Rebecca Paul MP: speeches

Speeches

• 25 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Thank you, Mr Efford. I am perplexed as to why some of the straightforward improvements to the safeguards have not been accepted. That should give us all pause for thought. If everyone here wants this to be the safest assisted dying service in the world, we must learn from other territories and improve the safeguards. Our priority should not be to make the service as accessible as possible, with as few barriers as possible, or to make it as easy as possible for medical practitioners to sign off. Time and again, throughout our proceedings, the importance of autonomy has been given as the reason why amendments cannot be accepted, but surely that must be balanced against what is in someone’s best interests. It is clear that in other areas of medicine a best interests approach is taken, for example under section 63 of the Mental Health Act 1983, which states: “The consent of a patient shall not be required for any medical treatment given to him for the mental disorder from which he is suffering”. A patient can thus be deemed to have capacity, and yet still receive treatment that they have refused, for example in the force-feeding of a young girl with anorexia. Those who argue for full autonomy would no doubt rail against this best interests approach. However, I suggest that it is always worth considering what we would want to happen if it were our daughter. This is not an easy balance to get right—I completely concede that—but right now the Bill has no best interests component. That means that if anyone inadvertently qualifies for assisted dying but should not, for example an anorexic girl who has refused treatment, there is no safety mechanism to take her out of scope. The amendment tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Braintree (Mr Cleverly) would have gone some way to addressing that. Clause 1 will profoundly change how society views suicide. Data from overseas territories indicates that introducing assisted dying can actually increase the number of unassisted suicides. In Oregon, whose system this Bill is specifically based on, non-assisted suicide has increased by a statistically significant amount. That demonstrates the seismic shift in attitudes that accompanies this, so when we tell our young people that suicide is not the answer and to seek help, we must do so knowing full well that the key message will be undermined by the availability of an assisted dying service, which may be plastered across billboards and advertised on daytime TV.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Under our current law, assisting someone to commit suicide is a criminal act. Clause 1 of this Bill is where we cross the Rubicon, moving away from well-established principles into a new era in which the state is empowered to help individuals to die. This monumental decision is one for Parliament in the coming months. However, what we must do on this Committee is bolster the safeguards so that the Bill is truly as safe as it can be. Our priority must always be the vulnerable: those who could be coerced into something that is not in their best interests, and those with no one to advocate for them or protect them, who could end upbeing pushed into a process because that is the easiest and cheapest option for everyone. This law must work for everyone, not just the privileged few. That is why I am so disappointed that at the end of nearly three days of debate, there has been not one improvement to the safeguards—not one. We asked for amendments to exclude people with impaired judgment and the depressed and suicidal; this Committee said no. We asked to protect those who are unduly influenced or encouraged by others to seek assisted dying—

• 25 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Will my hon. Friend give way?

• 25 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to speak to amendment 11, which stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire. This is one of the areas of the Bill where we all agree on what we are trying to achieve, so it comes down to making sure that the drafting does exactly what we all intend in order to protect people. The definition of “terminal illness” in the Bill has two components. The first is that the person has an inevitably progressive and irreversible condition; the second is that their prognosis is less than six months. An issue raised in our evidence sessions is that there is a risk that a person with a mental disorder or disability will meet that definition if they are suffering physical symptoms that mean that they satisfy both parts of the test; a possible example could be a young woman suffering with severe malnutrition as a consequence of anorexia. With respect to the point that the hon. Member for Stroud made, I agree that anorexia on its own would not qualify, but the issue arises when there is a physical manifestation from that disorder such as severe malnutrition or even diabetes, which can co-occur, as we heard in the evidence sessions. It is clear that that is not the intention of the hon. Member for Spen Valley or anyone on the Committee, as evidenced by the inclusion of subsection (3). I thank the hon. Member for making that point; it is much welcomed. However, in oral evidence, Chelsea Roff said that “we have case law in the UK where people with anorexia are being found to be terminal. We have to take that reality into account.” –– [ Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 153, Q194.] Before I get into amendment 11, which aims to address the issue, it is important to understand what clause 2(3) is trying to do. It reads as follows: “For the avoidance of doubt, a person is not to be considered to be terminally ill by reason only of the person having one or both” of a mental disorder or a disability; it refers to the relevant bits of law. As my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire has set out, the words “for the avoidance of doubt” make it clear that this is a clarifying subsection that does