Rebecca Smith MP: speeches 2025

Speeches

• 6 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. As it was to the Minister, the baton has been passed to me from our Cabinet Office spokesperson, my hon. Friend the Member for Kingswinford and South Staffordshire, as part 2 sets specifically how the Bill applies to the DWP. We recognise that there is a huge amount of work to be done, given the increasing levels of fraud and error against the Department for Work and Pensions in recent years. We broadly support the details of part 2, but unsurprisingly, we will have some questions in the coming sessions, and we are tabling a number of amendments too. Clause 72 amends the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to provide powers to require information related to fraud. An authorised officer can give a written notice requiring information where they have reasonable grounds to suspect that the person has committed or intends to commit fraud, and where it is necessary and proportionate to do so. The Minister spoke about how this will enable organisations outside the DWP to be required to provide information. It would be useful to understand better the Social Security Administration Act and what it is currently used for, to make sure that we have covered specifically why it needs to be amended in addition to the provisions of this legislation. I recognise what the Minister is saying, but is there a problem now? Are we not able to take its provisions far enough, and so need these changes to be made? Why are existing information-gathering powers insufficient? This is quite a broadening of the current powers, so some clarification would be great. I have another question on clause 72 and the changes proposed to the 1992 Act. When we talk about a “person”, is this just the person the information is being requested of—an estate agent or whoever it may be—or does the term also relate to the person being investigated? Are we talking about the person who is suspected of committing a fraud, a person in possession of information about that person under suspicion, or both? In effect, who is the written notice intended for? I am sure that is probably straightforward, but it would be useful to have it outlined clearly. I note what the Minister said about the code of practice, which I was not planning to mention in this speech. I was saving my comments on that for clause 73—we are learning as we go in this. Can the Minister confirm whether there are any limits on the non-financial institutions that will have to provide information under the verification notices? Does this include institutions such as education institutions, insurance companies, water agencies and others that people receiving benefits might be paying bills to? Where do the limits lie around the types of organisations that will be contacted? I appreciate that is done in other legislation at the moment, but it is quite a big move. We may well cover this later, but are they subject to the same sort of time restrictions as other organisations? If a school that has never had to do this before is contacted, and they have no idea of what is expected of them, how are we going to ensure that they are not penalised? This could be the first time that anything like this has come in their direction.

