Rebecca Paul MP: speeches

Speeches

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I begin by echoing the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. I completely understand why the Government have brought this clause forward. I welcome the debate. Similar to the hon. Member for Chichester, who spoke so eloquently, I was deeply moved by the evidence we heard from Claire Throssell. I cannot even imagine how she has coped. To do what she has done and to try to take something positive from that is an incredible thing. The evidence this Committee has heard from those witnesses and other survivors of domestic abuse is that they feel that the family courts have not properly identified risk and believe that a pro-contact culture has, at times, overridden safety. That is extremely concerning, and it is absolutely right that we take it extremely seriously. Child safety must come first. Where the present framework has contributed to poor outcomes, it is right that the Government act, but it is also incumbent on us today to make sure that the clause that is being repealed is indeed the cause of the harm to those children. I also make the point that, where Parliament removes an existing statutory principle, it has a duty to be clear about what will replace it. My concern today is less with the Government’s objective than with whether repeal on its own is sufficiently precise, evidence based and thought through to achieve the Ministers’ intended objective. The Government’s own impact assessment, which has already been set out, says that “repeal alone is unlikely to materially change outcomes”, even though it is expected to “change the process judges follow”. That is an important starting point for this debate. It is really important that we do not make changes to law because everyone wants us to make those changes and thinks that will improve things when, in reality, we have the evidence and facts to know that it may not deliver those outcomes. It is incumbent on all of us to make sure that we actually deliver the outcomes that we all desire; we all have the same ambition. I know this comes from a good place and we are all approaching this debate in the best way we can to protect children. My purpose this afternoon is to be constructive—I am not saying I have all the answers on this, and I hope my comments will be taken in that spirit. If the Government proceed with repeal, do they also need to do more to provide a principles replacement framework, clearer guidance and stronger supporting reforms? It is important to start with the facts around the presumption. The current presumption does not give any parent an automatic right to contact, override the welfare checklist or override the paramountcy principle in section 1 of the Children Act 1989, and it certainly does not require courts to make orders that place children at risk. The Family Services Foundation is clear in its written evidence that current law already places the child’s welfare first, stating: “Section 1(6)…expressly ensures the presumption applies” only where parental involvement “does not put the child at risk of suffering harm”. It says that practice direction 12J and the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 already provide an important framework for identifying and responding to abuse in family proceedings. Equally, I recognise the contrary concern expressed by survivors who say that, in abuse cases, the presumption can place pressure on courts to prioritise parental contact even where there are serious safety concerns and can make it harder for victims to be properly heard and protected. The real question is therefore not whether safety matters more than contact—it plainly does—but whether removing the current presumption will improve how risk is identified and acted upon, or whether it risks creating new uncertainty while leaving the deeper operational problems untouched and discouraging parental involvement in cases where it would actually be beneficial. There are already substantial protections in the current legal framework, although they clearly fail in the worst way on occasion. The Family Services Foundation points out that the Children Act 1989, practice direction 12J and the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 already equip the courts to restrict or refuse contact where “harm is shown”. It also reminds us that the UK is bound by the UN convention on the rights of the child, including article 9, which recognises that children should maintain regular contact with both parents unless that is “contrary to the child’s best interests”. Both Parents Matter makes a similar point, saying: “The Presumption was introduced in 2014” to reflect the UNCRC and provide a statutory benchmark that the safe involvement of both parents generally furthers child welfare. I emphasise the word “safe”—no one has ever said that parents should be involved if it is not safe. I make those points not to argue that nothing should change. If the Government are minded to proceed, we need a clear understanding of how the replacement framework will continue to distinguish between safe parental involvement, which can be beneficial, and unsafe parental involvement, which must be stopped. At present, I am not sure the Bill by itself gives enough reassurance on that point, and I am worried that safe parental contact will be discouraged. That leads to one of the most important points of all. The Government’s own documents suggest that repeal alone may not be the solution that they are hoping it will be. As mentioned earlier, the impact assessment says, “repeal alone is unlikely to materially change outcomes”, although it is expected to change the process that judges follow. That is a significant admission. It suggests that if the Government want safer and better outcomes in family proceedings, repeal can be only part of the picture, and perhaps not the decisive part. We should keep in mind that many of the awful failures that have rightly horrified people seem to be failures of risk assessment, information sharing, institutional practice, professional judgment and resourcing. The Centre for Policy Research on Men and Boys puts it well: “If abusive contact is being ordered or preserved inappropriately, then the concern lies with the quality of risk assessment, the speed and fairness of investigation, and the consistency with which courts and agencies apply the law.” That is a useful and constructive way of putting the point. It does not deny the seriousness of the problem, but it does ask whether the solution is the right one. My concern is not that the Government want to strengthen protection; it is that repeal may be presented as more self-sufficient than, on the basis of the evidence, it really is. I also think the Committee should be careful and candid about the strength of