Samantha Dixon MP: speeches 2026

Speeches

• 26 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Clause 46 removes the unnecessary and outdated requirement for polling station staff to call out the name and elector number of a voter when delivering a ballot paper. This change will bring Northern Ireland in line with practice in Great Britain. This practice can be intimidatory and unwelcome for voters, and its removal is in line with the Government’s wider commitments to tackle harassment and intimidation in the democratic process. Calling out is also unnecessary given the requirement to produce photo ID at polling stations in Northern Ireland. This change will apply to all elections in Northern Ireland. The clause will also make some technical amendments to ensure that legislative references to the corresponding number list are correct. I commend the clause to the Committee. Question put and agreed to. Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 47 Voter identification requirements

• 26 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Clause 33 sets out in law a clear and unambiguous deadline to register to vote in advance of a poll. Subsections (2) and (3) set the deadline at 5 pm, 12 working days before a poll. That brings the deadline forward by seven hours from the existing deadline of 12 working days before a poll. We believe that is the right thing to do for electors and administrators. It creates consistency by aligning the 5 pm deadline with other citizen-facing deadlines, including absent vote and voter authority certificate application deadlines. It will also allow any queries or issues with a registration application to be effectively addressed within the working day by electoral administrators. Subsections (4) and (5) introduce a power for the Secretary of State and Scottish and Welsh Ministers to make regulations to change the deadline for elections that they have a responsibility for. In doing so, they might consult the Electoral Commission. Regulations must be subject to the affirmative procedure. Clause 34 repeals unique requirements for additional documentary evidence to always be provided by anyone trying to register to vote just before an election, even if the chief electoral officer is confident of their eligibility based on the data held. The current late-registration requirements in Northern Ireland require that additional documentary evidence to support an application to register must always be provided by anyone trying to register just before an election, even if the routine data checks carried out by the chief electoral officer provide a clear address and identity match. The chief electoral officer for Northern Ireland has made it clear that he has full confidence in the quality of the data available to him. That allows him to be confident in the identity of the vast majority of people making applications to register to vote. Therefore, it is necessary to request supporting evidence from applicants only where the data check is not clear. The repeal of these requirements will make voter registration easier for many people. In particular, it will remove an unnecessary barrier for many younger electors who may have fewer forms of documentary evidence than those over 18. Question put and agreed to. Clause 33 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 34 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 35 Electoral identity card issued in Northern Ireland: month and year of birth

• 26 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Electoral registration officers are responsible for maintaining accurate and complete electoral registers, which are fundamental to the integrity of elections. The clause ensures that those appointed to that role are senior officers within their authority, with the authority and accountability needed to oversee this important function effectively. By defining “senior officer” with reference to existing statutory roles, the clause provides clarity while allowing appropriate flexibility for councils. The clause applies across England and Wales, taking account of the different local government frameworks in each. Taken together with section 28 of the Representation of the People Act 1983, this change means that the returning officer for UK parliamentary elections, and police and crime commissioner elections, must be a senior officer of the local authority, who can command the use of the local authority resources needed to run elections effectively. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee. Question put and agreed to. Clause 31 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill . Clause 32 Anonymous registration Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 26 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I beg to move amendment 8, in clause 30, page 40, line 30, leave out paragraph (a) and insert— “(a) in subsection (1), omit from “and except” to the end;”. This amendment and Amendment 9 correct amendments of section 201(1) of the Representation of the People Act 1983 so as not to introduce a requirement for regulations made by the Electoral Commission to be made by statutory instrument. Such regulations are subject instead to procedural requirements under Schedule 1 to the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000.

