Sarah Sackman MP: speeches 2026

Speeches

• 28 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle for this new clause on the unduly lenient sentencing scheme. The ULS scheme is an exceptional power, reserved for the most serious cases, that applies only to offences passed in the Crown court. One of the things that we have seen—this is not an unwelcome development—is its expanded use. What started as an exceptional power used in a handful of exceptional cases has grown in usage as members of the public, their representatives and others who have either experienced crime, or have loved ones who have, take up the ULS scheme in greater numbers. In 2025, the Office of the Attorney General assessed around 1,500 cases. It is important to focus on what the ULS scheme is and what it is not. It is a legal backstop that rightly sets a hard test. Someone simply not agreeing with or taking issue with the sentence handed down to a particular offender is not, of itself, a basis for challenging it. One needs to show that there has been a gross error in the application of the sentencing guidelines, and that the sentence is manifestly inadequate given the seriousness of the offence. I understand the points that the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle is making. I would, though, draw attention to the fact that the Law Commission is currently undertaking a review of criminal appeals, which includes looking at reforms to the unduly lenient sentencing scheme. The Law Commission is due to publish its report in autumn 2026. I suggest that that is an appropriate moment to look at the operation of the scheme and at what is suggested in the new clause about its current operation as it applies in the Crown court, rather than pre-empting what that report might say and how the Government might think about the scheme’s potential extension to the magistrates court. I cannot support the new clause at the moment, as it would in effect significantly alter the scope and operation of a power that is supposed to be exceptional. It would make the exceptional the norm. It would entail administrative burdens and goes against the grain of what was intended when the scheme was first conceived. However, I look forward to seeing the Law Commission’s work. That will be the appropriate moment to re-examine how the scheme operates and how it operates in a reformed system. I urge the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle to withdraw the new clause.

• 28 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Lady makes a fair point. There is a mismatch between the performance data that PECS has recorded and the qualitative evidence that one hears from barristers and the judicial office as to the time that is being lost because prisoners are not being produced on time. One of the things we discussed in the first meeting of the oversight board was that we need to have a shared understanding of the data and how we capture it. Another important theme, which we will come to in respect of another new clause, is remote hearings. Clearly, while we absolutely need to improve and speed up the operation of prisoner transport, and initiatives like opening up bus lanes are all to the good, we also have a demand issue. If we want to reduce the demand for prisoner transport, unless it is needed to further the interests of justice, one way to alleviate some of the pressure is to make greater use of remote hearings. This kind of cross-agency working and grip, with ministerial attention, as well as taking soundings and engaging with the Bar, which sees the effects every day, is going to be really important. We are expanding case-progression functions and case co-ordinators to every Crown court; introducing staff with delegated judicial powers to focus on progressing cases; and sorting out problems that would otherwise take up judges’ time and reduce the hearing time that we spoke about earlier. All those things are under way and will drive at the problem. But I want to be honest with the hon. Member for Reigate, and others who maintain the argument that we should make the efficiencies and have the uncapped sitting days and the investment before we trouble ourselves with reform. I am a realist, and when I look right across Government, questions of efficiency and productivity challenge our public services all the time. Of course we want our systems to be more efficient, and so we should—the taxpayer deserves nothing less—but we have the insight of the independent review, and our own modelling, which assumes that we have maximalist investment coupled with 5% efficiency gains year on year, and those two things together will not reduce the backlog. They temper it and dampen it down, but they do not cut into it. Assuming efficiency gains above 5% year on year would be optimistic for the system. If it were easy to do, previous Governments would no doubt have achieved it. I am not going to assume more than a 5% efficiency gain, because to do so would be setting ourselves up to fail. This is probably the area where I take issue with the Institute for Government, because although it accepts, in broad terms, the time savings that can be made through our reform package—I understand that Members will say, “The assumptions are highly uncertain” and all the rest of it—it assumes that we can revert to the efficiency levels that existed pre-pandemic. It essentially assumes an efficiency gain of between 18% and 20% practically overnight, and I simply do not think that that is achievable. Of course we want to drive improvements in prisoner transfer. Of course we hope that case co-ordinators will get the systems going through, and that blitz courts will work, particularly in London, where things are most acute. But I am not prepared to assume that all that will cumulatively amount to efficiency gains of more than 5% year on year, because we have all seen the lessons, not just from the criminal justice system but right across public services, in respect of how difficult efficiencies are to achieve. That is why we are pulling every lever—not just the investment or the efficiency drive but the structural reforms—so that the investment is going into a reformed, modernised system that takes the decision to reallocate work to the magistrates court, where we know that cases are dealt with in a more timely and proportionate fashion, and out of the Crown court. That is what all these reforms amount to. I know the establishment of the Crown court bench division keeps being cited because it will make a 2% saving, but we estimate that the package of measures taken together will make a 20% saving, because of the combined effect of the changes to magistrates courts’ sentencing powers and the magistrates retaining more work. We are pulling every lever because, when we combine all three levers, that will get the backlog down in the timeframe that the Deputy Prime Minister has set out in his various statements.

• 28 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I think the hon. Member thinks that I rose to make some really brilliant, devastating party political point. I did not; I was just rehearsing the history of how we got here. At the time, the view was taken by those who finally took the axe to the inspectorate that it did not represent value for money and was not working in an effective way. I make that point to say that, if we are going to have an inspectorate that does some of the things we want it to do, or whatever system we alight on, we all want to ensure that it represents value for money and drives better performance. Clearly, the Government of the day did not think that it did. No inspectorate would have scope to scrutinise judicial decisions. It is also important to say—there have been improvements in this regard—that extensive operational data and metrics, which everyone is welcome to look at, provide an insight into the performance of our criminal courts, whether in terms of case timeliness, conviction rates or sentencing outcomes. That is exactly as it should be. At this point, my focus is on driving reform, modernisation and the proper delivery of the investment that we are making, rather than on the inspection landscape, but I do not disagree with the sentiment that lies behind the hon. Member for Chichester’s new clause. Getting the mechanism right and taking our time to think about what form it should take, and how it could be properly resourced and as effective as we want it to be is something that we all want to take our time over, so I urge the hon. Member to withdraw her new clause.

