Rebecca Paul MP: speeches

Speeches

• 28 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir John. I speak in support of amendments 59, 35 and 36 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle, and the new clauses tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester. Those new clauses are constructive, and the Government should engage with them seriously. They seek to address the right question: how can we increase capacity, improve efficiency, preserve public trust and make better use of the system before cutting into long-standing criminal justice safeguards? The Opposition amendments would ensure that before clauses 1 to 7 are commenced, the Government must show that they have exhausted the practical alternatives, such as more sitting capacity, better use of buildings, fewer lost sitting days from late guilty pleas and prisoner transport delays, proper funding for sitting days and a serious examination of extended sitting hours. That is the right order of operations. The Government’s approach too often appears to be about restricting rights first and hoping that savings arrive later. Our approach is to build capacity and fix operational failures first and contemplate introducing legislation only then, and if truly necessary. Our approach is encapsulated perfectly in amendment 59 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. The amendment would prevent clauses 1 to 7 of the Bill from coming into force until reasonable steps have been taken “to increase Crown Court sitting capacity, including but not limited to— (a) using buildings not currently in use as courts to hear cases where cells are not needed, and (b) reducing lost sitting days as a result of late guilty pleas and prison transport delays.” That is exactly the right approach, and it is at the heart of the argument we have made throughout proceedings. The Government say that the backlog is so bad that they must remove the right to elect a jury trial, create judge-alone trials, expand magistrates’ sentencing powers and restrict appeals. We say that before they do any of that, they should show us that they have used all the practical means already available to increase capacity and reduce wasted court time. We are seeking to draw attention to the tangible, everyday causes of courtroom delay, which, as the Minister well knows, is often about the case not being ready, defendants not arriving, late pleas, poor listing, lack of courtrooms or staff, or failure to use the estate properly. If those are the root causes of inefficiency, it is extraordinary to reach first for the curtailment of our ancient right to jury trial rather than for more mundane operational fixes. I would go as far as to suggest that the evidence that the Committee has received from the Bar Council could almost have been written in support of the amendment. It says that the current backlog was not caused by the availability of jury trials. It supports “opening all…courts so they can hear cases”, “intense court listing” and “proactive” CPS “case ownership”, “revising” the PECS contract so that “defendants are delivered to the dock on time”, “better use of technology” and “proper resourcing”. It also specifically identifies PECS as a problem, and warns that the Government’s impact assessment does not contain enough modelling on the changes needed to make prisoner transport work under the new system. Amendment 59 also references late guilty pleas. Late pleas waste enormous amounts of time. They consume preparation time, courtroom hours, witness time and judicial energy that is better spent elsewhere. If the Government can reduce late pleas by better case progression, better early engagement or stronger listing discipline, that should happen before constitutional rights are reduced. I am in danger of repeating myself, but this point is central to the Opposition’s position: it is far more sensible to make the existing system work properly than to redesign it around its current inefficiencies. Another question we should ask is whether every possible physical capacity option has been explored. Are there hearings that do not require cells and could be heard in other suitable buildings? Are there underused spaces in the existing estate? Are there ways to free Crown courtrooms by moving appropriate administrative or preliminary business elsewhere? Those are practical questions to which I have not seen a satisfactory answer. It seems logical that the Government should be required to answer them before commencing clauses 1 to 7. In essence, if the Government are minded to oppose this amendment, they are effectively saying that they are content to shred legal rights before making the effort to prove that they have exhausted all possible operational reform first. That is the wrong way around. That is also the crux of our case for amendment 35, which was also tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. It would prevent clauses 1 to 7 from coming into force until three conditions have been met. First, the Lord Chancellor must have “provided funding for at least 130,000 sitting days in the Crown Court in the financial year following the coming into force of this Act”. Secondly, HMCTS must have assessed that “the Crown court has, so far as possible, used that allocation of sitting days”. Thirdly, the Lord Chancellor must have “made a statement to the House of Commons that the funding provided…has not reduced the number of cases pending trial in the Crown Court compared with the start of the financial year.” Put as simply as possible, before the Government curtail fundamental safeguards in the criminal justice system, they should first fund and use the Crown court at maximum practical capacity. If that works, there is no need for clauses 1 to 7. If it does not, Ministers can come back to Parliament having at least proven that the obvious operational fix was seriously attempted. One of the persistent weaknesses in the Government’s case thus far has been the “do nothing” comparison. Too often, the Government present the Bill in the context of a binary choice: do nothing, or accept the package as it is. But that is a false choice; there are other options. One of the most obvious is to run the Crown court at full sitting capacity and see what happens. The Bar Council has welcomed the removal of the cap on sitting days and has long argued that courts should sit at maximum capacity. If increased sitting days are now being funded, those additional days should be allowed to take effect before Ministers demand more controversial, and likely irreversible, changes. The Institute for Government has also weighed in on this issue. It says: “There is a lot of uncertainty attached to the potential benefits of the government’s proposed reforms.” It also says that there is a serious risk that these reforms could backfire and actually cause a decline in court performance. It identifies productivity as central, noting that the assumptions behind the Government’s proposed savings are “uncertain”. If boosting productivity and increasing sitting capacity are critical, then amendment 35 is exactly the right kind of test. Let us see whether properly funded sitting days can reduce the backlog before proceeding with more radical measures. Amendment 35 is therefore one of the strongest amendments we are considering today. It does not deny the reality of the backlog—the Opposition never have. Rather, it confronts it directly. It does not say, “Do nothing,” it says, “Do the obvious thing first—fund the Crown court, use the capacity, report back and only then consider whether more fundamental changes are genuinely necessary.” I also support amendment 36, also tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. It would prevent the Lord Chancellor from “bringing sections 1 to 7 into force until he has…undertaken a consultation on the potential benefits of introducing extended sitting hours in the Crown Court, and…laid before Parliament a report on the outcome”. The consultation would have to consider “potential rates of fees and remuneration for legal professionals and court staff working extended hours” and the availability of HMCTS staff. The amendment is a reasonable one. It simply requires the Government to consult and report before commencing clauses 1 to 7. Given the scale of the changes the Government are asking us to approve, that is not an excessive demand, in my view. The amendment also seeks to address one of the practical concerns around extended sitting hours. It recognises that extended hours may have benefits but also inherent costs. It explicitly requires consideration of remuneration and staff availability. We all understand that we cannot run a court system merely by wishing it to sit longer. Judges, advocates, court staff, legal professionals, witnesses and support services all have to be able to make the model work. If hours are to be extended, that must be properly resourced. That is precisely why a consultation is needed. The Government should not be able to say on the one hand that extended hours are too complicated to consider, while on the other hand pressing ahead with sweeping reforms to jury trial and appeal rights. If their position is that extended hours are impractical, Ministers should set out the evidence. If extended hours are practical in some settings, Ministers should explain where and how. If remuneration is the problem, the Government should consult on it. If staffing is the problem, they should say so. What the Government should not do is ignore the question altogether, as they seem to have done here. There is also a simple point of fairness. The Government are asking defendants, victims, witnesses, lawyers and the public to accept major changes to the criminal process. They should therefore be willing to accept a much smaller burden: to consult, report and explain why a less constitutionally disruptive capacity measure is or is not viable. Taken alongside amendments 59 and 35, amendment 36 offers a coherent and moderate alternative path forward: build capacity first, fund sitting days first, examine extended hours first, fix operational problems first and only then ask Parliament to consider whether the more drastic provisions in clauses 1 to 7 are necessary. That is a measured and responsible approach that the Government should consider accepting. I will speak briefly to new clauses 3, 4, 5, 13, 17 and 22, which would improve the Bill. They focus on delivering capacity, efficiency, transparency, public trust and practical reform in line with what the Opposition also seek to achieve. New clause 3 would allow certain Crown court locations or courtrooms to operate as extended-capacity courts, with a morning session from 9 am to 1 pm and an afternoon session from 2 pm to 6 pm. The purpose of that is to allow two different cases to be heard in the same courtroom on the same day. That is clearly a significant operational proposal, and while the principle is sound, it raises serious questions about the availability of judges, court staff, interpreters, security and CPS staff. It also raises questions about remuneration, because the criminal Bar, solicitors and court staff are already under enormous strain. A justice system running on exhausted people will not produce better justice simply because the building stays open for longer. We need to consider all those things at the same time. New clause 3 is aimed at the right problem: capacity. The Government are asking us to make very large changes to jury trials, allocation and appeals. Before they do that, they should be able to show that every realistic capacity option has been explored. If courtrooms can be used more intensively without compromising fairness, quality or the welfare of those involved, that should at least be examined. The Bar Council’s evidence is clear that the backlog has not been caused by jury trials but by