• 6 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  If I may, I will come to that when I speak to amendment 25, which deals with housing benefit. I think it will be simpler if I deal with the amendments separately, but I thank the hon. Gentleman for that question. We believe that we should look at the recipients of what are essentially proxy accounts because, without that measure, it would be easy, as I said, for fraudsters to evade monitoring deliberately, and therefore investigations and consequences. The Bill in its current form will be limited in how it can tackle welfare fraud, which is one of the main purposes of the legislation. Ultimately—maybe with the exception of error—where people are determined to commit fraud, there are numerous ways of doing it, and if the Government’s Bill is not enabling that significant investigation, we believe that it will fall at the first hurdle. We also believe that the proposal has the value of increasing protection for vulnerable or older people who may otherwise be unwittingly targeted by those seeking to defraud the DWP. In effect, therefore, this amendment broadens the scope of fraud prevention, ensuring that any misuse of benefits by third parties is identified, and that includes those who are acting as a proxy. We argue that this is, in effect, a tidying-up amendment to enhance the measures in the Bill and to ensure that the legislation does not create loopholes before it has come into force. We have also tabled amendment 25, as we believe that we should add housing benefit to the list of benefits that fall within scope. If we are serious about tackling fraud and error, we should want to expand the relevant benefits as far as we can, while ensuring that the cost-benefit analysis remains proportionate. Although housing benefit is in the process of being replaced as part of the roll-out of universal credit, as of November 2024, 2 million claimants of traditional housing benefit remain. New claims, as Members will know, can still be made for housing benefit by people who have reached state pension age or who live in supported, sheltered or temporary housing. Receipt of benefit is dependent on household income, including savings and capital, among other criteria. Amendment 25 provides a focus in our debate on economic impact and cost effectiveness. The current accredited official statistics, published by DWP in its report, “Fraud and error in the benefit system”, show: “The Housing Benefit overpayment rate was 6.3% (£980m) in FYE 2024, compared with 5.7% (£860m) in FYE 2023… Overpayments due to Fraud were 3.9% (£600m) in FYE 2024, compared with 3.5% (£530m) in FYE 2023.” That represents £600 million of lost taxpayer money. The report continues: “Under-declaration of financial assets (Capital) was the main reason for the changes across total Housing Benefit overpayments”— I know that came up quite a lot during our evidence sessions. The report also states that at a total level, capital fraud “increased to 2.2% in FYE 2024, compared with 1.3% in FYE 2023.” We know that that is a significant problem. Indeed, as we heard in evidence from the Minister about capital fraud, the amount is eye-watering. Often this is about error, but equally, it does still mean that people fall out of scope for receiving benefits. That increase is statistically significant and highlights why we believe that housing benefit should be brought within the scope of the Bill, if the Government are truly serious about tackling welfare fraud and error.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have some queries about clause 17 and the provisions on recovery from bank accounts. My comments apply to clause 38 as well, but I will speak specifically to clause 17. Earlier, the Minister mentioned that some of the powers for direct deductions and deductions from earnings are used more widely across the DWP, particularly in the CMS for recouping costs for parents. Have the Government thought more broadly than simply direct deductions and deductions from earnings? My understanding is that the CMS has quite strong powers beyond that and has used them in the past. Given the nature of fraud against public authorities—these are ultimately quite serious offences—what more has been done to consider whether direct deductions and deductions from earnings are enough and will be all that is required? At some stage, do we need to think about putting in tougher and more stringent powers to claw back the money owed to the Government?

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the Minister for that reassurance and for outlining that there are further abilities to recover funds. Particularly in recoveries from organisations, does that include the seizure of assets should that be necessary? A lot of organisations might be asset rich but cash poor. If we seek to retrieve money on behalf of the Government, is the ability to seize assets, if required, within the framework the Minister alluded to?

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I could probably have intervened on my hon. Friend the Member for Kingswinford and South Staffordshire, but he was in full flow at the time and I did not want to put him off. I have a clarification question on the meaning of the bank. Is the Minister looking to ensure that things such as the National Savings and Investments bank, which is obviously a Government bank, are included? I believe it would fit the definition given, in that it accepts deposits, but I thought it would be worth putting on record that the breadth of this definition would cover institutions such as those and making sure that we get the Government’s own house in order as well as ensuring that commercial banks work with the Government.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have a few requests for clarification about this group of clauses. The point that my hon. Friend the Member for Kingswinford and South Staffordshire made about clause 63 and wanting to avoid double jeopardy makes complete sense, but it raises a question—forgive me if this is covered somewhere else, perhaps in other legislation. As I listened to the Minister and other hon. Members, it struck me that this part of the Bill is about civil penalties, and we looked earlier at criminal penalties, but where are the criminal penalties for organisations? We have talked about the differential, but in our earlier conversations it felt like we were talking more about specific individuals who might have committed fraud. I may have missed that in the Bill or elsewhere, but I wanted to ask that question, particularly following the points about double jeopardy. I also seek clarification on clause 51, particularly in respect of the need to deal with potential internal civil service fraud. It jumps out that the definition of “relevant individuals” covers businesses, membership organisations and so on, so I want to double-check where the civil service will be incorporated. I assume it could be an unincorporated association under subsection (3)(e), but I am not sure about that. I want to highlight something that came up in our pre-meet with the Ministers. A 2023 National Audit Office report highlighted the difficulties with whistleblowing, particularly in respect of senior colleagues. That is a problem in the private sector too, but we are here to look at public authorities. What safeguards have been put in place to ensure that more junior civil servants are able to raise concerns about more senior members of staff, particularly in the light of research highlighting that that is particularly tricky? Does that need a bit more work as the Bill makes progress?