the evidence base behind repeal. Both Parents Matter says that the Government’s own review “provided limited and inconclusive evidence of the impact of the Presumption. It could not determine how often the Presumption was applied in judgments, nor could it assess how harm…related to the application of the Presumption.” It also criticises the underlying methodology: “Quantitative analysis was based on only 245 court judgments, with over half from a single magistrates’ bench. Qualitative analysis involved only 29 parents.” It added that the literature review “examined only 55 studies, excluded all research published after April 2024,” and omitted “major studies showing positive outcomes” from safe shared parenting and ongoing parental involvement. Other evidence goes further, arguing that the Government review appears to have misunderstood or overstated the conclusions to be drawn from Professor Anja Steinbach’s work. I recall a striking line from Professor Steinbach, who said: “There is plenty of research showing that contact with both parents is beneficial”, and “except for violence…contact with both parents is the baseline.” I do not think that material should make the Committee cautious about treating the review as a fully settled or exhausted evidential platform for repeal. Again, my point is not that that means that repeal must not happen; it is that we should not over-claim what the existing evidence can prove or support. I also think it is important to avoid turning this into a false choice between protecting children from abuse and supporting children to maintain safe relationships with both parents. The Centre for Policy Research on Men and Boys says that the public debate often frames the issue in that way. However, it says: “A good family justice system must do both. It must protect children and adult victims from abusive parents. It must also protect children from the avoidable loss of safe, loving, and important parental relationships.” I think that is right. The Family Services Foundation similarly said: “reform should focus on enhancing the protections available, rather than creating conditions that may inadvertently prevent children from maintaining safe, meaningful relationships with their parents.” That is why I urge the Minister not to present clause 17 as though all principled concern about repeal is somehow concern for parental rights over child safety. It is perfectly possible to support the Government’s child safety objective while asking whether the law should continue to recognise some clear and carefully framed way, where there is no established risk of harm, of enabling children to benefit from stable and safe relationships with both parents. Several of the written submissions that we received raise concerns about unintended consequences if repeal proceeds without a clear replacement framework. Both Parents Matter warns: “Removing this important statutory benchmark, and relying instead on practice and non statutory frameworks” may increase uncertainty, inconsistency and conflict. The Family Services Foundation says something similar, warning that repeal may confuse frontline professionals, affect negotiations outside court, reduce the incentive for out-of-court resolution and, ultimately, increase strain on a family court system that is already under pressure. It notes that only a minority of separated families ever come before the courts, but many more families and professionals orient their expectations around the legal framework. That is a serious point. Even if the court’s paramount consideration remains unchanged, removing a statutory starting point may still alter behaviour before a case ever reaches a final hearing. It may affect how solicitors advise, how CAFCASS frames disputes, how mediation is approached and how parents negotiate. With that point in mind, I hope that the Minister might be in a position to share some more detail on how she expects the changes to operate, and why she is confident that they will improve outcomes rather than simply shift conflict elsewhere.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to start the day with you and end the day with you, Ms Jardine. I am sure you are very much enjoying starting your day with me and ending your day with me, too. [ Laughter. ] I have just realised how that can be interpreted. My apologies, Ms Jardine; I cannot account for the minds of other Members. To get back to business, I do not support clause 6 standing part of the Bill. It will expand the Government’s existing power to increase the maximum custodial sentence that a magistrates court can impose for a single either-way offence. The current maximum is 12 months, but the clause will permit Ministers, entirely at their own discretion, to increase that to 18 months or even 24 months. That will affect consecutive sentencing for multiple either-way offences. The Government have justified the change on the basis that the power is needed so that sentencing limits can be adjusted swiftly to rebalance work between the magistrates courts and the Crown court. The Government estimate that increasing the maximum to 18 months would save 8,000 Crown court sitting days. That all sounds rather neat but, in reality, it is another example of the Government trying to force more serious criminal business into a part of the system designed for swift, relatively low-level justice, and doing so before they have properly shown that the courts can absorb it or that the benefits are worth it. The first and perhaps most important point is that even Sir Brian Leveson did not recommend the change. Sir Brian said that his recommendation on restricting the right to elect trial by jury was “contingent upon magistrates’ sentencing powers remaining at the current maximum of 12 months.” He also recommended that the Government’s ability to amend magistrates’ sentencing powers by statutory instrument be repealed, and that the current 12-month maximum be made permanent. Clause 6 therefore cannot be said to follow Leveson: it goes beyond him and, on this point, directly contradicts him. That is a serious weakness in the Government’s position. Ministers have repeatedly leaned on Leveson when defending the Bill as a whole, but in this instance he gave no endorsement of what clause 6 will usher in. More than that, he warned us directly against it. It is perfectly valid to ask, “If the very review on which the Government say the Bill is based said that 12 months should remain the ceiling, why are Ministers now seeking the power to raise it to two years?” Let me briefly touch on a second common-sense point. The move from six to 12 months took effect only for offenders convicted on or after 18 November 2024. In other words, the current system has barely had time to bed in and the Government are already asking Parliament to authorise a further