• 28 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Committee will not be surprised to hear that the Government do not support a sunset clause, for two primary reasons. First, these reforms address a challenge in our system that not only is acute—because of the crisis, which we inherited from the previous Government, that has been allowed to run out of control—but has long-term drivers, meaning that the demand pressures on our court system are not going away. Of course we want to get the backlog down to a sustainable level, but that will not alleviate the challenges, described in the independent review of the criminal courts, presented by the changing patterns of crime; the procedural safeguards in our system, which mean that trials take longer; advancing technology; and the types of evidence that need to be dealt with. All that contributes to a demand pressure that will be sustained, and Government forecasting shows that that demand will continue to grow. Even once we have the backlogs under control, we will need these reforms to maintain an improved, sustainable position as part of the modernised rebalancing of the workload between Crown court and magistrates court, which is supported not just by the authors of the independent review but by the likes of Lord Ian Burnett, an experienced Lord Chief Justice, who spoke about this in his evidence. Secondly, as colleagues well know, Parliament is sovereign. We are bringing these reforms forward because we believe they are the right measures to tackle a crisis and modernise our system. People have heard me say this time and again, and I stand by it, but this is about turning a crisis into an opportunity. I have spoken about the ways in which we have seized the opportunity to modernise our system and make it fairer and more sustainable. If future Parliaments think that we did not get it right, they can no doubt pass legislation to change it. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

• 28 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will take one short intervention.

• 28 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I absolutely recognise what the hon. Lady says. That is why I come back to this: swifter justice for victims is the guiding principle behind all these reforms. As she says, the longer people are stuck waiting for their day in court, the longer they need to be supported. It becomes a vicious cycle, because we must expend more resource on victim support to keep them engaged in the process. It is not just that we do that for longer; it gets harder the longer they are stuck in the backlog. I very much agree with her: I would rather that money were redeployed to enhance what those victim support agencies can do. I do not think primary legislation is the vehicle for it, but I absolutely agree with the sentiment. I urge her to withdraw her new clause.

• 28 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I do have confidence in the changes. Look at the levers in the Government’s gift: we can get more money for the system—tick. We can try to drive performance and govern the system to be more efficient—we are doing everything we can, but I refuse to be over-optimistic about that. The other lever I can pull is reform, based on the recommendations we have had. The hon. Lady asks me why we are not piloting, being more cautious or waiting for the efficiencies to work themselves through the system rather than running all these things in parallel, and I simply say: look at the crisis we are in, and look at the extent of the problem. If I were to wait for that 5% to play out year on year, even with maximalist investment, I cannot say that we would get the backlog down in 20 or 30 years. I do not know if we would ever get it back down, because our modelling shows that it is insufficient. That is the conclusion that Sir Brian Leveson drew and it is supported by our impact assessment. It is why we have to act for the people stuck in the system now, with their cases being listed until 2030. I have drawn on healthcare analogies a number of times in this debate, as have others. The NHS, for example, is an institution that always needs more funding—we are all living longer, and some of the conditions we are facing are more and more complex—but we do not keep pouring money into an unreformed system. Here, we are saying, “Let’s reform the system, get it working better and more efficiently, and give it a chance to succeed by equipping it not just with the investment in terms of sitting days, but with the capital investment, too.” This is not, I hope, an enthusiastic strategy. I call it the kitchen-sink strategy, because I am trying to throw everything at it to achieve the real-time goal of bringing down these backlogs. When we announced these plans and the timeframe for when we expected to see the backlogs come down, even with these bold and radical plans, the argument I was met with was, “My goodness, you’re not getting the backlog down until 2035,” and we are pushing to see if we can make that date sooner and pulling at every lever we have. I understand that this Department is going to be judged on whether we turn the corner on the backlog in this Parliament, and whether we see it start to come down in enough time, so that victims of crime and defendants on remand can start to feel it in this Parliament and certainly early into the next. That is the essay question I set myself, and we asked for a comprehensive, evidence-based answer from an independent review. It told us that we could not pick and choose our levers; we need to use all three, and that is what these measures are designed to drive at. That is the best explanation I can give for why we say that, while efficiency and investment are hugely important and necessary, they alone are not sufficient. We need the reforms in clauses 1 to 10. New clauses 32 and 33, which were tabled by my hon. Friends the Members for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson) and for Bolton South and Walkden, rightly highlight the disparities in outcomes that we see across our criminal justice system, and the questions about the trust and confidence that many minoritised communities have in the system. We had a constructive debate on this issue last week, generated by new clause 29, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington. As I said then, the Government are listening carefully, not only to the Committee but to stakeholders that represent those communities impacted every day by questions of racial inequality in the criminal justice system. We remain committed, during a later stage of the Bill’s passage, to tabling a Government amendment on a review that will cover all the things that we believe are necessary, including consideration of the impacts of our criminal justice system not just on black and minority ethnic groups but on those from working-class backgrounds. Given that commitment, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden not to press the new clauses to a vote. New clause 13 touches on efficiencies, on which I have already set out my arguments, and also addresses questions of public trust in the system. A theme of our debates has been the importance of public trust in our criminal justice system. Even those who do not directly interface with the criminal justice system need to know that it works and is there if they need it. There are two essential elements to sustaining public trust, the first of which is transparency. We have spoken about this a lot, and I know the hon. Member for Chichester has tabled further new clauses on transcripts. We have spoken a lot about transcripts and the recordings of proceedings in both the magistrates court and the Crown court. I think that opening up the process and making it intelligible to the public is so important, as well as the provision of reasons by judges in the Crown court bench division. Those are all ways in which transparency can play an important part in maintaining public trust. However, there is another element of public trust: people trust systems that work. If a system ceases to work and breaks down—if someone who reports an assault that they experienced on their way home from the underground station is told that they will receive a court date that is one or two years away—that is the sort of thing that corrodes trust. We can think of myriad ways in which it can happen, but I would suggest that a state failing to deliver the very basics of timely justice is corrosive of trust. That is why what I am trying to do is not just about efficacy, or being able to say that we now have a properly run criminal justice system; it is about trust and legitimacy. Those questions of trust are true, irrespective of someone’s social background. We say again that the new clause is not necessary, but those questions around public trust in our system are writ large through the Government’s mission, not just in our approach to this legislation, but in our entire approach to restoring our criminal justice system to the state it needs to be in.