• 3 Mar 2025 · Potential closure of Newton Ferrers Pharmacy · Hansard source

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  Further to a similar online petition that is approaching 1,000 signatures, I present this petition of over 100 constituents from Newton Ferrers and Noss Mayo who rely on Newton Ferrers pharmacy, which is owned and run by Esi Kumurdzi. My constituents are deeply concerned about the future of this vital pharmacy, which is under threat due to soaring costs and the out-of-date NHS contract. The petition states: The petition of residents of South West Devon, Declares that the potential closure of Newton Ferrers Pharmacy is causing significant concern for the local community; further declares that the pressures placed on local pharmacies include inadequate funding, rising operating costs, the difficulty in recruiting and retaining community pharmacists, and the recent rise in National Insurance rates for employers, which is expected to cost pharmacies an additional £50 million; further notes that these closures have led to increased pressure on GP surgeries and hospitals, as patients are forced to seek alternative care options; and acknowledges that the vital role that community pharmacies play in providing accessible, convenient, and cost-effective healthcare to local populations should be recognised in the renegotiated Community Pharmacy Contractual Framework. The petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urges the Government to take immediate action to address the challenges facing community pharmacies, including assessing the adequacy of funding in this area, providing support to reduce operating costs, addressing the impact of National Insurance rises, and improving workforce retention strategies in the lead-up to the renegotiation of the Community Pharmacy Contractual Framework. And the petitioners remain, etc. [P003048]

• 27 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the Minister for those points, but I seek a bit more clarification. There are references to “the Minister” in clause 3, and I want to be clear about this, because we talked a lot about the code of practice during the evidence session on Tuesday. Is the Minister saying that the code of practice will have reference to the authorised officers? So, for Hansard, where clause 3 refers to “the Minister”, it is actually more likely, through the code of practice, to be referring to the day-to-day operation of those investigators. The Minister also mentioned that the definition of reasonableness is as per other departmental records and is widely available. Just to clarify, will that also be in the code of practice so that it is easily accessible for anybody in the public to look at what that might include? I seek more clarification on those two points.

• 26 Feb 2025 · Family Businesses · Hansard source

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  Does my right hon. Friend agree that the myriad Labour attacks on family businesses will have a huge impact on businesses like Vospers vehicle franchise in my constituency? Founded in 1946, it employs 600 people but faces a £1.4 million increase in national insurance contributions and a future business property relief levy on the next generation, in an industry that has seen a 20% reduction in sales in January alone, following the Government’s so-called growth Budget.

• 26 Feb 2025 · Family Businesses · Hansard source

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  Of the 500 or so that the Minister has just explained will have to pay inheritance tax, does he have any idea what number are small businesses, compared with the large estates that he seeks to challenge in the legislation?

