Rebecca Paul MP: speeches

Speeches

• 17 Jun 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill · Hansard source

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  I rise to speak against new clauses 1 and 20, and in support of new clause 106, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson). First, it is important for me to say that I fully support women’s reproductive rights. I think that we generally get the balance right here in the UK, and protecting that is a hill I would die on. However, I am disturbed by new clauses 1 and 20, which would decriminalise abortion up to birth. If they become law, fully developed babies up to term could be aborted by a woman with no consequences. The reason we criminalise late-term abortion is not about punishment; it is about protection. By providing a deterrent to such actions, we protect women. We protect them from trying to perform an abortion at home that is unsafe for them, and from coercive partners and family members who may push them to end late-term pregnancies. I have great respect for the hon. Member for Gower (Tonia Antoniazzi), who has tabled new clause 1. We share many of the same objectives on other topics, but in this case I think she is trying to solve a very real issue—the increased number of prosecutions—with the wrong solution. These amendments are driven by the case of Carla Foster, among others. Carla Foster is a mum who was prosecuted under UK law for carrying out an illegal abortion in May 2020, during the covid pandemic. She carried out the abortion at 32 to 34 weeks of pregnancy after receiving the relevant drugs through the pills-by-post scheme introduced during lockdown. This is a terrible case that harshly demonstrates the flaws with the current process, but the issue here is not the criminalisation of abortion after 24 weeks; it is the fact that Carla Foster was given the pills without checking how far along she was in the first place. She was failed by people here in Parliament who voted to allow those pills to be sent out by mail during lockdown without an in-person consultation. That was an irresponsible decision; and one that might have been forgiven in the light of a global pandemic if it had remained temporary. However, in March 2022 the scheme was made permanent. If we want to protect women from knowingly or unknowingly acquiring abortion pills after 24 weeks of pregnancy and inducing an abortion at home, we must put an end to the situation in which those pills can be acquired without a face-to-face consultation at which gestational age verification by medical professionals can take place. These drugs are dangerous if not used in the right way, as we saw when Stuart Worby spiked a pregnant woman’s drink with them, resulting in the miscarriage of her 15-week-old baby. Make no mistake: the pills-by-post scheme enabled that evil man and his female accomplice to commit that crime. It is also important to note that prior to the pills-by-post scheme, only three women had been convicted for an illegal abortion over the past 160 years, demonstrating the effectiveness of the safeguard. However, since that scheme was introduced—according to Jonathan Lord, who was medical director of Marie Stopes at the time—four women have appeared in court on similar charges within an eight-month period. Criminalisation of abortion after 24 weeks is not the problem; the pills-by-post scheme is. If new clause 1 passes while the pills-by-post scheme remains in place, here is what will happen. More women will attempt late-term abortions at home using abortion pills acquired over the phone, and some of those women will be harmed. Many of them will not have realised that they are actually going to deliver something that looks like a baby, not just some blood clots—that is going to cause huge trauma for them. Many of those women genuinely will not have realised how far along they are, due to implantation bleeding being mistaken for their last period, and on top of all of this, some of the babies will be alive on delivery. We in this place need to get away from this terrible habit of only considering issues through a middle-class lens. What about women who are being sexually exploited and trafficked? What about teenage girls who do not want their parents to find out that they are pregnant?

• 16 May 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

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  It is a privilege to speak in this place on such an important Bill. Having been part of the Committee that scrutinised it line by line, and, on some occasions, word by word, for several months earlier this year, it is a pleasure to see so many of my colleagues from Committee Room 10 present today—a reunion of sorts. I am here, as always, with the intention of improving the Bill, so that if it does indeed pass, vulnerable people are as protected as they can possibly be from unintended consequences. It is important to remember that on Report and Third Reading we are not voting on whether we agree with the principle of assisting someone to end their own life. Our role is to vote on the law in front of us—on whether the words on the page are clear and do what is intended, on whether the statutory process is safe, and ultimately on whether the provision of assisted dying benefits our community. I am not against assisted dying in principle, but I am against this Bill. I am happy to put it on the record now that I have no personal religious beliefs; I am against the Bill for the simple reason that it will harm far more people than it will help. The people who will be harmed are the most vulnerable in our communities, and I am not willing to accept that collateral damage. Today is important, because we have the opportunity to improve the safeguards in the Bill so that some of those groups are better protected. I urge Members to take that opportunity to the full. It requires very little skill to draft law that works for 90% of cases, but there is much skill in ensuring that the other 10% is catered for as well. I urge everyone to set the highest standards today and think about how we can ensure that those unordinary and unexpected cases are adequately protected, too. It really is life and death, so please do not accept anything that is not good enough.