• 28 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  These clauses are in part 3 of the general provisions of the Bill. They provide the position on the commencement of measures in the Bill, the powers to make consequential, transitional and other provisions in connection with the coming into force of the provisions of the Bill, and the Bill’s territorial extent and short title. Clause 21 is a technical clause that will allow the Secretary of State to make any further consequential amendments or legislative changes where required to implement the provisions in the Bill. Clause 22 creates a power to allow the Lord Chancellor to make “transitional or saving provisions” by regulation “in connection with the coming into force of any provision of this Act.” Clause 23 will allow the Secretary of State to, by regulation, amend the Sentencing Act 2020, so as to specify the cases or purpose for which the amendment or repeal made by the Bill has effect. Clause 24 allows for regulations under statutory instrument to be made under the Bill once it becomes an Act. The Bill contains nine delegated powers; we have considered the scope and extent of those powers carefully and have taken the decision to include them only where it is necessary, in respect of particularly technical or detailed areas, or to allow flexibility for our legislation to remain up to date and be responsive to changes. Clause 25 sets out the extent of the Bill. All measures apply to England and Wales only, save in respect of four areas: section 7; section 18(6) and subsection (7); sections 10(4) and 11(8); and part 3. Those four areas have UK-wide extent, except for sections 10(4) and 11(8), which have the same extent at the Armed Forces Act 2006, so that they extend to the UK, the Isle of Man and British overseas territories except Gibraltar. Clause 26 states that the measures in the Bill will be commenced via regulations on the day that the Secretary of State appoints apart from clauses 21 to 25 and clause 27, which come into force on the day on which the Act is passed, and section 6 and section 20, which come into force at the end of a period of two months beginning with the day on which the Bill is passed. Finally, clause 27 states that the Bill “may be cited as the Courts and Tribunals Act 2026” once it becomes an Act of Parliament. I thank all members of the Committee for the spirit in which they have engaged over the last five days. Some may know the famous line, “I fought the law and the law won.” Some may also know that I have been developing a Spotify soundtrack to get me through the Committee, inspired by some of the interventions. Everyone has not only made this stage constructive and engaging, but given the Government a lot of food for thought as we take the Bill through to the next stage. It will be all the stronger for the contributions that have been made, so I thank everyone for that.

• 28 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I entirely agree that training, in all the respects that the hon. Member for Chichester speaks about, is key, whether it is training on equal treatment or on a trauma-informed approach to rape and serious sexual offences, or specific training pertaining to domestic abuse and identification of coercive and controlling behaviour, or to ensure the consistent application of special measures and evaluation of expert input into trauma-informed practice.

• 28 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I agree with the sentiment behind the new clause to ensure that we are monitoring efficiency, effectiveness and performance across our criminal courts system. However, as the shadow Justice Minister just said, the best mechanisms for holding the system to account in terms of performance and judicial accountability merit greater reflection. We are taking the time to consider the IRCC’s recommendations. The hon. Member for Chichester alluded to the history, and that there has previously been an inspectorate of court administration; that of course ceased operation under the coalition Government, who found it unnecessary at the time.

• 28 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Our understanding is that the new clause seeks to improve efficiency by requiring cases to be trial-ready before they are sent to the Crown court. I will explain very briefly how a case is currently prepared for trial in the Crown court and why it is important that that preparation takes place before a judge in the Crown court, as early as possible. All criminal cases begin in the magistrates court, and indictable offences such as murder must, by law, be sent to the Crown court at the first hearing, after the magistrates have dealt with matters such as identification and bail or remand. At the plea and trial preparation hearing in the Crown court, a professional judge examines the issues between the parties, such as evidence and disclosure issues, and sets a timeline for trial preparation, as well as the trial date. It is also at that point that a formal plea is entered in the Crown court. There are clear statutory expectations on parties, set out in the criminal procedure rules, to be proactive in case management, and judges are experienced in managing timeliness through enforcement action. However, we recognise that there is always more that can be done, which is why we have effected the roll-out of case co-ordinators in our Crown court to drive case progression. Magistrates are not similarly trained in managing trials on indictment, and we do not think they would be an effective equivalent to a Crown court judge in determining these matters before they reach the Crown court. Requiring cases to be held back until they are considered “ready” prior to being sent to the Crown court would, we believe, risk introducing further delay for the most serious offences. In addition, retaining such serious cases for longer in the magistrates court could have several unintended consequences, including additional pressures on custody time limits and delays in accessing special measures—measures that enable vulnerable and intimidated witnesses to give pre-recorded evidence at an early stage. Those protections are available across the Crown court but are not all available in the magistrates court, so delaying transfer to the Crown court would delay access to them for some victims and witnesses, potentially undermining the quality of their evidence. The new clause would, in practice, introduce delays into the court system and delay the progression of the most serious cases. For that reason, I urge my hon. Friend to withdraw it.

