Sarah Sackman MP: speeches 2025

Speeches

• 12 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I think the hon. Lady is right that that is not specified as a requirement. All three panel members would be drawn from the relevant professions and would therefore be subject to the standards pertaining to those professions. In the legal profession, they will be practitioners who are experienced in analysis and reaching decisions based on facts and law. The professional standards for all three regulated professions place a high value not just on integrity, but on impartiality. For the commissioner and for any judges on the panel, the “Guide to Judicial Conduct” makes the principles explicit.

• 12 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I appreciate the passion and force with which the right hon. Lady makes that point. I have set out the Government’s concerns about deliverability—the operational challenges around delivering what has been suggested. This is a case of applying section 22 of the Welsh Language Act to the commissioner, who under the promoter’s new schedule 2 would be able to give guidance to panels on how exactly they should facilitate exactly what the right hon. Lady is seeking—the ability of the dying person who is seeking an assisted death to express themselves through the Welsh language within those most sensitive of proceedings. There could be facilitation by the commissioner in order to commission an interpreter and assist the person to speak in Welsh. I appreciate that the right hon. Lady feels that that would create a barrier that is not appropriate to this context, but I think it is a reflection of the fact that certainly the Government are not seeking to stand in the way of people expressing themselves in Welsh. We want to vindicate that. It is in line with our wider commitment to devolution and to working with the devolved Governments in the context of the Bill. The right hon. Lady has made her point forcefully, and no doubt the Committee will come to vote on this amendment, but I have to, on behalf of the Government, acting responsibly, lay out some of the challenges that it would mean to the operability and deliverability of the Bill.

• 12 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-third sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman’s first point is a matter for the impact assessment itself. Clearly both Departments have data on the state of the professions, on how many KCs there are in the country and on how many people will be needed to provide the service. As I say, if Parliament wishes it and legislates for it, the state will work to deliver it, but the detail will come in the impact assessment. On the hon. Gentleman’s second question, as I made clear earlier, the effective shift away from the High Court model in clause 12 to the model in the new clauses has been driven by the policy intent of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. I will not get into the precise chronology of when the matter was raised, but it came from my hon. Friend. Yesterday, I hotfooted it from the Committee to Justice questions, where I was delighted to see the hon. Member for Reigate. We discussed capacity issues in our Crown courts and civil courts. Those issues are well reported in the media, but there is no connection between them and the policy shift here. If this is what Parliament chooses to legislate, the state will work to deliver it.

• 12 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-third sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is important to look at this issue in the context of what my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley is setting out to do through the legislation, and what the panel’s function is, which is the function that was discussed in the debate. This is not a trial or an inquiry. That is not what is being undertaken by the panel. The panel’s purpose is to ensure that the eligibility criteria process has been followed in a correct, lawful and safe way. As others have pointed out, it is not adversarial, and will not be described as such in the Bill. All that I am saying on behalf of the Government is that the Official Solicitor’s role is most frequently to assist in court with a difficult or novel point of law when the person cannot do it themselves. Well, we do not have that here. We are not determining points of law; we are determining whether this person has met the eligibility criteria. Secondly, the Official Solicitor’s role is for when individuals lack capacity. In the Bill, by definition, the person who is applying has already satisfied two doctors that they have capacity. Of course, the question of capacity may be something that the panel wishes to explore further—it has the three panel members and the ability to draw on its powers to seek further information to test that—but it is not clear, without altering the current role that the Official Solicitor plays within our legal system, what role they would be serving.

• 12 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-third sitting) · Hansard source

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  My understanding is that it would, yes. If I am wrong about that, I will obviously come back to the Committee and correct it, but my understanding is that it would. They are two different things—one is called a certificate of eligibility and one is a High Court declaration—but in terms of how they operate within this legal scheme, my understanding is that they would have the same legal effect, and they are intended to. Under new clause 21, the panel must hear from, and may question, the person seeking assistance and the co-ordinating doctor, or the independent doctor, or both. The panel may also hear, and may question, the person’s proxy if that is relevant, and any other person, including those appearing to have relevant knowledge or experience. This could include family members, or other individuals with an interest in the welfare of the person, as well as other experts. The new clause is explicit that the panel must not grant the certificate of eligibility if it is not satisfied that all the requirements have been met. Further consequential amendments introduce references to the certificate of eligibility throughout the Bill. Once the panel has made a decision, it will be required to notify the person seeking assistance, the co-ordinating doctor, the commissioner and any other person specified in the regulations. As others have pointed out, the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley do not spell out every step of the process or the procedure that the panels would be expected to follow. That is left to secondary legislation, and it will be for the commission and the commissioner to produce their own guidance on how the panels and the panel procedure are intended to be governed and regulated. That is in line with the approach to legislation more broadly, with main objectives typically set out in primary legislation, and secondary policy issues and technical and administrative matters, dealt with through secondary legislation, regulations and guidance.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty First sitting) · Hansard source

