Samantha Dixon MP: speeches

Speeches

• 24 Jun 2026 · Elections: First Past the Post · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I thank the hon. Member for Richmond Park (Sarah Olney) for calling the debate, and all hon. Members who have contributed to it. The Government recognise the strength of feeling expressed today regarding our voting system, which after all sits at the heart of our democracy. We welcome open and constructive debate on the voting systems we use and their effectiveness, whether by long-standing Members or more recently elected Members. As set out in our manifesto and our strategy for modern and secure elections, the Government believe that strengthening our democracy, upholding the integrity of elections and encouraging voter participation are key priorities and fundamental responsibilities for Government. Our Representation of the People Bill, which is currently before Parliament, contains a range of measures that will deliver on those commitments. As the hon. Member for Wokingham (Clive Jones) mentioned, that includes protecting elections against foreign interference. It also means moving towards more automated voter registration, strengthening the resilience of our electoral processes and opening up democratic participation for the next generation by removing barriers to increased participation. Those are substantial electoral reforms, and the Bill represents the boldest and most ambitious change to our democracy for decades. It will help to keep our elections secure, build public trust and encourage more people across society to engage and participate. Turning to the specific matter of this debate, the Government recognise that different voting systems can be better suited to different types of polls and elections. We believe that the first-past-the-post system works where people are elected to a body, such as a council or Parliament, where there is a mix of representatives from different parties and platforms. Although it is not perfect, the first-past-the-post system provides a robust, efficient and secure way of electing those representatives. It provides for strong and clear local accountability, ensuring a direct link between elected representatives and local constituents, as so ably demonstrated—and dare I say, embodied—by the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon). The first-past-the-post system is also well understood by voters, and as such we do not want to make any changes just for the sake of it. At present, therefore, the Government have no plans to change the electoral system for UK parliamentary elections or local council elections in England. For single-person executive positions, such as mayors or police and crime commissioners, the same reasoning does not apply, as they exercise their powers as individuals. We therefore believe it is appropriate to use a different voting system—the supplementary vote system—which allows voters to express a first and second preference, and which requires the winning candidate to receive the majority of the votes counted.

• 24 Jun 2026 · Elections: First Past the Post · Hansard source

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  I will write to the hon. Member on that point, but I would say that the supplementary voting system ensures that mayors have a broader base of support from the people they represent. SV was the system used when the roles of mayors and PCCs were first established, and it was changed to first past the post following the Elections Act 2022. The Government have been consistently clear about our intention to revert the system back to SV. I refer the hon. Member for Cheadle (Mr Morrison) to the fact that we have already passed the necessary legislation to change it back in some cases. The change for other mayoral systems and police and crime commissioners will occur in due course, once the relevant measures in the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026 are commenced. The forthcoming mayoral election in Greater Manchester will therefore take place under SV, which we have always been clear is the most appropriate system for electing mayors. However, the electoral system we use is just one part of ensuring trust in our democracy. We are also strengthening the postal and proxy voting system to make it more resilient and responsive. We are introducing tougher political finance rules that will give electors more confidence in how political parties are funded and protect UK politics from foreign interference. And we recently launched a democratic engagement fund to provide £2.5 million to increase democratic participation. Turning to the points raised by other hon. Members, trust in our elections is important to everyone in this House, as referenced by the hon. Members for North Herefordshire (Dr Chowns), for South Cotswolds (Dr Savage) and for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart). That is central to what we are trying to do in the Representation of the People Bill. The Government recognise that our voting system is of fundamental importance in ensuring trust between elected representatives and the public. Although the first-past-the-post system is not perfect, it is a way of ensuring that elected representatives have a strong connection with their constituents. My hon. Friend the Member for Falkirk (Euan Stainbank) talked about disengagement from voting. I would gently suggest that that was not borne out by the recent by-election in Makerfield, which saw high levels of participation. In reference to his remarks and those of my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Dr Arthur) regarding the devolved Governments, we work closely with them; indeed, I met Ministers from Scotland and Wales yesterday to discuss our proposals for legislation and bringing them forward, so that we can learn and work together across our country. I think I have covered the comments about trust and involvement. Several hon. Members—including the hon. Members for South Cotswolds, for Didcot and Wantage (Olly Glover) and for North Herefordshire, and my hon. Friends the Members for Edinburgh South West and for Falkirk—asked about a national commission on electoral reform. We have no plans to set up such a commission and do not believe that doing so is appropriate or necessary at this time. The important reforms we plan to introduce as part of the Representation of the People Bill will ensure that our democracy remains secure and robust in elections going forward. To summarise, the Government are content that first past the post is the appropriate system for use in UK parliamentary elections and local council elections in England, and that the supplementary vote system should be used for single executive positions. We currently have no plans to make any further changes to that approach. Although I appreciate that that is disappointing news for many hon. Members in the room, we will continue to welcome discussion and feedback on this important topic. In closing, I thank the hon. Member for Richmond Park for securing this important debate, and all hon. Members who have contributed.

• 11 Jun 2026 · Grenfell Tower Fire: Ninth Anniversary · Hansard source

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  I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Kensington and Bayswater (Joe Powell) for raising this truly important issue. The ninth anniversary of the Grenfell Tower tragedy will be, above all else, a day of remembrance, shaped by loss, love and the enduring strength of this community. I want to begin by acknowledging the survivors and relatives of those who died at Grenfell Tower; I know they have the deepest sympathies of the whole House and our most profound respect. The fire at Grenfell Tower, which claimed 72 innocent lives, was a national tragedy and a scandalous chapter in British history. We will never forget what happened that night, and we must make sure nothing like it can ever happen again. I recognise how each anniversary is intensely personal and deeply painful for bereaved families, survivors and the wider community. I am also struck every day by the grit and resilience of this courageous community, not least in the way it leads the commemorations. The Government will continue to be guided by the community and honour its voice. As I am sure my hon. Friend appreciates, it is right that the community shapes how the day is marked and that we stand alongside it in support. I have had the privilege of meeting many members of the Grenfell community, and I carry with me a lasting impression of their strength and determination. I want to acknowledge the concerns that have been raised about justice and respond to them briefly. This Government recognise the importance of justice and acknowledge that it remains a central concern for the community. In the light of recent announcements, I want to respond to those concerns. The Metropolitan police has been investigating the Grenfell Tower tragedy since June 2017. It is one of the largest and most legally complex investigations the Met has ever conducted, with around 220 officers and staff dedicated to the investigation. Those responsible must be held to account, and we fully support the Met in its important work, which must remain independent. We also remain supportive of wider Government involvement, including from the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice, and I know that on a cross-Government basis we are focused on ensuring that justice is served. We are mindful of this community’s enduring spirit at a time of continued change at the Grenfell Tower site. This Government will continue to support bereaved families and survivors and the local community, and to work with the independent Grenfell Tower Memorial Commission to create a memorial worthy of those we remember. The Grenfell Tower Memorial (Expenditure) Act 2026 is now in force, providing the statutory authority needed to take forward the construction of the memorial and ensure its long-term care. The design team, Freehaus, is working with bereaved families, survivors and the local community to help shape the memorial. It is right that the voices of those most affected by the tragedy remain central to these decisions, guiding what comes next. The memorial will honour those who lost their lives and all those whose lives were changed forever. It will be a place for people to remember, to reflect and to pay their respects. This anniversary reminds us of our shared responsibility to honour the dead and to make sure that Grenfell’s legacy is shaped by those most directly affected. It is in that spirit that I now turn to what this Government are doing to make sure that such a tragedy can never happen again. As I set out in my recent written statement to the House, alongside the May 2026 Grenfell Tower inquiry progress report, the tragedy exposed deep and long-standing failures in the systems that were meant to keep