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q We see that there has been a lack of robust assessment of business costs so far. The Government have been unable to say what the cost to the banks will be. Do you have any concerns about the costs or the other impacts on businesses in the sectors? I suppose the flip question of that is: do you think there should be incentives to get them to actually work with it? It feels to me like there is a huge amount of good faith here, in that banks are expected to bear the costs of providing this information, but are there unforeseen costs that we need to be concerned about as well? Daniel Cichocki: In terms of broad principles, obviously wherever there is additional legislation and regulation on the sector, we would hope that that is proportionate. We anticipate doing further work with the Government to help to support the impact assessment as a result of the more detailed work when we see the draft code of practice, when we are better able to understand the methods through which this information will be shared, the practicalities of how it works, and the scale at which the powers will be used. We therefore anticipate more work being done around the impact assessment. We would hope and anticipate that the Government would recognise that the impact on the private sector needs to be proportionate. As well as the cost implications around resource, this is also around prioritisation. To my earlier point, many of the teams that will be complying with this legislation will currently be complying with the broader legislation and regulation that we have in place, sharing information with the Government and law enforcement, and ensuring proportionality of how that resource is deployed. Certainly from an industry perspective, as a broad principle, we would see it as appropriate and desirable for much of that resource to be focused on serious and organised crime in the round. Eric Leenders: I have a couple of brief points. First, one consideration is congestion. There is quite a crowded mandatory change stack, as we call it. There is a sequence of changes in train that firms are already implementing. Secondly, to your specific point about the cost-benefit analysis, we recognise the challenge that the cost will be direct, as in the build costs that we have just summarised. The benefits—reducing and deterring criminality generally, and perhaps even preventing it—are perhaps more indirect. I suppose that leads to another point: the extent to which we need to be thoughtful about circumvention and how to ensure that the legislation is suitably agile, so that bad actors cannot game the system no sooner than it has been introduced.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q It would still be helpful to have something in writing, even in advance of each issue that we can scrutinise, because we are being asked to scrutinise something in its fullness without a level of detail. Anyway, I will leave that there, because it has been covered enough. Now the question that I was coming to, if I may. The state pension has been explicitly excluded from the eligibility verification measure, and the three means-tested benefits are the initial focus. I wonder why the Government have left it open to include other non-means-tested benefits in future, and what data would the Government ask for in those cases? Andrew Western: The state pension is excluded—because of the particular nature of the eligibility criteria for state pension and the consequently incredibly small amount of fraud that we see on it—considering the number of people we would have to bring into scope of the measure to go after what is a tiny amount of fraud. It is not considered proportionate to do that, as far as I am concerned. The determination that we have made as to the three benefits that should initially be in scope is entirely predicated on current levels of fraud and error. We want to retain the ability, if necessary, to bring other benefits into scope, should there be a surge in fraud in those benefit areas. We do not anticipate this, but we want to future-proof the Bill as best as we can, should there be any material changes in the level of fraud in those areas. For instance, if we consider the tiny amount of fraud in the state pension versus the £1 in every £8 currently spent in universal credit that turns out to be fraud or error, it is clearly right to distinguish between benefits and consequently to have some in scope and others not.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q How far do you think the increased time limit that would be in place for investigating fraud related to the covid-19 schemes will improve recovery rates? That is a slightly different topic, but do you think those longer time limits mean that we are more able to recover that money? Joshua Reddaway: In short, yes. Would you like a longer answer?