jump to 18 or 24 months. The earlier increase to 12 months was justified as a response to court pressures, and the Government said it would save up to 2,000 sitting days. We have not had anything like enough time to assess properly how that change has worked in practice before Ministers seek power to go dramatically further. If the Government and the Minister wish to make evidence-based law, they should first show Parliament what the 12-month expansion has actually done: what kinds of cases have been retained, what sentencing patterns have changed, what effect there has been on appeals, what impact there has been on magistrates courts and whether the claimed savings have materialised. Instead, they are asking, through clause 6, for a much broader delegated power, and inviting us to trust that this will all somehow work out later. That is not good enough where a question as fundamental as the administration of good justice is concerned. The Bar Council puts its objection crisply and, I think, rightly. It says: “Summary trial is designed for the purpose of dispensing swift justice in low-level cases. The extension of summary justice to cases in which a defendant could receive up to 2 years’ imprisonment…particularly when combined with the removal of a right to elect Crown Court trial, and the removal of a right of automatic appeal” amounts to a “comprehensive rolling back of safeguards.” That is blunt language, but it is hard to disagree with. Clause 6 will change the kind of cases that summary justice is expected to absorb. The Law Society warns that under the clause magistrates will have the power to impose lengthy custodial sentences for serious offences such as actual bodily harm, grievous bodily harm and possession with intent to supply drugs “in proceedings that are intended to be quicker” and less formal than than those in the Crown Court. It warns that this raises the likelihood that “people will receive longer custodial sentences with fewer safeguards or opportunities to rectify wrongful convictions.” I will dwell on this point for a moment, as it is something that none of us who have been tasked with scrutinising the Bill in detail should forget. A system designed to be faster, simpler and less formal is being asked to shoulder cases in which the consequences are far more severe. Two years in prison is not some trivial matter: a custodial sentence like that can cost a person their job, their home, their family life, their good name and their future. A justice system that is appropriate for low-level offending cannot be assumed fit for cases that carry that sort of life­changing penalty. There is then the practical point that clause 6 will not solve the pressure in the system so much as move it around. The change will merely transfer the burden from one overstretched part of the system to another. The Law Society says that the magistrates court already has its own backlog of more than 370,000 cases, and that the Government have shown no convincing plan to deal with the added pressure brought by more serious and complex cases. JUSTICE makes the same point, and adds an especially telling practical detail drawn from the Institute for Government’s analysis: since magistrates’ sentencing powers were increased from six to 12 months in 2024, only around 30% of sentences in the six-to-12-month band were handed down by magistrates. That suggests a lack of confidence, or a continuing tendency to send more serious cases upwards, which in turn means the Government’s projected savings may not materialise in anything like the way they hope. If magistrates are already not retaining all the cases that the Government assumed they would after the jump to 12 months, what is the evidence that authorising 18 or 24 months will suddenly transform the position? If cases continue to be sent up, or bounce between jurisdictions, the supposed efficiency gain becomes much more doubtful.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Thank you for that, Ms Jardine. I reassure you that I will not be speaking for very much longer, but I will cover the last of what I consider to be the important points. Thank you for your guidance and patience. The Law Society warns that the Bill’s proposals will increase the number of defendants in magistrates courts who are ineligible for legal aid, even though they would currently qualify if their case were heard in the Crown court, because the magistrates court means test is significantly stricter. It notes that duty solicitor numbers have dropped sharply between 2017 and 2025 and that the impact assessment does not properly address “the disparity between the magistrates’ and Crown Court means tests”. We know that individuals in full-time, minimum-wage employment may not qualify for legal aid in the magistrates court, and that unrepresented defendants often do not understand charges, and often enter inappropriate pleas, struggle with cross-examination and end up with harsher outcomes. Under the Bill, then, a defendant may face a much more serious case in a summary forum, with a possible sentence of 18 months or two years, yet be less likely to have publicly funded legal representation than they would be if the case were before the Crown court. That simply is not fair. Even if one were somehow persuaded that giving the magistrates courts the power to impose sentences of 18 or 24 months might in principle be acceptable, we would still have a major objection to how the clause is drafted. It does not simply set the limit and leave it there; it expands the regulation-making power so that the Government may increase the maximum to 18 or 24 months by statutory instrument. The delegated powers memorandum justifies that on the basis that magistrates’ sentencing limits may need to be adjusted swiftly “where operational pressures” require a “rebalancing of work”. Are we not, then, being asked to hand over a flexible tool that could be used to rebalance criminal jurisdiction by secondary legislation? I could not be more convinced that Parliament should retain oversight of increasing the powers of magistrates. At the very least, any such regulation should be made by affirmative resolution. This is not the sort of decision that should be casually adjustable at ministerial convenience. For all those reasons, I oppose clause 6 standing part of the Bill. Even Leveson did not recommend this change; on the contrary, he said his wider recommendations were “contingent upon magistrates’ sentencing powers remaining at…12 months” and recommended that the power to alter them by statutory instrument “should be repealed”. The move to 12 months has taken effect only recently and has not yet been properly evaluated. The clause will extend summary justice into cases carrying up to two years’ imprisonment, despite the fact that summary justice was designed for lower-level, swifter cases. It will push more serious cases into magistrates courts that are already under strain, and do so in a package that also weakens appeals and intensifies legal aid problems. It risks moving the backlog rather than solving it, and it does so by way of an over-broad delegated power that gives Ministers too much room to reshape criminal jurisdiction by regulation. The magistracy deserves respect, and nothing I say should be taken as criticism of the many magistrates who serve conscientiously and well, but having respect for magistrates is not the same thing as assuming that every structural burden should now be placed on the summary justice system. The Government have not even begun to make the case for the clause compellingly.