Richard Foord MP: speeches

Speeches

• 14 Jan 2025 · Strengthening NATO · Hansard source

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  For 75 years, NATO has stood as a bulwark against territorial acquisition, and NATO is stronger when all its members stand against that. What discussions does the Foreign Secretary plan to have with the President-elect of the United States about the status of Denmark, Greenland and Canada? Will the Foreign Secretary remind President-elect Trump that when he pronounces on how he would like to expand the United States’ sphere of influence, NATO’s adversaries are also watching?

• 14 Jan 2025 · Strengthening NATO · Hansard source

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  2. What discussions he has had with NATO allies on strengthening that alliance.

• 13 Jan 2025 · Hospice and Palliative Care · Hansard source

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  Hospices in Devon were already struggling before the Government’s Budget last autumn, which introduced a hike in employers’ national insurance. To talk first about the national picture, we have heard that a third of funding for hospices tends to come from the state, through the NHS. However, in Devon, it is less than a fifth. For Hospiscare, a charity based in Exeter, the figure is 18%, while for Seaton Hospice at Home and Sidmouth Hospice at Home, the figure is 0%; they do not receive any funding at all from NHS Devon. Last year, I got together with Ben Bradshaw and Simon Jupp, the former MPs for Exeter and for East Devon. We put aside our political differences—Simon Jupp and I were contesting the seat of Honiton and Sidmouth at the time—wrote to the chair of NHS Devon, the brilliant Sarah Wollaston, and secured an extra £500,000 for hospice care in Devon. None the less, the charity Hospiscare still has a deficit of £2.5 million per year. Following the national insurance announcement last autumn, The Guardian reported in mid-November that Whitehall was considering options to relieve the financial pressure on hospices. It suggested that civil servants were weighing up the possibilities of offsetting the NI rise, funding hospice nursing staff directly, or setting up a “direct funding pot” for hospices. Following the announcement on 19 December and the Christmas gift of capital funding for hospices, it seems that the Government chose the direct funding pot for hospices. The problem with the additional capital funding is that a lot of hospices do not have physical buildings. They do not have infrastructure. They provide nursing services and hospice at home, so they cannot simply offset day-to-day spending with that capital spending. They are completely missing out, and that is the experience for Seaton hospice at home and Sidmouth hospice at home services in my east Devon constituency. In conclusion, these charities step in where the NHS does not. Providing care is central to the Government’s vision of shifting treatment from hospitals to communities, yet the current trajectory seems to be forcing patients back into overstretched, acute hospitals.

• 13 Jan 2025 · Developing AI Capacity and Expertise in UK Defence · Hansard source

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  Throughout the decades—at least since 1945—the development of defence technology has been bound by international law. I understand that the Defence Committee has taken the view that it will not be informed by law or ethics, but I wonder whether work will be done in future to bring together the House of Lords report from 2023 and the work that the Sub-Committee has done so expertly.

• 13 Jan 2025 · Gas Storage Levels · Hansard source

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  In 2022, following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we saw a huge Government subsidy for household energy bills and an extra £15 billion per year in additional support for households. I appreciate that gas is traded globally and that the gas price moves globally, but if storage had been greater in 2022, could any of that £15 billion have been saved for taxpayers?

• 13 Jan 2025 · Sudan: US Determination of Genocide · Hansard source

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  Twenty years ago, the Save Darfur coalition was one of the biggest international social movements of its time, but today the campaigning voices of charities and NGOs on the conflict in Sudan are not being amplified in quite the same way, certainly not by Governments. Why does the Minister suppose this is, and what more can the British Government do to amplify the appeals for support from humanitarian organisations?

• 9 Jan 2025 · Local Transport Authorities and Mayors: Financial Support · Hansard source

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  Cullompton and Wellington railway stations were two of the most advanced of all the programmes in the restoring your railway fund. The existing local transport authorities have already invested in getting us to the stage of a full business case, with a high benefit-cost ratio of 3.67. Can the Secretary of State confirm that this programme is in no way disadvantaged compared with those transport authorities in urban areas that have mayors?

• 8 Jan 2025 · Access to Public Services: Technology · Hansard source

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  What steps is her Department taking to help older people who do not feel comfortable utilising technology to access public services?

• 7 Jan 2025 · Northern Gaza · Hansard source

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  The Minister said at the outset, “The UK is doing all we can to alleviate this suffering” in Gaza. Does the Minister really think that? The Government are not even tracking British components for F-35 fighter jets, which are being used in northern Gaza.