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  As I understand it, both in the context of the High Court—which has the ability to speak to whomever it likes—and of the panel, when we come to debate its role, that is a discretion. It is a requirement to hear from the person seeking an assisted death; it is a requirement to hear from the co-ordinating doctor. However, hearing from others is discretionary, which means that, if it is necessary in order to be satisfied that the eligibility criteria are met—which is what the scheme requires—in that context, under the panel’s or the High Court’s discretion, it may seek evidence from elsewhere. That is what the provision, as the Government reads it, is designed to do. The amendment that my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe puts forward clearly limits that discretion; whether that is desirable is a policy choice, but that is how it is intended to function. As I have said, the Government will continue to remain neutral on these substantive policy questions, but I hope that is useful to members of the Committee.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty First sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Harris. As I and my colleague and hon. Friend the Member for Aberafan Maesteg have made clear throughout the debate, the Government continue to remain neutral on this Bill and do not take a position on assisted dying. My remarks will therefore focus on the legal and practical impact of the amendments, to assist the members of this Committee in undertaking line-by-line scrutiny. Amendments 267 and 105 to107, which have now been withdrawn, deal with the Bill as currently drafted in relation to the High Court. Clause 12 as currently drafted would require the High Court to make a declaration that the requirements of the Bill have been met, following a person’s first declaration to receive assistance to end their own life, with statements from a co-ordinating doctor and an independent doctor. The amendments relate to how the High Court will declare itself satisfied that a person has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life and that they have not been coerced or pressured. Briefly, amendments 407 and 410 seek to change who the High Court—as others have said, we might come on to debate some of these themes relation to the panel—would engage with when considering applications for assistance under the Bill. In determining whether the person has a clear, settled, and informed wish to end their life and that they have not been coerced or pressured, the High Court would be required to hear from and question the person seeking assistance, as opposed to having the option to do so. As my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley pointed out, in the later provision in relation to the panel, that has now become a requirement. As my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe made clear, under her amendment 410 the High Court would lose the ability to hear from or indeed question any other party other than the person seeking assistance and the assessing doctors. Removing the ability—whether of the High Court or, as we may come on to debate, of the panel—to hear from and question any other party may limit that body or court’s ability to interrogate wider evidence or points of view.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Amendments 432 to 434 would remove provisions regarding proxies from the Bill. They deal with proxies in the context of the High Court process. As a consequence, the High Court would be unable to hear from the person’s proxy where the proxy has signed the first declaration, and the person would be unable to use a proxy to authorise a medical practitioner to provide assistance to end their own life. Removing the ability for persons seeking assistance to use a proxy would limit access to the assisted dying process for people who, for example, have a physical impairment, are unable to read or are for some other reason unable to sign the declaration. As I said earlier, the Government remain neutral, but I hope that provides some context and an explanation of how the amendments would operate.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Amendments 312 and 313 would make several changes to the process for High Court approval of applications under the Bill as drafted. Amendment 312 would allow a person who believes that the requirements of the Act have not been met to make that known to the High Court and to be heard before a declaration is made. The proposed mechanism is that the person would enter a caveat in any district registry of the High Court within 14 days of the application being lodged or received. Of course we will come to later amendments, but under the Bill as drafted, the High Court has the power to hear from and question any person to determine whether the applicant has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life, and that they have not been pressured or coerced, so there is that mechanism to hear from others through that channel. Amendment 313 would enable appeals to be made against a decision by the High Court to make a declaration, as opposed to only where a declaration is not granted. As drafted, the Bill provides that any person may seek a judicial review of any decision of the High Court, including the decision to make a declaration, if they are adjudged to have standing. Amendment 269 would enable any person, other than the person seeking assistance, to apply for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal against a decision of the High Court. The amendment would also enable appeals to be made against a decision by the High Court to grant a declaration, as opposed to only where a declaration is not granted. The Court of Appeal would not be obliged to consider the matters set out in the Bill when forming its decision. It is important to say that whether with or without the amendment, any person may still seek a judicial review of any decision of the High Court, if they are adjudged to have standing.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Court Transcript Costs · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member is absolutely right that initially there was not enough uptake. The Government acted to drum up awareness of the scheme precisely because we want to test its effectiveness for victims of rape and serious sexual offences. I reassure her that application numbers are up. We are conducting the evaluation, and once we have the results, we will be able to test whether we can implement the scheme in the future.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Court Transcript Costs · Hansard source