• 6 May 2025 · Dedicated Schools Grant · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Butler. I draw attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I am pleased to respond to this important and thoughtful debate on behalf of the Opposition. I thank the hon. Member for Tewkesbury (Cameron Thomas) for securing it, and I completely agree with his remarks about the importance of teaching children in the home as well as the school. It is clear from all the contributions we have heard that, across all political divides, we share a desire to see all children, regardless of their location, their background or the complexity of their needs, accessing high-quality education in a setting that supports their potential. That vision depends heavily on fair and sufficient funding for our schools. As we have heard, the dedicated schools grant is at the heart of that. It would be appropriate, before turning to the concerns raised today, for me to briefly review the last Government’s principal achievements in this space, all of which have a bearing on any debate on the dedicated schools grant. Hon. Members will recall that it was a Conservative Government that took the step of reforming school funding through the introduction of the national funding formula, thereby ending the postcode lottery that, for too long, left similar schools receiving vastly different allocations. The national funding formula delivered greater transparency and a demonstrably fairer methodology, and drew a clearer line between the needs of pupils and the funding schools received. However, as the hon. Member for Tewkesbury set out, there are clearly still some disparities. It is right that we look at those and consider what can be done to address them. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s view on that. It was also a Conservative Government that increased core schools funding to record levels. Between 2010 and 2023, funding per pupil rose in real terms, with particular investment in the high needs block of the dedicated schools grant. In fact, by the final year of the previous Government, we had delivered a £10 billion increase in overall schools funding compared with 2019-20, including a £4 billion increase to the high needs budget, bringing total high needs funding to £10.5 billion in 2023-24. We backed that up with targeted support for pupils with SEND through capital investment focused on expanding special school places and improving facilities across the country. It was the Conservative party that took decisive action to address poor-quality provision, cracking down on unregistered settings and increasing the powers of local authorities and Ofsted to take action where provision fell short. Our approach was unambiguously vindicated, as England soared up the Programme for International Student Assessment league tables between 2009 and 2022 in maths, English and science. In that period, England went from 21st to seventh for maths, from 19th to ninth for reading, and from 11th to ninth for science. Moreover, in December 2023, children in England were named best in the west for reading, and in December 2024 they were ranked the best at maths in the western world in the 2023 TIMSS—trends in international mathematics and science study. Regrettably, where England has surged in international education rankings, Labour-led Wales has slumped. While England went from 21st to seventh in maths, Wales went from 29th to 27th. While England went from 19th to ninth for reading, Wales stayed 28th. While England went from 11th to ninth for science, Wales slumped from 21st to 29th. Ultimately, whether in England or Wales, there will always be more to do, as the hon. Member for Tewkesbury highlighted, but I can say without hesitation that the legacy left by the last Government on school funding and educational outcomes is overwhelmingly positive, based on a relentless focus on sustained investment and principled reform, and a clear commitment to inclusion. It is not just our record; it is the yardstick by which the current Government must be judged. Our position today is consistent with that record: we support fair funding, we support the principles behind the dedicated schools grant and we believe in the importance of local flexibility and accountability. We support the overarching aims of the SEND and alternative provision improvement plan, and the continuation of investment to support the transition to new national standards, but we also recognise the real pressures that local authorities and schools are facing. While funding has increased, so too has demand, and the current system is struggling to keep up. The number of pupils with an education, health and care plan has more than doubled in the last decade. Local authorities up and down the country—Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat alike—are grappling with high needs deficits, a growing wave of legal challenges and spiralling parental frustration. In my constituency, SEND makes up an ever-growing proportion of casework, and I hear every week from parents struggling to secure the provision that their child so desperately needs. It is little wonder that the Public Accounts Committee recently found that the current system risks creating a “lost generation” of children without intervention from central Government. The National Audit Office was equally blunt in its 2024 report on SEND provision, which made it clear that, without systemic reform, there will be systemic collapse. The crux of the matter is that, as of January 2024, approximately 1.9 million children and young people in England were identified has having special educational needs, with 1.7 million attending school. Despite the 58% real-terms increase over the last decade in high needs funding, which reached £10.7 billion in 2024-25, the system is not delivering improved outcomes for those children and young people. The financial strain that is placing local authorities under is deeply alarming. The NAO estimates that, by March 2026, 43% of local authorities will have deficits exceeding or close to their reserves, leading to a cumulative deficit between £4.3 billion and £4.9 billion. The situation is exacerbated by the impending end of accounting arrangements that currently prevent those deficits from impacting local authority reserves. Without a clear plan to manage the deficits, many councils risk issuing section 114 notices, effectively declaring bankruptcy. Demand for education, health and care plans has surged by 140% since 2015: the number of children with one reached 576,000 in 2024. That increase, coupled with long waiting times—only 50% of EHCPs were issued within the statutory 20-week target in 2023—has eroded confidence among families and children in the system’s ability to meet statutory and quality expectations. Sadly, at the very moment that clarity and support were most needed, the Education Secretary introduced the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill, which would do nothing less than destroy standards in English schools. No less serious are the broken promises on compensation for national insurance contributions, which have left schools in an impossible funding situation. It is reported that some schools face funding gaps of up to 35% for those additional NIC costs. That shortfall will only exacerbate existing financial pressures, forcing schools to divert funds from essential services, potentially leading to the loss of valued staff, reduced capacity to accommodate pupils with special needs and a generally lower standard of education provision. In summary, we are at a point where the Government are asking councils to maintain high-quality provision even as they manage large accumulated deficits, some exceeding £100 million, without knowing how or when those will be resolved. Schools have been asked to go further and faster on inclusion without the confidence that adequate support services will be in place to back them up. At the same time, parents are being asked to trust a system that all too often feels both overwhelming and overwhelmed. I want to put a number of questions to the Minister that reflect the concerns raised by Members, local authorities and professionals across the education sector. First, the Government have confirmed that they will continue funding local authorities through the dedicated schools grant for the foreseeable future, but what is the long-term plan for managing the high needs deficits that many councils have accrued? The safety valve programme and the delivering better value programme provide some support, but they are not available to every authority and they do not provide a long-term solution. Will the Minister confirm whether the dedicated schools grant will remain ringfenced beyond 2025? Will she guarantee that local authorities will not be forced to divert core council budgets to prop up SEND provision at the expense of other vital services? Secondly, on transparency and accountability, colleagues have spoken of the challenges that their local schools face in not just securing adequate funding but navigating a system that is complex, fragmented and adversarial. Parents are turning to tribunals in record numbers, while local authorities are caught between an ever-growing web of statutory duties and finite budgets with which to deliver them. What steps are the Government taking to reduce the number of SEND tribunals, and what support will be offered to schools to manage rising demand? Finally, I want to address the issue of place planning and capacity. One of the most frequent complaints we hear from local authorities is about the mismatch between need and availability, particularly in relation to specialist settings. This is not just about funding; it is about the ability to plan, build and adapt provision to changing demographics and trends. Will the Minister set out what work is being done to support local authorities in expanding specialist provision where it is most needed? How will the Department ensure that capital investment keeps pace with rising demand? What role does she see for the dedicated schools grant in ensuring that sufficient places are available for all? I will end my long list of questions by thanking the hon. Member for Tewkesbury for securing today’s debate. The dedicated schools grant is a critical part of how we deliver education in this country, but if it is to work as intended, particularly in relation to SEND, it must be fair, transparent and sustainable. I look forward to hearing from the Minister how the Government will make it so.

• 2 Apr 2025 · Universities: Funding and Employment · Hansard source

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  I am going to continue because of the time. On the concerns about the quality of some higher education provision, the Government have said they are considering changes to the regulation of franchise providers, some of which have been implicated in cases of poor-quality provision and potential fraud. Although I welcome the consultation launched by the Department for Education, I caution that many of the largest franchise providers are already regulated by the Office for Students, so the key question is not simply whether they are regulated, but how well the regulatory framework is working and whether it is actually driving up standards. Finally, we have heard Ministers speak in recent months about “tweaking” the role of the Office for Students to strengthen its focus on value for money. In September, the Department said that it was “developing options for legislative change,” and the Secretary of State has since re-announced that commitment, but as far as I can tell no tangible progress has been made. When will we actually see legislation brought forward? We have also heard mention of the Public Sector Fraud Authority being brought in, but that sounds remarkably similar to the Internal Audit Agency investigation mentioned in last year’s National Audit Office report. What is changing, exactly? Are we simply hearing the same announcement robed in new language? I conclude by emphasising that the largest losses to the taxpayer do not always come from outright criminal fraud, and can come from legally operating institutions that provide poor value. These providers operate within the letter of the law, but not within its spirit. They enrol students on low-value courses with high drop-out rates and weak earnings potential, while drawing down large sums from the student loan system—sums that in many cases will never be repaid. We cannot continue like this. Our goal should be a higher education system that is sustainable, high quality and genuinely life-changing. I look forward to continuing this discussion in the months ahead.

