Rebecca Paul MP: speeches

Speeches

• 15 Jun 2026 · Social Media Ban for Under-16s · Hansard source

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  I really welcome this restriction on social media for children. As a mother, I am grateful for it, and I am grateful to everyone across the House who has pushed for it. As others have alluded to, there will clearly be practical issues and difficulties with implementation, and we all need to work together to address that, but one thing I would like to understand from the Secretary of State is what consideration has been given to enforcement through the device, as opposed to age verification by social media providers.

• 3 Jun 2026 · Seasonal Hospitality Businesses in Coastal Areas · Hansard source

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  I agree with the hon. Gentleman, as I often do. Hospitality businesses are valued employers, community anchors and, for many young people, the first step on the career ladder. I think we all agree that such businesses should be supported right across the country—a point that the hon. Gentleman just eloquently made—but that support especially matters in coastal areas, as has been highlighted so clearly. The first point I want to make is that seasonal hospitality is, by definition, seasonal. That may sound obvious, but from studying the Government’s approach to employment regulation, one sometimes wonders whether Ministers have grasped it. A seaside café does not have the same staffing needs on a wet Tuesday in January as it does on an August bank holiday. A hotel in a resort town cannot pretend that February occupancy and summer occupancy are the same thing. This sector hinges on the weather, the school holidays, domestic tourism and the reality that coastal footfall rises and falls sharply across the year. When Ministers push forward employment laws that make flexible and seasonal working harder, they are striking at the operating model that has sustained the coastal hospitality sector for generations. The Employment Rights Act 2025’s approach to guaranteed hours puts seasonal employers in an impossible position. The Opposition have warned the Government of this, which is why a future Conservative Government would repeal every job-destroying, anti-business, anti-growth measure in the Act as a matter of urgency. Additionally, the Government’s national insurance rise has made it more expensive to employ people. The threshold has fallen, the rate has risen and labour-intensive businesses, especially hospitality, have been hit particularly hard. At the same time, business rate relief for retail, hospitality and leisure was cut from 75% to 40%, and it is next set to end entirely. For seasonal businesses of all types, that is a brutal combination. Tragically, and infuriatingly, I know that many will not survive it. The truth is simple: this Government are hammering hospitality left, right and centre, with higher employer national insurance, higher business rates, more regulation, more risk and more costs piled on to the very businesses they claim to support. Ministers say they want growth, but their policies are doing the opposite. Businesses are closing. Pubs that have stood at the heart of their communities for generations are wondering how much longer they can last. Cafés and restaurants are looking at the bills landing on their doormats and asking whether they can afford to open their doors at all. However, there is a better way. This Government could adopt our policy of taking 250,000 high street businesses, including pubs and hospitality businesses, out of business rates entirely. That would make an immediate difference—for many, it would be the difference between thriving or closing up for good. We would also repeal the family business tax, because family firms should be able to last across generations, rather than being bled dry by the Government when one generation tries to pass a business on to the next. I will be visiting the Isle of Wight myself later in the summer for my friend’s wedding at Osborne House, which I know will be the wedding of the year. My friend has deep ties to the communities there, and she has told me much about the brilliant local businesses—from the Gossips Café in Yarmouth to traditional rural pubs such as the Horse and Groom and the Chequers Inn, whose owner, Mark Holmes, has been commendably vocal in calling for more support so that pubs can survive. These are exactly the sorts of unique places that give coastal and island communities their character.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I begin by echoing the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. I completely understand why the Government have brought this clause forward. I welcome the debate. Similar to the hon. Member for Chichester, who spoke so eloquently, I was deeply moved by the evidence we heard from Claire Throssell. I cannot even imagine how she has coped. To do what she has done and to try to take something positive from that is an incredible thing. The evidence this Committee has heard from those witnesses and other survivors of domestic abuse is that they feel that the family courts have not properly identified risk and believe that a pro-contact culture has, at times, overridden safety. That is extremely concerning, and it is absolutely right that we take it extremely seriously. Child safety must come first. Where the present framework has contributed to poor outcomes, it is right that the Government act, but it is also incumbent on us today to make sure that the clause that is being repealed is indeed the cause of the harm to those children. I also make the point that, where Parliament removes an existing statutory principle, it has a duty to be clear about what will replace it. My concern today is less with the Government’s objective than with whether repeal on its own is sufficiently precise, evidence based and thought through to achieve the Ministers’ intended objective. The Government’s own impact assessment, which has already been set out, says that “repeal alone is unlikely to materially change outcomes”, even though it is expected to “change the process judges follow”. That is an important starting point for this debate. It is really important that we do not make changes to law because everyone wants us to make those changes and thinks that will improve things when, in reality, we have the evidence and facts to know that it may not deliver those outcomes. It is incumbent on all of us to make sure that we actually deliver the outcomes that we all desire; we all have the same ambition. I know