under-investment, poor management of the estate, failures in prisoner transport, listing problems, technology issues and inadequate resourcing. New clause 3 seeks to address that; it asks how we increase throughput while keeping the basic architecture of justice intact. New clause 4 takes a more cautious approach, and for that reason, it may be the more attractive version of the idea. It would require an independent report into the feasibility of holding two trials a day in designated courtrooms, followed by a Government response and proposals for a pilot, if appropriate. That seems to be a serious and reasonable way to proceed. It does not assume that the model will work: it asks for independent work; evidence; consideration of the effect on defendants, victims, witnesses, judges, practitioners and staff; and an assessment of cost and resource implications. New clause 5 would require the Lord Chancellor to publish annual targets for reducing the Crown court backlog, both nationally and in each HMCTS region, and to report to Parliament on progress. Again, that appears useful and sensible. If backlog reduction is the central justification for the Bill, Ministers should be willing to define what success looks like and be judged against it. The regional element is especially important. We know that the backlog is not the same everywhere, and it is undeniable that some court centres have done better than others, sometimes because of stronger local leadership, better listing or more effective case progression. Others face particular estate, staffing or operational problems, and a national figure alone can hide those differences. If the Government are relying on predicted reductions of sittings days and caseload, Parliament should be able to see whether those predicted benefits are actually being delivered, and where they are and are not being delivered.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I begin by echoing the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. I completely understand why the Government have brought this clause forward. I welcome the debate. Similar to the hon. Member for Chichester, who spoke so eloquently, I was deeply moved by the evidence we heard from Claire Throssell. I cannot even imagine how she has coped. To do what she has done and to try to take something positive from that is an incredible thing. The evidence this Committee has heard from those witnesses and other survivors of domestic abuse is that they feel that the family courts have not properly identified risk and believe that a pro-contact culture has, at times, overridden safety. That is extremely concerning, and it is absolutely right that we take it extremely seriously. Child safety must come first. Where the present framework has contributed to poor outcomes, it is right that the Government act, but it is also incumbent on us today to make sure that the clause that is being repealed is indeed the cause of the harm to those children. I also make the point that, where Parliament removes an existing statutory principle, it has a duty to be clear about what will replace it. My concern today is less with the Government’s objective than with whether repeal on its own is sufficiently precise, evidence based and thought through to achieve the Ministers’ intended objective. The Government’s own impact assessment, which has already been set out, says that “repeal alone is unlikely to materially change outcomes”, even though it is expected to “change the process judges follow”. That is an important starting point for this debate. It is really important that we do not make changes to law because everyone wants us to make those changes and thinks that will improve things when, in reality, we have the evidence and facts to know that it may not deliver those outcomes. It is incumbent on all of us to make sure that we actually deliver the outcomes that we all desire; we all have the same ambition. I know this comes from a good place and we are all approaching this debate in the best way we can to protect children. My purpose this afternoon is to be constructive—I am not saying I have all the answers on this, and I hope my comments will be taken in that spirit. If the Government proceed with repeal, do they also need to do more to provide a principles replacement framework, clearer guidance and stronger supporting reforms? It is important to start with the facts around the presumption. The current presumption does not give any parent an automatic right to contact, override the welfare checklist or override the paramountcy principle in section 1 of the Children Act 1989, and it certainly does not require courts to make orders that place children at risk. The Family Services Foundation is clear in its written evidence that current law already places the child’s welfare first, stating: “Section 1(6)…expressly ensures the presumption applies” only where parental involvement “does not put the child at risk of suffering harm”. It says that practice direction 12J and the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 already provide an important framework for identifying and responding to abuse in family proceedings. Equally, I recognise the contrary concern expressed by survivors who say that, in abuse cases, the presumption can place pressure on courts to prioritise parental contact even where there are serious safety concerns and can make it harder for victims to be properly heard and protected. The real question is therefore not whether safety matters more than contact—it plainly does—but whether removing the current presumption will improve how risk is identified and acted upon, or whether it risks creating new uncertainty while leaving the deeper operational problems untouched and discouraging parental involvement in cases where it would actually be beneficial. There are already substantial protections in the current legal framework, although they clearly fail in the worst way on occasion. The Family Services Foundation points out that the Children Act 1989, practice direction 12J and the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 already equip the courts to restrict or refuse contact where “harm is shown”. It also reminds us that the UK is bound by the UN convention on the rights of the child, including article 9, which recognises that children should maintain regular contact with both parents unless that is “contrary to the child’s best interests”. Both Parents Matter makes a similar point, saying: “The Presumption was introduced in 2014” to reflect the UNCRC and provide a statutory benchmark that the safe involvement of both parents generally furthers child welfare. I emphasise the word “safe”—no one has ever said that parents should be involved if it is not safe. I make those points not to argue that nothing should change. If the Government are minded to proceed, we need a clear understanding of how the replacement framework will continue to distinguish between safe parental involvement, which can be beneficial, and unsafe parental involvement, which must be stopped. At present, I am not sure the Bill by itself gives enough reassurance on that point, and I am worried that safe parental contact will be discouraged. That leads to one of the most important points of all. The Government’s own documents suggest that repeal alone may not be the solution that they are hoping it will be. As mentioned earlier, the impact assessment says, “repeal alone is unlikely to materially change outcomes”, although it is expected to change the process that judges follow. That is a significant admission. It suggests that if the Government want safer and better outcomes in family proceedings, repeal can be only part of the picture, and perhaps not the decisive part. We should keep in mind that many of the awful failures that have rightly horrified people seem to be failures of risk assessment, information sharing, institutional practice, professional judgment and resourcing. The Centre for Policy Research on Men and Boys puts it well: “If abusive contact is being ordered or preserved inappropriately, then the concern lies with the quality of risk assessment, the speed and fairness of investigation, and the consistency with which courts and agencies apply the law.” That is a useful and constructive way of putting the point. It does not deny the seriousness of the problem, but it does ask whether the solution is the right one. My concern is not that the Government want to strengthen protection; it is that repeal may be presented as more self-sufficient than, on the basis of the evidence, it really is. I also think the Committee should be careful and candid about the strength of the evidence base behind repeal. Both Parents Matter says that the Government’s own review “provided limited and inconclusive evidence of the impact of the Presumption. It could not determine how often the Presumption was applied in judgments, nor could it assess how harm…related to the application of the Presumption.” It also criticises the underlying methodology: “Quantitative analysis was based on only 245 court judgments, with over half from a single magistrates’ bench. Qualitative analysis involved only 29 parents.” It added that the literature review “examined only 55 studies, excluded all research published after April 2024,” and omitted “major studies showing positive outcomes” from safe shared parenting and ongoing parental involvement. Other evidence goes further, arguing that the Government review appears to have misunderstood or overstated the conclusions to be drawn from Professor Anja Steinbach’s work. I recall a striking line from Professor Steinbach, who said: “There is plenty of research showing that contact with both parents is beneficial”, and “except for violence…contact with both parents is the baseline.” I do not think that material should make the Committee cautious about treating the review as a fully settled or exhausted evidential platform for repeal. Again, my point is not that that means that repeal must not happen; it is that we should not over-claim what the existing evidence can prove or support. I also think it is important to avoid turning this into a false choice between protecting children from abuse and supporting children to maintain safe relationships with both parents. The Centre for Policy Research on Men and Boys says that the public debate often frames the issue in that way. However, it says: “A good family justice system must do both. It must protect children and adult victims from abusive parents. It must also protect children from the avoidable loss of safe, loving, and important parental relationships.” I think that is right. The Family Services Foundation similarly said: “reform should focus on enhancing the protections available, rather than creating conditions that may inadvertently prevent children from maintaining safe, meaningful relationships with their parents.” That is why I urge the Minister not to present clause 17 as though all principled concern about repeal is somehow concern for parental rights over child safety. It is perfectly possible to support the Government’s child safety objective while asking whether the law should continue to recognise some clear and carefully framed way, where there is no established risk of harm, of enabling children to benefit from stable and safe relationships with both parents. Several of the written submissions that we received raise concerns about unintended consequences if repeal proceeds without a clear replacement framework. Both Parents Matter warns: “Removing this important statutory benchmark, and relying instead on practice and non statutory frameworks” may increase uncertainty, inconsistency and conflict. The Family Services Foundation says something similar, warning that repeal may confuse frontline professionals, affect negotiations outside court, reduce the incentive for out-of-court resolution and, ultimately, increase strain on a family court system that is already under pressure. It notes that only a minority of separated families ever come before the courts, but many more families and professionals orient their expectations around the legal framework. That is a serious point. Even if the court’s paramount consideration remains unchanged, removing a statutory starting point may still alter behaviour before a case ever reaches a final hearing. It may affect how solicitors advise, how CAFCASS frames disputes, how mediation is approached and how parents negotiate. With that point in mind, I hope that the Minister might be in a position to share some more detail on how she expects the changes to operate, and why she is confident that they will improve outcomes rather than simply shift conflict elsewhere.