not make any change to the rest of clause 2. It appears to be clarifying that mental disorders and disabilities alone will never qualify someone for assisted dying—I think we all concur with that—unless they also have a physical condition that meets the terminal illness test, namely that it is inevitably progressive and irreversible and that the person has a prognosis of less than six months. This is where the problem lies. If someone has a physical condition arising from their mental illness, such as severe malnutrition resulting from anorexia, and if the physical condition meets the definition of a terminal illness, they will qualify. As the Royal College of Psychiatrists said in its position statement: “The wording of the Bill could also be interpreted to include those whose sole underlying medical condition is a mental disorder. While anorexia nervosa, for example, does not itself meet the criteria for terminal illness as it is not an ‘inevitably progressive illness, disease or medical condition which cannot be reversed by treatment,’ its physical effects (for example, malnutrition) in severe cases could be deemed by some as a terminal physical illness, even though eating disorders are treatable conditions and recovery is possible even after decades of illness.” To remedy the issue, amendment 11 would remove the words “For the avoidance of doubt”, to make this a legally effective clause, rather than just a clarifying one. That means that it is providing an additional safeguard to those with mental disorders and/or disabilities. It would also remove the word “only”, to ensure that a physical condition resulting from a mental disorder or a disability will not make a person eligible for assisted dying. The amendment is further bolstered by amendment 283, tabled by the hon. Member for York Central, which would make it clear that comorbidities arising from a mental disorder do not qualify a patient for an assisted death. I thank the hon. Member for Spen Valley for tabling amendment 181 to try to address the issue, but I do not believe that would quite solve the problem, which is quite a tricky one. “For the avoidance of doubt” would still be there, as would “only”. The sentence beginning with “Nothing in this subsection” makes it crystal clear that if a condition meets the six-month condition and the rest of the definition, it will be considered a terminal illness. There is therefore no exclusion for physical symptoms manifesting from mental illness or disability, which I think is what we are all trying to get to. In my view, the only amendment that would address the issue is amendment 11, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire. It would remove both “For the avoidance of doubt” and “only”, and would therefore better ensure that a physical condition resulting from mental illness or a disability does not make a person eligible for assisted dying.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  A thought has suddenly been triggered: we are talking as if the provision of this service is undertaken by the NHS, but what are my hon. Friend’s thoughts if the service were being delivered privately? How does that interact with his automatic assumption that there would be a referral to a palliative care specialist?

• 25 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for his intervention, but I respectfully suggest that that is not the case and there is data. Professor David Paton found a 6% increase overall, and interestingly it was 13% for women.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will speak to amendments 9 and 10, which were tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire (Sarah Bool). Members will spot the trend: I have been speaking in favour of a lot of her amendments. Amendments 9 and 10 would make sure the Bill does what it aims to do: ensure that assisted death is available only to those who are genuinely at the end of life. Under clause 2, a person is terminally ill if they have a prognosis of less than six months and if they have “an inevitably progressive illness, disease or medical condition which cannot be reversed by treatment”. That wording gives rise to a risk of unintended cases meeting eligibility criteria. In Oregon, conditions such as anorexia, diabetes, arthritis, HIV/AIDS and hernias have all qualified for assisted death. That is partly because the Oregon law uses the language of “irreversible”, just as the Bill says “cannot be reversed by treatment”. Conditions like diabetes arguably cannot ever be “reversed”, which suggests something more akin to “cured”; they can only be managed. The definition of terminal illness is now broader than it was ever intended to be.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I know the hon. Member has a huge amount of experience on this matter given his career, so I thank him for that contribution. It must not be forgotten that it is the nature of such illnesses for there to be periods of unwellness, when people are at their lowest ebb, and it is our job to protect them from something that could sound appealing at that moment in time. The crux of this issue is that—subject to the point that the hon. Member for Spen Valley made about the improvements that we may now see following the amendments that we have just discussed—the Bill makes no distinction between a condition that is inevitably fatal and one that could be substantially slowed with treatment.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for that thoughtful intervention, and I completely concede that it is not entirely clear, and there are different sources that describe it differently, which, for a non-medical person like myself, makes it difficult. There are certain websites, including NHS England, that may reference it as “progressive”, but equally I am sure that there are other sources that do not describe it in the same way. The hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough makes a really good point, and he will see that I quite often talk about things arguably being the case; I am not saying that it definitely is—I am just highlighting that there is a risk, because if people disagree on whether it is progressive, that is when we have an issue. I see this as an opportunity to tighten up any of that potential risk. I would say the ordinary person on the street would not expect diabetes to ever fall within the definition of a terminal illness, yet there is a risk that it could do, for the reasons I have explained. That means that the drafting of clause 2 is not quite tight enough in my view.