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  The Government recognise just how important accessing transcripts can be for certain victims. That is why transcripts of sentencing remarks are available free of charge to the families of victims of fatal road offences, murder and manslaughter. It is also why this Government are running a one-year pilot that offers free sentencing remarks to victims of rape and sexual offences. That is due to conclude in May. We are also looking in the round at how we lower the cost of obtaining a court transcript through increased use of technology.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Court Backlogs · Hansard source

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  The last Government left a mess in every single corner of our justice system—our criminal courts and our civil courts. In the process, they let down not just victims of crime but businesses, employees, employers and children in care; every part of our system was left in a complete mess. That is what we are sorting out, with record Crown court sitting days—a commitment of 110,000 sitting days—and running almost to a maximum across all jurisdictions to bring down the backlog. We are sorting out the mess that we were left with.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Court Backlogs · Hansard source

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  I am sorry to hear how long victims in my hon. Friend’s constituency are waiting. That is why we are taking urgent action to bear down on the Crown court backlog, not only by increasing sitting days this year, but by committing to record numbers of sitting days next year. Of course that will not be sufficient to bring down the backlog and deliver swifter justice for victims, and that is why we need to hear from Sir Brian Leveson and implement reform in due course.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Court Backlogs · Hansard source

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  The magistrates court is being run in a sustainable way. We extended the sentencing powers in order to free up capacity in the Crown court, and that has been sustainable, and we are increasing capacity in our magistracy by recruiting an additional 2,000 magistrates from diverse backgrounds every year. But that is why we are looking at system reform, whether in the magistrates court or the Crown courts. We are going to need once-in-a-generation reform, and when Sir Brian Leveson reports back, that is what we will get.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  As the Lord Chancellor has said, our priority is delivering swifter justice for victims and bearing down on the Crown court backlog. That is why we have asked Sir Brian Leveson to consider all options, which have to include reclassification of offences and the intermediate court. We have to have a whole-system reform, but I fear that if we were to exclude those options, we would not be gripping the problem.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  I am really horrified to hear of that case. Of course, as I mentioned earlier, the transcript of sentencing remarks should have been made available free of charge, but I am happy to meet my hon. Friend to discuss how transcripts of trials more broadly can be made available.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  As the hon. Member well knows, the solicitors profession is highly regulated. We have the Solicitors Regulation Authority, which itself is regulated by the Legal Services Board. All our professionals, whether they are practising in criminal or civil law, are highly respected and highly regulated, and we are indebted to them.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  I am sorry to hear about that tragic case in my hon. Friend’s constituency. Encouraging or assisting suicide is an offence under the Suicide Act 1961, and sending communications that encourage or assist serious self-harm is an offence under the Online Safety Act 2023, but we are going to tighten up the law to address the situation that my hon. Friend has described. Of course, this is about not just the law, but the enforcement of the law as well.