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Huq. I do not support clause 7 or schedule 2. I welcome the debate on various amendments and the comments from the Minister. Clause 7 and schedule 2 would replace the current automatic right of appeal from the magistrates court to the Crown court with a much narrower permission-based system. At present, a defendant convicted in the magistrates court can appeal to the Crown court against conviction or sentence, and that appeal is heard by way of a full rehearing, usually before a Crown court judge sitting with between two and four magistrates. About 40% of conviction appeals and 47% of sentence appeals succeed. We are now being asked to introduce a system that would instead require permission for such appeals, would usually proceed on written grounds, would be heard by a single judge and would limit the grounds on which permission is granted. The Government say that that would save about 500 Crown court sitting days. I feel that I may be running out of ways to phrase this sentence, but yet again we are seeing a significant roll-back of an important safeguard, justified on the basis of a small hypothetical gain. We should ask ourselves whether an important protection is being weakened for anything like a proportionate return. On clause 7, I do not believe that it is. I strongly emphasise that appeals are not historical oddities or a procedural quirk; they are one of the principal safeguards against the risks inherent in summary justice. The Bar Council is very clear: “The proposed change would remove a vital safeguard against wrongful summary conviction and excessive (or unlawful) sentences imposed by magistrates. The consequence risks adding to the burden on the criminal courts rather than reducing it.” It goes further and says that the current right “does not appear to be exercised frivolously or vexatiously.” The Law Society made similar points in its written evidence: it said that the automatic appeal route is a “vital safeguard” and that in 2024 it was used in 2,487 cases, overturning magistrates’ decisions in 41% of convictions and 44% of sentences. It describes about 1,000 miscarriages of justice as being corrected through that route. That is the central fact that the Government cannot really get around. If four in 10 conviction appeals and nearly half of sentence appeals succeed, that cannot be read as evidence that the appeals process is being abused. In fact, it is the opposite: the process is demonstrably being exercised appropriately. I am deeply concerned that if we roll back the right to appeal, we will be locking the door on an unknown number of cases in which a conviction might have been found to be erroneous, but will now not be identified as such. That is an unknown number of miscarriages of justice not put right, and an unknown number of lives ruined. I am not willing to pay that price for the gain of 500 sitting days, and I cannot bring myself to believe that Government Members are differently inclined. We do not particularly need to speculate about what the safeguards protect against, because we can point to recent examples. In the notorious Hamit Coskun case, a defendant convicted in the magistrates court of a section 5 public order offence had his conviction quashed on appeal to the Crown court. The appeal court found that the prosecution had failed to prove essential elements of the offence and stated plainly: “For these reasons we allow this appeal and quash…conviction”. That is the automatic appeal route doing exactly what it is supposed to do and correcting a conviction that should never have been imposed.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend makes a really important point. There is a lot that is positive about the clause, but, as he rightly says, we have to think about it in the context of all the other changes. Unfortunately, we could find that the other changes unwind the good that is done by this clause. That said, it is still a positive clause, and I am pleased to see it in the Bill and to debate it today. Lastly, I want to flag that in its evidence, Victim Not Suspect notes a need to address verification and/or the reliability of digital evidence, which it believes is relevant to the admissibility test and has not been addressed in the Bill. It would be useful to hear the Minister’s view on that matter too. Victim Not Suspect says: “Without forensic verification, including IP address data, account ownership confirmation from platforms such as Meta, and metadata examination, there is no reliable basis for assessing authorship.” That is a point of detail, but it could become important in certain cases, so it is worth bearing in mind. There may be scope to improve and tighten that up in the Bill during its further progress, which is why I have flagged it to the Minister.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is truly a pleasure to get to a part of the Bill on which I suspect we will agree more than we will not. I think we will all find that rather refreshing after the last few sittings. Clause 8 seeks to introduce a new framework governing the admissibility of evidence about the previous sexual behaviour of the complainant. I very much welcome the fact that we are now having this debate and looking to address some of the issues we currently see in the justice system with respect to sexual assault crimes. Rape and sexual violence are horrendous crimes that have a lifelong impact on victims. In oral evidence, we heard this directly from some of the brave witnesses who testified, and I thank them for giving their time so generously and for speaking so honestly and courageously. What was made very clear is that they are keen to see change in how the justice system deals with these types of offences. They want to see justice done swiftly and considerately. It takes a huge amount of bravery for an individual to report these types of crimes and to pursue their attacker through the courts, so we must do all we can to ensure that the process is quick, supportive, effective and efficient for them, while preserving the principles of natural justice. Although I may disagree with some victims on the limitation of jury trials being a way to achieve this, I share the same ambition: to speed up the process so that justice is no longer delayed and denied. It is important to remember that most of these crimes are committed by someone the victims knows, making the process even more of an intrusive ordeal. It is deeply personal. That is why it is important to treat victims with respect and care, not to diminish their experiences or feelings, and not to make them feel like they are the ones on trial. It is incredibly important not only for justice, but for deterrence purposes, that the state sends a clear message that those guilty of such crimes will face the consequences. This is much needed at a time when violence against women and girls is rife in our communities. If the state can get this right, we should see more victims coming forward and being more willing to undergo the stress of a trial in the confidence that justice will prevail. In June 2021, the Conservative Government published the findings of an end-to-end review of the criminal justice system response to rape, which they referred to as the rape review. What it found made for difficult reading. In the prior five years, there had been a significant decline in the number of charges and prosecutions for rape cases and, consequently, fewer convictions. One in two victims were withdrawing from rape investigations, demonstrating a big problem. The Home Secretary at the time, my right hon. Friend the Member for Witham (Priti Patel), said: “We are not prepared to accept that rape is just ‘too difficult’ a crime to prosecute. We can, and must, do better.” The review set out that there are an estimated 128,000 victims of rape a year, that less than 20% of victims of rape report to the police, and that only 1.6% of rapes that are reported result in someone being charged. That means that considerably fewer than one in every 100 rapes actually leads to justice for the victim. That shows the scale of the issue. One of the actions set out was that “only evidence about the victim that is pertinent to the case should be used at court and a victim’s credibility should not be undermined by pre-conceptions or rape myths.” In the final recommendations issued by the Law Commission in 2025, it was made clear that the use of evidence relating to the previous sexual behaviour of the complainant—for example, previous consensual sex between the defendant and complainant, or between a defendant and a third party—is highly distressing, humiliating and even traumatising, and is often irrelevant and can prejudice a case. The admission of sexual behaviour evidence has, rightly, long been restricted through so-called “rape shield” legislation, which applies specifically to a trial where a person is charged with a sexual offence. No question can be asked about the sexual behaviour of the complainant without the leave of the court, and various gateways are considered in determining that. However, the Law Commission has criticised those gateways for being too restrictive, too broad and too complicated. Clause 8 seeks to address some of the issues raised by the Law Commission, and has incorporated the stage 1 recommendation accordingly. It amends the conditions that must be met before a defendant can adduce sexual behaviour evidence or ask questions intended to elicit evidence of sexual behaviour in criminal proceedings. It ensures that such evidence may be admitted only if it “has substantial probative value in relation to a matter which— (i) is a matter in issue in the proceedings, and (ii) is of substantial importance in...the case as a whole”. However, clause 8 does not include stage 2 of the two-stage framework suggested by the Law Commission, which prohibits the use of sexual behaviour evidence unless its admission would not significantly prejudice the proper administration of justice. The Law Commission has raised that specific deviation in its written evidence. I ask the Minister to give her reasoning for not adopting the second stage, so that we are all clear. It is reassuring to see the Bar Council welcoming the changes brought by clause 8, which it says “provide appropriate safeguards for victims and for fairness of trials.” The Law Society also supports the proposals, along with many other rape crisis and women’s organisations. Having said that, I note that a joint letter from Rape Crisis England & Wales, the Centre for Women’s Justice, Rights of Women, the End Violence Against Women Coalition and Imkaan, while welcoming much of clause 8, raises some specific concerns. It would be helpful to hear from the Minister on those points and whether she intends to make any changes.