• 26 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Clause 45 seeks to enhance the security of candidates by ensuring that candidates at UK parliamentary elections are able to receive appropriate and tailored security briefings from the police in a timely and effective manner. The clause makes provision for a new form to capture candidates’ contact details, which candidates will be able to complete and return with their nomination papers. The returning officer will send the contact details to the relevant local police force or forces, so that they can contact the candidate to invite them to security briefings for the election or in case of emergency. Completion of the form will be optional and any submitted forms will be kept confidential. This is a simple and straightforward measure to improve the support that police forces are able to offer to candidates. New clause 56, tabled by the Liberal Democrats, would require the Electoral Commission to publish and maintain guidance relating to candidates’ safety and security. It would also require returning officers to provide that guidance to candidates as soon as their nomination had been confirmed. The Government are clear that harassment and intimidation of voters, electoral staff and campaigners, both online and in person, is totally unacceptable and has a profoundly detrimental impact on our democratic process. Consequently, we are highly sympathetic to the goal that the new clause seeks to achieve; that is reflected in ongoing workstreams and measures already included in the Bill. The Government and the Electoral Commission already have significant work under way in this area. The Joint Election Security Preparedness Unit is a permanent function dedicated to co-ordinating security and preparedness work ahead of electoral events. Prior to each election, JESP leads a comprehensive programme of work to ensure that candidates and election officials have the resources they need to feel safe and secure during the election, including updating security guidance for candidates and returning officers, and supporting returning officers to understand the support available to them at key potential flashpoints, such as polling stations. Specifically, ahead of the upcoming May 2026 elections across England, Scotland and Wales, updated candidate security guidance was sent to returning officers and political parties in England and Wales for distribution to candidates in early January—earlier than previous years—to support parties to use the guidance in wider candidate training. Police Scotland has issued guidance to candidates standing for election to the Scottish Parliament. The comprehensive Government guidance now covers how candidates should interact with Operation Ford, the personal security measures they should adopt and the cyber-security services available to them, as well as guidance on reporting online abuse to platforms. The updated guidance also includes a link to the National Protective Security Authority’s counter political interference and espionage action plan. The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government has also hosted webinars for returning officers and electoral service managers in England, Wales and Scotland, to highlight the Government’s security offer across physical, cyber and information threats. The Electoral Commission already regularly provides and updates guidance to candidates and returning officers. The commission has also updated its election security guidance for returning officers, and the wider gov.uk page has been updated. In partnership with the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the Crown Prosecution Service and the College of Policing, the Electoral Commission has also issued joint guidance specifically on harassment and intimidation. However, we recognise that more can be done. That is why we are also working with the Electoral Commission and the Speaker’s Conference to develop an updated code of conduct for campaigning, and improved safety guidance for returning officers and candidates. In the Bill, the Government will also make provision for candidates to complete an optional additional form when completing their nomination form papers. The purpose of that additional form is to allow candidates to provide their contact details to the returning officer, specifically so that the returning officer can then share those details with local policing. Once local policing has that information, the relevant force elected official adviser will make contact and arrange relevant security briefings for those candidates. I encourage all candidates to take up the opportunity of a security briefing at the earliest opportunity. Given past and ongoing work by the Government and the Electoral Commission in this space, co-ordinating with the relevant policing authorities and providing guidance, the Government do not consider it necessary to place a statutory duty on the commission to perform such functions. For these reasons, and with these reassurances in place, I hope that new clause 56 will be withdrawn.

• 26 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Our electoral registration system relies on public confidence, part of which is knowing how personal data is used and having genuine control over it. As we update voter registration processes and prepare to extend the franchise to younger citizens, it is essential that the protections around personal information keep pace. The open, or edited, register is not used for elections. It is available to be purchased and used for a wide range of purposes. The Bill introduces a clear and important safeguard. Electors will no longer be placed on the open register by default. Instead, they will be asked directly whether they wish to appear on it. That ensures that inclusion is an active decision rather than a presumption. An opt-in approach gives people stronger control, aligns with guidance from the Information Commissioner’s Office, and reflects modern expectations of consent with regard to personal data. As we move towards more automated forms of registration, individuals might not always complete an application form themselves. In that context, it would no longer be fair or appropriate to assume inclusion on the open register. Moving to an opt-in system ensures that no person appears on the open register without their explicit consent. Strong protections for younger people are built into that change. Anyone under the age of 16 registering as an attainer will be automatically excluded from the open register and will not be able to opt in. At its core, this measure strengthens the standard of consent, protects personal data and supports a modernised approach to voter registration. It contributes to a system that is secure, transparent and respectful of individual choice, ensuring public confidence as registration processes evolve. I commend clause 37 to the Committee.