this comes from a good place and we are all approaching this debate in the best way we can to protect children. My purpose this afternoon is to be constructive—I am not saying I have all the answers on this, and I hope my comments will be taken in that spirit. If the Government proceed with repeal, do they also need to do more to provide a principles replacement framework, clearer guidance and stronger supporting reforms? It is important to start with the facts around the presumption. The current presumption does not give any parent an automatic right to contact, override the welfare checklist or override the paramountcy principle in section 1 of the Children Act 1989, and it certainly does not require courts to make orders that place children at risk. The Family Services Foundation is clear in its written evidence that current law already places the child’s welfare first, stating: “Section 1(6)…expressly ensures the presumption applies” only where parental involvement “does not put the child at risk of suffering harm”. It says that practice direction 12J and the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 already provide an important framework for identifying and responding to abuse in family proceedings. Equally, I recognise the contrary concern expressed by survivors who say that, in abuse cases, the presumption can place pressure on courts to prioritise parental contact even where there are serious safety concerns and can make it harder for victims to be properly heard and protected. The real question is therefore not whether safety matters more than contact—it plainly does—but whether removing the current presumption will improve how risk is identified and acted upon, or whether it risks creating new uncertainty while leaving the deeper operational problems untouched and discouraging parental involvement in cases where it would actually be beneficial. There are already substantial protections in the current legal framework, although they clearly fail in the worst way on occasion. The Family Services Foundation points out that the Children Act 1989, practice direction 12J and the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 already equip the courts to restrict or refuse contact where “harm is shown”. It also reminds us that the UK is bound by the UN convention on the rights of the child, including article 9, which recognises that children should maintain regular contact with both parents unless that is “contrary to the child’s best interests”. Both Parents Matter makes a similar point, saying: “The Presumption was introduced in 2014” to reflect the UNCRC and provide a statutory benchmark that the safe involvement of both parents generally furthers child welfare. I emphasise the word “safe”—no one has ever said that parents should be involved if it is not safe. I make those points not to argue that nothing should change. If the Government are minded to proceed, we need a clear understanding of how the replacement framework will continue to distinguish between safe parental involvement, which can be beneficial, and unsafe parental involvement, which must be stopped. At present, I am not sure the Bill by itself gives enough reassurance on that point, and I am worried that safe parental contact will be discouraged. That leads to one of the most important points of all. The Government’s own documents suggest that repeal alone may not be the solution that they are hoping it will be. As mentioned earlier, the impact assessment says, “repeal alone is unlikely to materially change outcomes”, although it is expected to change the process that judges follow. That is a significant admission. It suggests that if the Government want safer and better outcomes in family proceedings, repeal can be only part of the picture, and perhaps not the decisive part. We should keep in mind that many of the awful failures that have rightly horrified people seem to be failures of risk assessment, information sharing, institutional practice, professional judgment and resourcing. The Centre for Policy Research on Men and Boys puts it well: “If abusive contact is being ordered or preserved inappropriately, then the concern lies with the quality of risk assessment, the speed and fairness of investigation, and the consistency with which courts and agencies apply the law.” That is a useful and constructive way of putting the point. It does not deny the seriousness of the problem, but it does ask whether the solution is the right one. My concern is not that the Government want to strengthen protection; it is that repeal may be presented as more self-sufficient than, on the basis of the evidence, it really is. I also think the Committee should be careful and candid about the strength of the evidence base behind repeal. Both Parents Matter says that the Government’s own review “provided limited and inconclusive evidence of the impact of the Presumption. It could not determine how often the Presumption was applied in judgments, nor could it assess how harm…related to the application of the Presumption.” It also criticises the underlying methodology: “Quantitative analysis was based on only 245 court judgments, with over half from a single magistrates’ bench. Qualitative analysis involved only 29 parents.” It added that the literature review “examined only 55 studies, excluded all research published after April 2024,” and omitted “major studies showing positive outcomes” from safe shared parenting and ongoing parental involvement. Other evidence goes further, arguing that the Government review appears to have misunderstood or overstated the conclusions to be drawn from Professor Anja Steinbach’s work. I recall a striking line from Professor Steinbach, who said: “There is plenty of research showing that contact with both parents is beneficial”, and “except for violence…contact with both parents is the baseline.” I do not think that material should make the Committee cautious about treating the review as a fully settled or exhausted evidential platform for repeal. Again, my point is not that that means that repeal must not happen; it is that we should not over-claim what the existing evidence can prove or support. I also think it is important to avoid turning this into a false choice between protecting children from abuse and supporting children to maintain safe relationships with both parents. The Centre for Policy Research on Men and Boys says that the public debate often frames the issue in that way. However, it says: “A good family justice system must do both. It must protect children and adult victims from abusive parents. It must also