• 25 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It would be reassuring if that were the case because such data can be very useful. By making sure we get into the routine of providing it, it is there if we ever need it. Amendment 173 provides that any regulations under the clause must be made under the affirmative rather than the negative statutory instrument procedure. In the interests of using our time well, I will not repeat the arguments that were made last week on this. However, if amendment 539 is accepted, the Bill will again defer a lot to ministerial powers and non-binding guidance and codes of practice. Under the negative procedure, Parliament is reduced to watching rather than properly participating in the decision-making process.

• 12 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-second sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member. I would just clarify that currently there is no legal right for a family to provide information to the panel, which is part of the issue. I turn to my amendment (c) to new clause 21. New clause 21 includes provision that, among other things, the panel’s function is to determine whether it is satisfied that the person has capacity, that they have a clear, settled and informed wish to end their life, and that they have not been coerced or pressured. However, it is not entirely clear what “satisfied” means in the new clause. My amendment assumes that, as in a civil court, it means “on the balance of probabilities”. As I understand it, the leading case on the meaning of “satisfied” is a 1964 House of Lords case, in which the court held that “satisfied” meant “on the balance of probabilities”, rather than the tougher test of “beyond reasonable doubt”. In a later amendment, I will propose that we adopt that tougher standard, but this amendment assumes that the current wording will stand. My view, as we have already established in lengthy debate, is that the capacity bar is low, because the doctor need only be 51% sure. On the clear, settled and informed wish and coercion test, the standard is only “to the best of the doctor’s knowledge”, which is not a particularly high bar to meet. We are therefore applying a low bar to a low bar. That certainly leaves us with a highly accessible process, but I suggest that that is not a positive or safe thing. My amendment would bring in a further safeguard. As I have said several times, I would have preferred to see such safeguards in clauses 1 to 3, but as they were not accepted there, I am forced to propose them here, because it is better to have them than not. The amendment would give the panel the ability, if there is a “real risk” that the criteria have not been met, to pause and make further enquiries. They would not be obliged to give a decision that day, but would be obliged to look into the matter further, ask for more testimony, request more documents and consult experts. The real risk test is taken from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. Doctors will already be familiar with it, as they are already required under the Human Rights Act to assess when there is a real risk of suicide. It is not a strange novelty. The objection has been raised that introducing a real risk test to the doctors’ assessments would complicate matters, but the panel stage is a distinct stage with a distinct set of rules. I hope that the amendment will be seen not as introducing a complication but as filling a gap, particularly as this stage is meant to be more akin to a judicial stage. Difficult situations will not necessarily be as rare as we hope. On coercive control, those with decades of experience of working with the most vulnerable have warned us time and again what the Bill could mean. Jane Monckton-Smith, one of the leading academics in the area, has said: “Unless we do take this incredibly seriously, this Bill is going to be the worst thing, potentially, that we have ever done to domestic abuse victims.” The consultant clinical psychologist Sue Smith, who specialises in cancer and palliative care, has submitted written evidence from which I will quote at length, because it vividly brings out the scale of the risk of coercive or controlling behaviour: “In my clinical experience working with people who have cancer, a cancer diagnosis and treatment effects can amplify CCB…A woman asking for her needs to be seen and met alongside her increased physical and psychological vulnerability creates a change within the couple, which can lead to violent acts or CCB. The seriousness of the cancer diagnosis may be systematically and actively denied or minimised, claims can be made by the male partner that she is attention seeking, or she is accused of making up the effects of treatment, and can be left isolated and alone when in physical need, e.g. managing treatment effects like nausea or pain that restrict the ability to wash, dress and where she is reliant on others for help. At the same time a male partner may also state, ‘You are better off dead anyway,’ ‘Your children don’t care, and no one else in your life cares about whether you die.’ They may also threaten to leave. This pattern is extremely confusing, harmful and threatening. It continues over time, and a woman learns to doubt her reality and experience, and is extremely isolated. This can lead to heightened anxiety, hopelessness and helplessness, and abject despair, which can lead to a person wishing they were dead. The confidence and ability to know what one needs and wants is severely compromised when her reality is continually minimised or denied and will impact informed decision making.” We can hope that the existing safeguards will catch some of those cases, but they will not catch all cases, so my amendment would go a little way towards improving the safeguards. Amendment (a) to new clause 21 tries to pin down a missing detail, namely the standard by which the panel makes its decision. In a criminal trial, a jury is sent away to consider its verdict. The members of the jury know that they must be certain, beyond reasonable doubt, of the defendant’s guilt. It is not enough to think it likely on balance, nor is it enough that they have an opinion that they can justify with good reasons. It must meet a high threshold. Why is there such a high standard? Because we have to be sure about the decision, given the grave consequences. We are now considering a similar question: what is the right standard for a decision that will make the difference between life and death? I turn to subsections (2) and (6) of new clause 21. We are told that the panel must be satisfied that the eligibility criteria have been met. The word “satisfied” is doing a lot of heavy lifting in the Bill. If a question subsequently comes to court, as has happened in Belgium where there was a wrongful assisted suicide, we will be asking the court to rule on whether the panel should have been satisfied. That raises an obvious question, which my amendment is designed to answer: what does “satisfied” mean? I turn to a real-life example. In a famous case in Oregon, an elderly woman called Kate Cheney sought assisted suicide. She had a terminal cancer diagnosis; she also had dementia, so she was referred to a psychiatrist to establish whether she had capacity. She was accompanied to the appointment with the psychiatrist by her daughter Erika, who seemed extremely assertive about the assisted death. Kate Cheney denied that she was being pressured. However, the psychiatrist noticed that the daughter was coaching her mother. Referring to Kate, the psychiatrist wrote in his report: “She does not seem to be explicitly pushing for this.” He concluded that she did not have capacity to make the decision. The daughter was, in her own word, “incensed” that the psychiatrist was casting such a judgment on her mother. Kate applied for a second opinion and was assessed by a clinical psychologist. He found that Kate did have capacity, but he added that her “choices may be influenced by her family’s wishes, and her daughter, Erika, may be somewhat coercive”. Nevertheless, he gave the green light to the application and Kate received the go-ahead. I ask members of the Committee whether they would be satisfied that Kate Cheney was eligible for an assisted death. Are they confident that colleagues would share the same judgment about being satisfied? Can they be sure that every social worker, legal figure and psychiatrist would be satisfied in the same direction? After all, the psychiatrists in Oregon were divided on it. In written evidence, the most experienced clinicians have urged us to recognise that abuse is difficult to pick up. Sarah Grove, a consultant in palliative medicine, says: “Over my years in practice, I have witnessed families acting for financial gain and not in their loved one’s best interests but in this kind of situation, this has always been impossible to prove.” Dr Kathryn Myers, a retired palliative medicine consultant, says: “I have seen coercion in the contexts of decision-making around the best place of care for patients and of money and property. Perpetrators are usually family members…Occasionally it has been overt and easy to detect, for example, threatening or manipulative words or actions. Most frequently it has been very subtle, one might even say, gentle. It can take skilled clinical nurse specialists