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I agree with my hon. Friend, as I normally do. Finally, there is the obvious practical point that there are better answers available. The Law Society says that reform and investment must be strategic, not piecemeal, and warns against stand-alone measures such as changing from jury trials to judge-only trials without convincing evidence that they will significantly reduce the backlog. It says that Parliament should insist on “detailed modelling” and on understanding the Government’s intentions across the whole package of reform, not just on this isolated measure. The existence of pressure in the system does not prove that every proposed constitutional shortcut is justified. The question is whether the shortcut is necessary. With clause 4, the answer is plainly no. For all those reasons, I oppose clause 4 and schedule 1, and I support amendment 51. Clause 4 offers a constitutionally serious reduction in jury trials for a tiny claimed benefit of 200 sitting days. The evidence does not show that juries are the cause of delay, collapse or miscarriage in these cases. Fraud cases are not too technical for juries. The key issue is dishonesty, and ordinary citizens are uniquely well placed to judge that. The removal of juries in these cases would damage open justice and public confidence. Schedule 1 gives effect to that flawed principle and then goes further by creating a route to ministerial expansion. Amendment 51 is therefore a sensible and necessary safeguard, but in truth, the better course is simpler still: clause 4 and schedule 1 should not be included in the Bill at all.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I completely agree with my hon. Friend. What is considered complex and lengthy could be quite subjective. We all know that we are potentially going to end up in the courts over defining exactly what is complex and lengthy. It feels like the Bill is not written clearly enough for us to understand exactly how it will work in reality. Amendment 51 is an important safeguard against those risks. In his written evidence, His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC notes that the schedule 1 list already “appears to be arbitrary, perhaps the work of a moment; and it goes beyond anything suggested before. But even that is not the end of it.” That is because part 2 of the schedule gives the Secretary of State the power by order to add or remove offences. He quotes the explanatory notes to show that offences not related to fraud or financial crime could easily be added in the future. He describes this as “a mighty step along the way to the end of jury trials.” That does not strike me as overstatement. The Secretary of State will indeed have this untrammelled power, and we should carefully heed this sober warning from a senior judge. For similar reasons, the Opposition oppose schedule 1 standing part of the Bill. Schedule 1 is the list that gives clause 4 its reach, and the list is already troubling. It is not confined to a tiny, tightly defined category of unusual mega-fraud; it covers a wider class of economic and financial offences, including money laundering and terrorist funding, and can then be expanded later. If we think the core principle of clause 4 is wrong, then the schedule that operationalises it is wrong too. Rivlin’s description of the list as “arbitrary” is worth keeping in mind. One of the reasons that schedule 1 is objectionable is that once Parliament accepts the principle that a whole category of serious Crown court cases can be singled out for juryless trial on grounds of length and complexity, the argument for confining the list to that category becomes very hard to sustain. The logic of the thing pushes outward. That is why schedule 1 is dangerous: for not only what it contains now but what it invites later. I am particularly concerned that there is an ideological push away from jury trials. My concern is that this is only the start, not the end of where the Government want to get to. I urge the Committee to think about this carefully. We are taking important decisions for the future.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I completely agree with the hon. Lady. She has set out a good example of the type of things that happen in reality. Life is not tidy, and unexpected things happen. As we look at the Bill and whether a sentence is over or under three years, it is easy to think in simple terms but, in reality, people who work in the justice system—I have not done so, but I have spoken to people who do—understand the movement and flexibility that is required. That is why amendment 24 works really well by taking that into account. The hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden, who drafted it, clearly has real-world experience of what actually happens in a courtroom. The Bill already recognises elsewhere that there can be a relevant change of circumstances requiring the court to revisit allocation, so the Government’s own drafting accepts that these matters are dynamic rather than static. If that is so, why would we not want to build in a bit more foresight at the front end as well? Paragraph (f) in amendment 24 is not some wild departure from the structure of the Bill; it sits comfortably with the Government’s own recognition that allocation decisions can become unsound as a case develops. It is simply a more prudent and realistic approach to cases in which the true seriousness may emerge only over time. Finally, the reference in amendment 24 to “other exceptional circumstances” is extremely important. No statute, however carefully drafted, can predict every factual scenario. That is especially true in criminal justice, where the facts and human consequences of a case can vary enormously. A residual exceptional circumstances test is therefore not a weakness; it is a mark of maturity in the law. It recognises that Parliament should not force judges into injustice. If the Government truly believe in justice rather than mere throughput, they should have no objection to preserving a