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am sharing the content of written evidence. People working in this arena—medical professionals and clinicians—have taken the time to submit written evidence, which suggests that they see a risk, so this is something that we need to think about. The hon. Gentleman could be right when he asks why someone would seek assisted death in that situation, but it is more about if someone technically qualifies. Obviously, we are still yet to get through the Bill, and there is lots for us to debate, but we want to ensure that people are not put on that pathway if they are not actually terminally ill and their condition can be managed. People could be in a low place, and we need to provide support. This comes back to my point about the balance of best interests. It is really difficult to set the right level, but we need to think about best interests and protect people at their lowest point. In Oregon, conditions such as anorexia, diabetes, arthritis and hernias have qualified for assisted death, not because they are inherently fatal but because treatment was refused or was unaffordable. We also need to think about situations such as supply chain issues with certain treatments. Situations that we do not want to happen could arise, and we need to think about what that means for this Bill. Some lawyers and doctors in the US have advised patients on how to bypass the terminal illness criteria by refusing food and water until they become terminal—we have talked about that quite a lot today. There is some evidence of that happening. Cody Sontag, an Oregon woman with early-stage dementia, had few symptoms and was not eligible for assisted death, but after she refused food and water for a few days, her doctor ruled that she met the six-month prognosis requirement. It is important that we carefully consider young women suffering with eating disorders, but I appreciate we have spoken about that group a lot today, so I will be brief. In Chelsea Roff’s evidence, she set out that at least 60 people around the world have been euthanised or assisted in suicide where anorexia nervosa has been listed by name as a terminal condition. In 100% of the cases, the people were women, a third were between the ages of 18 and 30, and two thirds were under the age of 40. Roff said, “I have to emphasise that these were young women who did not have failing organs and did not have comorbid terminal conditions…they had decades of life ahead of them.” –– [ Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 139, Q175.] UK courts have already ruled that treatment can be withdrawn from young women with anorexia, acknowledging that the likely result will be their death, after doctors framed their condition as terminal or untreatable. These examples powerfully demonstrate why it is vital these amendments are accepted, so that these conditions do not lead to a person qualifying for assisted death, if they can be managed sufficiently with treatment. In oral evidence, Dr Miro Griffiths asked us, “What constitutes six months left to live, particularly if you are engaging with technological devices, medical assistance and so on? For example, I have a progressive condition that continuously makes me weaker and has respiratory complications and so on. If I remove the ventilator that I use at night, if I remove my other medical devices and if I stop my engagement with therapeutic services, does that constitute me having a terminal illness, because my rapid acceleration towards death becomes more evident?” –– [ Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 142-143, Q179.] In written evidence, Pathfinders Neuromuscular Alliance warned that for those with conditions like muscular dystrophy, access to treatment is essential. It said, “It would not be unreasonable therefore to suggest an individual with neuromuscular respiratory failure could die within six months—and yet they might also live 20 to 30 additional years in this state.” In written evidence, a group of leading physicians and researchers, including experts from John Hopkins University and the Royal College of Psychiatrists said, “The Bill’s definition of terminal may not adequately distinguish between a condition that is inevitably fatal and one that only becomes terminal without adequate care.” They added, “Under this Bill, patients with incurable but treatable conditions could become terminal if they are unable to access timely treatment or choose to forego life-sustaining care.” It is therefore vital that the definition of terminal illness is tightened to avoid unintended consequences. These amendments would ensure that the Bill applies only to those who are generally at the end of life, without prospect of recovery. I urge the Committee to give consideration to accepting them.