highly trained in communication skills and in detecting coercion, who know the person well and who have a relationship of trust with them, several conversations over several days if not weeks to uncover that coercion has occurred.” In such a case, with limited time, a panel may not be certain whether to give the green light to an application. That uncertainty will be even greater if it does not know what evidential standard to employ. My amendment would clarify that grey area. It would bring in a standard that has been tried and tested and is well understood. To be clear, “beyond reasonable doubt” merely means that the panel is sure. The courts have said that the two phrases are equivalent, as has the Judicial College in its guide to judges, “The Crown Court Compendium”: “What is required is a clear instruction to the jury that they have to be satisfied so that they are sure…if an advocate has referred to ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, the jury should be told that this means the same thing as being sure.” The Crown Prosecution Service says: “the magistrates or district judge in a magistrates’ court or the jury in a Crown Court must be sure that the defendant is guilty. Sometimes you’ll hear this described as ‘sure beyond a reasonable doubt’ or ‘satisfied so you are sure’. Importantly, the word “satisfied” by itself is not enough. Juries must be not just “satisfied”, but “satisfied so you are sure”. The wording in the amendment would be equally strong. It opts for “beyond reasonable doubt” because it is a better known phrase and more widely understood than “satisfied so you are sure”. I do not want to get too hung up on which of those phrases to use. The point is to adopt the tried and tested standard that has worked in the courts. We want the Bill to have the highest standards and to protect people. Amendment (a) to new clause 21 would help to achieve that. Members will all be delighted to know that I am moving on to the last amendment.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twentieth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. I rise to speak to my amendment 468 to clause 9, which would ensure that the assessing doctor must “ask the person why they are seeking an assisted death.” We have heard a lot in this Committee about the importance of the patient-doctor relationship. My hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley said that we should be “trusting in the judgment of clinicians, who know their patients well” –– [ Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 26 February 2025; c. 634.] He also said that patients “may want to speak to their GP because they have had a relationship with them over 30 or 40 years” –– [ Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 481.] It is therefore worth asking how the Bill shapes the patient-doctor relationship. The Bill asks doctors to do many things to and for patients. It asks doctors to consider whether to raise the subject of assisted suicide; personally, I wish we had agreed to the amendment that would have ensured that it was the patient who brought the subject up first, but we are where we are. The Bill asks doctors to explain the patient’s diagnosis and prognosis and to lay out options for treatment and palliative care, if there is any available; if there is not, the doctor can only state that point and move on. Nevertheless, we are asking the doctor to look into the matter and lay out possibilities. The Bill asks doctors to check for capacity and for coercion, to ascertain whether the patient has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life, to witness declarations and, eventually, to give the patient a substance and oversee the patient taking it. In other words, it makes doctors absolutely central to the process, as the facilitators of the process, as the people who accompany the patient and as the professionals with the biggest responsibility for ensuring that the safeguards are followed, yet it never asks doctors to make a simple but vital inquiry: why? That is all that my amendment would add. It would simply require the assessing doctors to ask the person why they are seeking an assisted death. I hope that the Committee will agree that that would be a reasonable and not overly burdensome change. Some hon. Members have suggested that certain amendments embroider the Bill too much, but in this case, the patient-doctor conversation is already embroidered. The Bill makes some very specific demands of the doctor as to what the conversation should cover. Surely it is only natural, amid all the conversations, for the doctor to take a moment—perhaps more than a moment, but a moment at the very least—to help the patient to talk through their reasons. This is a very vulnerable moment in somebody’s life. The simplest of questions can often unlock the most information. In some cases, for the small number who would benefit from the Bill, the answer would probably reassure the doctor, but for those others we worry about, the question would provide another important safeguard. It would be another opportunity to check that this really is in the best interests of the patient. How would the conversation go? I do not think that we can generalise. It might be the briefest exchange or it might lead to a really searching discussion. Doctors know how to take their cue from the patients in these things. Crucially, the doctor’s role is not just to offer advice or information. Even if the doctor says nothing, it may make all the difference for the patient to be able to speak aloud their concerns, their confusion and their hopes and fears. I absolutely accept that many doctors, if not most doctors, would ask the question why anyway, but given its importance, I still urge the Committee to set that out in the Bill. In doing so, we would be affirming that this is more than a bureaucratic exercise; it is about a person and about getting to the truth of what they want and need. I do not think we should not make the mistake of assuming that every doctor has the time, or will take the time, to have the in-depth conversations needed to really understand what is driving a patient’s request. It is up to us to make legislation that keeps standards high at all times. There is currently nothing in the Bill that will guarantee an in-depth conversation. I am afraid that not all doctors believe that that is even a likely outcome. In written evidence, the GP Edward Tulloch states: “To conduct the required assessments outlined in 7.2 and 8.2 of the Bill within a standard GP appointment (lasting 10-15 minutes) is completely unrealistic. It will require multiple appointments to properly carry out such detailed discussions and complete the associated legal paperwork.” We all know what pressure the NHS is currently under. Many of us cannot get a GP appointment. So, how certain are we that adequate time can be allocated to the assisted dying process to ensure the criteria are truly met? By putting the “why” question on the face of the Bill, my amendment would bring us closer to the possibility of real, serious and honest conversations about a patient’s reason for seeking an assisted death. That would be especially helpful for those who have just received a terminal diagnosis. We have received some important written evidence from six palliative care doctors, who state that “our experience is that many patients experience a period of adjustment to ‘bad news’ and may say that they cannot live under these conditions. However, after a period of reflection and adjustment, the majority come to find peace and value in their altered life circumstance, in a way they would not have believed possible.” The consultant psychiatrist Jennifer Bryden provides an especially interesting perspective, as someone who has seen this from both sides: “Having gone through several long episodes of illness, I now know that feeling entirely useless and a burden to everyone is a phase that will pass. For many people a terminal diagnosis will be their first time through the cycle and they will believe those thoughts represent reality. In coming to terms with a severe illness, depression is an expected phase and learning to accept all humans need each other takes time”. Dr Bryden goes on to say that the current cooling-off period is not enough time for people to come to terms with such a diagnosis. Clearly, people may need all the help they can get to understand their new situation. Asking the patient for their reasons is only the beginning of that process, but one that may help them come to terms with their situation and validate, or not, their initial inclination. Finally, asking why can identify those patients who are being coerced or pressured. Nobody should think that that is easy to spot. According to the charity SafeLives, which counters domestic abuse, it takes the average person who experiences violent abuse 2.3 years to access effective help. In the year before they finally get help, 85% of victims will have sought help of some kind from an average of five professionals. Often, sad to say, those who missed the signs will have been healthcare professionals. That is for physical abuse; psychological abuse will be far harder to spot. We cannot put in enough safeguards to ensure that doctors have all the tools they need and all the opportunities they can, to spot those signs.