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Jardine. As the Committee has likely anticipated, I will argue that clause 3 should not stand part of the Bill. Clause 3 is the heart of the Government’s constitutional gamble. It creates a wholly new general rule for trial on indictment without a jury in a substantial category of criminal cases. Under the clause, a defendant charged with an either-way offence who has pleaded not guilty will lose the right to be tried by a jury unless the court considers that, on conviction, they would be likely to receive a sentence of more than three years’ imprisonment. It also allows reallocation later if the case changes, says that there is no right of appeal against allocation or reallocation, permits some decisions to be made without a hearing, and still allows a judge sitting alone to impose a sentence of more than three years. The Government continue to maintain that this change is necessary to reduce the Crown court backlog and reserve jury trials for the most serious cases. I note, though, that the very good House of Commons Library briefing points out that these provisions are based only in part on Leveson, and contain material differences from that which he recommended. Sir Brian proposed restricting, not abolishing, the right to elect, he did not propose the same increase in magistrates’ sentencing powers, and the Government’s model is more aggressive than the one on which much of the original discussion was based. JUSTICE makes the same point directly in its written evidence. It says that the Bill goes further than the review by removing the right to elect entirely, replacing the full rehearing appeal from the magistrates court with a permission stage, allowing the extension of magistrates’ custodial powers to 18 or 24 months, and introducing judge-only trials for either-way cases with likely sentences of three years or less. I say that at the outset because I am keen to avoid the suggestion that the Bill amounts to the Government reluctantly implementing a difficult but expert-led recommendation. That is simply not the case in clause 3. In fact, we are dealing with a discretionary political choice to legislate in a way that is broader, harder and less cautious than many of the evidence-based alternatives that are already on the table. As the Law Society put it: “Clauses 1 to 7 represent radical changes to criminal procedure without convincing evidence that they will improve efficiency.” The Bar Council says: “Radical changes to the availability of jury trials…are unnecessary and will consume resources without bearing down on the backlog.” That is the proper context in which clause 3 should be considered. As much for my own clarity as for the benefit of the Committee, I would like to dedicate a limited amount of time to clarifying what the clause actually does. It inserts into the Senior Courts Act 1981 proposed new sections 74A to 74D, which create a mechanism under which, in a very wide category of cases, the court must decide at the outset whether a defendant will be tried by a jury or by a single judge alone. The central test is the threshold sentence: whether the defendant, if convicted, would be likely to receive more than three years’ imprisonment or detention. If the likely sentence is above that threshold, the defendant gets a jury; if not, the default is a judge-alone trial in what the Government and stakeholders have described as the Crown court bench division, although that phrase is not used in the Bill itself. This is about not a tiny number of trivial cases but a structural redesign of the Crown court’s work. According to the Government’s own modelling, about 14,000 cases would continue arriving at the Crown court in 2028-29 and would require a trial, of which approximately 4,000 are expected to be heard by a judge alone, rather than a jury. The package is said to reduce Crown court sitting day demand by 27,000 days a year while increasing magistrates court sitting day demand by 8,500. Even if one accepts every assumption behind those figures—many serious people do not—they demonstrate that this is a major transfer of work and power. The offences within scope are not, as has sometimes been implied, confined to the sort of minor petty theft case used in media briefings. The written evidence from JUSTICE makes that point bluntly. Clause 3 would cover a huge number of either-way offences, including “sexual offences, sexual abuse of children, stalking, fraud offences, violence against the person offences and theft offences.” JUSTICE offers a chilling practical illustration with this observation: “Most of the postmasters wrongly convicted in the Horizon scandal received a sentence under three years.” That point ought to give the Committee serious pause. We are being asked to remove jury trial for the types of case in which miscarriages of justice have historically occurred. The centrepiece of clause 3 is the idea that a court can safely determine, at an early stage, whether a defendant is likely to receive more than three years if convicted, and that that prediction is a just and adequate basis for deciding whether the defendant gets a jury at all. I do not accept that. More importantly, the Bill itself does not truly accept it either. The Commons Library briefing I referenced earlier notes this contradiction plainly: “While cases that are less likely to result in a sentence of more than three years would be allocated for trial by a judge alone, the judge could still pass a custodial sentence of more than three years.” In other words, the very legislation that uses the three-year threshold as the decisive basis for removing jury trials simultaneously recognises that the threshold may not map on to the final seriousness of the case at all. The initial allocation may say that the case is not serious enough for a jury, yet the final outcome may be serious enough for more than three years in prison. If that is not an admission that the threshold is an unstable and unsafe proxy, I do not know what is. Does that not cut to the most basic but most profound concern about this Bill—that it just is not fair? If the threshold cannot reliably distinguish the cases that merit a jury from those that do not, the clause is not preserving jury trial for the most serious cases. It is rationing jury trial on the basis of an impressionistic and sometimes speculative sentence prediction. The written evidence from the London School of Economics says exactly that, stating that the three-year threshold “is a poor metric for determining the right trial procedure” and that if jury trial is a “cornerstone protection against the state”, alternative measures ought to be exhausted first. We cannot properly predict a sentence at the plea and trial preparation hearing, and in the context of clause 3, that is a problem. If the allocation decision is to be made at the hearing, the notion that a judge can decide the likely sentence then and there is, in many cases, unrealistic and, at the extreme, absurd. In many cases, the evidence is incomplete at the PTPH. In sexual offences, full achieving better evidence transcripts are often unavailable, and practitioners rely on summaries. CCTV may not yet have been watched in full, medical evidence may be outstanding and the victim impact, which can materially affect a sentence, may be unknown. Sometimes the complainant is still in hospital. It may well be that the psychiatric or psychological impact becomes clear only weeks or months later. Yet the clause asks the court to decide mode of trial at exactly this sensitive and uncertain stage. The Government are therefore building a supposedly rational system on a procedural moment that practitioners know, and I am sure the Minister knows, is often evidentially immature. The Committee will remember reading the Victims’ Commissioner’s written evidence, which accepts the need for reform but recognises the concern that sentencing ranges vary and that the evidential picture may be incomplete when the crucial decision is taken. JUSTICE likewise says that the proposal risks unfairness because the allocation and reallocation system lengthens the PTPH and depends on speculative assumptions about how much court time will actually be saved. The Bar Council adds that the Bill gives no schedule or annexe identifying categories of offence; instead, a Crown court judge will simply assess in individual cases whether the likely sentence exceeds three years, meaning that the determination is case specific, contestable and uncertain from the outset. I can well imagine the response to all that being that if circumstances change, the case can be reallocated, but to my mind that is not a defence of the clause; it is an admission that the initial prediction is often too flimsy to bear the weight placed on it. As any King’s counsel will readily point out, real criminal cases are not static things. Charges are amended, defendants are added and new evidence emerges. Perhaps a section 18 becomes a section 20. When something like that happens, is it seriously proposed that the case repeatedly cycles through reallocation every time? Clause 3 says yes, at least in substance. Proposed new section 74B provides for a formal reallocation mechanism where there is a relevant change of circumstances, including changes in the indictment or new evidence affecting likely sentence. The problem is that that does not solve the uncertainty; it adds another layer of litigation, or at least potential litigation. It invites both sides to argue over whether the threshold position has changed, whether reallocation is required, whether the change is sufficiently material, what prejudice would be caused by moving the case, whether delay, wasted cost or witness inconvenience should prevail, and what happens if the case is already part way down the tracks. Frankly, that sounds like a dream come true for a solicitor’s billing manager, but the rest of us can surely see the problem. JUSTICE and the Bar Council have both picked up on that point. JUSTICE notes that the “allocation of cases is going to lengthen the plea and trial preparation hearing as will the process of reallocation”, and it warns that the absence of any right of appeal against allocation decisions is likely to increase judicial reviews and Court of Appeal litigation. In the Bar Council’s written evidence, it states: “The proposed Crown Court Bench Division introduces an extra layer of hearings and complication…It could result in further litigation at an interlocutory stage.” It argues that one of the Bill’s fundamental flaws is precisely the fact that it presents a false binary: either do nothing, or do this. The Bill does not properly assess a range of other policy options. Having made those points, I would like to pose a question to the Minister, which I think may shed some light on where we are with the clause. Has the additional work needed at both Crown court and magistrates court level for allocation, reallocation, submissions and case management been factored into the claimed 27,000 sitting day decrease and 8,500 sitting day increase? If the answer is yes, can we get some insight into precisely where and how? If the answer is no, the core productivity claim behind clause 3 is overstated from the start. If clause 3 were merely a bad threshold coupled with an elaborate reallocation maze, that would be bad enough. However, the Government have compounded the problem by providing no right of appeal against allocation or reallocation decisions, and by permitting some decisions to be made without a hearing. Under proposed new section 74D, there would be no right of appeal against an allocation or reallocation determination made under proposed new sections 74A or 74B, and a reallocation determination could be made without a hearing. That is extraordinary. A defendant may lose trial by jury on the basis of an early-stage sentence prediction, under a mechanism that the Government know may need to be revisited as the case develops, yet there is no appeal. JUSTICE warns that the likely consequence of the proposal is judicial