• 7 Jan 2025 · Employer National Insurance Contributions: Charities · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member was exactly right to draw particular attention to hospices, given that the House will shortly be debating the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill. I have heard from constituents that if we are to introduce that Bill, they would like to see also proper investment in palliative care. Does he agree that that is another reason why national insurance needs to be prioritised for hospices?

• 7 Jan 2025 · National Resilience and Preparedness · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That this House has considered national resilience and preparedness. It is an honour to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger. I have brought this debate to the House so that the people I represent can hear from the Government what they are doing to make the UK more prepared and resilient. I was partly inspired by the Hallett inquiry into covid-19, and its module 1 report published in July, but I want to go beyond pandemics to think of the UK’s broader resilience and preparedness. At Cabinet Office questions last month, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster confirmed that the Government would respond to module 1 this month, and we look forward to hearing what the Government have to say. I want to focus on three areas: future pandemics, food security and hybrid threats.

• 7 Jan 2025 · National Resilience and Preparedness · Hansard source

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  I agree with the hon. Gentleman that the civil contingencies legislation in this country puts a lot of the onus on the devolved institutions and a lot of the responsibility on local government. We cannot afford for national Government to therefore shed all their responsibilities and simply rely on local and devolved institutions. Resilience is the capacity to withstand or to recover quickly; I suggest that the UK Government do not currently offer us that. The covid-19 pandemic exposed critical weaknesses in the planning and preparedness for large-scale emergencies. While the UK has made great strides in terms of our recovery—and we did after the pandemic—we may still lack the capacity to withstand other crises. Our vulnerabilities to emerging climate change, to food security risks and to hybrid threats from the UK’s adversaries leave us unprepared to endure shocks and unable to recover swiftly. On covid-19, module 1 of the Hallett inquiry was a crucial call to action. The report concluded that the nation was “ill prepared” and that citizens were “failed” by the systems we had in place at the start of 2020. I think of how Boris Johnson, the Prime Minister at the time, was wandering around hospitals shaking hands while the national guidance proposed that we should do something completely different. The report revealed that the UK’s emergency planning was too much focused on influenza and failed to account for any other sort of pandemic. One of the most critical failings identified was the “unduly complex and labyrinthine” nature of the UK’s civil emergency planning structures. Responsibility for pandemic preparedness was dispersed across multiple bodies, leading to inefficiencies and a lack of clear leadership. The inquiry also scrutinised the Government’s risk assessment processes, finding five major flaws that significantly affected the UK’s preparedness, including a lack of focus on prevention and insufficient consideration of interconnected risks, including economic and social vulnerabilities. The 2016 preparedness exercise Exercise Cygnus, which simulated the impact of a flu pandemic, identified critical gaps in the UK’s preparedness, including insufficient capacity in the health system and a lack of essential supplies such as PPE. The recommendations from the 2016 exercise were not acted on, and when covid-19 emerged the same shortcomings persisted, with delays in the provision of PPE, inadequate testing, and healthcare services that became overwhelmed in some places. Over 200,000 excess deaths have been attributed to covid-19 in the UK, many of which may have been preventable with better planning and better resilience. The pandemic also inflicted severe economic damage, with the UK experiencing one of the deepest recessions among the advanced economies. Businesses closed and jobs were lost. The strain on the public sector and on public services like our NHS is still being felt to this day. The inquiry’s report set out key recommendations to overhaul the UK’s approach to civil emergency preparedness. The recommendations included regular pandemic response exercises and enhanced data sharing. Yet just last Thursday, Clare Wenham from the department of health policy at the London School of Economics stated: “We’ve had the biggest pandemic of our lifetimes” yet in 2025 we are “we’re worse prepared than we were when we went in.” When the Minister responds to the debate, it would be interesting to know where the Government are in relation to the World Health Organisation pandemic preparedness treaty. One of the 10 key recommendations from the covid-19 inquiry’s module 1 report emphasised the importance of enhanced data collection and data sharing. The emphasis on domestic resilience—the subject of this debate—has to be balanced with the obligation to co-operate internationally. Pandemics do not respect borders and require global solutions. The Government should act swiftly to implement the inquiry’s recommendations, engage with international frameworks such as the World Health Organisation treaty, and rebuild public trust in the nation’s ability to protect its citizens. Covid-19 also highlighted some of the difficulties in other aspects of our resilience. We need only think about the supermarket shortages we saw and how people reacted: that was a reminder of just how vulnerable Britain is to food supply shocks.