narrow, exceptional route to jury trial where justice plainly demands it. Amendment 39, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle, deals with the alternative, broader approach to building flexibility into clause 3. It is an especially important amendment because it puts the issue in the clearest possible terms: those of natural justice. The amendment says that a trial should still be conducted with a jury where the defendant demonstrates that to be tried without one “would amount to a breach of the principles of natural justice.” That is an extremely modest safeguard. It would not wreck the clause; it would merely build in additional protection through allowing an element of judgment to decide the mode of trial. It would not restore the right to a jury trial in every either-way case; it simply says that where the injustice is plain, a jury trial must remain available. I struggle to see how any Government serious about fairness could object to that. This is an issue of paramount importance on our side, and I hope on the Government’s side too. My hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle tabled amendment 39, as well as amendments elsewhere in the Bill—in relation to clause 1, in relation to reallocation under clause 3, and in relation to clause 4—to seek to protect natural justice. We will keep making these points. If Ministers insist on creating judge-only routes, they must at the very least accept a residual safeguard based on natural justice. For all the reasons I have outlined, I support amendments 23, 39 and 24. They would deliver the additional safeguards needed, so I urge the Government to adopt either the Opposition’s amendment or the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Jardine. I am pleased to speak in support of amendments 25 and 12, and particularly in support of amendment 43, tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. The amendments all engage with a simple point of fairness. Whatever one’s view of the Government’s wider proposals, it cannot be right to change the rules after a defendant has already elected for a Crown court trial. Such defendants made their choice under the current rules. They did not opt for Crown court for any reason other than the fact they would get a jury trial, so for the court to remove that choice from them without any hearing would frankly be shocking. Let us keep in mind that some of these people will be innocent, and remember that some may have chosen the magistrates route if they had known that going to the Crown court would not give them the jury trial they seek. The retrospective application of new rules is deeply unfair. Whatever side of the jury trial argument we are on, surely we can all agree that those who have already opted for jury trial should have that decision respected. The amendments differ slightly in drafting but all try to achieve the same thing: to ensure that where somebody has already elected for jury trial, that choice is respected and the new regime does not operate retrospectively. Amendment 25 would disapply the new allocation rules where a defendant has already elected Crown court trial before commencement. Amendment 12 would strip out the retrospective commencement provisions. Amendment 43 would instead tie the new regime to cases in which the first hearing in the magistrates court takes place after the change in the law. Those are different routes with the same fair and sensible objective. This should not be controversial. If the state tells a defendant that they have a right to elect for a jury trial and they exercise that right, it is manifestly unfair to turn around later and say that the right has vanished and that their case will now be dealt with under a wholly different system. In fact, to call it unfair fails to make the point seriously enough. It would amount to a violation of one of the most foundational principles of our legal system: that retrospective legislation of this kind runs contrary to basic rule-of-law principles and requires the strongest possible justification. As JUSTICE, the cross-party law reform and human rights organisation put it in written evidence: “The retrospective application of the provisions is contrary to the rule of law.” It went on to state: “It is deeply unfair for defendants who elected Crown Court trial in expectation of a jury to have their cases heard by a judge alone under a process that did not…exist when they made that choice.” I always endeavour to see all sides of a given issue, but in this case I honestly struggle to see any argument against those statements. I hope the Minister will agree that retrospective application is fundamentally unfair. If the Government are not moved by appeals to basic fairness, they should at least be moved by their own stated objective of reducing delay. The Bar Council is unmistakeable in warning us: “The retrospective provisions may also be subject to numerous legal challenges.” That is exactly the opposite of what Ministers say they are trying to achieve. If the Government push ahead with retrospective application, they risk drawn-out legal challenge, more hearings and more uncertainty in cases that are already in the system. Measures explicitly brought in to help to reduce the court backlog will, perversely, multiply it. This is exactly the sort of illogical thinking that Committee stage is intended to weed out. I very much hope that the Minister will engage on this point. Our concern is echoed elsewhere in the written evidence we received. Dr Samantha Fairclough’s detailed submission to the Justice Committee states clearly that the Government’s plan to give the Bill retrospective effect is “unfair…will create significant additional work in allocating those cases…and likely result in appeals.” JUSTICE makes a similar point, saying: “Reallocation of cases already in the Crown Court caseload” could lead to judicial review challenges, further hearings and additional “burdens on both defendants and the prosecution”. Even on a practical level, the amendments are eminently sensible. They seek to diffuse the legal landmine that the Government are in danger of stepping on, and would avoid yet more work for a system that is already under intense strain. As I have stated, the amendments are nothing other than fair and reasonable—in fact, they are a minimal safeguard. My colleagues and I have been clear that we should not be going ahead with these reforms, but if Ministers insist, the very least they can do is to ensure that they operate prospectively rather than retrospectively. People should be judged and dealt with under the rules in force when they made their election, not have the rug pulled from beneath them halfway through proceedings. That is why I support amendments 25, 12 and 43, and I urge the Government and the Minister to accept at least one of them.