protect children from the avoidable loss of safe, loving, and important parental relationships.” I think that is right. The Family Services Foundation similarly said: “reform should focus on enhancing the protections available, rather than creating conditions that may inadvertently prevent children from maintaining safe, meaningful relationships with their parents.” That is why I urge the Minister not to present clause 17 as though all principled concern about repeal is somehow concern for parental rights over child safety. It is perfectly possible to support the Government’s child safety objective while asking whether the law should continue to recognise some clear and carefully framed way, where there is no established risk of harm, of enabling children to benefit from stable and safe relationships with both parents. Several of the written submissions that we received raise concerns about unintended consequences if repeal proceeds without a clear replacement framework. Both Parents Matter warns: “Removing this important statutory benchmark, and relying instead on practice and non statutory frameworks” may increase uncertainty, inconsistency and conflict. The Family Services Foundation says something similar, warning that repeal may confuse frontline professionals, affect negotiations outside court, reduce the incentive for out-of-court resolution and, ultimately, increase strain on a family court system that is already under pressure. It notes that only a minority of separated families ever come before the courts, but many more families and professionals orient their expectations around the legal framework. That is a serious point. Even if the court’s paramount consideration remains unchanged, removing a statutory starting point may still alter behaviour before a case ever reaches a final hearing. It may affect how solicitors advise, how CAFCASS frames disputes, how mediation is approached and how parents negotiate. With that point in mind, I hope that the Minister might be in a position to share some more detail on how she expects the changes to operate, and why she is confident that they will improve outcomes rather than simply shift conflict elsewhere.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  One thing I have increasingly noticed, particularly in high-profile cases, is that people live-tweet, setting out exactly what is going on. That is another thing to bear in mind. I very much welcome the progress that the Minister has set out, but in the world of social media it is important that people, and particularly victims, can get an accurate transcript as easily as possible, especially if something inaccurate has been tweeted out.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Jardine. As the Committee has likely anticipated, I will argue that clause 3 should not stand part of the Bill. Clause 3 is the heart of the Government’s constitutional gamble. It creates a wholly new general rule for trial on indictment without a jury in a substantial category of criminal cases. Under the clause, a defendant charged with an either-way offence who has pleaded not guilty will lose the right to be tried by a jury unless the court considers that, on conviction, they would be likely to receive a sentence of more than three years’ imprisonment. It also allows reallocation later if the case changes, says that there is no right of appeal against allocation or reallocation, permits some decisions to be made without a hearing, and still allows a judge sitting alone to impose a sentence of more than three years. The Government continue to maintain that this change is necessary to reduce the Crown court backlog and reserve jury trials for the most serious cases. I note, though, that the very good House of Commons Library briefing points out that these provisions are based only in part on Leveson, and contain material differences from that which he recommended. Sir Brian proposed restricting, not abolishing, the right to elect, he did not propose the same increase in magistrates’ sentencing powers, and the Government’s model is more aggressive than the one on which much of the original discussion was based. JUSTICE makes the same point directly in its written evidence. It says that the Bill goes further than the review by removing the right to elect entirely, replacing the full rehearing appeal from the magistrates court with a permission stage, allowing the extension of magistrates’ custodial powers to 18 or 24 months, and introducing judge-only trials for either-way cases with likely sentences of three years or less. I say that at the outset because I am keen to avoid the suggestion that the Bill amounts to the Government reluctantly implementing a difficult but expert-led recommendation. That is simply not the case in clause 3. In fact, we are dealing with a discretionary political choice to legislate in a way that is broader, harder and less cautious than many of the evidence-based alternatives that are already on the table. As the Law Society put it: “Clauses 1 to 7 represent radical changes to criminal procedure without convincing evidence that they will improve efficiency.” The Bar Council says: “Radical changes to the availability of jury trials…are unnecessary and will consume resources without bearing down on the backlog.” That is the proper context in which clause 3 should be considered. As much for my own clarity as for the benefit of the Committee, I would like to dedicate a limited amount of time to clarifying what the clause actually does. It inserts into the Senior Courts Act 1981 proposed new sections 74A to 74D, which create a mechanism under which, in a very wide category of cases, the court must decide at the outset whether a defendant will be tried by a jury or by a single judge alone. The central test is the threshold sentence: whether the defendant, if convicted, would be likely to receive more than three years’ imprisonment or detention. If the likely sentence is above that threshold, the defendant gets a jury; if not, the default is a judge-alone trial in what the Government and stakeholders have described as the Crown court bench division, although that phrase is not used in the Bill itself. This is about not a tiny number of trivial cases but a structural redesign of the Crown court’s work. According to the Government’s own modelling, about 14,000 cases would continue arriving at the Crown court in 2028-29 and would require a trial, of which approximately 4,000 are expected to be heard by a judge alone, rather than a jury. The package is said to reduce Crown court sitting day demand by 27,000 days a year