• 10 Mar 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill · Hansard source

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  Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak, Madam Deputy Speaker. I want to thank Surrey police for all they do to keep us safe in Reigate and Banstead. I welcome much of what is in the Bill and I will not repeat what has already been said. Instead, I will focus my remarks on what I believe is required to tackle the scourge of commercial sexual exploitation in this country. It is easy for people to think that sexual exploitation does not affect them and that it does not happen in their neighbourhood, but it is more common than many realise. It is happening behind closed doors on very normal, everyday streets. Sexual exploitation, often of young women, is an awful crime that destroys lives before they have barely had a chance to begin. Exploited repeatedly, day in, day out, those young people are treated as merchandise, with the sole purpose of turning a profit for pimps and traffickers. It is incumbent upon us to break the business model, starting by outlawing the advertising of individuals for prostitution. Classified ad sites, like Vivastreet, are rife with it. They are the Etsy of sexual exploitation, fuelling sex trafficking by providing a convenient centralised platform for sex buyers to access what they want in their local area. Buying sexual services can be as easy as ordering a pizza. Although prostitution is legal, pimping, which is the provision of a prostitute to perform a sex act with a customer for gain, is not. There are often tell-tale signs on the adverts, like the same phone number being used for multiple ads, that the women are not acting freely and willingly, and that they are under the control of a pimp, who is profiting from their exploitation. Such sites have had years to get to grips with it, but still not enough is being done to weed out those adverts. However, we must take some responsibility too. Hon. Members will no doubt be staggered to hear that such advertising of prostitution is entirely legal, because legislation has not kept pace with technology. Advertising prostitution in a phone box is illegal under section 46 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, yet when the same advert is online, it is not illegal. That is utterly absurd. In 2023, the Home Affairs Committee cited evidence in its report on human trafficking that 75% of victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation are advertised online. The cross-party group concluded: "Websites advertising prostitution significantly facilitate trafficking for sexual exploitation.” I strongly urge Ministers to take this opportunity to close that loophole. There is a similar issue with the regulation of online pornography compared with offline pornography. Our current laws have not been updated quickly enough to recognise the huge shift online and the need to apply the same standards across the board. A survey by the Children’s Commissioner in November 2022 found that one in 10 children had seen pornography by the age of nine, with half having seen it before they turned 13. The impact of that travesty can be clearly seen, with 47% of young people between the ages of 16 and 21 stating that girls “expect” sex to involve aggression. Huge damage is being done to young women and men by this damaging content, which normalises and sexualises the choking and strangling of women during sex—illegal in offline pornography but not online pornography. Although not illegal per se, degrading acts, like spitting on women, are commonplace in online porn, so is it any wonder that we are seeing such disdain for and poor treatment of girls in our society? If we are serious about tackling the issue and halving violence against women and girls, we must crack down on online porn and ensure it is regulated to the same standards as that which is offline. The independent pornography review, led by Baroness Bertin, recommended that there be parity of regulation between online and offline pornography, which I very much welcome. The main statutory regulator of offline pornography is the British Board of Film Classification. It is responsible for classifying pornographic content before it can be published and ensuring it does not contain illegal content. Any such offline illegal content cannot be sold or supplied in the UK, and the same rule should apply online. That simple change could be transformational if effectively executed and properly enforced, although I recognise the technical and practical challenge of trying to regulate the worldwide web. I thank the Secretary of State for listening to my two asks. I look forward to hearing from her whether she is receptive to accepting amendments to ban online prostitution adverts, and to bringing the regulation of online pornography in line with that for offline pornography.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Seventeenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I very much appreciate the opportunity, Mr Dowd. I will attempt to be brief. First, I welcome the acceptance of amendment 414, in the name of the hon. Member for Ipswich; of amendment 108, in the name of the hon. Member for East Thanet; of amendment 275, in the name of the hon. Member for Sunderland Central; and of amendment 341, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham. The amendments strengthen the clause, so I thank Committee members for accepting them. I have one pertinent point to put on the record about clause 4. The clause deals with what is and is not included in the initial discussion with registered medical practitioners, so the definition of assisted dying, as well as what it actually is, becomes relevant to understanding what guidance does and does not come into play. During these proceedings, there has been a tendency to speak as if assisted dying were another type of treatment or healthcare option being offered by medical practitioners, rather than a completely different and separate offering. It has been said many times that assisted dying should be treated in the same way as any other treatment and that the existing guidance from the GMC sets out appropriate best practice and should applicable and relied on. I have some concerns about that, which I wish to put on the record. The legal norm, and GMC guidance, is that patients should be offered all reasonable medical treatments. A medical treatment can be defined as something that combats disease or disorder. It is fundamentally about healing, relief of symptoms, recovery and cure, so straightaway we have a conflict. Assisted dying ends the life of a person; it is not a treatment in the normal sense of the word. It is important that it is not a treatment, so that doctors are not obliged to offer it in the same way that they would offer another, more normal, medical treatment. The Association for Palliative Medicine’s written evidence covers the point: “A crucial question is whether or not assisted death by lethal medication is considered to be a medical treatment. Given that doctors are required to assess eligibility for, prescribe, and be present at the administration of the medication, AD might be considered to be a ‘medical treatment’. If this is the case then either assisted dying should be offered to all people meeting the eligibility criteria, or doctors need to behave differently towards this medical treatment than to all other treatments. Both of these approaches are contrary to all prior medical practice and public expectation, and laden with risks of unintended consequences. The APM recommends that if AD is implemented in England & Wales it is done outside of ‘usual medical practice’ and is not regarded as medical treatment.” This is because there are detrimental consequences from classifying assisted dying as treatment and relying on guidance. First, it could undermine the doctor-patient relationship by confusing the distinction between healing and ending life. Patients who are used to looking to their caregivers for help may worry that they will instead be put on a pathway to an assisted death. That could deter them from seeking medical help when they need it. Dr Jamilla Hussain spoke powerfully on that point, so I will not repeat it. Secondly, the word “treatment” currently has largely positive connotations. If the word starts to be used for assisted dying, its meaning will change entirely. I wonder about the intersection with other pieces of guidance and law that refer to treatment, for example where treatment can legally be given without the consent of the patient. We all agree that assisted dying should never be administered without consent, but that is why we must be careful with our language and definitions. In certain situations, treatment can lawfully be given without consent, so it must follow that, to protect against the risk of unintended consequences, assisted dying is not deemed to be a treatment. I ask the Minister’s view on that risk—I note that there is no reference in the Bill to assisted dying being a treatment, which is really good news—and his advice on how best to ensure that assisted dying is not and will never be considered a treatment as a consequence of the Bill or of any other statute or guidance. I also ask his view on the appropriateness of relying so heavily on GMC guidance for best practice, as I imagine that that guidance could change at any point without the consent of Parliament.