• 28 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member for Chichester rightly acknowledges the significant amount of work that the Government are currently undertaking in this space, and we had an opportunity to debate that in Committee earlier. In relation to the new clause, it might be worth briefly explaining why such an extension would not provide significant benefits compared with the systems already in place. In relation to bail decisions, a transcript of the hearing is rarely informative for victims. What victims need and want to know, and what the victims code already requires, is for victims to be informed of the outcome of the bail hearing and any conditions imposed. Those updates are already provided to victims by victim witness care units within five working days. We are currently exploring how responsibilities under the code are being met by the relevant service providers and how to better support them in the delivery of the code. To strengthen that further, once commenced, the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 will introduce a compliance framework, requiring criminal justice bodies to keep their performance against the code under review. Transcripts of judicial summings-up are unlikely to add significant value for many victims. Those remarks are given before the jury begins to deliberate and are intended to guide them by summarising the evidence and setting out the relevant law. They are not, and cannot be, a reflection of the jury’s decision. Without the full context of the trial, they may risk causing confusion rather than providing clarity. Before being released, summings-up must be manually reviewed to ensure that they are accurate. That, too, is resource intensive. In looking at where we can roll out making transcripts available at either low or no cost, we must target those areas that add value for the public and victims. As I said when we discussed this last Thursday, we are focused on driving improvement for the longer term. That is why we are undertaking a study in the use of AI to transcribe court hearings. The findings will identify what is possible from AI transcription in a Crown court setting, in considering how to make the provision of transcripts more cost-effective. I think we are in a good place. As the hon. Member for Chichester says, there is more to do, and the Government would be grateful for work across the House to see how we can drive greater transparency in transcription in our Crown courts, but I urge her to withdraw her new clause.

• 28 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  This group contains a number of new clauses, and I want to make sure that I address all the principal themes. New clause 5, tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester, relates to publishing targets for reducing court backlogs. It would require the Lord Chancellor to set and publish targets for reducing court backlogs, and to report annually to Parliament on progress. It is important to note that the Ministry of Justice and His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service are downstream Departments, by which I mean that we are subject to demand pressures that are not fully within our control as they are driven by additional arrests and charging decisions. We have published our central demand forecasts, on which the Department’s impact assessment and modelling is based, but the fluctuation and uncertainty in demand makes it particularly challenging for us to set a fixed, specific target. In the absence of credible reforms, targets will not achieve much. I can tell the hon. Member for Chichester in general terms that we want to get back to a sustainable position. Some Members have referred to reverting to our position before the covid pandemic, which was when we saw the exponential rise in the backlogs. However, I do not want to put a figure on it, because that would simply not be achievable, and having targets that we know we cannot achieve is setting ourselves up to fail, and it lacks credibility. In the independent review of the criminal courts, Sir Brian Leveson made a series of recommendations related to how performance management and accountability across the criminal justice system could be strengthened. We are looking carefully at those recommendations, particularly in respect of whether we ought to establish a performance oversight board, in addition to the governance forum that already exists. Sir Brian recommends that such a board should monitor and report on the performance of local criminal justice boards and publish a shared set of performance measures. As I have said, we will be publishing our response to the second part of Sir Brian’s review shortly. Performance management, and monitoring our success in reducing the court backlogs, is essential. Within Parliament, we have the scrutiny provided not only by shadow Justice Ministers, as well as all parliamentarians, but by the Justice Committee, which provides rigorous scrutiny on a cross-party basis. Of course, we also have the regular, frequent publication of Crown court data. Although those targets are not specified, no one is pushing at them harder than the Ministry of Justice and myself, and that is what the Bill primarily targets. However, we do not think that it is necessary to publish specific targets in the legislation, and I ask the hon. Member for Chichester not to press new clause 5 to a vote. New clause 17, and to some extent new clause 13, touches on efficiencies. It suggests that we ought to review efficiencies before we embark on reform. Indeed, the hon. Member for Reigate and others have made this argument during the debate: do the efficiency first, and see whether it works, before engaging in reform. I want to address that argument head on. We have been clear from the start that there is no silver bullet or simple panacea to the backlog. The insight of the independent review of the criminal courts is that we need investment, efficiencies and reform, and we are not ducking the need to drive efficiencies. One of the areas where I think we all agree is the fact that the system is incredibly inefficient, and the backlog itself compounds that inefficiency, but we are not waiting for legislation to drive at that efficiency reform. A number of other Members and I have mentioned relevant measures, and I want to touch on a few. For example, the blitz courts have been in operation in London since April, and I am going to visit one in a couple of weeks. That highly effective model of very aggressive listing has had success in the past, and it is being used to drive down certain case types in the backlog, such as assault against an emergency worker. We also need a consistent and clear approach to national listing, such as using the AI listing assistant that I referred to earlier. We are gripping the issue of prisoner delivery right across the country. Lord Timpson and I have established an oversight board, bringing together representatives of His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service, His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, and the prisoner escort and custody service. It is a year-long project—a sprint, as it were—to look at how we can drive improved performance under the existing contract, and how we can imbed digital solutions to make that run much more efficiently.