people safe. The loss of 72 lives was a profound and preventable failure of oversight and accountability by industry, successive Governments and regulators. Bereaved families, survivors and the community continue to remind us of the human cost of those failures and the need for lasting change. The Government have accepted the inquiry’s findings and are taking forward reforms to build a stronger and more accountable building safety system. Since February 2025, we have completed 21 of the inquiry’s recommendations, and we remain on track to deliver all recommendations by the end of 2029. We recognise that too often, inquiry recommendations have been made and accepted but not implemented, and we are determined that that will not be the case here. We are continuing to explore ways to improve transparency and accountability so that the public can see that the Government are following through on their commitments. We accepted the Grenfell Tower inquiry’s recommendation to maintain a public record of recommendations made by inquiries. That tracker was published on gov.uk last summer and shows the progress made on implementing recommendations from 2024 onwards. It will be updated regularly and expanded to capture new inquiries as they conclude. I note my hon. Friend’s comments on the national oversight mechanism, and I know how important that is to the bereaved and to survivors, notably Grenfell United. The Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee is also conducting an inquiry into this issue. We welcome that work, and have submitted evidence to support the Committee’s inquiry. The Government have been clear that supplier exclusion must be carried out in line with the Procurement Act 2023, and must not jeopardise the ongoing criminal investigation. The pause does not prevent the Cabinet Office from resuming or undertaking future debarment investigations. In the interim, we have taken steps to stop senior officials and Ministers associating with the seven most highly criticised companies in the Grenfell Tower inquiry phase 2 report. Across Government, Ministers and officials will no longer share platforms with those firms. As the Secretary of State set out to Parliament earlier this year, remediation remains a central priority. In the King’s Speech, we set out our commitment to bring forward the remediation of unsafe cladding Bill—a decisive step towards fixing the cladding crisis and making sure that those responsible are held to account. We will introduce a new legal duty to remediate, requiring those responsible to identify and fix unsafe cladding promptly, or risk criminal prosecution. Where they do not act, a new remediation backstop will allow a third party to step in and carry out the work. Each building made safe means fewer families left waiting, and real progress in helping people move on with their lives. We will never forget those we lost, and we remain focused on making sure that such a tragedy never happens again. Grenfell was the result of deep and widespread failings, and it is our responsibility to address them. As we continue with these efforts, we remain firmly committed to supporting the Grenfell community. We recognise the profound impact of the tragedy on the whole community, and in particular on children and young people. Working with the Department for Education, we have provided more than £800,000 in additional funding to support the physical health and emotional wellbeing of children and young people in schools serving the Grenfell community, as the tower is carefully taken down. That is alongside a further £8 million provided by the Department of Health and Social Care to support the physical health and wellbeing of the community during this period. Our thoughts are also with the residents living in the community around Grenfell Tower. They deserve safe, high-quality homes. Refurbishment work on the Lancaster West estate, led by the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea and supported by further Government funding, will make a real difference. That work must be shaped by the views of residents themselves, as they know their community best. We expect swift progress from RBKC in response to the C3 regulatory judgment by the Regulator of Social Housing, and the regulator continues to engage intensively with RBKC on its improvement activities. I am concerned to hear my hon. Friend’s comments about the change in RBKC’s scrutiny arrangements and will seek further advice about that. In addition, we will continue to explore stronger and more independent oversight to ensure that RBKC sets the standard of an exemplar council, and so homes are delivered to the standard and at the pace people rightly expect. As I come to a close, I acknowledge that I am the latest in a long line of Ministers who has had responsibility for the Government’s response to the tragedy and the recommendations from the inquiry, and I acknowledge that that is hard and difficult. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Kensington and Bayswater for the tenacity and constancy that he has shown to the community he represents with such determination. As we look ahead to the future of the homes and the community around Grenfell, we are reminded once again of the strength that is shown in how people come together to remember, to support one another and to make sure that those who were lost are never forgotten. That strength must also guide us, and I pledge to the House that we will continue with determination, guided by those most affected, so that the legacy of Grenfell is one of lasting change. Question put and agreed to.

• 8 Jun 2026 · Draft Combined Authorities (Mayoral Elections) (Amendment) Order 2026 · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the Committee has considered the draft Combined Authorities (Mayoral Elections) (Amendment) Order 2026. It is a pleasure to serve under you in the Chair, Sir Desmond. The draft order was laid before the House on 21 May 2026. Over the course of the past year, Parliament has debated, agreed and decided—through the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026, which received Royal Assent in April—that the voting system for mayors and police and crime commissioners should be changed to use the supplementary vote system. The SV system was used when the positions of elected mayor and police and crime commissioner were first established, decades ago, and the Government believe that it is the most appropriate voting system for single executive offices, where it is essential that an individual has a broad mandate from their electorate. The English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act contains the main measures required to change the voting system used for those types of elections, and they will be commenced in due course. However, a number of other changes must be made to the election conduct rules via secondary legislation to fully enable the use of SV—for example, updating the images of ballot papers to allow a voter to select multiple preferences, and updating guidance to electors and the procedures used at the count should there be a second round of counting. We stated during passage of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill that the Government’s intention was to implement the change to SV for any mayoral or PCC election taking place after the scheduled May elections this year. The order has been drafted to be concise and so will make only the necessary additional amendments to enable SV to be used for both combined authority and combined county authority mayors, including those who exercise police and crime commissioner powers. Therefore, the order will not make amendments with regard to elections for local authority mayors, the Mayor of London or police and crime commissioners. Further legislation will be brought forward for those in due course. The draft order will make the change to SV for any combined authority or combined county authority mayoral election for which notice is given on or after the date that the order comes into force. As this is a reversion to the original voting system used for mayoral elections, the SV process will be familiar to administrators and electors, so implementing the changes will be straightforward and we are confident that returning officers will be able to make the necessary changes. The conduct rules for elections of combined authority and combined county authority mayors are set out in the Combined Authorities (Mayoral Elections) Order 2017. The draft order will make a number of amendments to the 2017 order. As I have said, the SV system was used when combined authority mayors were first established, so the changes will largely revert the 2017 order to its original drafting. The Electoral Commission has been formally consulted on the changes and has raised no objections. Articles 3 to 5 of the draft order will amend schedules 1 to 3 to the 2017 order, respectively, which set out the conduct rules for these mayoral elections, both when the poll is a stand-alone poll and when the poll at a mayoral election is combined with the poll at another type of election or referendum. The amendments will update the guidance given to voters in polling stations to reflect the fact that they now have the option to select a second preference. They will also update the various processes involved in counting the votes to reflect that a second round of counting may be required. They will also make a number of consequential amendments throughout the conduct rules to ensure that references to votes refer to first and/or second preference votes as appropriate. Schedules 1 and 2 to the draft order contain updated statutory electoral forms. Schedule 1 sets out the forms in respect of a stand-alone mayoral election, and schedule 2 sets out the forms where a mayoral election is combined with another type of election or referendum. Two types of forms require updating to enable SV. The first is the ballot paper. A new ballot paper image is provided in the draft order to allow voters to select both a first and a second preference of candidates. The draft order also contains the ballot paper to be used when there are only two candidates running, because in that scenario voters will not be given the choice to select a second preference and the poll will revert to a simple majority voting system. The second form is the postal voting statement. Such statements contain guidance to postal voters, and the draft order provides new postal voting statement forms, which will inform the voter that they may select both a first and a second preference where three or more candidates are running. These are straightforward changes necessary to implement a change set out in primary legislation, the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act, and I hope that the Committee will join me in supporting the draft order. I look forward to answering any questions Members may have.