while increasing magistrates court sitting day demand by 8,500. Even if one accepts every assumption behind those figures—many serious people do not—they demonstrate that this is a major transfer of work and power. The offences within scope are not, as has sometimes been implied, confined to the sort of minor petty theft case used in media briefings. The written evidence from JUSTICE makes that point bluntly. Clause 3 would cover a huge number of either-way offences, including “sexual offences, sexual abuse of children, stalking, fraud offences, violence against the person offences and theft offences.” JUSTICE offers a chilling practical illustration with this observation: “Most of the postmasters wrongly convicted in the Horizon scandal received a sentence under three years.” That point ought to give the Committee serious pause. We are being asked to remove jury trial for the types of case in which miscarriages of justice have historically occurred. The centrepiece of clause 3 is the idea that a court can safely determine, at an early stage, whether a defendant is likely to receive more than three years if convicted, and that that prediction is a just and adequate basis for deciding whether the defendant gets a jury at all. I do not accept that. More importantly, the Bill itself does not truly accept it either. The Commons Library briefing I referenced earlier notes this contradiction plainly: “While cases that are less likely to result in a sentence of more than three years would be allocated for trial by a judge alone, the judge could still pass a custodial sentence of more than three years.” In other words, the very legislation that uses the three-year threshold as the decisive basis for removing jury trials simultaneously recognises that the threshold may not map on to the final seriousness of the case at all. The initial allocation may say that the case is not serious enough for a jury, yet the final outcome may be serious enough for more than three years in prison. If that is not an admission that the threshold is an unstable and unsafe proxy, I do not know what is. Does that not cut to the most basic but most profound concern about this Bill—that it just is not fair? If the threshold cannot reliably distinguish the cases that merit a jury from those that do not, the clause is not preserving jury trial for the most serious cases. It is rationing jury trial on the basis of an impressionistic and sometimes speculative sentence prediction. The written evidence from the London School of Economics says exactly that, stating that the three-year threshold “is a poor metric for determining the right trial procedure” and that if jury trial is a “cornerstone protection against the state”, alternative measures ought to be exhausted first. We cannot properly predict a sentence at the plea and trial preparation hearing, and in the context of clause 3, that is a problem. If the allocation decision is to be made at the hearing, the notion that a judge can decide the likely sentence then and there is, in many cases, unrealistic and, at the extreme, absurd. In many cases, the evidence is incomplete at the PTPH. In sexual offences, full achieving better evidence transcripts are often unavailable, and practitioners rely on summaries. CCTV may not yet have been watched in full, medical evidence may be outstanding and the victim impact, which can materially affect a sentence, may be unknown. Sometimes the complainant is still in hospital. It may well be that the psychiatric or psychological impact becomes clear only weeks or months later. Yet the clause asks the court to decide mode of trial at exactly this sensitive and uncertain stage. The Government are therefore building a supposedly rational system on a procedural moment that practitioners know, and I am sure the Minister knows, is often evidentially immature. The Committee will remember reading the Victims’ Commissioner’s written evidence, which accepts the need for reform but recognises the concern that sentencing ranges vary and that the evidential picture may be incomplete when the crucial decision is taken. JUSTICE likewise says that the proposal risks unfairness because the allocation and reallocation system lengthens the PTPH and depends on speculative assumptions about how much court time will actually be saved. The Bar Council adds that the Bill gives no schedule or annexe identifying categories of offence; instead, a Crown court judge will simply assess in individual cases whether the likely sentence exceeds three years, meaning that the determination is case specific, contestable and uncertain from the outset. I can well imagine the response to all that being that if circumstances change, the case can be reallocated, but to my mind that is not a defence of the clause; it is an admission that the initial prediction is often too flimsy to bear the weight placed on it. As any King’s counsel will readily point out, real criminal cases are not static things. Charges are amended, defendants are added and new evidence emerges. Perhaps a section 18 becomes a section 20. When something like that happens, is it seriously proposed that the case repeatedly cycles through reallocation every time? Clause 3 says yes, at least in substance. Proposed new section 74B provides for a formal reallocation mechanism where there is a relevant change of circumstances, including changes in the indictment or new evidence affecting likely sentence. The problem is that that does not solve the uncertainty; it adds another layer of litigation, or at least potential litigation. It invites both sides to argue over whether the threshold position has changed, whether reallocation is required, whether the change is sufficiently material, what prejudice would be caused by moving the case, whether delay, wasted cost or witness inconvenience should prevail, and what happens if the case is already part way down the tracks. Frankly, that sounds like a dream come true for a solicitor’s billing manager, but the rest of us can surely see the problem. JUSTICE and the Bar Council have both picked up on that point. JUSTICE notes that the “allocation of cases is going to lengthen the plea and trial preparation hearing as will the process of reallocation”, and it warns that the absence of any right of appeal against allocation decisions is likely to increase judicial reviews and Court of Appeal litigation. In the Bar Council’s written evidence, it states: “The proposed Crown Court Bench Division introduces an extra layer of hearings and complication…It could result in further litigation at an interlocutory stage.” It argues