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Lady for that extremely good news. That would definitely be helpful and provide some reassurance. Amendments 9 and 10 are essential to ensure that those people who are never intended to eligible for assisted dying under this Bill are kept outside of it. Amendment 9 seeks to ensure that it is not just illnesses that can be reversed by treatment, but illnesses where the progress can be controlled or substantially slowed by treatment, that are ineligible—diabetes being the classic case, which can be slowed and controlled by treatment. Amendment 10 further bolsters that by ensuring that treatments that improve prognosis are not disregarded under clause 2(1)(a). The problem that we have with clause 2 in its current form is that it fails to distinguish between those who are truly at the end of their life and those who only become terminal if they do not access treatment. There is no requirement for a person to be receiving medical care when their prognosis is assessed, which means that many manageable but irreversible conditions—like diabetes, potentially, and chronic kidney disease—could qualify as terminal if treatment is stopped. Let us take the example of someone with type 1 diabetes, like my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire (Sarah Bool), who tabled these amendments. If she were to stop taking her insulin, she might meet the criteria for terminal illness under the Bill and qualify for an assisted death—I mean, I certainly hope she would not. Without treatment, type 1 diabetes could arguably be an inevitably progressive and irreversible condition that would result in death within weeks or months.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank my hon. Friend—another doctor. I would suggest that diabetes cannot be reversed, but can be managed with treatment. All I am trying to do is make sure that that piece is picked up. I think we all agree that we would not expect diabetes to fall within the terminal illness diagnosis. No fewer than 15 clinicians and medical researchers mentioned diabetes in written evidence. Other conditions are mentioned too. Two consultant physicians—Rosemarie Anthony-Pillai and DP Whitehouse—say that those on medication for heart failure could qualify if they stopped taking their medication. Dr David Randall, a consultant nephrologist at the Royal London Hospital, sets out in written evidence the example of a young man who has benefited from a kidney transplant but stopped his immunosuppression medication. That would lead to transplant rejection and, likely, death within a few months. Would he qualify as terminally ill if we were not to agree to these amendments?

• 24 Feb 2025 · Social Media Use: Minimum Age · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer, and to be here today to support the petition calling for social media companies to be banned from allowing children under the age of 16 to create social media accounts. I stand here today in complete agreement with the over 700 Reigate constituents who signed the petition urging us to take action on this important issue. As a mother of three, I spend much time worrying about the impact of social media and screen time on my children and their peers. When I was growing up, in the school holidays I was out playing with my friends, climbing trees, building camps and learning the critical social skills that we all need in adulthood. Now, instead, we do not let our children out, and the only world we allow them to explore is a fantasy one that is rife with risk and does not equip them with the life skills that they need. When children are online, they can interact with predatory individuals without realising, see unrealistic body images that batter their self-esteem and be convinced that black is white by false information. That is extremely damaging. Many adults fall for those things, so how on earth do we expect our children not to? It is no coincidence that we see a mental health crisis in our young people at the same time as mass adoption of smartphones and access to social media. Yes, increased mental health support is needed, but the best remedy is to remove the root cause. I note that the previous Conservative Government took some welcome first steps in the fight to safeguard our children through the introduction of the Online Safety Act. Thanks to that Act, providers must be proactive in removing illegal content such as child sexual abuse material, and they must protect children and young people from content that is harmful. That could include harassment, abuse, bullying or content about suicide, self-harm and eating disorders. The Act also includes welcome measures to prevent children from accessing online pornography, something I particularly welcome in the light of the huge damage that material does to both our girls and our boys. While the Online Safety Act is a welcome starting point, we must go further. That is overwhelmingly the view of Brits, 75% of whom now back raising the minimum age for creating a social media account from 13 to 16, as a recent More in Common survey shows. If, as I hope, we raise the minimum age to 16, more thought needs to be given to enforcement. While platforms may set a minimum age requirement, with 13 being the standard for most social media sites, those limits are easy to circumvent. If teenagers can evade the ban by using a simple virtual private network, we will not get the full benefit of raising the age limit. It will be of great value to hear more today about the best ways to overcome this challenge. I also want to touch quickly on smartphones, as this is another route to better safeguarding and protecting our children. The hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Tony Vaughan) made some really powerful points on this. I strongly support a ban on smartphones in schools for children under 16. When asked, 42% of older teenagers say that on a typical day their smartphone distracts them from schoolwork, and nearly half say social media has distracted them enough to affect their grades. Currently, only 11% of schools are genuinely smartphone free, and children at these schools get GCSE results one to two grades higher, so there is clearly a big upside to banning smartphones in schools. The Conservatives recently tabled an amendment to Labour’s Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill to do exactly that. Unfortunately it was voted down, but I urge the Labour Government to seriously consider implementing this much needed restriction in some form. To be honest, I am perplexed as to why they rejected the amendment, when this one measure would be a game changer in terms of protecting children and improving educational outcomes, which is the whole purpose of the Bill. I hope that they will reconsider the amendment at a later stage.