• 26 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to speak to my amendment 398. I recognise that much debate about capacity has already taken place, so I will do my best not to be too repetitive, but it is an important topic and I want to cover a few things. Fundamentally, I consider the bar for the capacity to make a decision to seek an assisted death to be far too low if, as we have already discussed, the approach currently proposed in the Bill is adopted. The Committee has received powerful written evidence that the Mental Capacity Act, as it stands, is not suitable for assisted dying. The Royal College of Psychiatrists says in its written evidence: “It is the RCPsych’s view that the MCA is not sufficient for the purposes of this Bill.” The former president of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, Baroness Hollins, says: “The Mental Capacity Act has proved very difficult to implement and doctors have not been found to be good judges of capacity.” The eating disorders expert Chelsea Roff says: “The MCA is not fit for purpose for determinations of capacity in life-ending decisions.” I do not think it is contentious to say that there should be a higher standard for ending one’s own life than for other courses of action. Baroness Hale has called the Mental Capacity Act threshold “not a demanding one.” The Royal College of Psychiatrists says in its written evidence: “While we are of the view that a person’s capacity to decide treatment can be reliably assessed, an assessment of a person’s mental capacity to decide to end their own life is an entirely different and more complex determination requiring a higher level of understanding.” Even if the Mental Capacity Act is working well in some other contexts, it does not necessarily translate well to assisted dying. Professor Gareth Owen told the Committee in oral evidence that although the Mental Capacity Act is quite reliable in current practice, “in areas of decision making where the decision itself is unsettled or conceptually much more profound or novel—I would suggest that the decision to end one’s own life has those characteristics—you cannot expect there to be such levels of reliability.” –– [ Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 239, Q303.] The Mental Capacity Act definition of capacity was not created with such a monumental decision with respect to assisted dying in mind. Although I note Chris Whitty’s recommendation that it is the starting point, I do not think it can be the end point. Further provisions are needed to ensure that it is fit for purpose, given the significance of the decision being made. Professor Owen said: “I have looked at mental capacity a lot in research, and there is no experience of the decision to end one’s own life. It is outside the experience of the Mental Capacity Act, the Court of Protection, the associated research and practitioners on the ground. The reference to the Mental Capacity Act in clause 3 puts you into an area where there is no experience of the central capacity question under consideration. It is very important that Parliament be clear-eyed about that.” –– [ Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 226, Q287.] Dr Sarah Hooper, a retired oncologist, says that “the patient in question may undoubtedly have ‘capacity’ for most important decisions. However, in the early days after a cancer diagnosis their ability to make clear judgements is nevertheless likely to be impacted. This kind of decision (for assisted suicide), once acted upon, is plainly irreversible. It is a very bad time to make that kind of decision.” It is true that the Mental Capacity Act is used for decisions to stop life-sustaining treatment, but, as Professor Owen said, we should not simply equate that with assisted dying. As he pointed out: “One is a refusal; one is a request. One is traditionally considered to be about bodily integrity—it is the so-called shield of the person, or the patient, against the intervention on the body that is being made by the medical profession. You are giving the patient an important right, which is a shield-like right. That contrasts with a request for assisted dying, which is a request. You are involving other people in an act that is an act of ending one’s life. That is not something that the medical profession has been comfortable with, going back thousands of years.” –– [ Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 236, Q288.] I also draw attention to a great deal of written evidence making the point that the current Mental Capacity Act is not as well understood by medical practitioners as we hope or expect. Alexander Elphinston, a retired solicitor, says, “from my experience doctors and other medical practitioners often applied the test of mental (in)capacity incorrectly.” Victoria Wheatley, a palliative medicine consultant, says, “I have observed a tendency to overestimate a person’s mental capacity in the absence of obvious features to the contrary.” Alan Thomas, a professor of old age psychiatry at Newcastle University, says: “The preferences of the assessor bias the capacity decision towards the assessor’s preference.” I will move on to the specific issues with the current definition of people who lack capacity under the Mental Capacity Act when applied to assisted dying, all of which my amendment 398 attempts to address. Part of my amendment does exactly the same as amendment 322, tabled and already eloquently spoken to by the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, so I will be brief on those overlapping bits. Under the Mental Capacity Act, there is a starting presumption of capacity. That is too lax a standard, as the Royal College of Psychiatrists says in written evidence. I quote: “The presumption of capacity may be problematic in the context” of assisted dying, given that the consequence would be the person’s death. This is literally a matter of life and death, and the presumption of capacity must not apply; the work must be done to assess capacity properly and thoroughly. Professor Preston said during the evidence session: “I think the aim is to have that bit of extra concern, so that we do not presume capacity, but instead almost presume that there is not capacity.” –– [ Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 241, Q307.] I think those are wise words, and my amendment and amendment 322 seek to give that protection. Both amendments also disapply section 1(3) of the Mental Capacity Act on helping a person to make a decision. The hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford has already made his point powerfully about that, so I will not add anything further. There are some differences where my amendment 398 goes further than amendment 322. First, given the uniqueness and irreversibility of the decision, there should also be a higher threshold of probability. As it stands, a person should be treated as having capacity if that is more likely than not, which is sometimes referred to as the “51% sure” approach. It would be much safer if doctors and judges had to establish beyond reasonable doubt that an applicant has capacity, given the significance of the decision. In my view, 51% sure is just not good enough