that one of the Bill’s fundamental flaws is precisely the fact that it presents a false binary: either do nothing, or do this. The Bill does not properly assess a range of other policy options. Having made those points, I would like to pose a question to the Minister, which I think may shed some light on where we are with the clause. Has the additional work needed at both Crown court and magistrates court level for allocation, reallocation, submissions and case management been factored into the claimed 27,000 sitting day decrease and 8,500 sitting day increase? If the answer is yes, can we get some insight into precisely where and how? If the answer is no, the core productivity claim behind clause 3 is overstated from the start. If clause 3 were merely a bad threshold coupled with an elaborate reallocation maze, that would be bad enough. However, the Government have compounded the problem by providing no right of appeal against allocation or reallocation decisions, and by permitting some decisions to be made without a hearing. Under proposed new section 74D, there would be no right of appeal against an allocation or reallocation determination made under proposed new sections 74A or 74B, and a reallocation determination could be made without a hearing. That is extraordinary. A defendant may lose trial by jury on the basis of an early-stage sentence prediction, under a mechanism that the Government know may need to be revisited as the case develops, yet there is no appeal. JUSTICE warns that the likely consequence of the proposal is judicial review pressure on the High Court, and appeal pressure on the Court of Appeal once written reasons are handed down, meaning that the supposed efficiency savings may be displaced into other courts. The Bar Council says much the same; it proposes, as a minimum safeguard, that there should be a hearing before reallocation, unless the parties waive it, and that there should be an appeal right. The absence of appeal is especially troubling because summary trial has historically been justified by two safeguards: lower-level offences and the ability to appeal. The Bill proposes to remove both. It moves up the seriousness of cases, while stripping away the classic safeguard of easy correction—that is not a tolerable bargain. Although the Committee has already debated the retrospectivity point at some length, clause 3 itself remains infected by it. The new allocation procedure will apply to cases already in the Crown court open caseload, including cases where the defendant has already been arraigned at a PTPH before the new regime comes into force, so long as the prosecution has not yet opened its case. For those cases, the court must make a determination under proposed new section 74A as soon as is reasonably practicable, and may do so without a hearing. That means that a defendant who chose a Crown court trial, expecting a jury, may wait months, prepare for that jury and then lose it retrospectively. The Minister herself has defended that approach by saying that the Government are on sound legal ground, and that there is no procedural or legal impediment, relying on advice from—as I recall—an unnamed KC. However, political defensibility and legal ingenuity are not the same as fairness. To put this in very plain terms, people did not opt to go to Crown court for the car parking or the architecture; they chose it for one thing only—a jury. To move the goalposts after the choice is made is profoundly unfair, regardless of other considerations. The Committee will recall reading through the written evidence from some eminent groups and individuals that, in as many words, call this retrospective application contrary to the rule of law. The Bar Council says: “The retrospective provisions may also be subject to numerous legal challenges.” Dr Samantha Fairclough argues that the plan is unfair, and she says: “It will also create significant additional work…and likely result in appeals.” That all points in the same direction. Retrospectivity here is not just constitutionally unattractive; it will ultimately prove to be practically self-defeating. A very large part of the Government’s case for clause 3 rests on the impact assessment, which says that clauses 1 to 7 will reduce Crown court sitting days by 27,000 a year, while increasing magistrates court sitting days by 8,500. It also says that the Crown court open caseload will fall by around 14,000 cases over 2028-2029, and that “overall the reforms will reduce demand on Crown Court time by almost 20%”. However, several stakeholders have criticised the assumptions and modelling, especially those on how much time judge-only trials would save. The Government’s core assumption is that hearing times will fall by 20% for judge-only trials, but Sir Brian himself accepted that this was associated with high levels of uncertainty, and the Justice Committee challenged how anecdotal the basis for that figure appeared to be.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is really helpful to hear the hon. Member’s perspective from her in-depth knowledge and experience, but I would challenge one aspect of her point: I might argue for a longer sentence if it meant I was more likely to get a jury trial and be found not guilty. Allow me to give an example. If I had created an offensive social media post, I would know that, if I could make my case to a jury, they would be much more likely to use their discretion and compassion and accept the human foibles that we have. They might well say, “This person did not intend to cause any harm—not guilty”. I therefore disagree with the hon. Member; I think she will find herself in a situation where—it sounds bizarre—people will argue that they should get a longer sentence in order to go to jury, so that they have a chance of being found not guilty and clearing their name.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  That is not the case. The hon. Lady has just set out that it is about setting out the worst possible cases with respect to the sentence—so they absolutely could do that. It is exactly what will happen. They will always be looking to achieve the best for their client—particularly if their client is not guilty. Let us remember that we are talking about some people who will not be guilty. Again, they know that if they have done a social media post—and we have seen that people have gone to prison for these things—they are much more likely to not go to prison if they end up in front of a jury. However, if they end up in front of a judge—my goodness me—there is a much higher chance that they will go to prison.