• 28 Apr 2026 · Fire and Rescue Services: Funding · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Murrison, particularly given your specific interest in this matter. I thank the hon. Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers) for securing this important debate, and for the consistent way in which he raises the issue in the House in his role as shadow Minister for crime, policing and fire. I welcome the opportunity to set out the Government’s position. We all know about the role that fire and rescue services play in keeping people safe. Every day, firefighters and fire service staff protect lives, prevent harm and provide reassurance to communities. Alongside responding to fires, they attend road traffic collisions, floods, wildfires and other emergencies. They deliver vital prevention and protection activity, and increasingly support wider resilience efforts at a local and national level, as hon. Members have mentioned. To carry out that work effectively, fire and rescue services rely on a mix of funding from central Government, council tax precept, retained business rates and specific grants. Getting that framework right is essential, particularly at a time when services face changing risks, increasing complexity and growing demands, beyond traditional fire incidents. My hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson) was right that 14 years of Conservative austerity have absolutely battered our fire and rescue services. Fourteen years of Conservative cuts to local authority and fire service budgets have left many areas operating on a shoestring: 20% of firefighter capacity was lost across the country during that period. Throughout the period, the Fire Brigades Union and its membership have worked tirelessly to protect the public and do more with less. We are working hard to remedy that. That is why the 2026-27 local government finance settlement marks a significant change. After a decade of short-term settlements, it delivers the first multi-year funding settlement for local government in 10 years. It gives fire and rescue authorities the stability and certainty that they need to plan ahead, invest in their workforce and estates, and make sound, long-term decisions in the interests of public safety.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I would prefer to press on; the hon. Lady will be able to respond later. To better protect against those who seek to covertly undermine UK elections, we are instead strengthening rules and closing loopholes at all stages of the political donations process. I have described the measures in some detail earlier today: “know your donor”, the three steps for foreign companies, and the consideration we are giving to the Rycroft review. A cap is not being placed across all donations because currently the majority of funding for political parties in the UK comes from private, corporate or other organisational sources. State funding accounts for around 10% of the total income of UK political parties. There is no public or political appetite to increase the level of state funding. I urge hon. Members of this Committee to reject this new clause. New clause 54 proposes that the Secretary of State shares plans for establishing a royal commission to consider the effectiveness and merits of political expenditure controls and, in particular, a cap on political donations. A public inquiry is an extremely costly and lengthy process. Instead, we have already sought to ensure that our democracy is strengthened by considering recommendations from authorities and expert bodies in this area, including the Electoral Commission, the Committee on Standards in Public Life and the National Crime Agency. Those risks and recommended solutions were taken forward and set out in our strategy for modern and secure elections, published on 17 July last year. Those commitments are now set out in full in this Bill. To ensure no stone was left unturned, the Secretary of State commissioned the independent Rycroft review to see where we could strengthen our laws and what could be recommended to protect against covert funding and foreign interference. I therefore hope that the hon. Member for Hazel Grove will withdraw new clause 54. The purpose of new clause 58 is to require the Electoral Commission to conduct a review of the feasibility of a cap on annual expenditure by political parties, candidates and third parties, and then for the Government to issue a response containing proposals informed by that review. The Government agree that transparency and fairness are vital principles to be upheld in elections. Further, it is of the utmost importance to limit the risk of foreign interference. We are committed to ensuring that we have robust systems to protect the UK from foreign interference, and this Bill reinforces electoral legislation against foreign interference. The commitment of the hon. Member for North Herefordshire to fairness and transparency in elections has been clear throughout the parliamentary process, and I share that commitment. The Government note the recommendations of the Rycroft review and will respond to those measures in due course. New clause 65 would substantially cut national spending limits for political parties and would, for the first time, bring most campaign staff costs within scope. National spending limits were intended to strike a careful balance, allowing parties to communicate effectively with voters across the country while preventing money from dominating elections. In practice, parties generally campaign within the cap, which operates as a ceiling rather than a target. Those limits were set by Parliament in 2000 and have been uprated over time to maintain their real-world value. Periodic uprating helps avoid eroding parties’ ability to communicate effectively with the electorate, so is consistent with the original policy intent that Parliament approved. The proposal to include campaign staff costs would represent a significant change to the regulatory framework, introducing additional complexity in how parties define roles and apportion costs. There is not currently clear evidence of a problem with this arrangement. The Government note the issues raised about the level of the spending limits, including those highlighted by the independent Rycroft review. As Members know, we are considering those very carefully and will respond in due course. On that basis—and to allow that work to be completed first—I invite the hon. Member to seek to withdraw the new clause.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  New clause 37 would ban the use of foreign languages in campaign material during the regulated period—it would make it a criminal offence. A primary purpose of the Bill is to encourage more people across society to engage and participate in our democracy. The new clause would not serve that purpose. It is not for the Government to prescribe the languages that campaigners are permitted to use to engage voters who come from a wide range of diverse backgrounds across the constituencies we represent. It is certainly not for the Government to criminalise the use of certain languages. Various electoral and non-electoral offences protect against malicious forms of campaign material, which is, in essence, what the hon. Member for Hamble Valley was talking about. For example, it is an offence to publish or distribute threatening, abusive or insulting material that is intended or likely to stir up racial hatred. It is also an offence to improperly influence someone to vote in a particular way or refrain from voting. That would include, for example, a leaflet that threatened to make use of force or place undue spiritual pressure on a person in order to induce them to vote in a particular way or refrain from voting. Those offences apply regardless of the language used in the campaign material. The Government have no plans to regulate the use of foreign languages in campaign material. We are seeking to minimise barriers to participation while safeguarding the integrity and security of elections. The measures in the Bill are intended to restore faith in our politics and ensure that the UK continues to be a thriving and diverse democracy. The new clause is entirely incompatible with those intentions. I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  New clause 66 would remove the prohibition on the Electoral Commission bringing criminal proceedings in England, Wales and Northern Ireland that was introduced in the Elections Act 2022. To be clear, the Electoral Commission has never brought criminal prosecutions, even prior to the changes introduced by the Act. It has a wide range of investigatory powers and is able to impose a variety of civil sanctions for certain offences. The Bill already extends and strengthens those powers to promote more robust and proportionate enforcement. Where criminal investigation and prosecution is required or thought appropriate for certain offences, the Commission refers those cases to the police and the relevant prosecuting authority, who are experts in this domain. The Government recognise the importance of ensuring that electoral law is enforced effectively, and that there is there is public confidence in the system of regulation governing political finance. That is why we commissioned the Rycroft review. As the hon. Member for North Herefordshire pointed out, the review looked specifically at criminal enforcement arrangements and concluded it entirely appropriate that criminal investigations are handled by the police, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland. The review noted that it would be unnecessary and potentially counterproductive for the Electoral Commission to have a prosecutorial role; it would require significant investment in specialist expertise that might be deployed only sporadically. Furthermore, although the Electoral Commission must enforce electoral law without fear or favour, it must also engage constructively with campaigners to help them to comply with the rules. Rycroft noted that it would be difficult for the Electoral Commission to maintain that constructive regulatory role with political parties if it were also pursuing criminal prosecutions. Given the review’s findings on this issue, we do not think that any changes are needed to the Electoral Commission’s role. We will respond fully to the Rycroft review in due course and consider whether any other legislative changes are necessary in line with its findings. I request that the hon. Member for North Herefordshire withdraw the new clause.