for such a monumental decision, and amending this part of the Bill would ensure a more rigorous and comprehensive assessment. Secondly—for me, this is one of the biggest issues with the current approach—the Mental Capacity Act requires an impairment of, or a disturbance to, the mind or brain for someone to be considered not to have capacity, irrespective of whether they can make a decision. Under the Bill currently, even if someone cannot understand, retain or use the information to make a decision—they cannot communicate that decision—they will still be deemed capacitous in the absence of an impairment, or a disturbance, of the mind or brain. In the real world, a doctor could assess a patient who gives the impression of being confused, illogical, erratic or inconsistent—everything about them could scream that they are not in a good place to make the decision—but they will still be considered to have capacity if there is no identifiable impairment of, or disturbance in, the function of the mind or brain at that point in time. That potentially puts those with depression, anxiety, learning disabilities or eating disorders, or even those in physical pain, in danger of being considered capacitous. In oral evidence, Professor Alex Ruck Keene said, “If I doubt that you have capacity to make the decision to take your own life, or end your life, but I cannot prove it, is it logical or are we required to proceed on the basis that you do?...In other words, I think you cannot understand the information, but I cannot prove the reason that you cannot understand it is that you have an impairment or disturbance.” –– [ Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 90, Q120.] According to his written evidence to the Committee, this means that someone could be approved for assisted dying even if they did not understand the relevant information, as long as they do not have an identifiable impairment of, or disturbance in, the mind or brain. He wrote, “the Committee may well feel that it would be problematic that such a person should be considered to be eligible for the receipt of assistance in dying.” In a letter to the hon. Member for Richmond Park, Professor Alex Ruck Keene KC said, “no matter how intensive the scrutiny of the person’s capacity, this would not address the issue of the situation where the person appears not to be able to understand, retain, use and weigh the relevant information but that is not caused by an impairment of, or disturbance in, the functioning of their mind or brain.” That is why my amendment seeks to remove this diagnostic element, so that section 2(1) of the Mental Capacity Act for the purposes of this Bill only would read as, “a person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if at the material time he is unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter.” That would provide better protections for this life and death decision, and I hope it addresses the issue raised so powerfully by Professor Alex Ruck Keene KC. As I close, I would like to make reference to amendment 49, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, which sets out starkly the deficiencies of the current capacity test if it remains unamended for the purposes of this Bill. If autonomy is what counts, and we are using the Mental Capacity Act as gatekeeper for assisted death, then the Bill in its current form means that: a person is assumed to have a capacity as a starting point; a clinician only needs to be just over 50% sure that a person has capacity; unwise decision making is not taken into account in determining capacity; and supported decision making is acceptable—for example, for those with learning disabilities. I ask the Committee members whether they are comfortable with that. If not, then as a minimum, amendment 322 should be accepted, but ideally my amendment 398 should also be, as it goes even further to increase the threshold for capacity and it addresses the significant issue with the diagnostic leg of the test. I am pleased to say that Baroness Finlay, who established and chaired the National Mental Capacity Forum, supports my amendment. Unlike the current drafting of the Bill, my amendment requires that a person is not assumed to have capacity in the first instance. It requires capacity to be proven beyond reasonable doubt, that unwise decision making is considered in assessing, and that a person is not helped to make a decision. I hope the Committee will support it.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Lady for raising that point. I think that what has been looked at is the number of unassisted suicides. The hon. Lady makes the good point that obviously we need to look at all the different factors that could be part of that, but I am just making the point that when we look at territories that have introduced assisted dying, we find that at the point at which it is introduced, we generally see, in most territories, an increase in unassisted suicide. I do not think that we should rush to disregard that. We need to recognise that in helping a small group of people at the end of their life, which undoubtedly this Bill will do, there will be a price to be paid. That price will be paid by our young people and other vulnerable groups. I will not vote in favour of clause 1—I do not think that there will be a Division on it anyway—but I will not oppose it either, for the reasons that my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire set out. I understand that it is the key clause in order for us to progress and continue the debate, which is what Parliament wishes us to do, but I hope that the Committee will be more receptive to improving the safeguards as we progress through the Bill. The amendments really were tabled in good faith. We did our best to write them in a clear way, but obviously the private Member’s Bill process makes that more difficult. This is not a Government Bill, but we are all doing the best we can to table amendments that would improve the safety of the Bill.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Under our current law, assisting someone to commit suicide is a criminal act. Clause 1 of this Bill is where we cross the Rubicon, moving away from well-established principles into a new era in which the state is empowered to help individuals to die. This monumental decision is one for Parliament in the coming months. However, what we must do on this Committee is bolster the safeguards so that the Bill is truly as safe as it can be. Our priority must always be the vulnerable: those who could be coerced into something that is not in their best interests, and those with no one to advocate for them or protect them, who could end upbeing pushed into a process because that is the easiest and cheapest option for everyone. This law must work for everyone, not just the privileged few. That is why I am so disappointed that at the end of nearly three days of debate, there has been not one improvement to the safeguards—not one. We asked for amendments to exclude people with impaired judgment and the depressed and suicidal; this Committee said no. We asked to protect those who are unduly influenced or encouraged by others to seek assisted dying—