• 27 Apr 2026 · Draft First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) Fees (Amendment) Order 2026 · Hansard source

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  I will endeavour to answer as many of the right hon. Gentleman’s questions as possible. Any that I do not answer—

• 27 Apr 2026 · Draft First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) Fees (Amendment) Order 2026 · Hansard source

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  I was just coming to that. The cost of delivering the service that the property tribunal provides far exceeds the fees we are talking about today, and that cost is borne by the taxpayer. We think that it is right and fair that, provided that fees are set at a level that does not impede access to justice, we recover some of the cost of providing this essential service from the users of the court. As I say, the current system has created a patchwork, inconsistent system that neither reflects the cost of administering proceedings nor supports a fair and proportionate contribution from all its users. The new framework will consist of a £47 application fee for applications to appeal a rent increase and to challenge terms of a successor tenancy, with no hearing fees applicable; fees of £114 for applications and £227 for hearings in cases where access to justice is paramount; and a standard fee of £200 to bring an application to the tribunal and £300 for hearings. Alongside this framework, fee exemptions apply for urgent issues such as seeking a remedial order for an unsafe residential building, as well as for potential low-value claims, including cases where tenants are recovering unlawful fees charged by their landlords. The estimated cost to the taxpayer of an average case brought to the property chamber is more than £900. Even after this framework is fully implemented, the property chamber will continue to be heavily subsidised by the taxpayer. A standard application fee of up to £200 therefore represents an important but modest contribution, and illustrates our commitment to access to justice, which has been the guiding principle in developing the framework. The property chamber deals with a wide range of cases involving users with varying financial circumstances, so it is simply not possible for a single fee to accurately reflect every type of application. Instead, the work that we undertook reviewed every type of application individually to identify the types of users and barriers they may face when seeking to bring a case to the tribunal. That led us to introduce a tiered framework that best reflects the varied work of the property tribunal. The new framework will create consistency in the charging of fees for applications that can be brought to the property chamber, increase levels of cost recovery and reduce the burden on the taxpayer, all while maintaining our commitment to ensuring that access for justice is protected for all. This instrument will introduce fees for applications in the residential property division of the property chamber that arise from, or are amended by, the Renters’ Rights Act. It is made under the powers provided by section 42(1)(a), section 42(2) and section 49(3) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. First, the Renters’ Rights Act 2025 will extend the right to apply to the property chamber to challenge a proposed rent increase to all private rented sector tenants. Tenants will also be able to apply to the property chamber within the first six months of a tenancy to request a termination if they believe that the starting rent is above the open market rent. The Renters’ Rights Act also includes the right of tenants to challenge the validity of a notice proposing a rent increase in the tribunal. Under the instrument, those applications will attract a £47 application fee and no hearing fees will apply. Secondly, the Renters’ Rights Act introduces a new route to the tribunal to challenge the terms of a tenancy that arises on succession from a tenancy that was previously made under the Rent Act 1977. Under the instrument, those applications will also attract a fee of £47. If the application proceeds to a hearing, no hearing fee will apply. Thirdly, the instrument applies our proposed standard £200 application fee and £300 hearing fee to appeals against the new financial penalties that local authorities can impose on landlords under the Renters’ Rights Act. It is reasonable and proportionate for landlords who choose to appeal to contribute to the cost of that process. Finally, the instrument brings new rent repayment order routes, created by the Renters’ Rights Act, into the existing fees regime. Applications will incur a £114 application fee and a £227 hearing fee, matching the fees that already apply to comparable applications. Turning to the impacts of the instrument, it is important to be clear about what it will mean in practice. As many of the measures in the instrument relate to the introduction of new or amended rights implemented by the Renters’ Rights Act, some users will be required to pay fees where none have previously been payable. That reflects the move, as I have said, towards a more consistent fees framework across the property chamber. Fees have been set at varying levels below cost to balance the principles of cost recovery with the principle of access to justice. It is important to note that, in the case of rent appeals, the balance between cost recovery and access to justice is more acute. I reassure Members that the introduction of a fee for those cases has been carefully considered and calibrated. In those cases, the consequence of being unable to bring an appeal makes an applicant potentially more vulnerable to housing instability and economic hardship, especially as tenants are often in a vulnerable financial position, given cost of living pressures. Given those considerations, a considerably lower fee of £47 has been applied. The fee is one of the lowest payable across the courts and tribunals system, and ensures that tenants will not be deterred from exercising their right to appeal a rent increase by the fee. In addition, there are other mitigations for rent appeals that ensure that fees do not deter or disadvantage tenants. The help with fees remission scheme will remain available to eligible applicants on lower incomes or in receipt of qualifying benefits who cannot afford to pay a fee. In the last year, we remitted £91 million pounds’ worth of fee income. Furthermore, under the Renters’ Rights Act, any rent increase will ordinarily take effect from the start of the first rent period following the date of the tribunal’s decision, rather than being backdated. In cases of undue hardship, the tribunal will be able to delay the date on which the rent increase takes effect by up to two months after the date of determination. That helps to ensure that tenants feel safe to challenge excessive proposed increases without fear of incurring additional financial pressures. Finally, where tenants are successful in appealing their rent increase, they may be able to recover the tribunal fee from their landlord in the end. Without these measures, we would not be able to keep the tribunal service running, and the taxpayer would be required to shoulder a far greater proportion of the cost of the courts and tribunals systems. Thus, this instrument provides the necessary framework for a sustainable courts and tribunals system that is there for all those who need it while ensuring that access to justice is protected. I believe that the measures are fair and necessary, and I hope that the Committee will support them.

• 27 Apr 2026 · Draft First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) Fees (Amendment) Order 2026 · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the Committee has considered the draft First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) Fees (Amendment) Order 2026. This instrument, which was laid before the House on 19 March, marks the first stage of a wider programme of reform to introduce a fairer, more consistent and more sustainable fees framework in the property chamber, supporting the significant reforms to the private rented sector implemented by the Renters’ Rights Act 2025. Through that Act, the Government have delivered landmark change: we will abolish section 21 no-fault evictions, strengthen the rights of tenants to challenge unreasonable rent increases, and enhance local authority enforcement powers. Taken together, those measures represent the biggest expansion of renters’ rights in a generation. However, rights only matter, and are only meaningful, if people can enforce them. That depends on a tribunal system that is sufficiently resourced and is accessible for all. Currently, around 250 types of application can be brought to the property chamber, but only about half of them incur a fee. That is because they originate from various legislative provisions, some of which are not referenced in the current fees order. That has created an inconsistent system that neither reflects the cost of administering proceedings nor supports a fair and proportionate contribution from its users.