• 7 Jan 2025 · National Resilience and Preparedness · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. I have not considered battery back-ups for mobile phone masts, but it strikes me as an example of a kind of psychology that we need to get into in this country—a way of thinking about our critical national infrastructure and how we might support it, rather than just supposing that everything is going to be all right on the night. Just last week, NATO’s deputy assistant secretary-general for innovation, hybrid and cyber warned that Russian hybrid attacks are now at a level that would have been absolutely unacceptable five years ago. We must not underestimate the damage that Russia can inflict on the UK without firing a bullet. The UK’s relaxed approach to security has left some of our critical national infrastructure vulnerable. A stark example is the Loch Striven oil fuel depot in Scotland, which stores fuel for NATO warships and aircraft but was reported late last year to be now surrounded by land brought into Russian ownership. The UK’s lack of preparedness is evident in many areas. A damning report by the Royal United Services Institute on the NHS’s wartime capabilities reveals that it has no capacity to manage either military or civilian casualties during conflict. I have seen this eroded and undermined in my Honiton and Sidmouth constituency. In east Devon, we have five community hospitals from which beds were stripped out under the last Government. We have seen about 150 beds removed; if that trend is scaled up across the country, it is little wonder that we see shortages of hospital beds during a spike in flu cases, let alone thinking about our preparedness for any sort of national emergency. Hospitals beds are one factor, but we need to think about blood supplies, transport and train personnel, shortages of which would mean the system would be overwhelmed in no time. A couple of months ago, my researcher Fraser Johnson went to Finland. The Finnish Government showed him that they have taken a long-term approach to resilience and preparedness. They require their people to have a whole-of-society approach to these things. Defence is not solely the responsibility of state authorities: it involves citizens, charities, non-governmental organisations, businesses and schools. The schools teach children how to analyse sources and combat disinformation. Finland has regional security committees that conduct local defence exercises twice a year. The concept of citizens as security actors ensures that resilience is embedded throughout society. Helsinki’s emergency preparedness is a model of comprehensive planning. It has underground shelters equipped with oxygen supplies, water reserves and beds for 800,000 people to be used in staggered eight-hour shifts. Of course, Finland is not the UK; it has some fairly unique challenges, such as being desperately cold and having a very long border with Russia, but we need to take some lessons from our north European neighbours. Finland’s broadcaster operates a secondary news desk 30 metres underground with its own energy supply, ensuring uninterrupted communication during emergencies. The Finnish National Emergency Supply Agency maintains a network of 1,000 public and private partners to ensure stockpiles of six months of fuel. We saw during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 not only that the UK had become dependent on gas exports from Russia, but that we did not even have sufficient gas reserves in the UK, with the result that the price here spiked considerably. Despite its proximity to Russia, Finland achieves all that with a defence budget of 2.4% of GDP, so it is partly about how we use the funding that we have. Our geographical distance from Russia should not lull us into complacency. By their nature, hybrid threats are difficult to detect and combat, and their impact will only escalate without decisive action. In January 2024, the Chief of the General Staff called for a shift in mindset to prepare for the possibility of war. The journalist David Parsley broke a story months later about how the Ministry of Defence is sketching out plans for a so-called citizen army of perhaps 200,000 volunteers, trained by reservists. The UK should adopt a total defence approach focusing on stockpiling, training and central co-ordination to enhance resilience against hybrid threats and other challenges. We must move beyond our piecemeal responses and develop a proactive plan to safeguard our nation and its future. Will the Minister commit to implementing the UK covid-19 inquiry’s recommendations to strengthen our emergency preparedness? Will she prioritise a national food security plan to ensure resilience against climate change and supply chain disruptions? Will she outline the steps the Government will take to develop a comprehensive strategy to counter hybrid threats and protect our national infrastructure?

• 7 Jan 2025 · National Resilience and Preparedness · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and I shall now get into the subject of food security. She draws attention to the Government’s food security report. Since the 1980s the UK’s self-sufficiency in food production has declined, going from 78% in 1984 to just 60% today. The statistics emphasise what my hon. Friend said. As for the Groceries Code Adjudicator, my hon. Friend is dead right: we need supermarkets to honour their deals and pay on time.