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving me a breather. As he knows, the Rycroft review considered this matter and—I mean this sincerely; it is not simply a form of words for the Committee —the Government are carefully considering those recommendations and will respond in due course. To give him that assurance: this is part of that consideration. Alongside the measures I mentioned, enhanced company permissibility tests ensure that only organisations with a genuine and substantive UK connection can donate, closing off key vulnerabilities in our electoral framework. The Government are also committed to robust monitoring and evaluation of the Bill, and anticipate that this will include an impact evaluation assessing whether the policies introduced have achieved their intended aims. We have discussed the Rycroft review, and I sincerely mean it when I say that we will respond fully in due course to all the measures in it, including on improved co-ordination between the Electoral Commission, the Government, the security services and the police. For those reasons, while I fully understand the commitment of my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington to strengthening our defences against foreign interference, the Government do not consider this amendment to be the right mechanism to achieve that end.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have said this before and I will say it again: the Bill is not designed to prevent specific individuals from participating in or undermining elections. It is about the general regulatory framework and criminal law that we intend to implement, uphold and shore up to prevent certain behaviours in the future. It is not about specific individuals, so I decline to respond the hon. Member’s comments, except to say simply that the legislation, in its entirety, aims to root out political violence, harassment and intimidation. New clause 15 proposes to require candidates at UK parliamentary elections, in order to be validly nominated, to complete a declaration on whether they have received any income or gifts from foreign nations or connected entities. A registered political party would be responsible for ensuring that such a declaration had been completed before allowing a candidate to be nominated as a candidate for that party. The Government are strengthening the rules around political finance to protect against foreign interference and have introduced several measures, which we have discussed, that will apply to candidates. The reforms will make it significantly more difficult for malign actors to interfere in our elections. As hon. Members know, and as I have said many times, the Rycroft review has recommended that the Government look further at enhancing rules for candidates to ensure that money received previously and then used in campaigns comes from permitted sources. The Government are carefully—and I underline that point—considering that recommendation, among all the others. The Government share the concern of the hon. Member for Hazel Grove but, in light of that ongoing work, I ask her not to move new clause 15. New clause 16 seeks to require registered parties to produce an annual risk mitigation statement relating to donations originating from foreign nations, and to commission an annual independent investigation into donations that they receive from foreign-owned UK entities. Foreign money has no place in the UK’s political system. We recognise the hon. Member’s concerns that the nature of foreign interference is evolving, with threats becoming increasingly sophisticated. That is precisely why the Government have introduced a package of measures that work together to close potential loopholes and address vulnerabilities to foreign interference. Via secondary legislation we will require donors to declare any benefits linked to their donations and we will strengthen donation rules to ensure that companies must demonstrate a genuine and substantive UK connection. Those changes will help to ensure that political donations genuinely reflect UK-based interests and will prevent the use of shell companies to channel impermissible donations. In practice, where behaviour is not already criminal, the new “know your donor” regime already addresses much of the issue that new clause 16 seeks to tackle. However, the new clause’s approach of annual risk mitigation statements and retrospective investigations of foreign nation donations is less proactive than the risk-based duty that the Bill introduces. As a reminder, rather than relying on parties to report annually about what they consider appropriate, the “know your donor” regime introduces risk-based due diligence on significant donations across the electoral regime. For the first time, recipients of donations will be required to adopt a risk-based framework for assessing the permissibility of donors, supported by Electoral Commission guidance, which will set out how donees can mitigate potential risks. That means that anyone receiving significant donations, not just parties, must carry out risk assessments, ensuring that the system as a whole is strengthened.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dame Siobhain. I will speak to clauses 70 to 74 first, and we will come to the amendments tabled by the Liberal Democrats later. Harassment and intimidation of voters, electoral staff and campaigners, both online and in person, is unacceptable and has a profoundly detrimental impact on the UK’s democratic processes. We know that electoral staff faced unacceptable abuse and intimidation during the 2024 general election. That is why we are extending the scope of the disqualification order to ensure that electoral staff are provided with the same protection as candidates, campaigners and elective office holders. Clause 70 will enhance the disqualification order’s ability to protect those who participate in public life, and those who play a crucial part in the administration and delivery of elections. It will also act as a deterrent, signalling that intimidatory behaviour is a serious matter that must not be allowed to damage our democracy. It is clear that more must be done to tackle the abuse and intimidation directed at those who participate in elections and political debate. While disqualification orders are a key part of tackling the unacceptable harassment and intimidation of those in public life, they do nothing to prevent those who have no interest in standing as a candidate from engaging in intimidatory or abusive behaviour. Clause 71 introduces a new statutory aggravating factor, which will empower courts to apply an uplift when passing sentence for an offence linked to intimidation. This is where the offender was motivated by hostility towards candidates, campaigners, elective office holders and electoral officials and their staff. Clause 72 introduces this new statutory aggravating factor in Northern Ireland, and amends the location of the pre-existing Scottish aggravating factor. This is a significant new deterrent for those who seek to damage the UK’s democracy or intimidate those who uphold it, and will ensure that anyone who does so will be subject to appropriate criminal justice penalties. Let us turn to clause 73. Disqualification orders were introduced in the Elections Act 2022, to be imposed on offenders throughout the UK who commit crimes of hostility against electoral candidates, campaigners and officer holders. Scotland introduced Scottish disqualification orders in the Scottish Elections (Representation and Reform) Act 2025, which gave similar protection to a fourth category: Scottish electoral officials. The Bill extends the scope of the disqualification order in the Elections Act 2022 to protect electoral officials throughout the UK, but Scottish electoral officials will continue to be covered by the Scottish legislation. To ensure that there is a fully reciprocal relationship between disqualification orders in Scotland and the rest of the UK, the Bill also applies the effect of Scottish disqualification orders to relevant elective offices throughout the UK. That ensures that if someone is disqualified from standing for or holding office in Scotland, they will also be unable to stand for or hold office in the rest of the UK, and vice versa. That will ensure a consistent approach throughout the UK for intimidatory behaviour towards those who participate in public life. If a person is convicted of specific criminal offences, motivated by hostility towards candidates, future candidates, substitutes, nominees, campaigners, holders of relevant elective office or electoral officials, they will be prohibited from standing for or holding office for five years across the UK. Clause 74 builds on the measures introduced in clause73, and makes amendments to various pieces of legislation to apply the Scottish disqualification order to relevant elected offices across the UK.