• 26 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I deeply appreciate the warmth that Members have shown for these measures. As someone who also served for a short time on the Speaker’s Conference and having experienced harassment myself, as many on the Committee have, I know that this is an important measure that will protect our candidates. Operation Ford is a great step forward, but I reassure the hon. Member for Hamble Valley that we do not stand still in this sphere. The work of the joint election security and preparedness unit, the defending democracy taskforce, Operation Ford and Operation Bridger does not rely on this legislation. That continues constantly, and not just during elections.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  The Government’s view is that such a report would be partial; it would only cover the work that the Government are doing and we could not speak to other organisations and their work in this arena.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I will write to the hon. Gentleman on those points at a later date, if I may. However, the First Minister and officers attended one of our evidence sessions, and I have engaged with colleagues who attended drop-ins as a result of this legislation coming forward.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  The point that I am attempting to make is that this piloting and the move towards auto-enrolment will enable EROs to test, based on a variety of different datasets, that the application is accurate, legitimate and not spurious or in any way fraudulent. While I note the hon. Gentleman’s point, these things are being done to avoid the scenario he has just described. EROs will continue to exercise their knowledge and judgment to assess eligibility before they send someone a notice that they will be registered to vote. Before a person is automatically enrolled, they will be written to, but the ERO will have tested, through a variety of different datasets, whether that application is legitimate. We will test that robustly and fairly and with the guidance of partners such as the Electoral Commission.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I will hopefully come to that point, but it will not. The details of the new canvass system will be set out in regulations following consultation with the chief electoral officer for Northern Ireland and the Electoral Commission, and will be subject to piloting. This change will support increased participation in elections in Northern Ireland and bring the Northern Ireland canvass system into closer alignment with Great Britain. Clause 27 is a consequence of clause 26. Before making any regulations under clause 26, the Secretary of State is required to consult the Electoral Commission. Where the commission has been consulted, clause 27 places a duty on it to prepare a report about a proposal to make regulations under clause 26, which is the new power to amend the canvass. Reform of the Northern Ireland canvass is supported by the Electoral Commission, and officials will work closely with the commission on it. It is important that the commission has an opportunity to consider the details of the new canvass system to ensure that the proposed changes are effective and robust before they are implemented. The provision mirrors the role that the Electoral Commission had when the canvass system was reformed in Great Britain. Clause 28 is also a consequence of clause 26. The Government are legislating to address current challenges and to reform and modernise the Northern Ireland canvass. The aim of this reform is to move toward a more regular and lighter-touch canvass system. However, these are technical and complex changes, and it is important that we get them right, so it is proper that the new canvass system will be subject to successful piloting. We will work closely with the chief electoral officer for Northern Ireland on the design of any pilots. I commend clause 28 to the Committee.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Siobhain. I have covered clause 7, so if Members will indulge me, I will turn to clause 8. Clause 8 sets out five specific circumstances in which the prohibitions put in place by clause 7 do not apply. The first circumstance in which the registration information of an individual under the age of 16 may be shared is if that disclosure is necessary for registration or the conduct of an election, referendum, recall petition or other poll. That simply allows electoral administrators to carry out their work. An example in action would be an electoral registration officer using the data of a 14 or 15-year-old to conduct the annual canvass. The canvass would help ensure that the young person in question is still accurately registered at the address electoral administrators have on file. Another illustration of the purpose of this provision would relate to the preparation of a poll. For example, clerks at polling stations must have an extract of the electoral register for electors who will vote at that polling station. There may be circumstances in which that extract is prepared in advance of polling day, and this provision allows it to include individuals who will turn 16 on polling day, but who at the moment of the preparation of the extract are still 15. The second circumstance provides that the registration information of an individual under the age of 16 may be shared in accordance with one of a limited number of supply enactments—specifically, those listed in clause 11. A supply enactment is a provision to allow either the entire register or the relevant part of the register to be supplied to a certain individual or organisation. The specific supply enactments where the disclosure of the registration information of under-16s is permitted are listed in clause 11, and as such I