• 7 Jan 2025 · National Resilience and Preparedness · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is spot on. A report produced last October by the University of Exeter and Chatham House highlighted the fact that climate change and environmental degradation are a real weakness in the UK’s national security strategy. Authors Tim Lenton and James Dyke from the University of Exeter contributed to that report, and talked about the national security strategy having a glaring blind spot for climate threats. The report specifically identified risks to the food supply chain as a critical concern, no doubt exacerbated by some of the challenges we have seen lately from Government policy around agricultural property relief and the proposed changes to inheritance tax. By contrast, Finland is a shining example, not just on food security but in many respects in relation to resilience. Finland has strategic food reserves, whereas the UK very much depends on real-time logistics, which poses severe risks when we see severe weather events, fuel shortages, or conflict. Another factor is the UK’s departure from the European Union. Until 2021 a significant portion of our imports came from the EU, and trade disruptions following the UK’s departure from that bloc have heightened the risks. Between 2018 and 2023, import volumes from the EU decreased by 6%, and it is not yet evident how the UK is compensating for the lost relationships with our European partners in terms of food supply resilience. The UK’s self-sufficiency in fresh vegetables—key in supporting the health of our nation—is at its lowest since records began. We are at just 53% for vegetable self-sufficiency. I have been involved in a campaign to have sections of British supermarkets that illustrate where products are grown in Britain or sourced in the UK, because at the moment it is easy in supermarkets not to know where food comes from. People are able to buy food from all around the globe, all year round. While that may be good in times of peace, we have seen during recent threats to global security that it may not persist. Threats to food security have reminded us of what we could see in the future for our national security, so let me move finally to the issue of defence and hybrid threats. Defence is no longer just about protecting against armed attacks. Over the Christmas period I read Keir Giles’s book “Who Will Defend Europe?” The chapter on hybrid threats is excellent at illustrating how such threats range from cyber-attacks to disinformation. Those forms of aggression from states such as Russia mean that when we think about defence, we must think so much more broadly than just bullets and bombs.

• 6 Jan 2025 · Housing: Military Personnel and Families · Hansard source

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  Under the previous arrangement between the Ministry of Defence and Annington, £100 million was released for accommodation upgrades in the first seven years of that arrangement. What due diligence was carried out ahead of the sale? What additional investment will be made in the married quarters that the Government have brought back into the MOD’s ownership?

• 6 Jan 2025 · Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse · Hansard source

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  Alexis Jay’s independent inquiry into child sexual abuse has not been fully implemented. The inquiry recommended legislating to force tech firms to take stronger action on online abuse material. Since then, this House has passed the Online Safety Act 2023, and Ofcom set out its implementation plans last October, but how can the Government ensure that tech companies take stronger action on online abuse?

• 6 Jan 2025 · Frozen Russian Assets: Ukraine · Hansard source

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  I can hear that the shadow Minister is coming to a conclusion. He is a former investment banker, so I am curious to know His Majesty’s Opposition’s position on the seizure of frozen Russian assets.

• 18 Dec 2024 · Engagements · Hansard source

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  Q15. It was good to hear that the Prime Minister visited British soldiers in Estonia yesterday, before they have to spend Christmas away from their families. We would all like to see a lasting peace emerge for Ukraine in the new year, but Putin may take any deal brokered by Trump as a break in which to re-equip and rearm. What will the Government do to deter Russia from restarting its imperial war of aggression following any peace deal?

• 18 Dec 2024 · Post Office Redress and Funding · Hansard source

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  Recently I met a couple of constituents—Tony Hibberd, a former sub-postmaster, and Colin Chesterton, a solicitor who is representing him pro bono. During our meeting, they raised concerns about the delays and inadequacies of the Horizon shortfall scheme. My constituent has waited in excess of four years since his claim application and 14 years since he was forced to lose his livelihood. What percentage of the claimants to the Horizon shortfall scheme have received an interim payment, and what percentage have had their requests settled in full?

• 17 Dec 2024 · Old Oak Common Station · Hansard source

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  I recognise the particular plight of my hon. Friend’s constituents, who are as far south-west as one can go in England. My time is up, but I plead with the Minister to think again about the £30-million mitigation fund and whether it really offsets the costs that south-west residents will bear.