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q On eligibility verification, the Government have said that the final decision will always be made by a human. There is an aim to automate some things, which is not necessarily a bad thing, but do you feel reassured by the human element at the end of the process, so that people are not adversely affected by automation, or are you concerned that that will still not be far enough or good enough? Ellen Lefley: Reassurance cannot be the word, unfortunately, given the moment we are in, which is one of increasing automation and increasing investment in data analytics and machine learning across government. Last month, I think, we had a Government statement about mainlining AI into the veins of the nation—that includes the public sector. Knowing that that is coming and having a clear focus on how the functions in the Bill will be operationalised need to be a key concern. The preservation of human intervention in decision making might have been a statement that has been made, but it is not on the face of the Bill. Indeed, we need to remember that the Data (Use and Access) Bill, which is also before Parliament, is removing the prohibition on fully automated decision making and profiling. That is happening concurrently with these powers. In addition, over the years, there have been numerous Horizon-like scandals that have happened in the benefits area. One, quite close to home in the Netherlands, was a childcare benefit scandal, which Committee members will know of. In that scandal, recipients of childcare benefit allowance in the Netherlands were subject to machine-learning algorithms that learnt to flag a fraud risk simply because of their dual nationality. So there is a problem here. Even with the powers that are subject to reasonable grounds, we need to have a wider discussion as to what reasonable means and what it definitely does not mean when we talk about reasonable grounds of suspicion, when suspicion is an exercise that is informed in a tech-assisted and technosocial decision-making environment. Justice has some suggestions as to how reasonable grounds can be better glossed in the Bill in relation to generalisations and stereotypes that a certain type of person, simply because of their characteristics, is more likely to commit fraud than others. Perhaps it could be recorded in the Bill that that definitely is not reasonable. Some useful wording from the Police and Criminal Evidence Act code of practice A is not in the Bill because it relates to the power to stop and search, which is not being given to DWP officers, probably rightly and proportionately, but some explicit paragraphs in the code of practice for stop and search for police officers say that they cannot stop and search someone based on their protected characteristics. Under the Equality Act 2010, they cannot exercise their discretion to stop and search someone due to generalisations and stereotypes about a certain type of person’s propensity to commit criminal activity. Amendments like those could strengthen the Bill against unreasonable, but perhaps not always detectable suspicions being imbued by machine-learning algorithms. Of course, if there will always be a human intervention in the decision-making process, perhaps that could be explicitly recorded in the Bill as well.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q The Bill is sort of a move on from the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill, which was introduced by the last Government. I know that the Information Commissioner had some concerns about the Bill’s previous iteration, and he has said that those concerns have roughly been addressed in this new Bill. Are you similarly reassured or do you have outstanding concerns about this piece of legislation? Jasleen Chaggar: We recognise that the Bill is different from the previous Conservative Government’s Bill and some changes have been made. However, we are still concerned that the purported safeguards in the Bill are really insufficient. One of the major safeguards that is pointed to as a reassurance is the fact that financial transaction information and special category data will not be handed over to the DWP from the banks. However, it is a circular safeguard in reality, because once the account number and name of the individual has been passed on to the DWP, it can very easily go back to the bank and request that granular financial information. That is incredibly privacy invasive, as you will know, so we are still concerned about the safeguards in the Bill. A similar safeguard is the provision for an independent person, but there are no safeguards about what qualifications that person should have. They are expected to provide an annual report to Parliament, but we are concerned that their oversight role is more to do with enforcement than accountability. There are provisions about the efficiency of the measures but no provisions about how they impact equality or the adverse consequences on benefits recipients, so we are not reassured by these safeguards.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I will ask one question in a second, but I wanted to come back on the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Kingswinford and South Staffordshire made about the code of practice. The Minister has said that each time in our scrutiny we get to a point in the Bill that relates to a bit of the code of practice, he will bring that to us then and we can discuss it. Will that be in writing? It strikes me that if something is there for us to discuss at a particular point, it would make much better sense to have discussed it all at the beginning, so that we can look at it as a whole. Otherwise, I am not quite sure how we will do it in debate. Andrew Western: A draft code of practice will not be available at that stage, so I will speak in general terms about what we intend to include, but there will not be a written document at that stage.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q What would get you to a place of feeling more comfortable with those safeguards? A provision that you can use the data once and then you cannot use it again? Where would you need to see movement in order to get to a place where you were comfortable with the safeguards? Jasleen Chaggar: Is that in relation to—