• 26 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fifteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Common law.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I know that Members will be eager to engage, and have already engaged, in a robust discussion about the issue of safeguarding, and how best to protect and prevent individuals from being forced or coerced into seeking assistance to end their life. As my hon. Friend the Member for Aberafan Maesteg has said throughout the debate, I will not be offering a Government view on the merits of any proposed amendments tabled by Members. Instead, I will offer some observations on the legal and practical effects of the amendments, to assist Members in undertaking line-by-line scrutiny. As a starting point, we have heard a series of concepts discussed in this debate, including manipulation, pressure, coercion, undue pressure and encouragement with coercive ends. There is a range of terms that some Members have used interchangeably, and fairly so. It is important to say that there is a consensus that all those things are unacceptable; the point, and the Government’s view, is that the current provision in clause 1(2)(b) would cover that behaviour with the currently used terminology “coerced or pressured”. Amendments 23 to 33 set out to include consideration of whether a person has been unduly influenced, in addition to having been coerced or pressured by another person, in the determination of whether that person is accessing assisted dying voluntarily. As I have already indicated, the Government’s view is that the terms “coerced” and “pressured” would cover the term “unduly influenced” as it is understood. If the Bill is voted into law, the guidance and training for the healthcare professionals who would apply the tests would need to be developed to cover that sort of behaviour in this specific context. Similarly, amendments 82 to 92 and new clause 5 seek to introduce an additional safeguarding requirement that a person has not been encouraged into undergoing the assisted dying process. It is important to contextualise the amendments, which would introduce this new safeguarding requirement into all the relevant clauses of the Bill where a doctor—or a court or panel, if that is what transpires—must already make an assessment as to whether the person has the relevant capacity, has a clear and settled wish, is making the declaration voluntarily and has not been coerced or pressured by any other person into making it. I have listened to the debates about what encouragement may or may not mean in this context. As I understand it, new clause 5 states that the definition of encouragement is that which would constitute an offence under section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961. In reality, that Act does not specifically define encouragement in legislative terms, so there is a risk that the definition becomes somewhat circular. As I will come to in a moment, as with the terms “coercion” and “pressure”, the meaning given to “encouragement” by the courts, where it is not defined by Parliament, is its natural meaning. I now turn to amendments 113 to 115 and 118 to 122. Let me deal first with amendments 113 to 115. As the Bill is currently drafted, registered practitioners who act as co-ordinating and independent doctors are required to establish that the person seeking assistance has not been coerced or pressured. People seeking assistance to end their own life are also required to confirm in the first and second declarations that they have not been coerced or pressured. The amendments seek to add an additional requirement to establish that the person seeking assistance to end their own life has not been manipulated by any other person into making the decision.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am going to make a little more progress; we will come back to that in a moment. It is really important that we have these concepts in other parts of criminal law and other parts of our legislation. I come back to the point that we run a risk, which runs counter to the intent that lies behind the amendments, if we add additional language into the Bill. I will develop that point and then take further interventions. As we have seen, clause 1 includes the terms “pressured” and “coerced”. The ordinary meaning of the word “pressure” is the use of persuasion or intimidation to make someone do something. There are broad types of behaviour, many of which have been eloquently brought into this debate, that would come within that. The ordinary meaning of the word “coerce” is to persuade someone to do something against their best interests by using force or threats. That could be subtle or it could be very blatant, but the word “coerce” is understood in that way by our courts and in other areas of our legislation. One can readily see how an act of manipulation such as in the examples used earlier, or the exertion of undue influence—I think the term “unduly pressured” was used—would all fall within the terms “coerced” and “pressured”. That is the settled view of the Government. There is a consensus that none of these things, including applying undue pressure, are desirable or acceptable in this or any other context, but there is a risk that adding terminology does not do what hon. Members intend, which is to create more safeguards. The risk is that by adding new words, those tasked with applying and interpreting legislation, if it comes to court, will assume there must be some specific reason for their inclusion. They will assume that the words must have some meaning distinct from the other words in the list—coercion and pressure—notwithstanding the fact that, on their natural meaning, the terms overlap and, in the Government’s view, are inclusive of those sorts of behaviours. That risks the effect of narrowing the interpretation of the words used rather than inviting our courts to give them their usual expansive meaning. In turn, that risks casting doubt on the current interpretation of those words in existing statutes such as the Serious Crime Act, which created an offence for coercive and controlling behaviour, and limits any read-across on interpretations from previous decisions into the application that we are debating. In short, it may actually serve to limit, not to add, to the safeguards in the process. It may risk adding confusion and uncertainty where what is already provided for in clause 1, with the words “coercion” and “pressure”, are simple, readily understood, expansive definitions that would cover precisely the behaviours that I think the hon. Members who tabled the amendments are concerned about.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  To bring it back to the specific debate about the amendments, the terms “coercive” or “coerce” and “pressure” appear in the criminal law and have broad definitions. That is how they have been interpreted by the courts. Others have referred to section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, which created an offence of controlling or coercive behaviour. In that context and the relevant Bill, Parliament chose not to make a specific legislative definition, but the way in which it has been interpreted, in accordance with its natural meaning, has vindicated the proposition that a broad meaning is given to those terms. For example, that offence could include coercive behaviour such as repeatedly putting somebody down, telling them they are worthless, seeking to control their daily routines or isolating them from friends and family to put pressure on them. As my hon. Friend says, we understand those sorts of behaviours in a much broader way in a changing society.