• 24 Feb 2025 · Social Media Use: Minimum Age · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Gentleman for making that point. It is a tricky and difficult thing to achieve, but a ban it makes it a little easier for schools. We have implemented guidance, but it has not cut through as much as we wanted. We now need to accept that we need to go further and introduce a ban, because it is much easier for schools to take action when it is on a statutory footing. I thank the hon. Member for Whitehaven and Workington (Josh MacAlister) for his great work on safer phones for our children. I hope to be able to support his private Member’s Bill on 7 March. These are exactly the type of initiatives that we should be working on together on a cross-party basis, because we all agree that we want to protect our children. I encourage Ministers and the Government as a whole to engage fully with the excellent points made in this debate, and act swiftly to protect our children from an increasingly insidious online realm that they are simply not equipped to navigate. I hope the Minister will give serious consideration to raising the minimum age for social media use to 16 and banning smartphones in schools. The value from these two changes alone would be huge for our society, and we would all thank the Government for it.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I completely recognise what my hon. Friend says, but there is another way to deal with the issue. Encouragement is already illegal. The other option is that we decriminalise it through in clause 24, but right now the Bill does not do that. That is why we are saying that we need to have the word “encouraged” in clause 1. There are other ways to do it, but until someone tables an amendment to clause 24 to decriminalise encouragement —I do not think that anyone has—then amendment 82 is very logical, and brings together all the legislation in a coherent way.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I agree that that would have been helpful. We have spent many, many hours today debating these amendments, and having had advance notice would have allowed some reflection and appropriate advice to be taken. If, indeed, the Minister’s position is right, I could have looked at withdrawing the amendment or tabling a new one. However, I have not had time to do that, so I am in a situation where I have to follow the advice that I have had. I think, if the Minister is right, having this on the face of the Bill is potentially a little messy because we would be duplicating, but that is not a massive downside from my perspective, whereas the upside is that, if she is wrong and I and the advice that I have had are right, we would be ensuring a higher level of safeguarding in this Bill.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank all Members for their contributions. I echo the hon. Member for Spen Valley when I say that this is one particular case where we all agree on what should be happening functionally and practically. We have had some quite technical arguments today about the meanings and definitions of certain words and how they would apply. It has been a constructive and interesting debate. As a first-timer to a Bill Committee, it has been a great experience. It is clear from the evidence received and the contributions from Members that subtle coercion is something we are all concerned about and recognise needs to be dealt with. We have heard powerful stories today and from witnesses in recent weeks, so it is incumbent on us to listen and take action. One of the points that resonated with me yesterday was that made by the hon. Member for Bradford West. I am now paraphrasing a little bit: essentially, she said that we are not legislating for a perfect world where everyone is treated equally; that our society is filled with inequality, and we must legislate for the reality, not for the rose-tinted version that we would all prefer. Coercion and undue influence does happen more commonly than we might think, and it is hard to detect. It is therefore vital that when we go through this Bill, we always have the most vulnerable at front of mind. It is not about when everything works perfectly, as intended, for the very small group of people who would benefit from the Bill, but what happens when it does not work, and the impact on a potentially bigger, more vulnerable group. That is the crux of our roles here today. I thank the Minister for her very informative and helpful speech setting out the Government’s position on legalities of the various definitions. There will, however, be different legal opinions on this. I sought advice from former Attorney General Victoria Prentis KC, who takes a different view. I am very aware that when it comes to going through the courts, there will be different interpretations and views. I am not a lawyer, so I do not know which is right, but I do know that if I put this amendment on the face of the Bill, it is there and it is safer. That is where I am coming from on this. I reiterate that we do see these terms “coerced”, “pressured” and “unduly influenced” in various bits of legislation. Those words are chosen for specific reasons. It is important to note that. On encouragement, I am going to talk again about the purpose of the amendment. Right now, under the Suicide Act, assisting someone to commit suicide is a crime, but encouraging someone to commit suicide is also a crime. Clause 24 of the Bill decriminalises the assistance piece to allow legalisation of assisted dying, but it does not decriminalise the encouragement piece. I have tabled amendment 82, because we need to address that. The clause is limited to the provision of assistance and does not include the encouragement of a person to end their own