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Based on your experience and the work that you are already doing with the PSFA, are there any gaps in the Bill? Is there anything that you think is not there that would help us to tackle fraud against public authorities, or do you think that as it stands, it is about as complete as you would want it to be? John Smart: Having worried about this for a number of years, I think there are a lot of steps that the Government—the PSFA—can take over time, but we are on a ladder to get to a position that is constantly moving because the fraudsters are developing all the time. One critical thing that I have been concerned about for a number of years is the use and sharing of data across Government. Government have so much data available to them, and third parties have a lot of data available to them. There is clearly a privacy question that rapidly comes into play, but from my perspective, if the data is available to Government, they should use it. They should use it proportionately: they should not exploit those powers to use that data on some sort of phishing trip, but if there is evidence that fraud is being or has been committed, getting that evidence in the hands of investigators quickly is critical to preventing the fraud from continuing and to identifying and recovering any money that has been lost. To my mind, there is quite a lot of work still to be done on data sharing across Government.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Interestingly, one of the previous witnesses talked about powers that other countries have but we do not, which potentially would do exactly what you have just described. Are there any countries already doing something along the lines of what you just suggested it would be helpful for us to look at—perhaps not for this Bill, but in the future? John Smart: An obvious example is the United States; there is an interesting case in point at the moment, which I have dealt with quite a lot. The US has whistleblower reward legislation in place, which is very effective at flushing out issues affecting payments made by Government. Their qui tam legislation, as it is called, flushes out frauds by incentivising whistleblowers to blow the whistle. It creates a lot of work for various organisations, but it encourages people to think about whether fraud is being committed against the Government in the US. That is an obvious piece of legislation that might be worth considering in this country.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you, Chair, and thank you, gentlemen. We have heard quite a lot of concerns already this afternoon about the potential disproportionate impact on disabled people. It would be good to hear from you as disability campaigners—because we have kind of heard people talking on your behalf so far—about how you think the measures will affect disabled people, and what could be done to address the impacts that may result from the Bill. Geoff Fimister: I should say, first of all, that the Campaign for Disability Justice was launched relatively recently—a few months ago—by Inclusion Barnet. We now have a substantial number of individuals—several hundred—supporting us, as well as a substantial number of organisations, ranging from large charities to grassroots disabled people’s organisations, so we get quite a lot of feedback. I suppose our concern with the Bill include a broad aspect, but also a very specific aspect as to how it may impact disabled people. The broad aspect is that, because it focuses very much on means-tested benefits, it will, by definition, disproportionately affect people on low incomes, and disproportionately affect disabled people, because they are more likely to be on low incomes than others. The practical issue, which I think has attracted the most concern, from the conversations I have had, is false positives, as the previous witness, Jasleen Chaggar, mentioned. We are all familiar with a world in which we have problems with malfunctioning technology. Every few months, my internet provider locks my inbox because of “suspicious activities”, which have included sending an email to an MP’s researcher or one to Mencap. Every now and then, my bank freezes my wife’s and my bank accounts because of “suspicious activity”, such as, on one occasion, purchasing a sandwich from a Marks and Spencer in Deptford. That might sound entertaining, but it is a serious business; this tech goes wrong, and I think the previous witness made the point that, if large numbers of people are embraced by this kind of trawl, it will go wrong for a percentage of them. We do not know whether that will be a large or a small percentage, but even a small percentage of a big number is a lot of people. People being left without any income if technology triggers the cessation of their benefit is a serious business. Not having any income can cause hardship, debt and stress. In extreme cases, there can be serious health and safety issues. Disabled people are concerned about that kind of eventuality. As to what we can do about it, I understand the thrust of the Bill and where it is coming from. In parliamentary terms, it has widespread backing, although a number of reservations have been expressed. We would like to see some sort of safeguard whereby benefits could not be stopped unless and until it was established that there was an overpayment—not that the DWP thinks that there might have been because the tech spotted something. We do not want to see a “shoot first and ask questions” later approach. If we could have some protection along those lines, that would be helpful. Rick Burgess: I stress that I am from the Greater Manchester Coalition of Disabled People. The panel is something we do, but I am not speaking in that role today. There are particular worries about how this affects people living with mental distress, particularly those with diagnoses of paranoia, schizophrenia, depression or anxiety. This adds to the feeling of being monitored, followed and surveilled, because you literally are being surveilled by your bank on behalf of the Government. So it will necessarily reduce the wellbeing of disabled people who are claiming benefits that are monitored