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Government fully recognise the seriousness of the threat posed by foreign interference in our democracy. Protecting the integrity of UK elections is essential, which is why it is a criminal offence to accept or facilitate donations from foreign sources, and why the Bill seeks to strengthen the system further. However, while I can understand and appreciate the intention behind new clause 2, we do not believe that it is the right way to address this threat. First, new clause 2 takes a broad and untargeted approach that would permanently bar any individual who “is, or has been…a member of, or…adviser to a foreign administration” from making political donations, regardless of how long ago that role was held, its nature or whether there is any ongoing connection to a foreign state. That risks excluding individuals who are entitled to participate in UK political life, and who pose no credible risk of foreign interference. Secondly, there would be issues of enforceability. I will not spend much time on this particular point, because it is important that I set out our arguments on the principle, and what I think the right answer to this is, but following the approach of new clause 2 would mean relying on definitions of persons that are difficult to get right and can be unenforceable in practice. The amendment relies on concepts such as a “politically-appointed adviser”, which is opaque, legally speaking, and risks creating legal uncertainty for campaigners and regulators. Thirdly, and more fundamentally, where the concern is hostile activity by, or on behalf of, foreign states, we already have robust and targeted tools in our national security legislation, which is complemented by safeguards in electoral law that we are seeking to enhance through the Bill. The National Security Act 2023 provides a clear criminal framework for tackling hostile state activity, including the foreign interference offence, which is specifically designed to capture conduct carried out on behalf of a foreign power to influence the UK’s political system. Existing electoral law is designed to ensure that money can only come from permissible sources and criminalises the acceptance or facilitation of donations from impermissible foreign sources. The Bill significantly strengthens the existing rules so that in future even donations that are potentially risky are identified earlier, scrutinised more closely, and returned where necessary. By introducing robust “know your donor” checks and requiring all donors to declare any benefits they have received in connection with their donation, we are reducing the space in which individuals who pose a real risk, or their proxies, can operate under the radar. Our new measures directly respond to the concerns raised by the hon. Member for Hazel Grove, as well as those of other key stakeholders, such as the Electoral Commission, the Committee on Standards in Public Life and the National Crime Agency. With that, I hope she feels she can withdraw her amendment. New clause 3 seeks to prevent those convicted of a prescribed offence relating to the promotion, incitement, or use of political violence from making political donations. Currently, if an individual is convicted of such an offence, that conduct rightly affects their democratic rights, including their ability to stand for election or to hold elected office. This helps to deter those who would undermine the democratic rights of others, such as candidates contesting an election. The Government are absolutely aligned with the intention behind this proposal. Political violence and its promotion or incitement have no place in our democracy, and we are clear that those who seek to undermine democratic participation through violence or intimidation should face serious consequences. The question, however, is not whether this behaviour is unacceptable—it plainly is—but whether this is the right legal mechanism to address it. If this amendment were to be accepted, it would represent a significant shift in the purpose of political finance law, which is about ensuring only those individuals who have a legitimate interest in our elections can support candidates and campaigns through their vote, volunteering their time or offering financial support. Although I share the hon. Member’s concern, the Government believe that this amendment does not address a regulatory gap and would not further our shared aim of reducing harassment and intimidation in politics. The harassment and intimidation of voters, electoral staff and campaigners is unacceptable and has a profoundly detrimental impact on our democracy. That is why we are taking forward several interventions in the Bill to tackle this issue, which we have already discussed in great detail, and are doing so through criminal law, electoral offences and disqualification, rather than through political finance rules, which are not designed to address conduct. With those reassurances, I hope the hon. Member will withdraw her amendment.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  This clause strengthens the electoral regime by restoring a clear, objective test for forfeiture: if an individual donor was not actually on an electoral register at the time of the donation, the donation is impermissible and liable to forfeiture. It responds directly to long-standing concerns from the Electoral Commission that the current framework is open to inconsistency. In particular, the 2010 Supreme Court ruling, which allowed courts to consider whether a donor was eligible, rather than actually registered, when assessing impermissible donations and their forfeiture, introduced uncertainty and risked discouraging thorough permissibility checks by campaigners. The clause removes the ambiguity in electoral law, ensuring that permissibility of an individual is determined on actual electoral registration. It reinstates a simple and objective test that supports consistent enforcement and reinforces the integrity of the electoral regime. Campaigners already must take reasonable steps to verify donor permissibility. The clause simply removes the scope for subjective interpretation of permissibility and strengthens deterrence by ensuring that impermissible donations cannot be retained by campaigners due to ambiguity in the law. By reinforcing the principle that only permissible donors may fund UK politics, the clause provides a clear deterrent for impermissible donations and supports compliance by political parties and campaigners.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will speak now to clause 62 and Government amendments 79 to 87, which were tabled in my name. I will come to the other amendments later. The clause introduces measures that have long been called for by the Electoral Commission, the National Crime Agency and the Committee on Standards in Public Life, which is now known as the Ethics and Integrity Commission, to tighten the rules around unincorporated associations. Under the current framework, unincorporated associations are permitted to make political contributions provided their main office and activities are based in the UK, but there are no restrictions on the sources of the funds behind those contributions. Existing rules therefore do not provide sufficient transparency or assurance about who is ultimately funding the political contributions made through such bodies. The clause introduces a strengthened framework to ensure that political contributions from unincorporated associations come from permissible sources and are subject to stricter and more consistent transparency requirements. The clause lowers the thresholds at which UAs must register with the Electoral Commission and report the gifts they receive, ensuring that significant contributors provide the same level of transparency as other regulated campaigners. It also extends transparency rules so that contributions to candidates count towards the registration threshold, and it requires UAs to appoint a responsible person, improving clarity about who stands behind such associations. Finally, clause 62 introduces new controls to ensure that funds used for political contributions come from permissible sources. UAs will be required to verify political gifts they rely on, and they will be prohibited from using unverifiable or impermissible funds for political activity. I commend clause 62 to the Committee.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  New clause 18 seeks to require digital campaigning material, in scope of the digital imprint regime, that contains images, audio or video generated or materially altered to include a statement that such artificial intelligence has been used. The Government fully recognise the challenges posed by AI-generated content, including deepfakes, and the risks they present to democratic processes and public trust in the online information environment. We agree that helping voters understand the authenticity of digital campaigning material is an important objective. However, AI technologies are developing at pace, and there is not yet a reliable or widely adopted technical basis for determining when content has been generated or materially altered by AI. That would make enforcement by the Electoral Commission and the police difficult in practice, and it would risk undermining campaigners’ compliance with the rules. The new clause, as drafted, would also create uncertainty and disproportionate legal risks for campaigners. For example, it would create a new criminal offence for failing to include a statement about AI use, even where the AI involvement may be trivial, automated or outside the campaigner’s knowledge or control. Further consideration would also be needed on how liability for offences should apply to those who republish material. There would also be a considerable chance of the new clause quickly becoming obsolete. AI is evolving rapidly, so adopting a definition of “generative artificial intelligence” in primary legislation might struggle to keep pace with technological developments and it could quickly become outdated. Although we share the intention to strengthen transparency in digital campaigning, the Government do not believe that the new clause is currently workable or proportionate. The Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology recently announced that the Government will establish a taskforce to put forward proposals for Government on best practice for labelling AI-generated content, with an interim report to be published in the autumn. I urge Members to follow the progress of that taskforce. I turn to new clause 10 and amendment 4. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Milton Keynes Central for those and for her commitment to strengthening online protections. I know Members feel strongly about that area. I share the objective of seeing the powers of the Online Safety Act 2023 being fully and effectively utilised. With that in mind, the Government have carefully considered new clause 10, which would require the Government to publish guidance on the operation of certain offences relating to digital communications, as they relate to candidates and elected officials. Under the Online Safety Act, in-scope service providers are already required to have effective systems and processes in place to identify and remove illegal content. That includes content that amounts to the two offences identified in new clause 10: the “false statements about candidates” offence and the offence of undue influence. Those duties apply equally to AI-generated and manipulated content where such material meets the threshold of either offence. As the independent regulator, Ofcom issues codes of practice that provide clear guidance on what action providers should take to manage and mitigate illegal content. The codes recommend various measures across risk management, user reporting and content moderation. Ofcom has already produced guidance to assist providers in making judgments about whether certain content is illegal, and such guidance includes usage examples where possible. As the independent and expert online safety regulator, Ofcom, not the Government, is best placed to offer such guidance. The Government have no plans to widen their role within the Online Safety Act regulatory regime by issuing guidance on matters within Ofcom’s remit. Introducing a new duty for Government to publish parallel guidance on two specific offences, and committing to regularly updating that guidance, would blur the lines between Government and the independent regulator, undermining the model for which Parliament has only recently legislated. The Government remain firmly committed to ensuring that protections keep pace with evolving threats to democracy, and I welcome continued engagement with parliamentarians on that important issue. As Members will know, Rycroft made recommendations in his review supporting the principle of advertising libraries and suggested that the Government could use their convening power to work with social media companies to extend the practice of advert libraries to achieve consistency in how they are presented. That is not the same as setting a legal requirement for a repository of digital political advertising, as intended by new clause 10. None the less, we are carefully considering all of the recommendations in the Rycroft review and will issue a response in due course. New clause 24 seeks to establish a repository for paid-for digital political advertising. Digital political advertising plays an important role in supporting democratic engagement. It remains one of the most accessible and cost-effective ways for political parties and campaigners to connect with the public and have their message heard. However, the Committee will be aware that the European Commission introduced similar requirements to new clause 24 in 2024, including mandatory transparency notices containing information such as spending and targeting, and the requirement for platforms to upload all political adverts to a European repository. In response, major platforms such as Meta and Google chose to cease hosting paid political advertising entirely in the EU, citing operational complexity and uncertainty as to whether compliance by platforms and campaigners was realistically achievable. If the UK were to adopt comparable measures without fully understanding their operational impact, we could see similar unintended outcomes here. The potential removal of political advertising from major platforms in the UK could risk reducing political pluralism online by restricting the ability of political parties, civil society organisations and candidates, many of whom rely on digital platforms to engage effectively with the public. Smaller, newer parties and independent candidates may be disproportionately impacted by such an outcome, losing an affordable channel to reach voters, while larger, well-followed parties and campaigning groups would likely be less affected. That would make campaigning more challenging for newcomers, potentially undermining the level playing field. The Government agree that transparency in digital campaigning is important, but any reforms must be carefully balanced to protect freedom of expression and avoid placing undue burdens on campaigners and platforms. This is a complex area, and the implications need detailed consideration to avoid replicating the unintended consequences seen in other jurisdictions. In the meantime, we welcome the steps already taken by platforms such as Meta and Google, which have created publicly accessible political advert libraries. We encourage other platforms to do the same. The measures in the Bill will extend the scope of digital imprint rules and place enforcement on a clearer and more proportionate footing, ensuring that voters can continue to make informed decisions on digital material in elections and referenda. We will continue to keep wider policy relating to electoral campaigning under review. I turn to new clause 25. The Government absolutely recognise the importance of protecting our elections from online interference, including concerns about how algorithms, such as recommender systems, can amplify harmful or misleading content. The current legal framework to tackle online electoral mis and disinformation has the Online Safety Act 2023 as its core pillar. New clause 25 would risk creating overlap and confusion with Ofcom’s responsibilities under the Online Safety Act. Under the Online Safety Act, in-scope services must take action in relation to any content that amounts to existing election offences during an election period. The Online Safety Act already provides Ofcom with extensive powers to gather information from services and scrutinise how algorithms operate as well as a mandate to require services to conduct illegal content risk assessments. That includes assessing the likelihood of users encountering illegal content through algorithms, how systems may exacerbate or mitigate those risks, and what safeguards are required. From 2027, categorised services will also be required to report information about their algorithms, including how they influence the display, promotion or recommendation of content. Creating overlap or confusion with Ofcom’s responsibilities under the Online Safety Act also increases the risk of regulatory uncertainty. For those reasons, we cannot accept the new clause. That said, the Government fully recognise the importance of ensuring that the commission has the tools it needs to enforce compliance with the regulatory framework it is responsible for enforcing. That is why we commissioned the Rycroft review to consider whether political finance rules and their enforcement can be strengthened in the light of emerging risks, including covert funding and foreign interference. As Members know, we are carefully considering relevant recommendations from the Rycroft review to ensure that political finance rules and their enforcement remain robust and fit for purpose, including recommendations relating to the Electoral Commission’s investigatory powers. We will revert with a full Government response to the review and consider whether to make further amendments to the Bill in the light of that work. New clause 27 would require the Government to establish a review to consider the adequacy of regulated periods of elections and referendums. More specifically, it would consider whether they are of sufficient length to combat mis and disinformation, and the impact of digital campaigning outside regulated periods.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will speak to clauses 65 to 69 before turning to the new clauses tabled by hon. Members. Under the current enforcement framework, most political finance offences, regardless of their severity, are treated as possible criminal offences, even when they amount to minor administrative breaches, such as the late submission of campaign expenditure reports. While criminal investigation and prosecution for such offences is rare, key stakeholders, including the Electoral Commission and the Ethics and Integrity Commission, have expressed concerns that the possibility of criminal prosecution for minor errors can deter participation in campaigning. Clause 65 and subsequent secondary legislation will address this by decriminalising administrative offences under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, so that they will be punishable only through civil sanctions by the Electoral Commission rather than criminal prosecution. We have worked closely with the Electoral Commission to determine which offences under PPERA should be decriminalised. Broadly, they relate to failures to comply with reporting requirements, such as failing to deliver a campaign expenditure return within the statutory time limit or failing to deliver a proper statement of accounts. Serious breaches, including intentional or reckless misreporting, will remain criminal offences and will continue to be investigated by the police and subject to criminal prosecution. This will provide much-needed clarity that the Electoral Commission is responsible for enforcing such administrative breaches, allowing police resources to be directed towards tackling more serious criminal offences and clamping down on foreign money entering politics. In addition, by removing the threat of criminal prosecution for minor infractions, the clause will encourage participation by individuals and organisations that wish to campaign, while ensuring more proportionate enforcement of the rules. Turning to clause 66, robust and proportionate enforcement of political finance law is essential for sustaining trust in our democracy. However, there is currently an enforcement gap in electoral regulation. Since 2010, to provide for more flexible and encompassing enforcement, the Electoral Commission has been able to impose civil sanctions for certain offences committed by political parties, third-party campaigners and referendum participants. In contrast, offences committed in relation to candidates and recall petition campaigners are subject only to criminal sanctions and enforcement by the police. Practically speaking, this means that breaches of the rules can be addressed only through police investigation and criminal prosecution, even where a breach is minor or unintentional. Yet criminal prosecution for minor infractions is frequently considered disproportionate to the offence and not in the public interest, which means that breaches of the rules often go unaddressed and unsanctioned. This enforcement gap risks undermining public trust in the integrity of the electoral system by creating the perception that the rules are not being enforced and that campaigners are not complying with them. At the same time, it can create a fear of criminal prosecution for candidates, election agents and recall petition campaigners, who could face police investigation for relatively minor breaches of the law. Clause 66 is intended to close that gap by extending the Electoral Commission’s enforcement remit, including its investigatory and civil sanctioning powers, to cover offences in relation to candidates and recall petition campaigners. Criminal prosecution will remain available for the most serious offences involving intentional or reckless breaches of the rules, but the EC will also now be able to apply its considerable knowledge and expertise to the enforcement of breaches across the political finance framework, providing for a more encompassing, proportionate and robust regime. Clause 67 removes the statutory cap on the maximum fine that the Electoral Commission can impose for certain offences. Currently, where an offence is punishable on summary conviction by a fine, the penalty imposed by the EC may not exceed that which can be imposed by the court. The maximum fine that can be imposed by a court in such instances is unlimited in England and Wales, but £10,000 in Scotland and £5,000 in Northern Ireland. The purpose of removing these restrictions is to ensure that the Electoral Commission’s maximum fine can be applied uniformly across all relevant offences around the UK. We will be increasing the maximum fine level in secondary legislation. This will ensure that the Electoral Commission’s new maximum fine provides a meaningful deterrent against violations of the rules across the UK, no matter where the offence is committed. As the regulator, the Electoral Commission is invaluable in upholding trust in our democracy. That is why we are expanding the commission’s role and powers, including extending its enforcement remit and increasing its maximum fine. We intend for the Electoral Commission’s expanded role and powers to apply UK-wide at all elections, including parliamentary and local government elections.