review pressure on the High Court, and appeal pressure on the Court of Appeal once written reasons are handed down, meaning that the supposed efficiency savings may be displaced into other courts. The Bar Council says much the same; it proposes, as a minimum safeguard, that there should be a hearing before reallocation, unless the parties waive it, and that there should be an appeal right. The absence of appeal is especially troubling because summary trial has historically been justified by two safeguards: lower-level offences and the ability to appeal. The Bill proposes to remove both. It moves up the seriousness of cases, while stripping away the classic safeguard of easy correction—that is not a tolerable bargain. Although the Committee has already debated the retrospectivity point at some length, clause 3 itself remains infected by it. The new allocation procedure will apply to cases already in the Crown court open caseload, including cases where the defendant has already been arraigned at a PTPH before the new regime comes into force, so long as the prosecution has not yet opened its case. For those cases, the court must make a determination under proposed new section 74A as soon as is reasonably practicable, and may do so without a hearing. That means that a defendant who chose a Crown court trial, expecting a jury, may wait months, prepare for that jury and then lose it retrospectively. The Minister herself has defended that approach by saying that the Government are on sound legal ground, and that there is no procedural or legal impediment, relying on advice from—as I recall—an unnamed KC. However, political defensibility and legal ingenuity are not the same as fairness. To put this in very plain terms, people did not opt to go to Crown court for the car parking or the architecture; they chose it for one thing only—a jury. To move the goalposts after the choice is made is profoundly unfair, regardless of other considerations. The Committee will recall reading through the written evidence from some eminent groups and individuals that, in as many words, call this retrospective application contrary to the rule of law. The Bar Council says: “The retrospective provisions may also be subject to numerous legal challenges.” Dr Samantha Fairclough argues that the plan is unfair, and she says: “It will also create significant additional work…and likely result in appeals.” That all points in the same direction. Retrospectivity here is not just constitutionally unattractive; it will ultimately prove to be practically self-defeating. A very large part of the Government’s case for clause 3 rests on the impact assessment, which says that clauses 1 to 7 will reduce Crown court sitting days by 27,000 a year, while increasing magistrates court sitting days by 8,500. It also says that the Crown court open caseload will fall by around 14,000 cases over 2028-2029, and that “overall the reforms will reduce demand on Crown Court time by almost 20%”. However, several stakeholders have criticised the assumptions and modelling, especially those on how much time judge-only trials would save. The Government’s core assumption is that hearing times will fall by 20% for judge-only trials, but Sir Brian himself accepted that this was associated with high levels of uncertainty, and the Justice Committee challenged how anecdotal the basis for that figure appeared to be.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank you for making that point, Ms Jardine. I just emphasise how serious the changes in this legislation are. I know the Opposition are willing to put in the hours that are needed to go through the full detail, so that everyone can say what they need to. I imagine the Government are equally keen to spend the hours required to do full justice to the Bill.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Thank you for that guidance, Ms Jardine. I would suggest that the legal aid changes are a really important outcome of clause 6. In fact, I think I would come under huge criticism if I made this speech without mentioning legal aid, because I have not raised it at all—well, I did in an earlier speech. I have not raised it at all today.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is making some powerful points. Hearing him read out what the law says brings home to me just how terrible this Bill is. Surely everyone can see that there is no clarity how it would work. Rather than there being any clear guidance, it essentially feels as though any judge can have their own view on complexity and length. We will end up with inconsistency and disputes and arguments about the approach. Surely, that could do the opposite of address the backlog by adding additional complexity and confusion to our justice system.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to start the day with you and end the day with you, Ms Jardine. I am sure you are very much enjoying starting your day with me and ending your day with me, too. [ Laughter. ] I have just realised how that can be interpreted. My apologies, Ms Jardine; I cannot account for the minds of other Members. To get back to business, I do not support clause 6 standing part of the Bill. It will expand the Government’s existing power to increase the maximum custodial sentence that a magistrates court can impose for a single either-way offence. The current maximum is 12 months, but the clause will permit Ministers, entirely at their own discretion, to increase that to 18 months or even 24 months. That will affect consecutive sentencing for multiple either-way offences. The Government have justified the change on the basis that the power is needed so that sentencing limits can be adjusted swiftly to rebalance work between the magistrates courts and the Crown court. The Government estimate that increasing the maximum to 18 months would save 8,000 Crown court sitting days. That all sounds rather neat but, in reality, it is another example of the Government trying to force more serious criminal business into a part of the system designed for swift, relatively low-level justice, and doing so before they have properly shown that the courts can absorb it or that the benefits are worth it. The first and perhaps most important point is that even Sir Brian Leveson did not recommend the change. Sir Brian said that his recommendation on restricting the right to elect trial by jury was “contingent upon magistrates’ sentencing powers remaining at the current maximum of 12 months.” He also recommended that the Government’s ability to amend magistrates’ sentencing powers by statutory instrument be repealed, and that the current 12-month maximum be made permanent. Clause 6 therefore cannot be said to follow Leveson: it goes beyond him and, on this point, directly contradicts him. That is a serious weakness in the Government’s position. Ministers have repeatedly leaned on Leveson when defending the Bill as a whole, but in this instance he gave no endorsement of what clause 6 will usher in. More than that, he warned us directly against it. It is perfectly valid to ask, “If the very review on which the Government say the Bill is based said that 12 months should remain the ceiling, why are Ministers now seeking the power to raise it to two years?” Let me briefly touch on a second common-sense point. The move from six to 12 months took effect only for offenders convicted on or after 18 November 2024. In other words, the current system has barely had time to bed in and the Government are already asking Parliament to authorise a further jump to 18 or 24 months. The earlier increase to 12 months was justified as a response to court pressures, and the Government said it would save up to 2,000 sitting days. We have not had anything like enough time to assess properly how that change has worked in practice before Ministers seek power to go dramatically further. If the Government and the Minister wish to make evidence-based law, they should first show Parliament what the 12-month expansion has actually done: what kinds of cases have been retained, what sentencing patterns have changed, what effect there has been on appeals, what impact there has been on magistrates courts and whether the claimed savings have materialised. Instead, they are asking, through clause 6, for a much broader delegated power, and inviting us to trust that this will all somehow work out later. That is not good enough where a question as fundamental as the administration of good justice is concerned. The Bar Council puts its objection crisply and, I think, rightly. It says: “Summary trial is designed for the purpose of dispensing swift justice in low-level cases. The extension of summary justice to cases in which a defendant could receive up to 2 years’ imprisonment…particularly when combined with the removal of a right to elect Crown Court trial, and the removal of a right of automatic appeal” amounts to a “comprehensive rolling back of safeguards.” That is blunt language, but it is hard to disagree with. Clause 6 will change the kind of cases that summary justice is expected to absorb. The Law Society warns that under the clause magistrates will have the power to impose lengthy custodial sentences for serious offences such as actual bodily harm, grievous bodily harm and possession with intent to supply drugs “in proceedings that are intended to be quicker” and less formal than than those in the Crown Court. It warns that this raises the likelihood that “people will receive longer custodial sentences with fewer safeguards or opportunities to rectify wrongful convictions.” I will dwell on this point for a moment, as it is something that none of us who have been tasked with scrutinising the Bill in detail should forget. A system designed to be faster, simpler and less formal is being asked to shoulder cases in which the consequences are far more severe. Two years in prison is not some trivial matter: a custodial sentence like that can cost a person their job, their home, their family life, their good name and their future. A justice system that is appropriate for low-level offending cannot be assumed fit for cases that carry that sort of life­changing penalty. There is then the practical point that clause 6 will not solve the pressure in the system so much as move it around. The change will merely transfer the burden from one overstretched part of the system to another. The Law Society says that the magistrates court already has its own backlog of more than 370,000 cases, and that the Government have shown no convincing plan to deal with the added pressure brought by more serious and complex cases. JUSTICE makes the same point, and adds an especially telling practical detail drawn from the Institute for Government’s analysis: since magistrates’ sentencing powers were increased from six to 12 months in 2024, only around 30% of sentences in the six-to-12-month band were handed down by magistrates. That suggests a lack of confidence, or a continuing tendency to send more serious cases upwards, which in turn means the Government’s projected savings may not materialise in anything like the way they hope. If magistrates are already not retaining all the cases that the Government assumed they would after the jump to 12 months, what is the evidence that authorising 18 or 24 months will suddenly transform the position? If cases continue to be sent up, or bounce between jurisdictions, the supposed efficiency gain becomes much more doubtful.