Neil Shastri-Hurst MP: speeches

Speeches

• 15 Jun 2026 · Brain Cancer · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this evening, Mrs Barker. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Colne Valley (Paul Davies) for opening this important debate, and to other right hon. and hon. Members for their contributions to it. I also pay tribute to Brain Cancer Justice and to all the people—over 109,000 in total—who signed this petition to ensure that we have had the opportunity to debate this important issue here today. At its heart, this debate has been about the patients, families and loved ones whose lives have been irreparably changed by a brain tumour diagnosis. For many families, of course, that diagnosis arrives suddenly, although too often it is also delayed.

• 8 Jun 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  I listened carefully to the Minister’s response to my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham (Jerome Mayhew), but the reality is that every day shopkeepers are facing abuse and threats and being stolen from. A direct consequence of the presumption in the Sentencing Act 2026 that those with a sentence of 12 months or less will not face prison is that there is no deterrent. Can the Minister genuinely say that our streets are safer as a result?

• 4 Jun 2026 · Jury Trials · Hansard source

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  Imagine a scenario in which two individuals are both charged with the same offence and the factual matrix of each case is identical. However, the first defendant has a string of previous convictions, whereas the second has none. Under the Government’s proposal, the first defendant would be able to elect for a jury trial, depending on the length of the potential sentence, whereas the second would not. How does that align with the Solicitor General’s assessment of the rule of law?

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Mr Efford. I will speak in support of amendments 18 and 19 and, in doing so, will address clause 25 more broadly. At its heart, clause 25 concerns one of the most sensitive and important decisions in the entire service justice framework—the point at which a victim is asked to express a preference as to whether an allegation should proceed in the service justice system or the civilian justice system. For many victims, this is the first moment at which they are invited into a process that will shape not only the course of an investigation, but their experiences of justice itself. That is precisely why it is incumbent on us to get it right. I think all of us would accept that asking a victim to make a jurisdictional choice without proper, balanced and comprehensible information risks placing an unfair burden upon them at a moment of deep vulnerability. It risks substituting clarity for confusion, and it risks turning what should be an informed decision into, in effect, an uninformed guess between systems they may not fully understand. Amendment 18 seeks to address that concern directly, and it does so by placing clear statutory requirements on the nature, quality and neutrality of the information that must be provided before any preference is expressed. That principle is incredibly important because, if we are asking victims to make decisions that can affect the trajectory of an investigation, we have a duty—indeed, a moral obligation—to ensure that those decisions are properly informed.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 18, in clause 25, page 43, line 23, leave out paragraph (a) and insert— “(a) must require that, before a victim is asked to express a preference regarding jurisdiction— (i) the victim is provided with a standardised explanation of the service justice system and the civilian justice system, (ii) such information is presented in a clear, accessible and neutral manner, (iii) the information includes an explanation of the key features, processes, available support and potential outcomes of each system, sufficient to enable the victim to make an informed decision, and (iv) the victim is informed of the availability of any independent legal advice or advocacy and how it may be accessed, (b) must require that— (i) a written record is made of the information provided to the victim, and (ii) where a victim expresses a preference, a record is made of the reasons for that preference, so far as provided by the victim, (c) must not present information in a way that is misleading or lacking appropriate context.”. This amendment creates requirements for the information victims receive regarding both justice systems.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I welcome the clause. Will the Minister set out how there will be consistency in the use of these powers by commanding officers, to ensure that there is equality of justice across the board?