will discuss them in detail during the debate on clause 11. However, this clause applies two crucial limits on disclosure of the registration information of 14 and 15-year-olds as part of a relevant supply enactment, as I will now explain. First, disclosure under a relevant supply enactment may be made only for purposes relating to an election at which a given person will be entitled to vote. That will allow the information of individuals under the age of 16 to be protected, while also allowing individuals who will be old enough to vote in specific polls to be included in campaigning activities relating to that poll. For example, it will allow 15-year-olds who will be 16 in time for a given poll to be sent campaigning materials relating to that poll. Secondly, there is a limit on disclosure under relevant supply enactments that requires that such disclosures must not contain information that would allow the date of birth of the young person in question to be learned. That provides an extra safeguard against the disclosure of any information about young people that is not absolutely necessary for the legitimate activities in question. For example, candidates have no need to know the exact age of a young person beyond the fact that they will be 16 on the date of a poll, so they will not receive such information. The third circumstance in which the registration information of under-16s may be disclosed under clause 8 is where such information is necessary for the purpose of a criminal investigation relating to an electoral offence. The provisions in the Bill prevent under-16s from being fined for failing to register to vote, but there are other electoral offences that rightly apply regardless of age group. Those include offences such as a fraudulent application to register to vote, or the offence of personation, where someone attempts to steal another’s vote. Such serious offences should be investigated no matter who commits them, and this clause allows for those criminal investigations to take place unimpeded.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I was going to come to the points the hon. Gentleman had raised.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Voter registration is the bedrock of our democracy and is foundational to participation in elections; without it, we cannot exercise our right to vote. As hon. Members have pointed out, the Electoral Commission estimates that between 7 million and 8 million eligible citizens are either incorrectly registered or not registered to vote at all. We will address that registration gap by moving towards a more automated voter registration system. Clause 17 will create a new process of registration without application, also known as direct registration. We believe that that will enrich our democracy by making voter registration as simple and easy as possible. It creates a new duty for electoral registration officers to add those who are unregistered directly on to the electoral register without those people having to go through the process of applying to register to vote, provided that certain conditions are met. That will be the case only if the ERO is satisfied that the person should be registered, on the basis of data obtained by the ERO. Those who are directly registered will be informed through a notice that it is happening. On the points made by the hon. Members for Broxbourne and for Hazel Grove, they will have the right to opt out of the process during the response period. In conjunction with regulations made under clause 36 on data sharing, clause 17 will open a world of opportunities for our brilliant EROs to use new data sources, both national and local, to get unregistered but eligible citizens on to the electoral register. It should also better streamline and hopefully, in time, reduce the administrative burden on EROs—for example, by reducing the need to send invitations to register and by softening the registration surges we see around election times. We understand that direct registration is not appropriate for every kind of voter. As mentioned, there will be exemptions for those who inform their ERO within the set response period that they do not wish to be registered in this way, or that they intend to make an application for registration. There is also an exemption for those who tell the ERO during the response period that they wish to be registered with an anonymous entry, a declaration of local connection, a service declaration or an overseas elector’s declaration. Instead, those people will be able to independently submit a relevant application. There will also be an exemption where the ERO receives an application for registration of that person during the set response period. We are not replacing the current system of registration, but are simply providing another means of registration. That will add a new, modernised mechanism that reflects the realities of how public bodies hold and use data today, and how individuals interact with those services. Direct registration offers many opportunities, but is not an overnight process. As will be covered in relation to clauses 20 to 25, it will take time to explore and test different data sources to ensure that they best identify eligible citizens. It will also take time to pilot and test the overall effectiveness of direct registration. There are significant opportunities here to move towards a more automated registration system that narrows the registration gap and builds a fuller and fairer democracy. Amendment 26 proposes a new condition that must be met before the ERO registers someone without an application—that the person’s existence has been properly verified using three separate datasets used for national and local data matching. I appreciate the spirit behind the amendment, and of course share the commitment of the