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Thank you for that, Ms Jardine. I reassure you that I will not be speaking for very much longer, but I will cover the last of what I consider to be the important points. Thank you for your guidance and patience. The Law Society warns that the Bill’s proposals will increase the number of defendants in magistrates courts who are ineligible for legal aid, even though they would currently qualify if their case were heard in the Crown court, because the magistrates court means test is significantly stricter. It notes that duty solicitor numbers have dropped sharply between 2017 and 2025 and that the impact assessment does not properly address “the disparity between the magistrates’ and Crown Court means tests”. We know that individuals in full-time, minimum-wage employment may not qualify for legal aid in the magistrates court, and that unrepresented defendants often do not understand charges, and often enter inappropriate pleas, struggle with cross-examination and end up with harsher outcomes. Under the Bill, then, a defendant may face a much more serious case in a summary forum, with a possible sentence of 18 months or two years, yet be less likely to have publicly funded legal representation than they would be if the case were before the Crown court. That simply is not fair. Even if one were somehow persuaded that giving the magistrates courts the power to impose sentences of 18 or 24 months might in principle be acceptable, we would still have a major objection to how the clause is drafted. It does not simply set the limit and leave it there; it expands the regulation-making power so that the Government may increase the maximum to 18 or 24 months by statutory instrument. The delegated powers memorandum justifies that on the basis that magistrates’ sentencing limits may need to be adjusted swiftly “where operational pressures” require a “rebalancing of work”. Are we not, then, being asked to hand over a flexible tool that could be used to rebalance criminal jurisdiction by secondary legislation? I could not be more convinced that Parliament should retain oversight of increasing the powers of magistrates. At the very least, any such regulation should be made by affirmative resolution. This is not the sort of decision that should be casually adjustable at ministerial convenience. For all those reasons, I oppose clause 6 standing part of the Bill. Even Leveson did not recommend this change; on the contrary, he said his wider recommendations were “contingent upon magistrates’ sentencing powers remaining at…12 months” and recommended that the power to alter them by statutory instrument “should be repealed”. The move to 12 months has taken effect only recently and has not yet been properly evaluated. The clause will extend summary justice into cases carrying up to two years’ imprisonment, despite the fact that summary justice was designed for lower-level, swifter cases. It will push more serious cases into magistrates courts that are already under strain, and do so in a package that also weakens appeals and intensifies legal aid problems. It risks moving the backlog rather than solving it, and it does so by way of an over-broad delegated power that gives Ministers too much room to reshape criminal jurisdiction by regulation. The magistracy deserves respect, and nothing I say should be taken as criticism of the many magistrates who serve conscientiously and well, but having respect for magistrates is not the same thing as assuming that every structural burden should now be placed on the summary justice system. The Government have not even begun to make the case for the clause compellingly.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I agree with my hon. Friend, as I normally do. Finally, there is the obvious practical point that there are better answers available. The Law Society says that reform and investment must be strategic, not piecemeal, and warns against stand-alone measures such as changing from jury trials to judge-only trials without convincing evidence that they will significantly reduce the backlog. It says that Parliament should insist on “detailed modelling” and on understanding the Government’s intentions across the whole package of reform, not just on this isolated measure. The existence of pressure in the system does not prove that every proposed constitutional shortcut is justified. The question is whether the shortcut is necessary. With clause 4, the answer is plainly no. For all those reasons, I oppose clause 4 and schedule 1, and I support amendment 51. Clause 4 offers a constitutionally serious reduction in jury trials for a tiny claimed benefit of 200 sitting days. The evidence does not show that juries are the cause of delay, collapse or miscarriage in these cases. Fraud cases are not too technical for juries. The key issue is dishonesty, and ordinary citizens are uniquely well placed to judge that. The removal of juries in these cases would damage open justice and public confidence. Schedule 1 gives effect to that flawed principle and then goes further by creating a route to ministerial expansion. Amendment 51 is therefore a sensible and necessary safeguard, but in truth, the better course is simpler still: clause 4 and schedule 1 should not be included in the Bill at all.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Thank you for that guidance, Ms Jardine, but that seems to suggest that we are not allowed ever again in this Bill Committee to bring up the fact that the right to elect for jury trial and rights to legal aid are being removed. Surely we need to be able to talk about that as we go through the Bill.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  If we are increasing the sentence in the magistrates court, I would imagine the Minister will agree that, in some situations, we are increasing the complexity of the case. For example, a sexual assault case could be quite complicated and require, in order to look after the alleged victim and make sure their wellbeing is managed, four consecutive days of sitting to get that over with. How will the magistrates court do that? They are all volunteers, and quite often they are working. How will this help address the backlog if we are in a situation where those volunteer magistrates are not able to commit to the four consecutive days needed to deal with a complex and sensitive case such as a sexual assault?

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I completely agree with my hon. Friend. What is considered complex and lengthy could be quite subjective. We all know that we are potentially going to end up in the courts over defining exactly what is complex and lengthy. It feels like the Bill is not written clearly enough for us to understand exactly how it will work in reality. Amendment 51 is an important safeguard against those risks. In his written evidence, His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC notes that the schedule 1 list already “appears to be arbitrary, perhaps the work of a moment; and it goes beyond anything suggested before. But even that is not the end of it.” That is because part 2 of the schedule gives the Secretary of State the power by order to add or remove offences. He quotes the explanatory notes to show that offences not related to fraud or financial crime could easily be added in the future. He describes this as “a mighty step along the way to the end of jury trials.” That does not strike me as overstatement. The Secretary of State will indeed have this untrammelled power, and we should carefully heed this sober warning from a senior judge. For similar reasons, the Opposition oppose schedule 1 standing part of the Bill. Schedule 1 is the list that gives clause 4 its reach, and the list is already troubling. It is not confined to a tiny, tightly defined category of unusual mega-fraud; it covers a wider class of economic and financial offences, including money laundering and terrorist funding, and can then be expanded later. If we think the core principle of clause 4 is wrong, then the schedule that operationalises it is wrong too. Rivlin’s description of the list as “arbitrary” is worth keeping in mind. One of the reasons that schedule 1 is objectionable is that once Parliament accepts the principle that a whole category of serious Crown court cases can be singled out for juryless trial on grounds of length and complexity, the argument for confining the list to that category becomes very hard to sustain. The logic of the thing pushes outward. That is why schedule 1 is dangerous: for not only what it contains now but what it invites later. I am particularly concerned that there is an ideological push away from jury trials. My concern is that this is only the start, not the end of where the Government want to get to. I urge the Committee to think about this carefully. We are taking important decisions for the future.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It will no doubt be a relief to Members to hear that I am not going to talk for quite as long as I did this morning. I oppose clause 4 and schedule 1 standing part, and I support amendment 51, tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. As is becoming habit, I will begin with a very brief overview of what we are considering. Clause 4 and schedule 1 create a new framework for judge-only trials in certain complex or lengthy cases. The listed offences include fraud, tax evasion, false accounting, insider dealing, money laundering, terrorist funding, bribery and related offences. The court may order trial without a jury if it is satisfied that the likely complexity and/or length makes that appropriate, that it is not in the public interest for the trial to be conducted with a jury, and that there are no other reasons why it would be more appropriate for the trial to be with a jury. There would be no right of appeal against that decision. That is a serious and constitutionally significant change in its own right, but what makes it even more troubling is that it has been justified on the strength of a paper-thin theoretical benefit. The House of Commons Library states that the Government estimate clause 4 will save 200 Crown court sitting days. That is around 0.18% of current Crown court capacity, which indicates just how small the potential gain is—if there is that gain at all. That is the first and most obvious point I want to make. The Government are proposing a very serious encroachment on jury trials in return for a saving that amounts to just 200 sitting days. JUSTICE describes the change as “unnecessary,” says that it “will not impact the backlog in any meaningful way” and warns that it risks opening the door to restricting jury trials in other categories of case too. The Law Society is similarly clear: “Removing jury trials for serious fraud cases is unlikely to have a significant effect on the backlogs, but would significantly erode the fundamental principle of open justice.” That should be the frame for the whole debate on clause 4. We are not being asked to approve some modest efficiency measure; we are being asked to displace the jury in some of the most important and contested criminal cases for an alleged benefit so small that, even in the Government’s own case, it barely registers against total Crown court demand. That trade-off is so poor that I refuse to believe the Minister, in her heart of hearts, believes it is the right way to proceed. The second point is that the case against juries being used in serious fraud and related cases has never really been made. In written evidence, the Law Society tells us: “Serious cases of any complexity, including serious allegations of fraud, must be presented by the prosecution in a way that is understandable, not only to the judge and jury…but also, in line with the principle of open justice, to the public.” It goes on to say: “They should be subject to effective case management to ensure they take only a reasonable length of time, if necessary, by reducing the number of charges”. In other words, the answer to complexity is to manage it properly, not to remove the jury. It is worth reminding ourselves that the issues juries decide on in fraud trials are factual, not technical—in particular, whether the defendant was dishonest. That is judged by reference