by the system. There is no getting away from that. On the potential risks, when you enter a trawling operation, you are not targeting it in any way; you are simply looking at everyone. So the error rate becomes extremely important. We do not know exactly what the technology is. We have not seen the equality impact assessment, but even if it had a failure rate of 0.1%, which would be a quite respectable systemic failure rate—it is pretty acceptable in a lot of these areas—that is still 1,000 people per million scanned. If you are talking about even the means-tested benefits, that is going to run to thousands of people getting false positives. If you think about the entire DWP caseload, which is 22.6 million people, that is over 22,000 people. Bearing in mind that the Post Office scandal involved fewer than 1,000 people, you are at the inception stage of something that could be the greatest miscarriage of justice in British history, if you go ahead with this with untested technology that has not had proper impact assessments. I stress, though, that we are against this measure in its totality because it treats disabled people as a separate population who should have lower privacy rights than the general population. In that respect, given that the United Nations has condemned the UK twice in a row for grave and systemic human rights abuses, this is going further in the wrong direction and failing to address the failures identified by the UN. It is further marking disabled people for additional state oppression and surveillance, which, as I said, will necessarily be harmful to a great many of the people under the surveillance regime.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q This is possibly a slightly nuanced question, but there has been a lot of talk about the authorised officer role. To my mind, when you go from the Minister to the authorised officer, that feels like quite a big jump in title. It might be quite a small thing but, from your experience at the PSFA, does that terminology work when looking to expand beyond that, in terms of people’s understanding of how senior the people doing these investigations are? The word “officer” is often used, particularly in the public sector, to mean quite a junior role. How do we ensure that the public and people across the public sector understand how senior these people are? Does that need to be on the face of the Bill or in the code of practice? How would you look at that? Mark Cheeseman: Again, I do not know whether it would need to be in the Bill; that would be for you to debate. As it gets past the authorised officer, there is a structure: there are senior leaders with deep experience in investigating fraud who are overseeing them. We have structures of senior investigation officers overseeing your investigators and the individual authorised officers. While it may feel like a big jump, there is a structure to ensure quality, to ensure the right practices, and so on. That directly compares with what happens elsewhere. I am pretty comfortable that “authorised officers” is a term used elsewhere. I recognise what you say about the seniority of grade; I had to have a wry smile, because it took me a while to get to HEO and SEO—higher executive officer and senior executive officer—but those are still senior, experienced roles. They are experienced administrators with a high level of skillset and expertise doing those roles. Part of the reason for creating the counter-fraud profession is to show the expertise and capability that those experienced counter-fraud experts have in taking action on fraud.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q 51 This question is for you, Joshua. As you no doubt know, the Bill will allow the Public Sector Fraud Authority to be established as a separate body from the Cabinet Office. Do you think that is the right approach, and what benefits will it bring? Joshua Reddaway: I guess I am agnostic as to what is done, but the benefits would be an opportunity for governance and an opportunity for accountability, clarity and transparency. I am sure that we would be absolutely delighted to audit the accounts for the PSFA and help to provide some of that transparency. Of course it is currently incorporated with the Cabinet Office, so it is about a clear line of sight. You have to offset that against the fact that there is an administrative burden for producing things like sets of accounts, and having governance and so on. The bigger question, and the one for the Committee, is whether it will enable better oversight of the powers in the Bill.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Do you have an opinion on that? Joshua Reddaway: I do not have a major opinion. I would ask whether you are comfortable with the oversight arrangements. One thing to point out is that this will be the closest thing to an anti-corruption unit that the Government have, with search powers. Are you happy with that being constitutionally in the Cabinet Office or not? I am also interested in what the criteria are. The explanatory notes have set out that there will be an efficiency assessment for the powers in the impact assessment. I am not sure the Cabinet Office is clear on exactly what that means. It is interesting to think about what would actually trigger it to exercise that power under the Bill to create it as a separate body.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Having a separate organisation? Joshua Reddaway: Having a separate body.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Given what you just said about the nature of the data that is already collected, could we avoid the fraud in the first place by sharing a lot of that information? If cross-departmental working is tightened up, might there be opportunities to flag fraud as soon as it starts to happen? John Smart: Absolutely. There are two points to make. The first is that that frauds that are already happening would be identified if the data was shared more effectively and quickly. Secondly, by joining up data that is sitting in Companies House, the licensing authority, or wherever, you can find evidence that a fraud is being carried out and prevent frauds from happening in the first place.