• 27 Apr 2026 · Draft First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) Fees (Amendment) Order 2026 · Hansard source

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  I am familiar with the argument raised by the Master of the Rolls; we discussed it during the passage of the Renters’ Rights Act, and I have discussed it with the relevant Minister. That is the subject of a whole series of policy choices that have been made to strike an appropriate balance between the rights of tenants and landlords. We do not expect that measure to be abused, and there are equities that go the other way. If someone backdates a payment, they will then be forced to pay arrears and additionality in one big lump sum, which can also create unfairness. That is the result of a policy choice that has been made in the Act, although it may be one that the Opposition take issue with. This is now all about ensuring that a tribunal is ready to receive any ensuing rent appeals as soon as possible after the order comes into force on 1 May—it is very exciting. I did jot down the right hon. Gentleman’s further question, but I am now struggling to read my handwriting, because we are at that point in the day.

• 27 Apr 2026 · Draft First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) Fees (Amendment) Order 2026 · Hansard source

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  Indeed. The other thing to say—this relates to both sets of questions—is that the new Renters’ Rights Act introduces a series of new rights that we want people to take advantage of. By the way, that is done not just in the purview of the tribunal system but in what some academics have called the shadow of the law. The Act enhances people’s bargaining rights with their landlords when discussing and negotiating rent. It does not necessarily mean that a case will end up in tribunal, although it may, and the fees are not a barrier to that. That is important because when we introduce an extension of rights with such a policy, we have to wait to see precisely how it alters the behaviours and the societal relationships that we are looking to rebalance. The Act is a big extension of renters’ rights, and a greater equalisation between the rights of tenant and landlord. The right hon. Gentleman is correct that we need to see how the demand coming into the chamber looks a year from now, and how the system is operating. Of course, we will need to keep that under review to ensure that the tribunal keeps up with demand. However, with the measures that we have introduced to anticipate the need for additional capacity, we are confident that we will be able to do so successfully. I will write to the right hon. Gentleman on the outstanding points that I have not been able to respond to, because I do not have the detail to hand, and I will ensure that he gets an answer on all of them. In short, the draft order strikes the right balance between cost recovery and access to justice. It is a necessary step that strengthens the sustainability and fairness of the property chamber. As a consequence, I urge members of the Committee to vote in favour of the draft order. Question put.

• 27 Apr 2026 · Draft First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) Fees (Amendment) Order 2026 · Hansard source