• 9 Mar 2026 · Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill · Hansard source

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  I am incredibly pleased to speak in support of Lords amendment 38, which seeks to raise the digital age of consent to 16. I only wish we had much more time for this debate, as it deserves. For years, parents like me have worried about the harms of social media on our children, and the detrimental impact of excessive screentime. We have tried to manage it as best we can on our own. We have felt the sting when we have been told by others that responsibility fully sits with parents, and that good parents do not need the state to help them get this right, yet no one says that about alcohol, smoking or buying fireworks. In all those cases, it is acceptable for parents to be helped by sensible laws put in place to protect children from preventable harm, yet social media and excessive screentime are just as harmful as cigarettes, alcopops and messing around with fireworks in the street, so why would the state not step in on that too? I have three children, and it is fair to say that they love screentime. If I try to talk to them when they are glued to a YouTube video of someone else playing a computer game, they ignore me, completely engrossed. They do not want to go out in the garden, play with their friends in the street or play with toys. Instead, if given a choice, they would always choose to stare zombie-like at their tablet. Thankfully, I have kept them away from social media, but there is only so long I can get away with that. Staring at a screen for endless hours is not healthy. It prevents children from developing the social and cognitive skills they need in adulthood and is terrible for their mental health. It is no coincidence that we are seeing a mental health crisis, which started at the same time as the mass adoption of smartphones and access to social media. It really should be a wake-up call. What does the future look like if our children’s most important relationship is with their phone? Their brains are literally becoming hardwired to respond to likes and shares, rather than human interaction and connection. Social media is doing exactly what it was designed to do: reeling our children in and feeding them content that often is not in their best interest but is highly addictive. We know this because we all experience it the same. Social media is not for children. We do not need any more time given over to consultation to confirm what we already know—

• 12 Feb 2026 · Healthy Relationships · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Jardine. I congratulate the hon. Member for Ribble Valley (Maya Ellis) on a refreshing, measured, fantastic speech. Like the hon. Member for Twickenham (Munira Wilson), I expected a slightly different topic, but it was pleasing to hear so much about the importance of strong families. Maybe we can do this debate again and I will write a slightly different speech. Between us all, we will cover various aspects that are relevant and important. I would also like hon. Members to know that I, too, am watching season 4 of “Bridgerton”—a classic Cinderella tale—which is very enjoyable. Healthy relationships are underpinned by respect. In most cases, the way we would wish to be treated ourselves is probably a good place to start our relationships with others, but we continue to see high levels of violence against women and girls, as well as other kinds of abuse such as coercive control, with no real signs of reduction. That suggests something is going badly wrong, and the Government have rightly set challenging ambitions to address this huge societal problem. We very much welcome the Government’s recently published VAWG strategy and their ambition to halve such violence, and we hope it will build on the work undertaken by the previous Government. The Conservatives elevated violence against women and girls to a crime type that policing leaders must treat as a national threat, and we committed over £230 million to the tackling domestic abuse plan from 2022 to 2025. That included quadrupling the funding for victim and witness support services by 2024-25, and it complemented the £300 million investment in the 2021 tackling VAWG strategy as part of the goal to drive down the prevalence of domestic abuse. The previous Government also created two new offences: stalking and stalking involving fear of violence, serious alarm or distress. That made it easier for victims to hold stalkers to account. On top of that, we also outlawed upskirting to further protect women and girls, criminalised revenge porn and deepfakes, and introduced the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 and, accordingly, domestic abuse protection notices and orders. We are clear that robust action against offenders is vital in the fight against VAWG. Although relationship education in schools can go only so far in addressing male violence against women and girls, it nevertheless plays an important role in educating young people on what positive and healthy relationships looks like, and the importance of putting in place clear boundaries. Those skills are vital in navigating relationships, recognising potential abuse, including coercive control, and knowing how and when to seek help when needed. Relationship education was made compulsory in all primary and secondary schools in 2020. It has several core objectives: to foster pupil wellbeing, to develop resilience and character, and to ensure that pupils are happy, successful and productive members of society. In spite of that, shockingly, nearly three women every single week are killed by men, and many, many more are raped and abused. The risks and harms arising from the online world are feeding this problem. Pornography is available online at the touch of a button on smartphones. Let me be clear: this is harmful stuff that depicts strangulation, rape, violence and degrading acts such as spitting on young women. Any young man seeing such misogynistic content day in, day out will inevitably view women and girls differently. They will be more likely to see them as an object to use and degrade. By comparison, the relatively trivial amount of time spent learning the opposite in a classroom cannot hope to offset that. The single best thing we can do to stem the tide is to introduce a ban on smartphones in schools for under-16s and increase the age limit for social media to 16. That will not address the whole issue, of course, but it will massively help. The Conservatives have backed it all the way, and I ask the Minister to do so too. The Government’s proposal to ban strangulation content is welcome and a positive step forward. I am concerned that our strong desire to eradicate VAWG has led to boys and men being unnecessarily demonised. There is a difference between calling out abusive behaviour and labelling a whole set of masculine attributes as toxic. Masculinity is a wonderful thing—the yang to femininity’s yin—and it is certainly not toxic in the great majority of cases, particularly when it is not fuelled by online porn. Our answer to a genuine question about the abuse of girls has been to tell a generation of boys, “You are the problem,” and then we are surprised when that approach, instead of nurturing healthy relationships, creates resentment and pushes more young men towards the very online subcultures that feed off grievance and rejection. Instead, we need to positively embrace what being a good man, a good partner and a good father look like. Fundamentally, boys need positive role models from which to learn and model their own relationships. That is why fathers and other male role models are so important. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts on that. When it comes to education on healthy relationships, we have seen an ever-growing load of subject matter covering issues from relationships to mental health. Good RSHE can be a protective factor when it is age-appropriate, factual and taught impartially, but it is also important to recognise that schools should not try to replace the education that should be the family’s role. There is a careful balance to be struck. As well as confident, self-assured boys, we need confident, self-assured girls who are clear about their boundaries and what behaviours they are willing to accept and not accept. That means not telling them that selling their bodies is empowering, not expecting them always to be kind, and not telling them that the feelings of men are more important than their safety. On that point, I hope we might hear something today about the Government’s unresolved approach to gender-questioning guidance for schools and the release of the long-awaited code of practice on single-sex spaces following the recent Supreme Court ruling. The Government cannot claim to support healthy relationships so long as they leave schools to navigate the issue without proper guidance. It is incumbent on this Government to reinforce rules that entitle our girls and women to privacy from males when they are getting changed—that is basic safeguarding. We received the draft non-statutory guidance on gender-questioning children back in December 2023, but two years later, schools and parents are still waiting for it to be published. Will the Minister confirm when we can expect to see both the gender-questioning guidance and the revised code of practice from the Equality and Human Rights Commission? My final point is on the need to be honest about where the deeper formation of relationships happens. Schools matter and good teachers can be life-changing, but let us not lose sight of the fact that children spend most of their time outside the classroom. The attitudes that shape relationships are forged primarily at home, as well as online and in peer groups. If we want healthy relationships, we cannot pretend that a curriculum document can substitute for a loving and nurturing family structure. Families can come in all different shapes and sizes, but the important thing is that they are loving, nurturing and respectful. Children learn how to interact with others from their main caregivers. What are the Minister’s plans to support strong families, given that it is likely to be the most impactful way a Government can ensure healthier relationships?

• 7 Jan 2026 · Jury Trials · Hansard source

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  Plans to restrict access to jury trial take a sledgehammer to one of the most important protections for the people of this country. I would expect any Government suggesting a change of that magnitude to have a strong rationale for doing so. Instead, we hear the nonsensical argument that curtailing jury trials will address the courts backlog, yet the Minister of State for Courts and Legal Services told the House that only 3% of court cases are jury cases. So before we even get into the debate, we need clarity on what this change will mean for the backlog. That means modelling and timescales, not justifications based on religious belief. I suggest that the Government are getting desperate when that is the best they can offer—perhaps next we will hear that the tooth fairy backs digital identification or that Father Christmas supports giving away the Chagos islands. Back in the real world, in 2024 the Lady Chief Justice gave evidence to the Justice Committee that our courts faced around 100 unplanned closures every week, with 200 near closures per month. That is in line with credible data suggesting that just yesterday, 15% of our Crown courtrooms sat empty, and it is the same today. If the Minister wants to tackle the backlog, might that not be the best place to start? Let me turn to the key benefit of jury trials: the involvement of our peers in delivering justice. These are people in our own communities with no obvious axe to grind or political motivations. Any justice system that concentrates powers in the hands of a small number of repeat decision makers inevitably risks groupthink and unconscious, or even conscious, bias. A jury is a built-in safeguard: 12 ordinary people drawn at random, bringing different instincts and experiences, and forced to test the prosecution’s case in a way that a single decision maker cannot. Simply put, it is safer to spread human fallibility across 12 people than to concentrate it in one. A system in which liberty hinges solely on inputs from various arms of the state—the police, the CPS and then a judge—cannot be as inherently fair as one in which justice is done with the people’s direct involvement. The curtailing of jury trials is not the only concern. Ministers want to expand sentencing powers in the magistrates courts by allowing them to hand down sentences of up to two years, while at the same time restricting the ability to appeal decisions taken in those courts. It is extraordinary that this Government think that someone who can sit as a magistrate from the age of 18, with no legal qualifications or experience, should be able to decide whether someone loses their liberty. If you were in the dock, would you be happy with that? Juries may not be perfect, but I know what I would prefer. If the Government are determined to push ahead with this, they are knowingly increasing the risk of wrongful convictions and excessive sentences. We know that more than 40% of appeals against decisions taken by magistrates courts are upheld. How many miscarriages of justice are this Government willing to accept? Ministers would be foolish to trade away a centuries-old safeguard for a headline about swift justice, only to discover afterwards that our courts are no speedier, just less just. I believe that the British people must remain participants in their system of justice rather than mere observers. I urge Ministers to think again. Do not curtail jury trials. Do not concentrate yet more power in fewer hands. Fix the courts. Protect our legal heritage.