hon. Member for Hamble Valley to ensuring that only eligible individuals are registered. Under the Bill, an ERO must directly register someone only if they are satisfied that the person is entitled to be registered. We are robustly exploring and will rigorously test different Government datasets that could be used to aid EROs in their new direct registration duties. As part of that, we are exploring which datasets will provide EROs with sufficient assurance to determine that a person is entitled to be registered. We do not agree with specifying a minimum number of datasets that should be used to determine someone’s existence. As the hon. Member for Hazel Grove pointed out, there is the potential for one or two robust and well-tested datasets to provide sufficient assurance. In those cases, it would be unnecessary and inefficient to require an ERO to consider further datasets, so I ask the hon. Member for Hamble Valley to withdraw his amendment. Clause 18 is similar to clause 17, but focuses on a new process of direct alteration. It aims to improve the accuracy of our electoral registers in the simplest and easiest way possible for the voter. It will create a new process of alteration without application, also known as direct alteration. It creates a new duty for EROs to update people’s name or address details in their electoral register, where data shows that those have changed. Just like with direct registration, those whose details are directly altered will be informed through a notice that that is happening, and they will have the right to object during the response period. The clause, alongside regulations made under clause 36 on data sharing, will enable EROs to use new data sources to identify people whose registration details are incorrect and update their entries without those people having to submit an application of alteration. That will help the accuracy and integrity of the register, and will make things easier for EROs, who might otherwise contact voters at the wrong addresses or using the wrong names. It will also help to prevent people from missing out on their right to vote, by ensuring that the right details are recorded for them. As mentioned previously, there will be an exemption for those who inform their ERO within the set response period that they do not wish their entry to be altered in that way. There are other exemptions, including for those who tell their ERO during the response period that they wish to be registered with an anonymous entry, a declaration of local connection, a service declaration or an overseas elector’s declaration. Instead, those people will be able to independently submit a relevant application. We are not removing the ability of individuals to contact their ERO to update their own details. Clause 18 will create a new, modern process that will be tested and iterated over time. It will allow EROs to use data in a common-sense way to improve the accuracy of the electoral register. Clause 19 introduces schedule 2 and makes further provision in connection with clauses 17 and 18 for registration without an application and for the alteration of certain registers without an application. Schedule 2 makes a number of amendments to the Representation of the People Act 1983 and the Representation of the People Act 1985 to allow for direct registration and alteration, and to build safeguards into the process. I draw the Committee’s attention, in particular, to paragraphs 16 to 19 of schedule 2, which aim to ensure that if a person is an overseas elector or is applying to be one, a registration without application is disregarded if they did not ask for it to be made and they are still eligible to be an overseas elector. The clause aims to reduce the risk of a new entry being created without an application, which could then invalidate the registration or declaration of an overseas elector. That is needed to ensure that overseas electors do not inadvertently lose their right to their status as an overseas elector—for example, in the unlikely event that an ERO directly registers that person at an address at which they are not resident, and they miss the registration notice while they are overseas. We think the risk of that happening incorrectly is low, but we want to include safeguards in case it happens. Amendment 27 proposes that direct registration and alteration duties for EROs—meaning registering someone or altering their registration details without that person submitting an application—and other, related provisions should not commence until after the Secretary of State has published an independent review. That review would look into the steps needed to avoid non-qualifying EU or Commonwealth citizens being directly registered. The amendment involves inserting a requirement for a review into clause 80, the Bill’s commencement clause.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  To offer some comfort to the hon. Gentleman, as set out in the Government’s policy paper, “A blueprint for modern digital government”, “technology presents us with” the opportunity to “improve the way that government delivers for the public”. Our ambition is to transform our electoral registration system, harnessing existing data from across Government to move to an automated system. We are working closely with the Information Commissioner’s Office to ensure that appropriate safeguards are put in place. We are working with the Department for Work and Pensions and His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs to assess whether the combined dataset that is already used to check registration applications and support the annual review of electoral registers could also help identify people who may not be registered. We are also working with the Home Office to explore whether its data could help to indicate whether people who are identified as eligible, but who are unregistered, appear to meet the nationality and immigration status requirements to vote. I hope that provides some comfort and clarity to the hon. Member. I respectfully ask him to withdraw his amendment and commend clauses 17 to 19 and schedule 2 to the Committee.