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in support of new clause 12 and offer broader support for clauses 5 to 9, which represent a significant strengthening of the protective framework in the service justice system. It is worth setting out the basic principle that the armed forces justice system must be capable not only of dealing fairly and effectively with wrongdoing, but of ensuring that the protection of victims and management of risk do not fall between institutional cracks. The credibility of the service justice system depends on continuity, coherence and, above all, confidence that protective measures will not be undermined by procedural happenstance. Clauses 5 to 9 make important and welcome progress. They will extend the availability and operation of sexual harm prevention orders, sexual risk orders, domestic abuse protection orders, stalking protection orders and restraining orders in the service justice system. They make provision for enforcement, variation and guidance structures, including in respect of the important role of provost marshals and service police in the exercise of those functions. The clauses will modernise the service justice landscape in a way that recognises the reality of contemporary risk management. They will ensure that service personnel and civilians subject to service discipline are not operating in a parallel system that is less capable of protecting victims or managing dangerous individuals. In particular, the extension to the service courts of protections against domestic abuse and stalking is a welcome alignment with civilian criminal justice standards, ensuring consistency of safeguarding irrespective of jurisdiction. However, as is often the case in the refinement of complex statutory schemes, there remains a narrow but important residual gap, which is precisely what new clause 12 seeks to address. The core issue is one of jurisdictional continuity. At present, protective orders in the service justice system are clearly available while an individual is subject to service law. Clauses 5 to 9 also go further by making provision for enforcement in certain circumstances in which the individual ceases to be subject to service discipline after an order has been made. A difficulty arises, however, in the transitional space where an individual is charged or even convicted while subject to service law, but ceases to be subject to service law before the protective order is imposed or finalised. Without express provision, there is a risk that such an individual, by virtue of leaving service, will fall outside the effective reach of the service court’s protective jurisdiction at precisely the point at which such orders are most necessary. New clause 12 performs a simple but important function. It would provide that where a person is charged with or convicted of an offence in the service justice system and was subject to service law at the relevant time, the service court may impose specified protective orders as if the person remained subject to service law. It is, in effect, a statutory deeming provision, preserving jurisdiction for protective purposes notwithstanding the cessation of service status. The legal merits of that approach are clear. First, it prevents what might properly be described as jurisdictional arbitrage. Without such a provision, there is a theoretical, though in practice very real, risk that individuals could seek to avoid the imposition of protective orders by leaving service prior to trial or sentencing. Even if such behaviour is not deliberately engineered, the mere existence of a gap creates inconsistency and undermines confidence in the system. The protective reach of the service justice system should not be rendered contingent on administrative status at a particular moment in time. Secondly, the new clause reflects a well-established principle in criminal justice, which is that protective orders are ancillary to the underlying offence and risk posed by the offender, not merely to their procedural status. The civilian courts retain wide powers to impose protective orders at sentencing precisely because the assessment of risk is rooted in conduct, not institutional affiliation. New clause 12 would ensure that the service courts are placed in an equivalent position, recognising that the underlying risk does not evaporate simply because service status changes. Thirdly, the new clause would promote legal certainty and coherence. Through clauses 5 to 9, the existing framework already recognises that certain orders may continue to have effect or be enforced after a person leaves service. However, enforcement is not the same as imposition. It is logically and legally cleaner to ensure that the court retains the power to make the order at the point of disposal, rather than relying on subsequent conversion or deeming mechanisms. The new clause therefore fills a structural gap and ensures that the life cycle of protective orders is not disrupted by jurisdictional transition. Fourthly, the new clause is carefully drafted in respect of its propriety. It would not create an unfettered or novel category of punitive power. Rather, it would explicitly confine the service court’s ability to make orders to those that it would have been able to make had the individual remained subject to service law. It is, in essence, a continuity provision, not an expansion of jurisdiction. Importantly, subsection (3) of the new clause would provide that such orders are to have effect “as if made by a civilian court of equivalent jurisdiction” and are “enforceable accordingly.” That is a critical safeguard. It would ensure interoperability between the service justice system and the civilian criminal justice system, avoiding the creation of parallel regimes that might otherwise give rise to confusion about enforcement authority. Subsection (4) of the new clause, enabling the Secretary of State to make regulations regarding recognition, enforcement and variation, is also welcome. It would provide necessary flexibility in an area where procedural interfaces between service and civilian jurisdictions must be capable of adjustment over time. In particular, it would allow for clarity as to which court is best placed to vary or discharge orders once a person has fully transitioned out of service life. That is a sensible delegation of secondary rule-making power, consistent with the established constitutional practice in this field.