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  To prevent attempts to circumvent spending limits, current rules require campaigners to seek permission from the courts before they are able to pay invoices late. In practice, most late or disputed claims are delayed due to routine administrative issues. The Electoral Commission has said that the court-based process for leave to pay applications is inefficient and costly, delaying prompt payments and placing unnecessary burdens on campaigners, the courts and suppliers, especially small businesses. Clause 55 addresses those inefficiencies by transferring responsibility for granting leave from the courts to the Electoral Commission. The commission will be able to give permission to campaigners to pay late or disputed claims. It is right that such decisions are made by the specialist regulator of political finance. By transferring that function to the commission, the clause will reduce unnecessary bureaucracy, support both suppliers and campaigners, and maintain the integrity and transparency of the broader campaign finance framework. Question put and agreed to. Clause 55 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 6 agreed to. Clause 56 Delivery and inspection of returns and declarations Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member will appreciate that implementation of the Bill will require substantial secondary legislation. As tempting as it is to set out a timetable, we have to focus on getting the primary legislation through first. There is the tension, which the hon. Member for Hazel Grove described, between going at pace to implement measures such as votes at 16 and considering as comprehensively as possible the matters that arise from the Rycroft review. It is a challenge, albeit not an insurmountable one, for the Government to do both. Considerable parliamentary time will be devoted to the secondary legislation; that will become clearer as time progresses. We need to move forward as swiftly as we can. We will introduce the amendment regarding crypto when parliamentary time allows, and we will ensure that it has parliamentary scrutiny. I have noted the comments by the hon. Member for North Herefordshire about a donor registration scheme. None the less, it is beholden on political parties, candidates and campaigners to take seriously the risks from donors. It will be their responsibility, under this legislation, to assess those risks, and if they are found to wilfully, recklessly or knowingly circumvent them, they will be subject to prosecution. We need to move forward with this legislation as much as we can. I sense the frustration from Members across the Committee about the time that will be required to do this, but we need to do it thoughtfully, carefully, and at pace but not too fast. I jest, but we will do it as soon as we possibly can in a way that does not jeopardise scrutiny. Amendment 39 agreed to. Amendment proposed : 32, in clause 58, page 68, leave out from beginning of line 15 to end of line 21 and insert— “(2) In carrying out a risk assessment, the party must prioritise taking into account whether the person from whom the donation is received is a foreign citizen and likely to have foreign influence links. (2A) In carrying out a risk assessment, the party must treat donations from UK citizens, who reside in the UK, as a low risk. (2B) In carrying out a risk assessment, the party must also take account of the following risks— (a) the type of person from whom the donation is received, (b) that person’s previous donation history, (c) the type of donation, (d) the amount of the donation, and any other risk factors the party considers to be relevant.”— (Paul Holmes.) Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will first speak to clause 58, schedule 8, Government new clause 60, and Government amendments 39 to 41 and 44 to 78, before turning to the amendments tabled by the Opposition. In line with recommendations from the Electoral Commission, the National Crime Agency and the Committee on Standards in Public Life—now known as the Ethics and Integrity Commission—clause 58 addresses a long-standing gap in electoral law. Current rules require recipients of donations to verify the permissibility of the donor but do not require them to assess whether a donor may be facilitating a donation from an impermissible source. Existing permissibility checks remain important, but they do not always provide sufficient assurance where donations are routed through third parties or where risk indicators are present. The clause introduces a clear, proportionate due diligence duty on campaigners to look beyond current permissibility checks and determine whether there is a material risk that a political contribution originates from an impermissible source. The new framework strengthens the ability of campaigners to assure themselves that donations come from permissible sources. Its purpose is not to impose unnecessary burdens, but to ensure that campaigners take reasonable, proportionate steps to understand who is behind a donation. By embedding a culture of risk-based due diligence, the clause helps to guard against foreign interference, increases confidence in the integrity of donations, and aligns political finance rules with best practice in other sectors. Government amendment 39 to 41 and 44 to 78 seek to clarify the point at which a political donation exceeds the £11,180 thresholds and requires a risk assessment under the new “know your donor” rules. Currently, the Bill requires a risk assessment once a recipient receives cumulative contributions from the same donor surpassing £11,180 in a calendar year. However, after that point is reached, every further donation received from the same donor in the same calendar year, regardless of value, would require another risk assessment. That was not our policy intention. Under the updated approach, a risk assessment will be required each time a donor gives £11,180 cumulatively or as an individual donation, after which the running total in effect will reset to zero. That replaces the previous rolling aggregation threshold, removing unnecessary repetition and ensuring that parties complete a risk assessment only when receiving a further significant donation from the same donor. Risk assessments could be carried out on every donation if a campaigner feels the need to do so.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The clause and schedule 4 ensure that in the event of the demise of the Crown, effective and consistent processes are in place for scheduled local elections and other polls, including mayoral elections, local referendums and Northern Ireland Assembly elections, as is already the case for a parliamentary general election. In the event of the demise of the Crown, if a UK parliamentary general election is taking place, legislation provides for a 14-day pause in the timetable for the general election to allow time for public mourning and the funeral arrangements, and the date of the poll is moved to after the date of the funeral. Different provisions are in place for other types of polls. We believe that the 14-day pause in proceedings used for UK parliamentary general elections is the most appropriate arrangement, so the clause extends those provisions to a number of other types of election and referendum, including parliamentary by-elections, scheduled local elections, London Assembly elections, mayoral elections, local referendums and Northern Ireland Assembly elections. The measures also apply to certain Welsh elections in specific circumstances, when they are combined with UK parliamentary or police and crime commissioner elections. A royal proclamation may already adjust the date of a postponed poll for a UK parliamentary general election by up to seven days. Under the Bill, when such a proclamation is made, any other polls combined with the general election will also move so that they remain combined. The Bill also creates an equivalent ministerial power to adjust postponed polls that are not UK parliamentary general elections by up to seven days. The provisions will ensure that consistent and appropriate provisions are in place for polls being held in such circumstances. I hope that Members will support the measure. Question put and agreed to . Clause 52 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill . Schedule 4 agreed to . Clause 53 Form of documents for elections and referendums Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 13 Apr 2026 · Family Voting · Hansard source

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  Greater Manchester police has completed its investigation and found no evidence of family voting. I thank the police for their careful and diligent work investigating this matter, as well as the Electoral Commission and the local returning officer for their support. As I said before, coercion in the polling station and other types of electoral offences are unacceptable and undermine confidence in our democratic system.