• 23 Mar 2026 · Puberty Blockers Clinical Trial · Hansard source

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  The use of puberty blockers on healthy children is deeply wrong. Children given those drugs are being locked into their discomfort and put on a one-way pathway to cross-sex hormones and surgeries. All of that leads to a lifetime of sexual impairment, fertility issues, bone density loss and other catastrophic psychological and emotional impacts. No child put on puberty blockers at the earliest stage of puberty and whose natural puberty is blocked will ever have an orgasm or be fertile. That is what anyone in this room cheerleading this trial is supporting. In December, the Health Secretary said at the Dispatch Box: “Am I comfortable that this clinical trial has undergone the proper process and ethical approval to ensure the highest standards and supervision? Yes, I am comfortable about that.” —[ Official Report , 17 December 2025; Vol. 777, c. 929.] However, on 20 February, we found out that the MHRA had U-turned and was expressing serious concerns about the current trial. The issues it raised were not new, though, having been raised from the outset by many in this room. Making children infertile and harming bone structure are not minor points of detail, but fundamental safety flaws. That last-minute intervention raises questions about the rigour and diligence of the overall approval process. How did a trial with such potentially catastrophic health impacts make it through the research ethics committee approval process? Having looked through the minutes of the meetings, I can see that the committee members met three times over Zoom; nine out of 12 attended the first, only five attended the second and only three attended the third. What stands out most to me is the REC’s delegation to a sub-committee of approval responsibilities for such a profoundly dangerous trial. Section 4.2.24 of the REC governance policy document indicates that sub-committees can be used when “research proposals…present no material ethical issues”. I am therefore staggered that it took the decision to delegate approval responsibilities in this case.

• 4 Feb 2026 · Postal Services: Rural Areas · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer, and to respond on behalf of the Opposition. I sincerely congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for South Shropshire (Stuart Anderson) on securing this debate and on the incredible persistence with which he has fought for his constituents. As my hon. Friend made clear, a functioning postal service is not a nice-to-have in rural Britain; rather, it is part of the vital infrastructure of daily life. The post is how people receive medical letters, time-sensitive official correspondence and the things they cannot simply pick up on the high street. For small businesses, farms and sole traders, it is how goods, invoices and documents move. We should not underestimate the harms when this important service fails. I want to cover two linked issues: the resilience of the post office network; and the reliability of deliveries and the way that failures fall hardest on rural areas. As of October 2025, there were about 11,638 post office branches in the UK, and the company is committed to maintaining about 11,500 branches. The Post Office is publicly owned, but the vast majority of branches are run by independent postmasters inside local shops. In my experience, that is why they are so deeply woven into rural life, and why, when a branch closes, the town or village feels it immediately and deeply. The network is supposed to be underpinned by access criteria, including a requirement that 95% of the rural population should be within three miles of a post office, and that 95% of the population of every postcode district should be within six miles of one. Even remote communities have a minimum level of access. Those are sensible measures of access, and it is therefore deeply concerning that the Department for Business and Trade Green Paper on the future of the Post Office explicitly asks whether to keep the existing requirement, remove the minimum 11,500 branch requirement or replace it with a different framework altogether. Rural Britain has heard that language before: “a different way of meeting obligations” is often a Whitehall euphemism for a quiet downgrade under which the network looks stable on paper but becomes thinner in practice, with reduced hours, reduced services and longer journeys for those without cars. Although the Government appear to be drifting, the Conservative party is clear about what the Post Office is for. It is more than a business; it is part of the UK’s social and economic fabric, especially in rural areas, and especially as bank branches continue to vanish from our high streets. For many communities, the post office is now the most realistic place to do basic banking, withdraw cash or deposit takings. There is also a straightforward point about support. The nationwide network, especially in rural areas, will not always be commercially viable based on pure retail footfall alone. That is why public funding has played a role. The Conservative Government provided more than £2.5 billion in funding in the past decade to sustain the nationwide network, including support for branches in uncommercial areas. That turned out to be money well spent, in the light of the ongoing use of the post office network. Post office data shows record levels of cash deposits at branches and significant use by both personal and business customers, alongside the roll-out of banking hubs operated in partnership with Cash Access UK. When the Minister responds, I hope we will hear some reassurance about the support for the post office network. Can we have a commitment today to retaining a minimum network size of at least 11,500 branches? Will we keep the rural and postcode district access criteria and will sub-postmasters be properly supported so that rural branches do not become financially untenable? I now turn to deliveries, which is where constituents, including my own, are impacted when the service breaks down. The universal postal service is a promise that has been repeatedly broken. In October 2025, Ofcom fined Royal Mail £21 million for missing its 2024-25 delivery targets, finding that only 77% of first-class mail and 92.5% of second-class mail was delivered on time, far below the long-standing universal service targets. Ofcom has since moved to reform parts of the universal service obligation, including allowing second-class letters to be delivered on alternate weekdays Monday to Friday and adjusting headline targets while introducing new backstop measures designed to prevent extreme