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in support of the amendment, which was tabled in the name of His Majesty’s loyal Opposition, and to set out my broader support for clause 20. I will begin with the clause itself, because it addresses the composition of the court martial. In such circumstances, it is right that we support the very sensible change that the clause sets out, with its underlying intent to ensure that the court martial is properly constituted and capable of commanding confidence across the armed forces and the wider public. Enlarging the pool of those who can sit on it is a welcome amendment. Precisely because we support that principle, however, we also need to examine whether the system is fully equipped for the realities it faces. In that context, the amendment becomes not only relevant, but in my view increasingly necessary. The amendment proposes a simple change, as set out by my right hon. Friend, to include retired holders of the relevant rank among those qualified for membership of the court martial. At first glance the amendment may appear relatively modest, but I suggest that, like many apparently modest changes in defence legislation, it subtly reflects something much more significant. It reflects a recognition of the demands placed on our armed forces justice system and how those are changing over time, and changing rapidly. We are operating in an era of increasing operational tempo—a phrase that is often used in defence debates, sometimes frequently.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Minister is right to challenge me on the case that I am making. It is about competing challenges facing those in senior rank in the armed forces. My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford gave the example of colonels or above. We have heard of very senior officers being brought before a court martial in cases that may involve, for instance, continuity of education allowance. These are senior individuals who then take out other senior individuals. They are often in a fairly small pool and have perhaps worked closely with one another during their service, but they also have increasing demands, given the global instability that we are currently facing. It therefore makes logical sense to widen that pool and take the pressure off the shoulders of those who have operational responsibilities by allowing those who have served in the past, and hold those ranks by virtue of their service, to sit within the court martial system and increase capacity. I am not suggesting that there is an inefficiency in the service—everybody involved is doing the best job they can. It is about flexing resources so that they are used most appropriately to deliver the outcomes that we need not only from a national security and defence perspective, but to maintain the integrity and speed with which service justice is administered. There is also a broader strategic point that we must not overlook, and it touches on the Minister’s point. We often speak about the importance of a whole-force concept and the idea that national defence is about not simply those currently in uniform but a wider ecosystem of reserve capability, which we will come on to later. It is also about veterans, institutional memory and those who can bring expertise from their time in service. We are, quite rightly, investing in the reserve forces. We are also increasingly recognising the value of civilian expertise in a variety of fields, such as cyber-intelligence or technology. In many respects, we are trying to build a much more flexible and adaptive defence structure, and yet, when it comes to the service justice system, we have not always applied the same logic with equal measure or consistency. We have in effect treated participation as something that must be narrowly confined to serving personnel, even when highly experienced retired officers could make a valuable contribution.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, who from his time as a Defence Minister knows well how to keep tabs on those who have served our country but are now retired. The pension scheme is an obvious way to do so. In addition, he makes an important point about the willingness of individuals to engage in the process. These are people who have given enormous service to their country, and often wish to continue giving service long into their years of retirement from active service. Our armed forces are more stretched and more globally engaged than before, and they are more frequently deployed than at almost any point in recent decades. The spectrum of threats facing our country is widening, from state-based adversaries to hybrid war, cyber-operations and persistent instability in regions where British forces are called to act with precision and professionalism. As I have set out, when operational tempo increases every part of the system is affected. It is not just about equipment, logistics or personnel numbers, but about the justice system that underpins discipline, accountability and command authority. The question, therefore, is a relatively simple one: does our current system of service justice have the flexibility, depth and resilience required to meet that demand? Amendment 9 is one attempt to ensure that it does. It recognises that we are asking a great deal of a relatively small pool of serving officers. We are asking them not only to command forces in complex environments but, where necessary, to sit in judgment in court martial proceedings, including in cases involving senior rank, complex evidence, and often significant reputational consequence for all involved. That is not to say that these individuals are incapable of doing those tasks, but that is a heavy burden on any system. It becomes more difficult still when we consider the practical realities of availability. Senior serving officers are, by definition, in high demand. They are deployed, rotated, assigned to strategic planning roles or engaged in operational command responsibilities that cannot simply be paused or rescheduled. At the same time, the court martial system requires a bench that is credible, experienced and capable of understanding the realities of service life. It is not enough that those sitting in judgment are legally competent to interpret the evidence; they must also understand the context in which decisions are made, the pressures under which orders are given and the operational environments in which conduct is assessed. That combination of legal competence and operational understanding is not easily found, and it is here that amendment 9 can make a tangible contribution. By extending eligibility to retired officers of appropriate rank, we end up expanding the pool of individuals who can bring that essential combination of experience and judgment to the court martial system. I want to be clear about what the amendment seeks to do and what it does not seek to do. It is not an attempt to dilute standards. On the contrary, it is an attempt to strengthen them by widening the field of those who meet them. It is not an attempt to undermine the authority of serving officers; it is an attempt to relieve them of some of the competing pressures that now fall on them in an increasingly demanding environment. It is not an attempt to create a separate or parallel justice system where some are tried by those who are still in active service and some are held in judgment by those who have retired. It is merely an attempt to ensure that the existing system has the necessary capacity to function effectively.