• 6 Feb 2025 · Financial Education · Hansard source

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  I warmly congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham (Jerome Mayhew) on securing this important debate, and I commend him for his sustained efforts to drive up the quality and availability of financial education offered to our young people. There is sometimes a tendency in this House—perhaps an understandable one—to gravitate towards short-termism. It is therefore a sincere pleasure to follow my hon. Friend, who, along with his colleagues in the all-party parliamentary group on financial education for young people, has been doing such excellent work to promote reforms that take a longer view and are geared towards boosting the life chances of future generations. Good financial education, delivered not only by schools, but by parents and families and within communities, has the potential to produce a generation wise to the dangers of credit card debt, alert to the practices of predatory payday lenders, and confident in their ability to open a bank account and budget appropriately. I believe that all of us in this place are truly committed to reducing inequality and ensuring that everyone has the best possible start in life, and I can think of few better ideas than ensuring that all young people enter adulthood with a sound grasp of how to manage their money. The British public seem to share that assessment. A research survey of UK adults conducted by Santander revealed that a full 70% felt that better financial education in their younger years would have improved their ability to manage their finances through the ongoing cost of living crisis. Meanwhile, two thirds of young people believe that a lack of financial education has played a role in them amassing the debts that they hold. Indeed, it is not just adults but children who are deeply concerned about financial matters. The London Institute of Banking and Finance reported in 2023 that 68% of children worry about money and their personal finances. That figure is hardly surprising when we consider that today’s children are the most digitally exposed in history; they face a constant barrage of offers to spend money in alluring but wasteful ways. Many of the apps downloaded on to the phones that our children spend so much time on are full of shining icons, inviting them to spend real-world money, with the tap of a finger, in exchange for worthless in-game currencies. Young players of online games are prompted to spend, in some cases, hundreds of pounds on loot boxes or so-called cosmetic items—that is, a virtual in-game weapon, or an outfit that is a slightly different colour from the default option. Financial literacy is clearly a skill that our children and young people need, to protect them and prepare them for the future. Although there is undoubtedly still work to be done, I briefly draw the House’s attention to the solid foundations laid by successive Conservative Governments over the past 14 years. After all, the Conservatives left England as one of the top-performing countries in education. Under the Conservative Government, children in England were named the best in the west for reading, and were ranked best at maths in the western world in the 2023 TIMSS—trends in international mathematics and science study. It was a Conservative Government who created the national network of 40 maths hubs to support schools in improving their mathematics teaching. That network is a partnership between schools, colleges and other organisations that work together to provide support for maths teaching in their regions. The positive impact of those hubs on young people’s ability to manage and understand money and finance is obvious. We were clear that we intended to go further: at the last election, we set out a comprehensive plan to ensure that every child studied maths to the age of 18, so that they would leave school with good numeracy skills. That would help them to navigate their finances with confidence. That is not to suggest that the entire burden of providing robust financial education can or should fall upon our schools. As is so often the case, families also have a central role to play in ensuring that children are imbued with good financial common sense. That does not need to be overly complex; simple measures, such as offering children small amounts of weekly pocket money, can help to normalise good habits such as saving and thinking carefully before making purchases. According to an ING survey of 12,000 parents across Europe, giving children pocket money reduces the risk of them getting into debt as adults.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Would it be fair to say that you would need to know fairly quickly whether or not it would be provided through the NHS for planning purposes? Professor Whitty: That is a key question, and to me that does seem something that Parliament may want to debate. That is not a question for us, but it is a point of principle one way or the other.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q My questions are to Alex Ruck Keene. Thank you for your written evidence, which I read with great interest. I have two questions for you. This follows on nicely from the discussion we have just had. Is there any risk that if the terminal illness definition were to remain in the Bill, it could be challenged under the European convention on human rights? My second question, which is completely different—just to mix it up—is on a really interesting point in your written statement about how we need to give consideration to the national suicide prevention strategy. I found that really interesting, because the Bill potentially turns on its head the way we view suicide, and obviously we have been sending a certain message out there, particularly to our young people. Could you elaborate on the point you were making in your written evidence to the Committee? Alex Ruck Keene: Gosh—yes. There is absolutely no way that you can stop people trying to challenge whatever Act is passed; there is no way you can stop people seeking to challenge that under the ECHR. We then get into this enormous argument about whether it is inevitably discriminatory. Courts to date have been very clear: “We are not going to get into this; it is for Parliament to decide whether to make assisted dying legal.” Once it is made legal for some people, but not for others, there is a difference in treatment. Whether it is discriminatory, and therefore contrary to articles 8 and 14 of the EHCR, depends on whether that difference is justified. I am trying to be very careful in my language, because I try to do that. The Bill Committee and Parliament need to be very clear how, if you are going to limit this to a cohort of people—I feel acutely conscious that I am sitting next to somebody who would be excluded—it could be explained to somebody that they are not eligible and that there is a difference in treatment but it is perfectly justified. If you cannot do that, it will be discrimination. The courts have been very clear that you do not have to have a system, but if you are going to have one—for example for social security benefits—then you need to have one that is non-discriminatory. That is the answer I can give to that. The one thing I can say is that you cannot stop lawyers trying to challenge. That is what they will do. Sir Nicholas Mostyn: All laws discriminate; 69 mph is not an offence but 71 mph is. All laws discriminate. The question is whether it is justifiable. Sir Max Hill: It is also a question of providing legal certainty, which is why the definitions in the Bill are so important. Provided that it is articulated clearly and within what the European Court so often calls the margin of appreciation, which it gives to sovereign states, then although I agree with Alex that a challenge may be possible, I cannot see a successful challenge to the Bill if it is drawn with the sorts of provisions we have here. Indeed, we have not seen local nation state examples of this sort being struck down by the European Court elsewhere in Europe, so I think it is very unlikely that we would see such a strike-down here. Alex Ruck Keene: I really hate to get into it with such eminent lawyers, but there has not been a case in Strasbourg seeking to say that a limited class of case is discriminatory, so we just do not know. Sir Nicholas Mostyn: I agree with that. I have changed my mind twice about this subject. Alex Ruck Keene: Do you mind if I quickly touch on something else?

• 9 Jan 2025 · Violence against Women and Girls · Hansard source

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  I thank my right hon. Friend for that intervention, and I completely concur. The fact that our laws have not been extended in this way demonstrates that they have not kept up with our ever-changing world. I therefore call on the Government to ensure that online pornographic content is held to the same standards as offline pornographic content. Lastly, I thank the all-party parliamentary group on commercial sexual exploitation for its groundbreaking inquiry into pornography during the last parliamentary term. That APPG has shone a light on this important issue, and has not shied away from harsh truths. We cannot end the epidemic of male violence against women and girls in this country without recognising and confronting the role that harmful online pornography is playing. Enough is enough. If everyone in this House cares about women and girls—and our boys too, because this is bad for them as well—it is time to take action and ensure that online content is properly regulated.