• 26 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clauses 41 and 42 strengthen the candidate nomination process by introducing new safeguards. That will protect the integrity of our elections and prevent impersonation or false nominations. Recent years have seen individuals stand for election in order to be disruptive, or as sham candidates. A recent case saw multiple individuals standing under the same name across a number of constituencies, highlighting the need for identity checks. The Speaker’s Conference recommended introducing candidate ID and stronger nomination requirements to prevent candidates from misleading the electorate or undermining the integrity of the democratic process. Clause 41 introduces a new requirement for those wishing to stand for election to provide evidence of their identity. The returning officer can deem a nomination invalid if there is a discrepancy in the ID that cannot be resolved to their satisfaction, or reject it if the ID leads them to doubt that the candidate is who they claim to be. If we are asking electors to identify themselves to register and vote, it is perfectly reasonable to ask candidates to do the same to stand. We are reinforcing the integrity of the nomination process by introducing a requirement for candidates to sign a declaration with their nomination, setting out that they understand it is a criminal offence to knowingly provide false information on nomination papers and that their papers do not include any false information. In combination, these measures will deter prospective candidates who wish to abuse the system and undermine our democratic processes. Clause 42 mirrors, for local elections in Northern Ireland, the provisions in clause 41 requiring candidates at UK parliamentary elections to provide proof of identity as part of the nomination process. To summarise, candidates at local elections in Northern Ireland will be required to include proof of identity with their nomination papers and to sign a new statutory declaration confirming that they understand it is a criminal offence to knowingly provide false information on nomination papers. We intend to extend these measures through secondary legislation to Northern Ireland Assembly elections. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

• 26 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Electoral registration officers are responsible for maintaining accurate and complete electoral registers, which are fundamental to the integrity of elections. The clause ensures that those appointed to that role are senior officers within their authority, with the authority and accountability needed to oversee this important function effectively. By defining “senior officer” with reference to existing statutory roles, the clause provides clarity while allowing appropriate flexibility for councils. The clause applies across England and Wales, taking account of the different local government frameworks in each. Taken together with section 28 of the Representation of the People Act 1983, this change means that the returning officer for UK parliamentary elections, and police and crime commissioner elections, must be a senior officer of the local authority, who can command the use of the local authority resources needed to run elections effectively. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee. Question put and agreed to. Clause 31 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill . Clause 32 Anonymous registration Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 26 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 45 seeks to enhance the security of candidates by ensuring that candidates at UK parliamentary elections are able to receive appropriate and tailored security briefings from the police in a timely and effective manner. The clause makes provision for a new form to capture candidates’ contact details, which candidates will be able to complete and return with their nomination papers. The returning officer will send the contact details to the relevant local police force or forces, so that they can contact the candidate to invite them to security briefings for the election or in case of emergency. Completion of the form will be optional and any submitted forms will be kept confidential. This is a simple and straightforward measure to improve the support that police forces are able to offer to candidates. New clause 56, tabled by the Liberal Democrats, would require the Electoral Commission to publish and maintain guidance relating to candidates’ safety and security. It would also require returning officers to provide that guidance to candidates as soon as their nomination had been confirmed. The Government are clear that harassment and intimidation of voters, electoral staff and campaigners, both online and in person, is totally unacceptable and has a profoundly detrimental impact on our democratic process. Consequently, we are highly sympathetic to the goal that the new clause seeks to achieve; that is reflected in ongoing workstreams and measures already included in the Bill. The Government and the Electoral Commission already have significant work under way in this area. The Joint Election Security Preparedness Unit is a permanent function dedicated to co-ordinating security and preparedness work ahead of electoral events. Prior to each election, JESP leads a comprehensive programme of work to ensure that candidates and election officials have the resources they need to feel safe and secure during the election, including updating security guidance for candidates and returning officers, and supporting returning officers to understand the support available to them at key potential flashpoints, such as polling stations. Specifically, ahead of the upcoming May 2026 elections across England, Scotland and Wales, updated candidate security guidance was sent to returning officers and political parties in England and Wales for distribution to candidates in early January—earlier than previous years—to support parties to use the guidance in wider candidate training. Police Scotland has issued guidance to candidates standing for election to the Scottish Parliament. The comprehensive Government guidance now covers how candidates should interact with Operation Ford, the personal security measures they should adopt and the cyber-security services available to them, as well as guidance on reporting online abuse to platforms. The updated guidance also includes a link to the National Protective Security Authority’s counter political interference and espionage action plan. The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government has also hosted webinars for returning officers and electoral service managers in England, Wales and Scotland, to highlight the Government’s security offer across physical, cyber and information threats. The Electoral Commission already regularly provides and updates guidance to candidates and returning officers. The commission has also updated its election security guidance for returning officers, and the wider gov.uk page has been updated. In partnership with the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the Crown Prosecution Service and the College of Policing, the Electoral Commission has also issued joint guidance specifically on harassment and intimidation. However, we recognise that more can be done. That is why we are also working with the Electoral Commission and the Speaker’s Conference to develop an updated code of conduct for campaigning, and improved safety guidance for returning officers and candidates. In the Bill, the Government will also make provision for candidates to complete an optional additional form when completing their nomination form papers. The purpose of that additional form is to allow candidates to provide their contact details to the returning officer, specifically so that the returning officer can then share those details with local policing. Once local policing has that information, the relevant force elected official adviser will make contact and arrange relevant security briefings for those candidates. I encourage all candidates to take up the opportunity of a security briefing at the earliest opportunity. Given past and ongoing work by the Government and the Electoral Commission in this space, co-ordinating with the relevant policing authorities and providing guidance, the Government do not consider it necessary to place a statutory duty on the commission to perform such functions. For these reasons, and with these reassurances in place, I hope that new clause 56 will be withdrawn.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Siobhain. I have covered clause 7, so if Members will indulge me, I will turn to clause 8. Clause 8 sets out five specific circumstances in which the prohibitions put in place by clause 7 do not apply. The first circumstance in which the registration information of an individual under the age of 16 may be shared is if that disclosure is necessary for registration or the conduct of an election, referendum, recall petition or other poll. That simply allows electoral administrators to carry out their work. An example in action would be an electoral registration officer using the data of a 14 or 15-year-old to conduct the annual canvass. The canvass would help ensure that the young person in question is still accurately registered at the address electoral administrators have on file. Another illustration of the purpose of this provision would relate to the preparation of a poll. For example, clerks at polling stations must have an extract of the electoral register for electors who will vote at that polling station. There may be circumstances in which that extract is prepared in advance of polling day, and this provision allows it to include individuals who will turn 16 on polling day, but who at the moment of the preparation of the extract are still 15. The second circumstance provides that the registration information of an individual under the age of 16 may be shared in accordance with one of a limited number of supply enactments—specifically, those listed in clause 11. A supply enactment is a provision to allow either the entire register or the relevant part of the register to be supplied to a certain individual or organisation. The specific supply enactments where the disclosure of the registration information of under-16s is permitted are listed in clause 11, and as such I will discuss them in detail during the debate on clause 11. However, this clause applies two crucial limits on disclosure of the registration information of 14 and 15-year-olds as part of a relevant supply enactment, as I will now explain. First, disclosure under a relevant supply enactment may be made only for purposes relating to an election at which a given person will be entitled to vote. That will allow the information of individuals under the age of 16 to be protected, while also allowing individuals who will be old enough to vote in specific polls to be included in campaigning activities relating to that poll. For example, it will allow 15-year-olds who will be 16 in time for a given poll to be sent campaigning materials relating to that poll. Secondly, there is a limit on disclosure under relevant supply enactments that requires that such disclosures must not contain information that would allow the date of birth of the young person in question to be learned. That provides an extra safeguard against the disclosure of any information about young people that is not absolutely necessary for the legitimate activities in question. For example, candidates have no need to know the exact age of a young person beyond the fact that they will be 16 on the date of a poll, so they will not receive such information. The third circumstance in which the registration information of under-16s may be disclosed under clause 8 is where such information is necessary for the purpose of a criminal investigation relating to an electoral offence. The provisions in the Bill prevent under-16s from being fined for failing to register to vote, but there are other electoral offences that rightly apply regardless of age group. Those include offences such as a fraudulent application to register to vote, or the offence of personation, where someone attempts to steal another’s vote. Such serious offences should be investigated no matter who commits them, and this clause allows for those criminal investigations to take place unimpeded.