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman makes a helpful challenge. Clearly, there is no impact assessment with the amendment. However, there is a joint service publication, the RARO—regular army reserve of officers—list, and there are those letters I receive annually asking me to update my address and contact details. There are already mechanisms by which individuals can be identified and recalled for this service. Given the operational tempo that I have described, it makes sense that we ameliorate the pressure on those who are currently in active service while not impacting the flow of justice through the service justice system.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I welcome the hon. Member’s intervention. If he is suggesting that we should look at going wider than the confines of this specific amendment, I would welcome that conversation. It is about increasing the flexibility and agility of the court martial system so that it reflects the challenges for those who currently serve in uniform.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I fear that recollections may differ. My interpretation of the evidence that we heard is not that this is a failing system—far from it. I gently suggest to the hon. Member that the civilian Crown courts and magistrates courts may not be the best benchmark against which to compare its performance. There is a wider issue, which the hon. Gentleman has touched on: this should not be merely about fixing a problem that exists now. There should be some horizon-scanning for the emerging challenges for the armed forces, not only in the present day but in the years ahead, and safety-proofing of the system against those challenges. That is the specific intent behind the amendment. My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford and I have spent time making the argument about the more senior pool of officers. That is a fair position to take, because they will be under much greater demands, with extensive challenges. Given the threat levels we face—there was a statement in the main Chamber yesterday about events in the middle east—we are living in a much more unstable world, with much greater demands on our armed forces. One can foresee increasing difficulty in constituting panels for cases, particularly those involving senior officers. It would be a dereliction of duty if, instead of planning for those threats and the challenges that they might pose to our armed forces, the Committee and the House more widely sought only to react to them in future. It is always better to do things proactively in a calm manner and think about the implications, rather than doing things retrospectively and hurriedly because an issue has arisen. I will dwell a little more on cases involving the higher ranks. When they do arise, it is often necessary for the panel to include officers of either equivalent or higher rank, but the pool of serving officers is by definition limited. As I hope I have described, that can create genuine operational and logistical difficulties in assembling boards that are both appropriately constituted, given the demands on their make-up, and able to proceed without undue delay. Retired officers of the relevant rank represent an obvious and sensible extension of the pool that would help us to proof the system. They would bring not only rank equivalence, but often a broader perspective. Having stepped back from the pressures of immediate command, they might bring a degree of reflective judgment that is particularly valuable in the complex and sensitive cases that invariably involve more senior officers, by virtue of the nature of the offences of which they are accused. I speak as someone who has developed a healthy respect over the years for the ability of retired officers to express opinions with a greater level of clarity than they may have done in post. That brings a refreshing breadth to the system. There is something about leaving service—I certainly found this myself—that appears to improve one’s ability to identify precisely what everyone else should have done differently. Stepping away from the pressures and challenges of day-to-day service life enables individuals to take a wider and more holistic approach. I am mindful of the fact that I am probably trying your patience, Mr Efford, so I will wind up shortly. I do not pretend that amendment 9 is perfect in every detail. The hon. Member for South Ribble provided a helpful challenge in relation to whether its scope should be wider. There are certainly questions about eligibility criteria and the mechanism for appointment, although I think that there is an obvious mechanism for identifying potential appointees. Those questions will need careful consideration, but that is not a particularly unusual position to be in at this stage of the legislative process. The purpose of Committee is not necessarily to produce final answers, but to test the direction of travel. I think the direction of travel is sound when it comes to ensuring that the system is foolproof. This is about the resilience of our justice system and about making better use of experience that already exists in our wider armed forces community. It is about ensuring that the demands of the increasing operational tempo are not inadvertently creating bottlenecks in the very system designed to uphold discipline and fairness. Ultimately, that is the balance that we are trying to strike: on the one hand we want armed forces that are operationally effective, globally deployable and able to meet the demands of a more dangerous and uncertain world, but on the other hand we want a service justice system that is robust, timely and capable of functioning without becoming a constraint on our operational effectiveness. Those two objectives should not be in tension. We need to think carefully about how we design institutions that can support them both. Clause 20 is an important part of that architecture: it will ensure that the court martial remains properly constituted and legally sound. Amendment 9 would strengthen that approach by ensuring that it remains practically workable under conditions of increasing demand. I urge the Government to accept the amendment, because I suspect that as operational pressures continue to rise and as we ask more of our armed forces across multiple domains, the need for flexibility in our service justice system will only become more rather than less pressing. If we get it right now, we will not only improve efficiency and effectiveness, but strengthen confidence in the system. That is ultimately what we should be trying to achieve in the Bill.