to the standards of ordinary decent people. Twelve ordinary jurors are far better placed to decide that than a single judge alone. That goes to the very nature of fraud. Fraud is not merely an accounting or regulatory puzzle; it is an allegation of dishonesty, and dishonesty, by definition, is exactly the sort of question on which the community’s judgment matters. Who should decide dishonesty: a single professional judge, or 12 citizens applying the standards of ordinary life? In a democratic criminal justice system, the answer should remain: the jury. The evidence that we have does not support the idea that juries are what make these cases collapse, drag on or miscarry. JUSTICE’s written evidence points to the Southwark Crown court data gathered by His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC, showing that the vast majority of fraud cases lasted less than three months, with only one or two per year lasting over three months and only two cases in total lasting over six months. That is important, because it rather punches the myth that these are all endless epics that juries simply cannot understand or follow. Rivlin’s evidence also says that jury trials compose a discipline that helps to keep fraud trials shorter. Without that discipline, judge-alone trials may end up running as long as, or even longer than, jury trials. More to the point, delays, collapses and miscarriages of justice in fraud are not caused by juries, as shown by R v . Hayes where convictions were quashed because of judicial misdirection, not because of anything the jury did wrong. That strongly refutes the suggestion that juries are the weak link in these cases. The Government have two problems here: first, they have not shown that such cases are generally too long for juries; secondly, they have not shown that juries are what is causing the failures when these cases go wrong. Unfortunately, that leaves the Government looking rather like they are indulging in ideological hostility to jury trials rather than evidence-based reform. There is also a wider constitutional point. The Law Society says, and I very much agree, that removing jury trials for serious fraud cases “would significantly erode the fundamental principle of open justice.” These are often cases involving major companies, financial institutions, public markets, public money, terrorism financing, bribery and corruption. They are exactly the sort of cases where the public must have confidence that justice has not simply been done inside a closed professional world by one member of that same world. Fraud and related financial cases often concern the conduct of powerful, well-resourced and sophisticated defendants. In those cases, public confidence matters immensely. A verdict reached by a jury of citizens commands a kind of legitimacy that a judgment by a single judge does not carry in the same way. That is not a criticism of judges, but a recognition of why juries exist in the first place. They are there to not just decide facts but connect the administration of criminal justice to the public itself.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is making a powerful point about the existing backlog starting to go down, and why it is important that we look at that and understand the impact that other measures are having. Does he agree that the recent change to suspensions for three-year sentences, which went live only a few weeks ago on 22 March, will decrease receipts to court, as it will increase guilty pleas? Whether that is good or bad is a totally separate debate, but it will surely reduce the backlog further.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is clear that the Minister honestly believes this change will address the backlog. I do not doubt her sincerity—we believe differently, but I understand that that is what she believes. What concerns me is this: how many miscarriages of justice is she happy to accept in order to bring down the backlog? Why on earth, when miscarriages of justice are clearly going to happen as a result of these measures, are they not mentioned in the impact assessment? It makes no mention of one downside being a potential miscarriage of justice. I find that astonishing.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I completely agree with the hon. Lady. She has set out a good example of the type of things that happen in reality. Life is not tidy, and unexpected things happen. As we look at the Bill and whether a sentence is over or under three years, it is easy to think in simple terms but, in reality, people who work in the justice system—I have not done so, but I have spoken to people who do—understand the movement and flexibility that is required. That is why amendment 24 works really well by taking that into account. The hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden, who drafted it, clearly has real-world experience of what actually happens in a courtroom. The Bill already recognises elsewhere that there can be a relevant change of circumstances requiring the court to revisit allocation, so the Government’s own drafting accepts that these matters are dynamic rather than static. If that is so, why would we not want to build in a bit more foresight at the front end as well? Paragraph (f) in amendment 24 is not some wild departure from the structure of the Bill; it sits comfortably with the Government’s own recognition that allocation decisions can become unsound as a case develops. It is simply a more prudent and realistic approach to cases in which the true seriousness may emerge only over time. Finally, the reference in amendment 24 to “other exceptional circumstances” is extremely important. No statute, however carefully drafted, can predict every factual scenario. That is especially true in criminal justice, where the facts and human consequences of a case can vary enormously. A residual exceptional circumstances test is therefore not a weakness; it is a mark of maturity in the law. It recognises that Parliament should not force judges into injustice. If the Government truly believe in justice rather than mere throughput, they should have no objection to preserving a narrow, exceptional route to jury trial where justice plainly demands it. Amendment 39, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle, deals with the alternative, broader approach to building flexibility into clause 3. It is an especially important amendment because it puts the issue in the clearest possible terms: those of natural justice. The amendment says that a trial should still be conducted with a jury where the defendant demonstrates that to be tried without one “would amount to a breach of the principles of natural justice.” That is an extremely modest safeguard. It would not wreck the clause; it would merely build in additional protection through allowing an element of judgment to decide the mode of trial. It would not restore the right to a jury trial in every either-way case; it simply says that where the injustice is plain, a jury trial must remain available. I struggle to see how any Government serious about fairness could object to that. This is an issue of paramount importance on our side, and I hope on the Government’s side too. My hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle tabled amendment 39, as well as amendments elsewhere in the Bill—in relation to clause 1, in relation to reallocation under clause 3, and in relation to clause 4—to seek to protect natural justice. We will keep making these points. If Ministers insist on creating judge-only routes, they must at the very least accept a residual safeguard based on natural justice. For all the reasons I have outlined, I support amendments 23, 39 and 24. They would deliver the additional safeguards needed, so I urge the Government to adopt either the Opposition’s amendment or the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Huq. I speak in support of amendments 23, 39 and 24 which, taken together, would do something simple but important: they would build a measure of flexibility back into the clause, so that jury trial is still available where the cause of justice requires it. The Minister should think carefully. As drafted, the clause creates a very blunt regime: unless the court predicts a sentence of more than three years, the trial is to be conducted without a jury. The amendments would go a small way towards softening that rigidity and making the system less arbitrary, more proportionate and hence more just. With the amendments, two different Committee members take two different approaches to delivering the same outcome of additional flexibility in the clause. Amendment 39, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle, is broad in nature, setting out an additional condition for jury trial when needed to ensure natural justice, whereas the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden takes a more granular approach to the problem by listing the specific circumstances that might warrant the need for jury trial, again to ensure fairness. Both approaches seek to achieve the same thing. I will speak to each amendment in a little more detail, starting with amendment 23. Clause 3 is currently built on one single condition for preserving jury trial in relevant cases: whether the defendant is likely to receive a sentence of more than three years if convicted. Amendment 23 would change the wording from “the condition” to “one or more of the conditions”. This is the gateway to allow amendment 24, which lists various conditions, to work. The amendment matters because it opens the door to a more sensible approach, in which sentence is not the only thing that counts. That is exactly the right approach. When we deal with a constitutional safeguard as important as jury trial, the Committee should be wary of a system that turns entirely on a single mechanistic threshold. Human beings and criminal cases are not that neat, and Parliament should not pretend that they are. The amendment is therefore modest, tidy, entirely sensible and the necessary first step to add judgment, flexibility and common sense to a clause that has far too little of all three. On amendment 24 and its list of conditions, the Government’s model under the clause is to ask the court at an early stage to forecast the sentence that would likely be imposed if the defendant were convicted. If the forecast is more than three years, there is a jury; if it is not, there is none. That is far too crude a test to bear the full constitutional weight that the Government want to place on it. The Bill itself exposes the weakness in the logic, because although the allocation decision turns on a prediction about a sentence above or below three years, the Bill also expressly states that nothing prevents a court sitting without a jury from later imposing a sentence of more than three years. In other words, even the Bill recognises that the initial prediction may not tell the whole story; if that is so, why should that prediction be the sole basis on which a person loses the right to jury trial? Amendment 24 is so worth while because it states that in deciding whether a defendant should still have a jury, the court should not only look at the likely sentence but be able to consider whether: the defendant is of good character; they have previously been convicted of an imprisonable offence; they are treated as rehabilitated; conviction would cause significant reputational or professional harm; the gravity or complexity of the case might increase; and other exceptional circumstances. That does not strike me as radical. It is simply an attempt to make the law reflect reality and be less prescriptive. Additional flexibility makes for better outcomes. One of the strongest parts of amendment 24 is the recognition it gives to good character and to those who have not previously been convicted of an imprisonable