• 17 Dec 2024 · Old Oak Common Station · Hansard source

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  It is an honour to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. The south-west is a region with enormous untapped economic potential. We already have a brilliant clean energy industry, which is growing. We have a fantastic defence industry, with lots of small and medium-sized enterprises. We have a thriving agricultural sector and a flourishing food sector. We have a tourism industry that welcomes more than 20 million visitors per year. Our economy depends very heavily, with all these things, on reliable transport links. We in Devon are bucking the trend nationally. Since 2019, the proportion of rail journeys taken across the country has fallen by 6%, but in Devon, it has increased by 9%. Time and again, however, we have seen the west country miss out on rail investment, which has been concentrated in other parts of the country—in the midlands, the north of England and, of course, London. The south-west is left grappling with an underfunded and unreliable rail network. The construction of Old Oak Common will exacerbate some of those challenges. Over the next decade, passengers travelling on mainline inter-city services serving the south-west will face severe disruption. Planned works will reduce the number of available seats on trains that are already crowded and have slow journey times. We will see a fall in the number of direct services to London Paddington. Last month, the Government pointed to a £30-million mitigation package. That is woefully inadequate. Compare it with the £6.5-billion cost of Old Oak Common —by contrast, £30 million is a pittance. Worryingly, that £30 million has already been committed to operational adjustments such as depot changes and electrification in London, with little or no regard for the south-west. The Tories’ catastrophic management—or rather, mismanagement—of the rail system was exemplified by the two-year industrial dispute that cost taxpayers an eye-watering £25 million per strike day, and led to reforms that have saddled the public with hundreds of millions of pounds in additional cost. Nowhere is the previous Government’s legacy of transport failure more apparent than in relation to High Speed 2, where flip-flopping over the last 15 or 20 years has led to ballooning costs, neglected communities and misery for passengers. I want to point out how that has affected people in some west-country communities. It might be supposed that it is only HS2 communities—people in the midlands and the north—who have been affected by some of the cost overruns and the indecision, but that is not so. When we saw the cancellation of HS2 by the previous Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak), there was then some big announcement about Network North, and we were promised that HS2 money was therefore going to be ploughed into stations and the redevelopment of stations across the country. In the constituency I represent, the right hon. Member for Richmond and Northallerton came to visit. He hired a community room in a farm shop—a sort of farm shop conference centre. He and other Conservative activists held up British Rail placards with the word “Cullompton” underneath, as if to encourage people that somehow there was money from HS2 that could be invested in our local rail transport. That was absolutely not the case, as has since been revealed. Now we can see that those were all empty promises. Old Oak Common is one more step in this misadventure, with an additional 20 minutes that it adds to a journey from Paddington to the south-west. That could be enough to influence holidaymakers to choose other destinations overseas, which would be a tragedy for the south-west economy. I really hope that the Government look kindly on proper mitigation.

• 17 Dec 2024 · Community Pharmacies: Devon and the South-west · Hansard source

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  It is an honour to serve under your chairship, Mr Betts. Growing up, people used to talk about going to the chemist, and at the time I saw that alongside going to the butcher or shoe shop—it was where we went to buy stuff. What I did not realise was how crucial pharmacies are to prescriptions and thus to people’s health and wellbeing, and I am ever so aware of that now that I represent a constituency in Devon. Under the previous Government, in the last two years alone, Devon has seen the closure of nine pharmacies, leaving the county with just 133. For the people I represent in Honiton and Sidmouth, that translates to just 16 pharmacies per 100,000 people—even fewer than in West Dorset. That is partly because income for pharmacies has stagnated, particularly what they receive from the NHS, and that is combined with rising costs, including energy bills and wages, as well as the cost of medication. Altogether, it makes for an unsustainable financial model. Yet pharmacies provide over 1.3 million consultations each week for people’s health concerns, which is keeping people out of the NHS and saving 38 million GP appointments every year. Just last month, a pharmacist in Devon noted that his team spends over two hours per day providing free, unfunded clinical consultations, and those prevent health conditions from deteriorating, and prevent hospital visits and additional strain on the NHS.

• 17 Dec 2024 · Community Pharmacies: Devon and the South-west · Hansard source

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  I think the hon. Gentleman has come up with an absolutely brilliant idea. Community hospitals are potentially hubs where pharmacies might sit in the future. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Tiverton and Minehead (Rachel Gilmour) for securing this debate; she has done a great thing by doing so.

• 17 Dec 2024 · Community Pharmacies: Devon and the South-west · Hansard source

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  It is flawed, particularly for those parts of the country that are rural and coastal, such as those represented by my hon. Friend and myself. In Honiton and Sidmouth, the average age of my constituents is 56. I went to a meeting of the all-party parliamentary group on ageing and older people last week, and we hosted Sir Chris Whitty, the chief medical officer for England. He described how, while in some societies people move away from the coast and rural areas to seek comfort and care in towns and cities, in England we do quite the reverse. That makes it even more crucial that we maintain our pharmacies in those rural and coastal communities. In short, we are calling for the Government to provide funding to halt the closures and stabilise the sector, ensuring that rural communities such as those in Devon are not left behind. We want to see the role of pharmacists expanded to give them greater prescribing rights and allow them to take on bigger public health responsibilities.