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am certainly not saying that those are bad Acts, and I do not want anyone to quote me as saying that. We could in theory sit here and come up with a whole set of terms that would be descriptive of types of pressure and coercion. We have come up with a number of those, including “undue influence”, “manipulation” and “unduly pressured”. There are other types of behaviour that we might seek to describe. Indeed, if one refers to the Crown Prosecution Service’s guidance in respect of the offence in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, there are a whole load of descriptors of different types of behaviour. We could name and enumerate all those different types of behaviours, but, in the Government’s view, that is not the best way to create legislation that is workable. It is the Government’s settled view that the words “coercion” and “pressure” cover off the types of behaviour that Members suggesting these amendments would wish to include. The risk is that such amendments create more confusion and shed more heat than light, if you like. Indeed, there is then the risk that the definition of coercion is narrower than it in fact is under our law as it is understood in our courts and in the body of common law and case law, which has been developed in construing those sorts of terms. We are still on clause 1, and we have spoken a little about the interplay between clause 1 and later clauses, particularly clause 26, which engages the criminal offence as drafted in the Bill. I want to stress that while the procedural clauses 1, 7, 8 and 12 may use the same language as the criminal offences in clause 26, they are conceptually distinct, as others have noted. Although it is right that a court could be expected to construe legislation as a whole, case law in relation to one provision will not necessarily flow through directly to a later provision. It may be helpful to illustrate that with the word “encouragement”, which has been raised. As we know, it is an offence to encourage or assist a person to commit suicide. As the hon. Member for Reigate pointed out earlier, it will continue to be so if the Bill is passed, outside of the specific exemption in the Bill. It is generally also an offence to encourage or assist a person to commit any other offence under the Serious Crime Act 2007. Specifically, it is an offence to do an act capable of encouraging or assisting suicide or another offence. The term “encouraged” is not defined in either statute. While it is true to say that section 2A(3) of the Suicide Act—which was added in 2009—clarified that doing an act that is capable of encouraging suicide includes a reference to a person doing so “by threatening another person or otherwise putting pressure on another person”, that was intended to be illustrative of the meaning of “encouraged” in that context; it does not serve as a general definition. Within the Bill, it is important to keep in mind the difference between the procedural requirements—which is what we are discussing in this group—and the criminal offence requirements. Adding words to one provision because they are found in a criminal offence elsewhere risks, in the Government’s view, unintended consequences. Adding “encouragement” to the procedural clauses is perhaps an example of this.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  On the hon. Gentleman’s first point, there is no suggestion that we should somehow accept any weaker form of provision in this Bill to protect other parts of the law. Having said that, he would well expect me, as a Government Minister, to be concerned with the integrity of our statute book as a whole. It is because the Government take a holistic view of how the criminal law and other areas of our law operate and define these concepts, and how they are read across the piece, that we make our contention in respect of these particular provisions, because the terms “coercion” and “pressure” are given their natural meaning and are expansive. In the Government’s settled view, they would be inclusive of the types of behaviour that are described in the amendments before us—namely manipulation, undue pressure and the sort of encouragement that I think, when he keeps coming back to it, the hon. Gentleman is referring to, which is not encouragement in a benign way as might exist between two perfectly supportive family members in a normal conversation, but the sort of encouragement that is intended to lead to coercive ends. The hon. Gentleman says that pressure is a subset of encouragement; the Government’s view is that coercion and pressure would cover off the other behaviours that are described in the amendments. It is not necessary to include those additional concepts, because it risks sowing confusion that somehow they are not included in the concepts of coercion and pressure.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It might help if I offer—with the usual caveat that of course the Government are neutral—the Government’s position with respect to what the hon. Lady has been discussing. It is important to point out that the terms “coercion” and “coercive behaviour” and “pressure” that are used on the face of the Bill appear in existing legislation without statutory definition. In other words, they are given their ordinary meaning and they operate effectively in that manner in the criminal law. The hon. Lady is absolutely right that clause 26, which we shall come to in due course, is a separate matter, but of course it will be important to review the Bill as a whole and to understand the interaction between the different provisions in clause 1, as we trace it through to the criminal offences. It is the Government’s view that manipulative behaviour or undue influence—the terms that the hon. Lady is using—would come within the normal meaning as understood in case law by the judiciary of the terms “pressure” and “coercion”. In terms of the integrity of the statute book, there is a concern that by adding additional terms, we run the risk of creating confusion, because when it comes to the interpretation of those provisions, judges will be looking to understand and ascertain what Parliament meant by “undue influence” that was not currently covered by coercion. Given that those terms are commonly broadly interpreted, it is the Government’s view that the sorts of behaviours that the hon. Lady is describing—“undue influence”—would be covered by the terms used on the face of the Bill. For simplicity, given that our existing body of law interprets those provisions widely, and to ensure consistent application of the law in this context and other contexts where coercion arises, it is important from the Government’s point of view to retain the Bill’s current wording.