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  That was exactly what I was going to suggest: I shall write to the right hon. Gentleman. I will write to him on his first question, which was about RDEL and the exact running costs of the property chamber. We expect an increase in the volume of receipts that the property chamber will take, and some work is being done internally as to what that might look like. As the right hon. Gentleman would expect, this is an expansion of rights, and as I have said, we have set the fees not to impede the enforcement of those rights but to enable it, while achieving a measure of cost recovery. We want to reduce conflict in our society, but we do not shy away from the fact that the thrust of the policy behind the Renters’ Rights Act is that we welcome people enforcing their rights where rents that are set far outstrip what can be considered reasonable. That is why we have deliberately empowered people by giving them rights that can be enforced. The hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle made a point about the tribunal’s readiness. In anticipating additional pressures on the tribunal, we have been undertaking steps to increase capacity within it. Those have included the recruitment of additional administrative staff and the establishment of a centralised operating hub. We are also working with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government to develop a new digital system for rent appeals in the property tribunal, to maintain the efficiency of that. The fees, along with the Ministry of Justice’s operating budgets, will support that capacity, so that those who rely on the chamber, be they tenants or landlords, can expect the capacity of the tribunal to keep up with the demand.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 20 concerns the statutory title “Central Criminal Court”, which has been on the statute book since 1834 and refers, in practice, to the Old Bailey. Under existing legislation, the title applies to the Crown court sitting within the City of London. Historically, the only Crown court located within the City has been the Old Bailey, so the provision has operated without difficulty. From next year, however, I am absolutely delighted to say that the City of London Corporation’s new courts complex at Salisbury Square will open. It is fantastic; I have been to seen it—I had to do that politician’s thing of wearing high-vis and a hard hat. The complex is an amazing facility for London’s justice system, with modern courtrooms. It is a brilliant resource, providing much needed additional Crown court capacity following more than £600 million of investment. Without legislative clarification, however, both the Old Bailey and the new courts at Salisbury Square would automatically be designated as the Central Criminal Court. That would cause operational confusion for court users and practitioners. Clause 20 therefore clarifies that the statutory title will continue to apply only to the Old Bailey. The clause also maintains the long-standing statutory entitlement of the Lord Mayor and aldermen of the City of London to sit as judges when the Crown court sits within the City. In practice, and as a matter of convention, they do not assert that entitlement in order to sit in hearings in criminal cases. The clause does not alter how that entitlement is exercised in practice; it ensures that the historic statutory entitlement continues to apply consistently when the Crown court sits in more than one location within the City. The City’s historic relationship with the Central Criminal Court does not affect judicial independence or integrity, and all judicial business will continue to be conducted by independent, legally qualified judges. I commend clause 20 to the Committee.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  On the hon. Gentleman’s last point about the reliability of the kit in courtrooms, that is critical not just for evidence via video. We have an ambition for greater use of video right across our criminal justice system, not just for vulnerable witnesses but in other ways that have been touched on. We have talked a lot about prisoner transportation being a challenge for the system; one way to address that is by having less demand for it, unless it is needed in the interests of justice and fairness. The increased use of video could be of real benefit but, of course, it has to be reliable. That is why the Government’s capital investment in increasing the budget for His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service—I saw some of that equipment in action in Harrow court—will make such a difference. When we are talking about vulnerable witnesses, who are given the option of section 28, the quality of their evidence can be impacted if it is inconsistent or glitchy, or if the way it appears in a courtroom is somehow distorted because it is too big or too small, or whatever. All those things will be important, which is why the significant investment agreed with the judiciary through the concordat process over the next three years will make such a difference, and why all the court transformation and reform measures are being accompanied by significant inward investment, as announced by the Deputy Prime Minister. I should say that HMCTS, the performance of which I routinely review with the Deputy Prime Minister, conducts regular audits of facilities and brings that to our attention so that we can see where the roll-out is happening, which courts are lacking facilities and which need to be prioritised for investment.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The family justice strategy, which will be forthcoming in July, will address a lot of what the hon. Member asks for. It will set out where the Government think reform is needed, and it will bring together what we are already doing with our child-focused courts programme, which is accompanied by a £17 million investment. We believe in that model, which we think has huge merit. It will be available to people regardless of where in the country they live. More generally, we are introducing the funding that the Lord Chancellor has allocated to sitting days for family hearings, the targeted recruitment of more judges, more fee-paid judges, the greater use of virtual hearings—which can be a supportive measure for people giving evidence, not just an efficiency measure—and training. The hon. Member for Chichester will know that the Domestic Abuse Commissioner has also undertaken detailed work in this area through her “Everyday business” report, which talks to some of the resourcing constraints faced by the family court. That work forms part of the commissioner’s report on a family court reporting mechanism, which is designed to provide ongoing evidence-based scrutiny of the family court’s response to domestic abuse in particular, and to highlight where systemic improvements are needed, so we have other accountability measures shining that light. If the hon. Member for Chichester awaits the strategy—she will no doubt want to take a look and critique parts of it—I think a lot of it will address some of the concerns she raises. As I said, before proposing the repeal of the presumption, we carefully assessed the impact it would have. We do not overstate it, but it is important because the change affects the judicial process, not the underlying reasons why families come to court. Because we do not expect it to increase case volumes, case length or demand for legal aid, we think that the current arrangements can meet it, but there are so many other improvements that we want to drive.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Let me start by thanking the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for tabling new clause 28. But before I come to that, I will set out the rationale for clause 15. The clause clarifies the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 by confirming that courts have a statutory power to direct the editing of pre-recorded cross-examination recordings under section 28 of the 1999 Act when material is inadmissible or where including it would not be in the interests of justice. That clarification matters because section 28 recordings capture the natural flow of their recollection under the pressure of cross-examination. Inevitably, that can sometimes include long periods of silence where the witness needs a break or material turns out to be inadmissible or prejudicial to the fairness of the trial. Without an explicit power enabling the court to direct appropriate edits, there is a risk that either the edits are not made—potentially compromising the integrity of the trial and wasting court time—or that the edits made become a point of contention, requiring additional hearings or appeals to resolve. Additionally, in the event of a retrial, the pre-recorded evidence may require editing to ensure that it covers only the charges for which a retrial has been ordered. Although the current criminal procedure rules already allow for editing of section 28 recordings, the Law Commission has highlighted that the absence of a specific statutory provision has created uncertainty and, once again, inconsistency in practice. The clause addresses that by placing the power on a firm statutory footing, ensuring that practitioners have a clear and consistent understanding of the power of the courts in this respect. It is important to emphasise that the clause does not introduce a new process, nor does it expand judicial powers; it formalises the careful, limited editing that already occurs to ensure trial fairness and integrity. Witnesses can be assured that the substance of their evidence will remain intact. Only material that is legally inadmissible or wholly irrelevant to the issues in the case will be removed. I commend the clause to the Committee. I will now turn to new clause 28, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. Before I come to the substance of the new clause, I want to begin by recognising the immense courage it takes for the vulnerable and intimidated witnesses we are talking about to come forward in the first place and give evidence. For many, recounting their experience is traumatic enough. Being asked to relive it by watching back their video-recorded police interview—known as their achieving best evidence interview—can be a great deal more challenging. It can bring