losses incurred while their employee is on jury service. As I have said before, we commend the participation in jury service of people from across society and from all backgrounds, which is why we are seeking to preserve jury trials for our most serious cases—those pertaining to matters that are not only serious for individuals but are in the public interest.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for his amendment, which would require cases to be eligible for an order under proposed new section 42A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 only where all offences listed are schedule offences. We consider that such a method would be overly rigid and would limit the application of clause 4. In reality, most complex and lengthy cases involving fraud and financial crime often prosecute a mix of principal and ancillary offences, some of which would not appear on the schedule of eligible offences. For example, sometimes theft offences, which are not included in the schedule, are prosecuted alongside fraud or money laundering crimes. Imagine a large-scale conspiracy to defraud and false accounting, perhaps involving multiple offenders operating through a network of shell companies. The prosecution case relies on hundred, perhaps thousands, of pages of electronic banking records, company accounts, internal emails, encrypted messaging data, and expert accounting evidence that traces the movement of funds through dozens of linked corporate entities across multiple jurisdictions. This is in every sense a highly technical and inherently complex case, which is likely to last several months. But there are counts of theft-adjacent offences of, say, handling stolen goods on the indictment. Those counts are not incidental: they are related to the fraud. They provide the fact finder with a holistic picture of the alleged offending. The judge considers the counts to be clearly related and properly joined for trial. If clause 4 were constrained in the way proposed by the amendment, that plainly suitable case—long and exceptionally complex—would be excluded even from consideration for judge-only trial, because those additional connected counts are not listed in the schedule. Requiring every offence to fall within the schedule would exclude cases that meet the policy intent of clause 4, thereby preventing the court from applying the provision precisely where it is most needed, solely because of the presence of additional non-schedule counts.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the shadow Minister for tabling amendment 51. I will first set out the rationale for clause 4 and schedule 1 and then address the amendment. Clause 4 and schedule 1 will allow for particularly complex or lengthy fraud and financial offences to be tried by a judge sitting alone. Cases involving fraud and serious financial crime are some of the longest and most demanding trials in the Crown court. They routinely run for weeks or even months, and there are examples of the most complex cases running for over a year. That is an incredibly substantial burden for jurors—lay members going about their lives—to bear, particularly as the compensation for those they work for is non-existent and their own compensation covers expenses but no more. Let me give a real-world example. A Crown court fraud trial was listed to run for 13 weeks—already a substantial commitment for any jury. Partial verdicts were returned by the jury four months later, with further verdicts provided the following month. The case finally concluded five months after it started. By that point the jury had dwindled from 12 to nine, worn down by delay after delay in such a long-running and complex trial. As I said, this is the primary rationale behind what we consider will also be a time-saving measure. This is a significant challenge. In fraud cases, marathon trials can drag on for months—at times, well beyond the original estimate—as jurors fall away, delays compound and the system ends up bending around the logistics of keeping 12 ordinary men and women available for an extraordinary length of time. Sir Brian Leveson was clear, as was Lord Justice Auld, that trial by jury is not always the most sensible and proportionate approach to the resolution of these types of lengthy and complex cases.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I was about to get to the essential position, which is that what I said on Thursday is twofold. What we were debating was in the context of whether there was an appeal route in relation to the mode of trial decision—the allocation decision. I have been absolutely clear that nowhere in this Bill is there any specific route to appeal, and I have never sought to suggest otherwise. Taking a step further, the law points against there being a jurisdictional power for judicial review on an allocation decision. Where the Bar Council’s letter discusses the availability of judicial review, it sets out that section 29(3) of the Senior Courts Act significantly limits the circumstances in which judicial review will be available for decisions affecting the conduct of a Crown court trial. That is the point that is raised in its letter, and to which I will provide a line-by-line response, but the Government essentially agree with that position. As I have said in Committee—if any of this was not clear, let me be clear about it now—there is a very high bar. There might be exceptional circumstances, which might well be tested when this legislation, if it comes forward, comes into force. For example, if a Crown court judge clearly acts outside the parameters of the legislation by allocating a case that is clearly excluded under these provisions from being judge-only—because it is, say, complex and lengthy or indictable-only—that may fall outside of this rule, but it is certainly going to be only an exceptional case. The best thing for me to do is write, so that Members can see what those reasons are and see what the Government’s position is. Essentially, we think that what is set out in the Bar Council’s letter as regards the availability of judicial review—there is no appeal route, and I have never suggested otherwise—correctly states the law.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 6 introduces a measure to extend the Secretary of State’s regulation-making power to enable the general limit on magistrates court sentencing powers to be set at 18 or 24 months of maximum imprisonment for single and multiple triable either-way offences. Currently, magistrates court sentencing powers are set at 12 months. The Government can already vary magistrates’ sentencing powers between six and 12 months by secondary legislation using the negative resolution procedure. That has been done twice, and used to good effect, since July 2022. However, the Crown court is now facing significant pressures, and many triable either-way offences currently heard and sentenced there can, as we know, be fairly and expeditiously dealt with in the magistrates court. Increasing magistrates court sentencing powers is one of the ways in which we will increase the range of cases that magistrates courts can hear and sentence, freeing up valuable Crown court capacity for the most serious and complex cases. By enabling the powers to be increased in that way, the clause will help us to free up capacity in the Crown court to the tune of 8,000 Crown court sitting days in the 2028-29 financial year, making a significant dent in the backlog. Magistrates are well prepared to take on that responsibility. They are dedicated and highly trained volunteers who give back to their community, working alongside highly trained legal advisers and an impressive cadre of district judges. The magistrates undergo an extensive selection process and work tirelessly to ensure that justice is delivered swiftly and fairly, currently assuming responsibility for 90% of all criminal cases. The clause does not increase magistrates court sentencing powers; instead, it enables the Secretary of State to set the general limit in the future at 18 or 24 months. As I have said, any such change would be made through a statutory instrument under the negative resolution procedure, when necessary, to respond to changing circumstances and manage unsustainable pressures across the criminal justice system. Importantly, the clause also ensures that the aggregate maximum term available for consecutive sentences will track the general limit. It also provides a safeguard that magistrates courts cannot impose a sentence exceeding the offence-specific maximum available on indictment, even if the general limit is set at 18 or 24 months. As such, I commend clause 6 to the Committee.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for her point, which has been raised by others. Those terms are well understood in their ordinary meaning and can be applied in a clear and straightforward way by judges.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  We consider it to be set out in clause 4 as drafted. It is sufficiently flexible and will no doubt be subjected to interpretation. We think that, as drafted—with all the carefully prescribed exceptions to what could be included, in addition to the public interest exclusion—it is sufficiently clear, and that there is a clear understanding of the sorts of offences that would come within the provision. I am also keen to work together constructively to ensure public confidence, particularly in cases involving loss of life, while still providing the courts with the flexibility they need for the clause to work appropriately. In the case of amendment 31, given the high bar already set in the clause and the cautious way that we expect judges will exercise these powers, we consider the statutory exclusion of these additional offences unnecessary. Again, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden not to press her amendment. Finally, the placement of amendment 32 in proposed new section 42B(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 means that it would not, in fact, exclude any offences beyond the indictable-only sexual offences that are expressly excluded by proposed new section 42B(2)(b). As I have said previously, we set up the clause so that jury trial is the default. Judges apply the test, and there are safeguards for case suitability and public interest. It would be very rare for sexual offences to be tried alongside the kinds of complex or lengthy fraud and financial cases that clause 4 is designed to capture. For those reasons, once again, I urge my hon. Friend not to press the amendment.