• 24 Nov 2025 · HMP Downview: Female Prisoners · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Lady for making that point. This is the reality of the data; we must not ignore what the data tells us. I did warn that it makes for an uncomfortable truth, but I can verify all of it and provide hon. Members with the data—I would not come to the House and give hon. Members incorrect data. Accordingly, we can conclude that the male transgender prison population poses a much higher risk to women and girls. When people parrot the line that transwomen are not a threat to women, in the case of the prison population, I am afraid that that statement does not hold up. Zoe Watts, a biological male who identifies as a women, was jailed for eight years and six months after trying to use a 3D printer to make a gun that had the capacity to cause mass casualties. He was arrested by armed officers and a stockpile of weapons and materials was found at his home. There was a disturbing video on social media of him smashing a watermelon with women’s faces on it using a glass shard-encrusted baseball bat. He was put in HMP Downview. Joanna Rowland-Stuart, a biological male who identifies as a woman, who stabbed his partner to death with a samurai sword, was put in HMP Downview too. John Dixon, now known as Sally, is a paedophile who was found guilty of 30 sexual assault charges involving seven children, some as young as six years old. He may have been held in HMP Downview too. There are also more well known transwomen prisoners who have hit the headlines, such as Isla Bryson and Karen White, both incarcerated with women. Isla Bryson, from Scotland, was jailed for raping two women, but only after being charged did he come out as transgender. This dangerous rapist was remanded in a women’s prison. Holyrood, it seems, is even worse than Westminster for drinking the gender Kool-Aid. The case of Karen White is even more appalling. A transwoman convicted of rape and a knife attack, he was remanded in HMP New Hall, a women’s and young offenders’ prison, where he sexually assaulted two inmates. Thankfully, this dangerous predator is no longer in the women’s prison estate. I hope hon. Members understand why I have grave concerns about such violent males continuing to be incarcerated with women. Not only is it against the law, the Supreme Court clarified back in April that single-sex provision must be based on biological sex alone, not anything else, but it is irresponsible and dangerous. Women prisoners deserve better than this. They should feel and be safe. I now want to get into a bit more detail about E Wing within HMP Downview. Ministers have said many times in response to written questions that E Wing is not part of the general women’s estate, which is an odd statement for them to make. E Wing is a wing within HMP Downview, and HMP Downview is a women’s prison, ergo E Wing is part of the women’s prison estate. I have visited it and seen it with my own eyes. Why might Ministers be at pains to say that it is not part of the general women’s estate? I believe they are using a play on words to obscure the fact that the single-sex provisions of the Equality Act are being breached. The current policy for managing transgender prisoners, introduced by the former right hon. Member for Esher and Walton when he was Justice Secretary, prohibits male prisoners who retain their birth genitalia or have any history of sexual or violent offences from being held in the general women’s estate, unless an exemption is granted by a Minister. So this ministerial characterisation that E wing is not part of the general women’s estate appears to be a tenuous effort to argue that they have complied with the policy and the Equality Act after all. E Wing is physically located within a women’s prison. It is subject to the same policies and procedures as the rest of HMP Downview. It has the same Governor. Its funding comes out of the same pots. Its inmates are supported by the same health services. It beggars belief that Ministers think that we will believe that this wing is not part of the women’s estate. Putting to one side this blatant breach of the Equality Act for now, let us consider whether the males held in E Wing are truly segregated from the rest of the female prison population. Again, Ministers keep saying that they are, but E Wing is like any other wing.

• 11 Nov 2025 · BBC Leadership · Hansard source

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  Like many in the Chamber, I want to see the BBC rebuild public trust and return to its core mission, but it must be recognised that as a result of its pro-gender-ideology bias, it failed to adequately report on issues such as the use of puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones in children, the placing of violent men in women’s prisons, and the loss of women’s medals in sport to biological males. On top of all that, it has attributed the crimes of violent men to women. Calling a male sex offender “she” can never be responsible, impartial journalism. How does the Secretary of State intend to ensure that the BBC moves away from its current ideological approach on gender to one based on facts and evidence?