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  To reassure Members, we have worked very closely with the Northern Ireland Office, as well as other devolved Governments, in the development of the Bill. Elections in Northern Ireland are an entirely reserved matter for the UK Government. Notwithstanding that, colleagues from all parties across Parliament were invited to come to drop-in sessions. A number of Northern Ireland colleagues did, and I also met the leadership of those parties that wished to meet me as we developed the legislation. I beg your indulgence, Dame Siobhain, and that of the Committee: I should have spoken to clause 29 at the same time that I addressed the other clauses in the group. Clause 29 is a consequence of clause 28, which provides for the piloting power in relation to amending the Northern Ireland canvass by regulations. As I noted earlier, it is proper that the new canvass system is subject to successful piloting. It is also important that the Electoral Commission has an opportunity to consider any canvass pilots and report on their effectiveness and robustness before they are implemented. The hon. Member for Hamble Valley and I will have to agree to disagree about the role of piloting. In my view, it is the way that we iteratively and robustly test ways in which a policy can be delivered. When we get to secondary legislation, the specifics of the piloting powers will be set out, and Parliament will have the opportunity to scrutinise those powers.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  The Government’s proposal is to introduce a broad power for the Secretary of State to make regulations on pilots testing new, innovative methods of electoral registration. We want to modernise electoral registration to make it simpler for people to engage in a genuinely useful, measured and proportionate way. The pilot design is in the developmental stage, and we have not decided where pilots will be conducted, but it is essential that Members note that for a pilot to go ahead, secondary legislation will be required. That will mean that Parliament always has the opportunity to scrutinise a proposal in detail, including on the use of datasets, which the hon. Member for Guildford mentioned. We are clear that any permanent changes to the registration process will be grounded in robust evidence and informed by thorough user research. I am confident that they will also be extremely well evaluated by the Electoral Commission. Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Yes, I can offer hon. Members that reassurance. I have worked with DFE colleagues to consider the independent curriculum and assessment review. That review will take onboard democracy, government and law being part of the curriculum going forward. As I mentioned, citizenship will also be introduced in primary schools. As we go forward, the wide collaboration of not just this Government but devolved Governments, local authorities and others will support schools, colleges and youth groups to roll out practical civic education. I mentioned that this is not a singular act but an ongoing task. A report of a proposed activity offered a year after the Bill becomes law will be little more than a snapshot of a much longer-term programme of work. For that reason, the Government do not support the new clause.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  The Government are committed to ensuring that everyone who is entitled to vote should be able, encouraged and supported to do so. Different authorities will have different approaches that will arise in different circumstances. Our provisions allow local authorities to take the most suitable approach when assisting people to get on the register. To address the concerns raised by the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner, while the guidance will be national, the application will be appropriate to local circumstances.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  The existing canvass regime in Northern Ireland is unfit for purpose. The current system requires the register to be recreated from scratch every 10 years and specifies that electors must re-register as part of the canvass to remain on the register. Electors who do not respond to canvass are removed from the register even if the chief electoral officer for Northern Ireland holds data to confirm that they are eligible. That means there is a risk that a significant number of eligible electors are lost from the register, impacting its integrity and accuracy. The Government are legislating to address those challenges and to reform and modernise the Northern Ireland canvass. The aim of this reform is to move towards a more regular and lighter-touch canvass system. Crucially, it will also avoid the arbitrary removal of eligible voters and improve the accuracy of the Northern Ireland register. Reform of the Northern Ireland canvass is supported by the Electoral Commission and the chief electoral officer for Northern Ireland, with whom we are working closely on the new system.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question, but I will return to that point when we debate the relevant clauses.