distressing experiences flooding back. However, we must be careful not to reach for legislative change where it is not necessary or helpful. Prosecutors may suggest that a witness watches their ABE interview to refresh their memory before cross-examination, but there is no legal obligation to do so. For some, watching the recording is manageable; for others, it is not, and the law already accommodates that reality. Where a witness does not wish to watch the recording, a written transcript can be provided for them to read instead. For some, that is a more accessible way of engaging with the material. Prosecutors make decisions about how and when memory refreshing should take place on a case-by-case basis, taking into account practical considerations, such as the length of the transcript and the witness’s ability to read and process it. However, I recognise that the achieving best evidence guidance for interviewers does not explicitly reference that practice. That omission will be addressed. The Ministry of Justice owns that guidance and will ensure that clarification is included in the next revision. Any future clarification to the ABE guidance will also be reflected in the relevant Crown Prosecution Service guidance and communicated to all prosecutors. Let me now turn to the proposal to introduce a time limit for the defence to submit questions to the witness. I must be clear: cross-examination questions cannot, under any circumstances, be shared with witnesses before they give evidence. However well intentioned the proposal may be, it risks undermining the very integrity of the process it seeks to improve. Exposing a witness to questions in advance may influence, whether consciously or unconsciously, how they respond. Beyond that, it risks undermining the defendant’s right to a fair trial. If there is any suggestion that a witness’s evidence has been prepared or influenced in advance, the credibility of the whole process is jeopardised. There are also practical implications to consider. Requiring counsel to finalise all cross-examination questions within six months of the ABE being submitted to court, or 14 days before cross-examination—whichever is soonest—would be unworkable in many cases. Defence questions evolve as new material is disclosed. Such a process would undermine the fairness of proceedings and the effectiveness of case preparations. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member not to press new clause 28 to a Division.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank all hon. Members for their contributions. I will set out the rationale for clause 17 and then address the central argument presented by Opposition Members about the repeal of the presumption —the Government do not overclaim for it; is not a silver bullet for the problems and challenges of child protection in this country and will not solve all the challenges in our family court—and why we nevertheless think that it is the right thing to do. I will then address the amendment and new clauses. The Government’s intention through clause 17 is to repeal the presumption of parental involvement from the Children Act 1989. The child’s welfare must always be the court’s paramount concern when making decisions about a child’s life, and that principle is enshrined in the 1989 Act. The Children and Families Act 2014 amended the 1989 Act to introduce a presumption that, in certain private law proceedings, the child’s welfare will be furthered by each parent’s involvement, unless evidence shows otherwise. We know that, in most families, both parents play a vital role in a child’s life. However, although the legislation clearly states that the presumption is rebuttable and does not apply where a parent poses a risk of harm to the child, it has none the less faced serious and sustained criticism. To echo what others have said about the testimony and campaigning work of Claire Throssell, ably supported by her MP, my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge (Dr Tidball), Women’s Aid and a whole host of survivors of domestic abuse and those who represent them, the presumption contributes to a pro-contact culture in the family courts that too often prioritises parental involvement over child welfare. We published our review of the presumption in full last October, and its conclusion was that unsupervised and face-to-face contact was the most common outcome in child arrangements cases, even where there were allegations or findings of domestic abuse. To give some context, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner has presented evidence of her own that proven allegations of domestic abuse arise in 80% of those cases. This is prevalent. Those cases come to the court in the way they do because, by definition, family relationships have broken down and there is conflict—that is the nature of these cases, and domestic abuse is already an issue in so many of them. The review demonstrates that, although the presumption is not the sole driver, it can be a contributory factor to a culture in family courts that prioritises parental involvement, even in cases of abuse, which means that, too often, decisions are putting children in harm’s way. I want to be really clear about that, because we are not overclaiming that the repeal of the presumption will change everything overnight, and we are certainly not saying that it will keep everybody safe. There has been a lot of criticism of the family court, but one thing I do know is that those tasked with making these decisions are trying, through their professionalism, empathy and training, to keep children safe. I do not doubt their good faith. I struggle to imagine the burden of having to make those decisions. We are talking about the devastation of loved ones who have lost children—but imagine being the judge who made that decision, and living with that. I do not think for one second that they would have intended that consequence, and I suspect that, where a child is harmed or even killed as a result of a child arrangement, they regret those decisions every single day. Through clause 17, we are seeking to ensure that judges approach the application of the law and the welfare checklist, which we regard as really important, with an open mind. The danger with the presumption is that they start with just that: a weighted approach to the consideration of the child’s best interests. We do not think that repealing the presumption is a silver bullet, but it will send a signal to the system—to the leadership of the family court and to everybody who sits within it— that the way to approach this is purely with an open mind, focused on the child.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  As with the previous debate, I will set out the rationale for clause 9 and then turn to the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Grahame Morris). Clause 9 will create a high admissibility threshold for evidence about a complainant’s compensation claims in sexual offence prosecutions. That could include evidence that a victim has made a compensation claim in relation to the offence being tried, the amount of money awarded as compensation, details of the claim or the fact that compensation was refused. The Law Commission report made clear that compensation claim evidence is disproportionately requested in sexual offence cases, and that, in some instances, it is used by the defence to insinuate that a victim has fabricated an allegation for financial gain. That kind of reasoning lacks a legitimate basis and risks unfairly undermining victims. This measure will ensure that such evidence cannot be admitted when its sole purpose is to introduce or perpetuate misconceptions about why survivors come forward. Instead, a judge will be able to admit compensation claim evidence only when it has substantial probative value to a genuinely important issue in the case. These reforms therefore strengthen protections for claimants while maintaining the defendant’s right to a fair trial. I will respond to the questions from the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle. He fairly raises the issue of how we can assess that these tests are being applied fairly and consistently. That will obviously take time as they bed in, but, in many ways, the precise rationale behind these changes is to codify, clarify and simplify tests that already exist for the treatment of evidence in these cases and to assist our judges to use them fairly. There is no doubt that future Ministers and others with responsibility for this issue will want to know that it is working as intended. No doubt studies can be undertaken in the future. I commend clause 9 to the Committee. I turn to amendment 68. The Law Commission’s review made clear that compensation claim evidence is disproportionately requested in sexual offences cases, as I have said. That is precisely why we have introduced the high admissibility threshold in the Bill. The amendment asks for a threshold of merely “relevance”, which is lower than the statutory threshold we propose. If we were to accept it, it would not give complainants any additional protections above the current status quo, despite the Law Commission identifying a clear issue with how this evidence is currently being requested and used. For those reasons, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden to withdraw the amendment. Amendment 69 focuses on the disclosure of evidence to the defence before an application is made to admit that evidence to the courtroom. However, the clause does not change the test that the prosecution must currently apply when considering whether to disclose details of a complainant’s compensation claim to the defence. Instead, it focuses on the stage after the prosecution and defence have reviewed the evidence, and asks the judge to consider whether the evidence indeed has substantial probative value and can therefore be relied on in court. As the clause stands, the case will remain that the prosecutor must disclose to the defence any material that might be considered capable of undermining or assisting the case of the accused—that is only fair—and that includes the compensation claim evidence. The defence, in cases involving sexual offences, can then consider how they wish to bring that forward. For those reasons, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden not to press the amendment to a vote.