offence. I raise this because the Government’s crude threshold risks producing perverse results. The people who may be hit hardest by clause 3 are precisely those who are newer to the justice system, those of previous good character and those for whom a conviction would be utterly life-changing. The Bar Council illustrated the point starkly in written evidence with the example of a 19-year-old student charged with possession with intent to supply after a small amount of Spice was found in their room—I am sure Members will remember my reciting that specific example in Committee on Tuesday. Because they are of good character, the likely sentence under the guidelines may be low enough that they lose jury trial altogether, even though the charge could destroy their future. Meanwhile, someone with previous convictions may be more likely to cross the sentencing threshold and so keep the right to a jury. That is exactly the sort of absurdity that amendment 24 tries to avoid. That is wholly consistent with the broader critique of the Bill. Conservative Members have repeatedly argued that the Government are treating this as an administrative exercise, when in fact people’s lives are at stake. The shadow Justice Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for West Suffolk (Nick Timothy), put it clearly on Second Reading when he said that the Government were proposing to remove fundamental rights “without a mandate, without a case and without any evidence”. —[ Official Report , 10 March 2026; Vol. 782, c. 207.] The Opposition also challenged Ministers on taking away jury trial for offences that cost defendants their jobs, their homes and their families. Amendment 24 responds precisely to that point. I note the inclusion in amendment 24 of cases in which the defendant would likely suffer significant reputational damage or have their employment or professional qualifications adversely affected. That is important because the seriousness of a case cannot be measured by custody alone. A sentence of under three years can still destroy a person’s livelihood, strip them of professional standing, end a career built over decades and permanently alter family life. The Government keep speaking as though anything beneath their threshold is somehow low level. The Opposition have rightly made the point that even where a sentence is below three years, the consequences can be catastrophic. Amendment 24 simply recognises that reality. There is an obvious point of fairness here, too. If the state wishes to prosecute a person in circumstances where conviction may ruin their livelihood or reputation for life, it is hardly excessive to say that jury trials should at least remain available. That is an ancient constitutional right and the Government should, even now, think very hard before removing it. I also support paragraph (f) in amendment 24, which deals with cases where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the gravity or complexity might increase. Again, this is simply common sense. Criminal cases often evolve, evidence changes, witnesses come forward, and issues that initially looked straightforward become anything but in the crucible that is the courtroom.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Lady is absolutely right that magistrates are doing that now, frequently and—as far as I am aware—fairly well, but we have to remember that they are doing it for low-level cases. In fact, their sentencing powers have increased only recently. The key point is that we will have an additional process. The magistrates do it, but now we will have this additional process at the Crown court level to decide between judge only and jury. Obviously, the sentencing guidelines and all the things we have just set out would be entirely relevant to that process and will factor in. I will go through a that in a bit more detail, so I hope the hon. Lady will bear with me. I will of course let her intervene—that would be really helpful. She clearly has a huge amount of experience in this area, and I want everyone to feed in. I am asking questions about how this will work in reality, so it would be really good to draw on everyone’s experience. The Crown court deals with sexual assault and other more complex cases and, as she knows, the sentencing has to take into account things such as victim impact, so it is lot more difficult to estimate the sentence. Let us continue the debate, because it is very helpful to have this discussion. To suggest that a judge in the plea and trial preparation hearing can undertake that assessment accurately and quickly off the back of the information that they have at that point, potentially on a paper determination without a hearing, is unrealistic. That could be very difficult for them. I will give a few examples, and again I am very happy for people to intervene or give their views, because we need to work through the nitty-gritty of how the measure will work in reality. For category 2 sexual assault, the achieving best evidence full transcripts of the complainants’ evidence are often not available. Instead, the court has to rely on a written summary, but my understanding is that that information is needed to provide an accurate and realistic estimate of the likely sentence. How is it proposed that that will be done in practice for allocation? Will the judge watch the videos of the complainants’ evidence for an hour or two before deciding? If the case hinges on CCTV footage, is it proposed that the judge watch that before making the allocation decision? Those practical points do not appear to have been considered in preparation for the Bill, although the Minister may have all the answers and I obviously look forward to hearing how she thinks the process will work in practice. It is not sufficient just to say that the judge will decide the likely sentence length without ensuring that they have the information they need to do that properly, particularly given the magnitude of the impact of the allocation decision. I therefore ask the Minister whether anyone has calculated how long it might take for the judge to go through the various videos and footage before the PTPH to get the information they need to make an allocation decision. It is important to remember that victim impact is often a significant factor in sentencing. Is it proposed that victim impact statements will be relied upon at the point of determining an allocation? What happens if, at that point, the impact is not yet known? For example, the complainant might still be in hospital, medical evidence might remain outstanding or the psychological impact might not be known for many weeks or months. On the face of it, we probably all thought that a judge deciding whether the likely sentence will be more than three years sounded straightforward. We would think that they just look at the sentencing guidelines, but I am not sure it is that straightforward. Once we start thinking it through and listening to those working in the justice system—I have spoken to people about this—we soon realise that it is far from simple, especially for complex cases such as sexual assault. The judge does not magically know the likely sentence; they need to understand the facts, the detail of the alleged offence and the impact on the victim before they can even begin to do that accurately. If they get it wrong, which is increasingly likely if insufficient information is available to them, that could result in defendants being denied a jury trial when they should have had one. That brings me on to my next concern. How long will it take on average for the judge to do all this? Has that been factored into the Crown court saving of 27,000 sitting days? Has the increased time that the magistrates will need to spend on this, due to the complexity of cases, been factored into the increased demand of 8,500 sitting days? We also need to bear in mind that the allocation process that the magistrates undertake under the current rules will also get more complex once the sentencing powers increase up to two years. There will have to be allocation decisions for more complex offences such as sexual assault and death by careless driving. Do magistrates have the expertise to accurately assess the likely sentence in those types of cases to adequately assess victim impact? The Government’s approach sounds simpler on paper, but I hope I have demonstrated that in reality I am not sure it is once we delve into it. These proposals add a not insubstantial amount of work simply to decide where to allocate the trial, essentially undertaking almost a mini trial to review the evidence before the allocation can even be decided. That does not sound time saving to me. It is the wrong way round. We expect the judge to make a judgment on sentence before the trial has even happened, which could change the type of trial the defendant is entitled to. That is fundamentally wrong. It is a flawed approach that will lead to bad outcomes for defendants and complainants.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will speak in support of amendment 40, tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle, amendment 18, tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Chichester, and amendment 28, tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden. Before I get into my speech, I think that the hon. Member for Chichester raised a really interesting point about whether we will ever really talk about “triable either-way offences” going forward, if these changes go ahead. In effect, we will have the rather strange situation—to take the example of category 2 sexual assault or death by careless driving—of either summary offences or those with a full Crown court and jury. It will be interesting to see how that all flows through in the definitions. That is an interesting debate, but probably not one that everyone wants to have right now. I will move on from such interesting questions, and I can tell that the Minister is delighted that I have decided to do so.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is really helpful to hear the hon. Member’s perspective from her in-depth knowledge and experience, but I would challenge one aspect of her point: I might argue for a longer sentence if it meant I was more likely to get a jury trial and be found not guilty. Allow me to give an example. If I had created an offensive social media post, I would know that, if I could make my case to a jury, they would be much more likely to use their discretion and compassion and accept the human foibles that we have. They might well say, “This person did not intend to cause any harm—not guilty”. I therefore disagree with the hon. Member; I think she will find herself in a situation where—it sounds bizarre—people will argue that they should get a longer sentence in order to go to jury, so that they have a chance of being found not guilty and clearing their name.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  That is not the case. The hon. Lady has just set out that it is about setting out the worst possible cases with respect to the sentence—so they absolutely could do that. It is exactly what will happen. They will always be looking to achieve the best for their client—particularly if their client is not guilty. Let us remember that we are talking about some people who will not be guilty. Again, they know that if they have done a social media post—and we have seen that people have gone to prison for these things—they are much more likely to not go to prison if they end up in front of a jury. However, if they end up in front of a judge—my goodness me—there is a much higher chance that they will go to prison.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Is the Minister saying that judges will not be required to review CCTV footage or understand the impact on the victim? Is she saying that that is not required in this process?