life. I understand the concerns of my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire about how “encouragement” could be interpreted, which is a really good point. I also take the point that although it is referred to in the Suicide Act, there is no clear definition, so we are relying on case law. If we all came to this with a blank bit of paper, we might come up with different laws. However, we have laws that are already in place, and that is why I have tabled this amendment. The reality is that encouragement of suicide is a criminal activity right now, which is why we need to address it here. On undue influence, the Minister set out that the amendment is not legally necessary. The hon. Members for Rother Valley and for Penistone and Stocksbridge gave interpretations of this point, but I gently point out that they contradicted each other, which shows how complicated the situation is. Different people will have different views. The hon. Member for Penistone and Stockbridge said that “undue influence” is a term in equity, and that it is not proper to have it as part of the criminal offence of coercion in clause 26, but the hon. Member for Rother Valley said that coercion in that provision does not include undue influence. Does that not show that the legal meaning of the Bill is unclear and would benefit from some clarification? Amendment 23 on undue influence first appeared on the amendment paper on 21 January, almost three weeks ago. My understanding from those who were previously in government, including at the Ministry of Justice, is that when an MP tables an amendment that is legally unnecessary, the Government would seek to meet them, together with Government lawyers, to explain why the Government believe the amendment is legally unnecessary and to give them time to reflect. It is my understanding that, with respect to the amendment in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire (Sarah Bool), that was not done. She met the Bill’s promoter, the hon. Member for Spen Valley, on Monday, but they did not discuss the amendment on undue influence. Similarly, my amendment 82 on encouragement appeared on the amendment paper on 4 February, over a week ago, and I have had no communication from either the Government or the Bill’s promoter about it. The first time I or my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire have heard that our amendments might be legally unnecessary or problematic is today. When formulating my amendment, I had the benefit of advice from former Attorney General Victoria Prentis KC, who has written a letter to The Times endorsing it; the Minister will appreciate that I would not want to withdraw my amendment without the benefit of further advice from her, so I will press it to a vote. However, if there are any points of technical drafting relating to the amendment that the Government would like to deal with through tidying-up amendments, I would very much welcome that. What has come out of this conversation is that it is not straightforward or clear; there are some things that need to be thought through, including the interactions between clause 24 and clause 26 and the various definitions, so that we are being really clear. I am open to doing that in the most suitable and appropriate way.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention and very much agree that we have had a rich conversation. We have taken much away from it. In closing, the amendments that I am pressing to the vote are about whether we think that someone who has been unduly influenced or illegally encouraged should be eligible to be assisted to die. I hope all Committee members can agree that that should not be the case and will support my amendments. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  rose—

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is the same question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire: would someone be allowed to access assisted dying if it was clear that they had capacity and their reason for it was simply not to cost their relatives financial expense or be a burden. It is important to be honest about what the Bill does. Is the answer to that yes?

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I can confirm that I did not contact the promoter on this. My understanding is that if something is not legally coherent, it would normally be the Government who would contact the relevant MP to have that discussion and allow that reflection. That was the point I was trying to make; my apologies if I focused on the promoter more than I should have. I always enjoy meeting the promoter of this Bill.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is really important that we are honest about what the Bill does. We are looking for a simple answer—yes or no. My hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire has very clearly set out the situation, and I know that the hon. Member for Spen Valley understands her Bill inside and out, so if she could give us a yes or no that would be really helpful.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for that point. I mean no disrespect in identifying a contradiction. A lot of us have talked quite differently about different things today and I have found it a fascinating debate.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for sharing her view on that.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  As ever, the hon. Lady so eloquently makes her point and I completely agree. I am not a lawyer but, given that the Suicide Act made the encouragement of suicide a criminal offence back in 1961, I imagine there is quite a lot of case law that would help define where that line is drawn on encouragement, but I would refer to better qualified people than myself.