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Yes, I am confident that the Electoral Commission will be able to perform that task, and I am sure that we will come back to those issues during line-by-line scrutiny. As with the other clauses in this part of the Bill, the provisions maintain close protection on the data of 14 and 15-year-olds, allowing disclosure of that information only when absolutely necessary and appropriate. Let me turn now to clause 12. In my explanation of clause 8, which provides for five circumstances in which the disclosure of under-16s’ information is permitted, I noted that clause 12 places further restrictions on three of those circumstances. Those restrictions apply to the following circumstances where clause 8 allows disclosure of information. The first is where information is sent to someone for the purposes of electoral registration or conduct duties. The second is where information is sent to someone for the purposes of criminal investigation into an electoral offence. The third is where information is sent to a person who has been nominated as that elector’s proxy. Where information has been shared in one of those three circumstances, the clause prevents the person who receives it from passing it on to anyone else. The clause also provides that someone who passes the information on to another person in one of those circumstances is guilty of a criminal offence punishable by a fine. As with the five clauses that precede it, clause 12 serves to ensure that the personal information of 14 and 15-year-olds is accessed and shared only when doing so is necessary and justified. Clause 13 is the penultimate clause in the group, which I am sure Members are glad to hear. The purpose of the clause is to provide flexibility in the regime that provides these protections, by making it possible for regulations to be made to adjust the protections. That might become necessary, for example, if new types of election or referenda are created in future, which might necessitate new groups having access to the data. Given the number and variety of changes the Bill proposes to our electoral system, such flexibility is simply good planning and avoids the risk of needing an emergency Bill to be rushed through Parliament should changes be needed. I immediately reassure hon. Members, however, that the scope of the power created by the clause is carefully limited and subject to important scrutiny requirements, as one would expect. The regulations that may be made using the power in the clause can be divided into five types. First, the power may be used to permit the disclosure of the electoral registration information of under-16s to additional recipients beyond those provided for in clauses 8, 9 and 11. Secondly, it may be used to set out the purposes for which such information, once shared, may be used, and to attach further restrictions. Such restrictions may include whether that information can be shared with further parties. Thirdly, the power may be used to amend clauses 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 14. However, the amendments that may be made are subject to restrictions, which I will come to shortly. Fourthly, it may be used to create new offences relating to the disclosure of 14 and 15-year-olds’ electoral registration information, which are punishable by a fine, but not imprisonment. Fifthly, it may be used to apply the same restrictions that apply to disclosure by registration officers and those who currently assist them to any new categories of person who might be involved with the preparation of electoral registers and lists. Three important restrictions are placed on that power, ensuring that the flexibility it provides to ensure our electoral system remains fit for purpose as times change does not come at the cost of appropriate scrutiny. The first and most important restriction is that although the types of information protected by clause 7 may be added to using this power, the categories of protected information cannot be reduced from what is in the Bill at the point it becomes law. That ensures that the type of data protected by this clause cannot be chipped away. Secondly, before this power is used, the Secretary of State must consult the Electoral Commission and anyone else that the Secretary of State feels is appropriate. Finally, regulations exercising this power are subject to the affirmative parliamentary procedure. I hope hon. Members will agree that the regulation-making power that this clause will create strikes the appropriate balance between appropriate legislative scrutiny and crucial flexibility to allow our electoral system to respond to external changes. Clause 14 is an interpretation clause. It simply serves to define terms used in clauses 7 to 13. None of the definitions presented in this clause is unusual or controversial. They include terms such as “voters register”, “local government election” and “recall petition” and are included simply to provide clarity and precision to the previous seven clauses of this Bill. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  We could go over and over this point. The Government have set out, in some detail, their objectives for the electoral system. In the case of the Northern Ireland canvass, we have set out the principles, we want to test them, we are taking the powers to test them, and we will come back to Parliament with specifics of those pilots so that they can be scrutinised as profoundly and deeply as Members choose to scrutinise them. Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Regrettably, the hon. Member may have to explain that to me again in a different way.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I have to challenge the hon. Gentleman’s assertion that the integrity of the process will be challenged; that is not the Government’s intention in any way. The principle is that we will use the same Government datasets in each location, but also allow local EROs to use the local datasets that they have access to in addition to Government datasets. The principle of piloting is to test robustness and integrity—that is precisely why the pilots are so important.