delays. There is a legitimate discussion to be had about sustainability and falling letter volumes, but reform must not become cover for a two-tier Britain where rural residents simply wait longer as a matter of course. The focus must now be on delivery offices, staffing and day-to-day operational reality. In my own Reigate constituency we face ongoing concerns about the standard of postal services in the village of Banstead. Constituents have raised this with me repeatedly since the general election, and with good reason. A key issue appears to be staffing. Royal Mail has admitted to higher than normal levels of sickness and vacancies, and when I visited the delivery office that serves Banstead it was clear that morale there was extremely low. Meanwhile there is an operational inefficiency built in. Banstead is served by a delivery office based in Epsom, meaning staff travel before rounds even begin. I think we can all guess what that leads to. One constituent received 10 items of post on 30 January after receiving none in the preceding 10 days. Others report the same pattern of long gaps followed by sudden floods. If that is the experience of a well-connected part of Surrey, it should shock no one that deeply rural areas are hit even harder. My hon. Friend the Member for South Shropshire highlighted severe delays in his constituency. The frustration felt by his constituents is wholly understandable. So what should happen next? First, the Minister should make it clear that regulatory fines are not the end of the story. Ofcom’s enforcement action was accompanied by requirements for Royal Mail to take corrective steps. The Government should press for transparent reporting at delivery office level with a particular focus on rural performance so that communities can see whether their service is improving and where the problems sit. Secondly, Ministers must ensure that any future changes to the universal service protect rural users. If second class is delivered less often, that should not translate into worse outcomes for rural areas. Backstop measures are welcome, but they must be enforced and felt in places that have been left behind. People do not care about clever statistics if their letters still arrive late, in clumps, or not at all. Thirdly, the Government should recognise the interdependence of the system. The post office is not a shop counter; it is part of the national postal infrastructure, so any reform must be judged by a simple test: does it improve the lived experience of rural users? I will end by returning to my hon. Friend the Member for South Shropshire, who has done what good MPs should do: listened locally, engaged with the operators and brought the issue to Parliament for debate. To be clear, neither he nor rural Britain are asking for special treatment. They are asking for fairness and competence. A letter posted in this country should arrive when the sender is told it will arrive. A rural post office branch should not be quietly allowed to wither. I look forward to the Minister’s response and hope we will hear some meaningful commitments on the issues today.

• 11 Dec 2025 · Fairtrade Certification · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Hobhouse. I begin by congratulating the hon. Member for Glasgow North (Martin Rhodes) on securing today’s informative and thoughtful debate. All the contributions have been insightful, but I particularly enjoyed the speech by the hon. Member for Ealing Central and Acton (Dr Huq) who spoke about the man from Del Monte, taking me back down memory lane. I had not thought about him for a long time, probably not since the ’80s. This is a timely debate. It rightly draws attention to a topic that has relevance to how the UK positions itself as a responsible trading nation and global partner. Fairtrade certification schemes have become a visible and recognised feature of British consumer life. They are well understood by the public, well supported by major retailers and increasingly used by UK businesses to demonstrate transparency and ethical practices across global supply chains. This debate invites us to reflect on how Fairtrade sits within the wider landscape of British trade and business policy, and how it might continue to support responsible sourcing, environmental sustainability and long-term development goals. At its core, Fairtrade is a voluntary certification scheme applied to consumer goods such as bananas, cocoa, coffee, tea and sugar. It sets minimum prices for producers, offers a Fairtrade premium to be invested in community projects, and lays out standards on labour rights and environmental protection. The scheme is built on a partnership model between producers in the global south and businesses and consumers in the global north. Over time, Fairtrade has come to play a role in supporting responsible UK sourcing practices. The UK has long been a leading market for Fairtrade goods, and British supermarkets were among the first in the world to adopt the Fairtrade label at scale. The distinctive mark is now found on thousands of product lines sold in every part of the country, from major supermarket chains to small independent stores. Beyond consumer familiarity, the benefits of Fairtrade certification also flow into business practices here at home. For British companies, certification helps to meet environmental, social and governance expectations from investors and consumers alike. It offers reassurance on the ethical provenance of goods and helps to reduce reputational risk in complex and sometimes opaque global supply chains. More broadly, Fairtrade fits into a wider framework of responsible sourcing in which UK firms are increasingly engaged. For example, the cocoa industry has seen significant improvements in transparency and long-term planning due to Fairtrade and similar voluntary schemes. British food and beverage companies, in particular, have drawn on Fairtrade principles to strengthen resilience and quality across key import lines. There is also a trade policy angle. Fairtrade is not only about individual transactions; it reflects a broader outlook on how the UK interacts with developing markets. As the Government have observed in the recent trade strategy, trade and development are not mutually exclusive goals. We can support UK business while also encouraging more ethical, sustainable and secure supply chains. The developing countries trading scheme, launched in 2023 under the last Conservative Government, is one such example. It reduces tariffs on goods from low and middle-income countries and allows for easier trade in value-added products, helping to support economic diversification. The previous Government were also clear that they recognised the role that voluntary schemes like Fairtrade play in complementing formal legal frameworks, such as the Modern Slavery Act 2015, which continues to apply to large UK businesses. In this context, Fairtrade certification can be seen as one of several tools that enable the UK to act as a responsible trading nation, championing higher standards while maintaining competitive access to key goods. One of the great strengths of Fairtrade is the strong grassroots support that it enjoys. I saw that at first hand earlier this year when I was contacted by my local Reigate Fairtrade steering group to draw my attention to the “Brew it Fair” campaign. The campaign highlighted that, while the Government have committed to protecting human rights and environmental standards by endorsing the UN guiding principles on business and human rights, and by passing the Modern Slavery Act, wages, incomes and working conditions remain inadequate for the majority of the people involved in tea farming. As such, the Fairtrade Foundation called on the Government to introduce a law on human rights and environmental due diligence. Again, good work was done in that space under the previous Conservative Government. The UK was the first country to create a national action plan to implement the UN guiding principles on business and human rights, which are widely regarded as the authoritative international framework to steer practical action by Governments and businesses worldwide on this important and pressing agenda. More recently, the UK has taken a number of steps through the Modern Slavery Act to ensure that no British organisation—public or private, and unwittingly or otherwise—is complicit through their supply chains in human rights violations. I am sure that the Minister will have more to say on that in a moment. I conclude by noting that this has been an excellent debate, and I repeat my thanks to the hon. Member for Glasgow North for securing it.

• 30 Oct 2025 · Property Service Charges · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for that point. An important debate for us to have today is about what we do going forward, both for those who have not yet bought a leasehold and to help our constituents who are in this situation right now. I am really interested to hear everyone’s views on that. These companies are a symptom of the problem; they are opportunists making money from an inequitable system. It is this House that must take responsibility for addressing the intrinsic unfairness and urgently make the changes needed to unshackle leaseholders. I hope that we will today hear hon. Members’ views on the solutions, not just the issues. We cannot keep building new housing estates under this same model, perpetuating the problem. This is increasingly important in the light of the Government’s ambitious plan to build 1.5 million new homes over the next few years. I have to say, if nothing has changed when the time comes for my children to purchase a property, I will be strongly advising them not to purchase a leasehold on a private estate. To start us off, I will give the House my view. I think making it easier for leaseholders to change property service company is important, as is better regulation and higher standards, but that will not fundamentally transform the situation. What is needed—what is critical—is a change to the default model, so that homeowners are not paying both the council and a private company for the exact same services. One sensible and equitable option would be that local authorities are obliged to adopt communal land and infrastructure on completion of new estates in all but the most exceptional cases. For that to work in practice, developers would need to be obliged to ensure that the infrastructure meets the council’s standards before transfer. That way, owners of leasehold properties would be put on an equal footing with everyone else, paying for communal services once through their council tax. That would certainly deal with future issues. But what about those who, like our constituents, are already trapped? It may be that something more radical is needed, such as a mandatory direction to all local authorities to adopt communal land where requested by existing estates. It would be difficult, I know, in this current financial environment and with the likely variability of estate quality, but it would certainly address much of the issue and allow my constituents to sell their properties and move on with their lives. I know that this Government are also keen to move forwards and towards commonhold arrangements, especially for flats, which essentially put management of the estate in the hands of leaseholders themselves. There are some benefits to commonhold over the current model, but it is not the silver bullet that is needed and brings its own set of problems. Anyone who, like me, has been involved in a residents’ association or similar organisation—or, indeed, who simply understands human nature—will know that most people do not want to pay out for significant works, so the works will not get done, which in time will result in crumbling roads, failing roofs and falling home values. Again, it will become difficult for residents to sell their properties. It is just another version of the same trap, and one that pits neighbours against each other. I urge the Government to think again on plans to make commonhold the default tenure for new build flats.

• 30 Oct 2025 · Property Service Charges · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for his encouragement and I will keep coming up with radical ideas. Before I finish, I want to raise the issue of education and information provision to homebuyers. If most people knew the current problems with leasehold arrangements, they would not buy them—or they certainly would not pay as much for them. I am sure that conveyancers include warnings and information when managing the sale and purchase process, but it is not cutting through. People are sleepwalking into purchases with little or no understanding of the uncapped service charges they are signing up to, and we must do more to ensure that people are adequately advised and informed before signing on the dotted line. I would be most grateful if the Minister could today give his view on a few things. How can we best address the current power imbalance between leaseholders and property service companies? What role does he see an industry regulator playing in driving up standards? What default tenure model should be used for future housing estates to reduce the incidences of these issues in the first place? I would also appreciate his views on my suggestion to move to a mandatory adoption model after development completion.