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will confine my remarks to amendment 6, tabled by the hon. Members for North Devon and for Tunbridge Wells. Although I have real sympathy with its purpose, I am hesitant about its drafting, and recognise that, in this place, we sometimes develop what could be described as an unhealthy instinct to overcomplicate what, at its heart, is a very simple objective—that serious allegations are handled properly, consistently and in a way that commands the public’s confidence. I will start with where I hope and think we all agree: that allegations of sexual offences and domestic abuse are among the most serious that any justice system will have to confront. They demand to be treated with urgency, professionalism and, above all, trust. I do not think it is controversial to say that victims, whether serving in uniform or not, should not feel that the system is treating them differently depending on administrative geography or institutional habit. That is the spirit in which I understand that the amendment seeks to ensure that such cases are not left solely within the service channels, but are referred immediately to civilian police forces, with the implication that civilian investigation would become the default route. I understand why Members are attracted to that clarity. There is a certain political comfort in having bright lines. I must confess that I have often found myself drawn to them, but that is usually just before discovering why lawyers or police officers prefer slightly more shaded ones. I support the principle underlying the amendment, but I have reservations about the way in which it seeks to achieve it. My first concern is practical. The amendment requires that where service personnel, or the tri-service serious crime unit, are made aware of an allegation, they must immediately refer it and transfer the investigation to civilian police. “Immediately” is one of those words that looks quite reassuring in legislation but behaves rather less co-operatively in real life. In practice, the first hours of an investigation are often the most sensitive. Evidence is fragile, scenes need securing and victims may need safeguarding. Crucially, the question of who is best placed to take operational control may depend on facts that are not yet fully known. There will be cases where civilian forces are clearly the best placed from the outset—I suspect that they may be the majority—but there will also be cases where service police are already on the ground, embedded in the environment and uniquely placed to stabilise the situation before any handover, if necessary, can sensibly take place. What worries me slightly is that we risk turning a sensible presumption of civilian involvement into a rigid statutory trigger that may inadvertently disrupt good policing practice at exactly the wrong moment. The second concern is more about coherence than timing. The amendment fixes jurisdiction by reference to the area where the offence took place. Again, that will work perfectly well in many cases, but the armed forces are not always known for their geographical neatness. People move, units deploy and conduct straddles locations. Investigations often involve a mixture of service personnel and civilians across different parts of the country. My concern is not that the principle is wrong but that a rigid allocation rule may create friction between agencies at precisely the moment when co-ordination matters the most. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, I have concerns about the role of service policing itself. The service police and the Defence Serious Crime Command are not an inferior version of civilian policing. They are specialised and professional, and they often operate in environments that civilian forces are simply not structured to manage at first contact. If we were starting from scratch, we would not design two parallel systems and hope they never meet; we would design integrated systems with clear rules on information sharing, handover and joint working. That is where the real answer to this question lies. What I do not want us to do—however well intentioned the amendment is—is accidentally create a system where the service police are required to stand down too early or where information is transferred without the structured co-ordination that makes investigations effective. That is a defence not of silos, but of joined-up working between different agencies. This is where I come to what I think would improve the Bill more than the amendment. What we really need is not just a duty to refer but a clear statutory expectation of mandatory information sharing and structured joint working between service police and civilian forces when dealing with sexual offences and domestic abuse. That would achieve the spirit of the amendment, and I think it would do so more reliably, without removing operational discretion at the earliest and most sensitive stage of any investigation. With that in mind, I gently press the Minister on this point. I do so in the spirit of someone who, prior to coming to Parliament, has sat through enough briefings to know that when everybody says, “Of course, we already share information effectively,” the definition of “effectively” remains quite different in different organisations. Will the Minister give a clear commitment that the Government will ensure mandatory enforceable information sharing arrangements between the service police and civilian police forces in all cases involving sexual offences and domestic abuse? If that commitment is forthcoming, a great deal of the concern behind the amendment would arguably fall away. It would ensure that civilian forces are engaged early, that victims do not fall between systems, and that service police are not left operating in isolation or ambiguity. Although I support the broad intent of amendment 6 and its aims of ensuring serious allegations are handled properly and consistently, I am afraid that I am not persuaded that the current drafting is the best way to achieve that aim. I worry that it may constrain operational judgment in ways that are not fully intended. I am, however, keen that we do not lose sight of the objective. I would strongly welcome the opportunity to work with colleagues across the House to refine this approach, potentially on Report, in a way that better balances mandatory co-operation with operational flexibility. If we get that right, we will do two important things at once: we will strengthen confidence in the handling of the most serious allegations, and we will ensure that those responsible for investigating them are not inadvertently placed in a straitjacket that makes their job harder rather than easier. On that basis, I hope the Government will engage constructively and I look forward to continuing this conversation.

• 17 Mar 2026 · Jury Trials · Hansard source

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  11. What assessment he has made of the potential impact of his proposed changes to jury trials on the criminal justice system.

• 10 Mar 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bolsover (Natalie Fleet). Although she is on the opposite side of the debate from me, she always speaks with huge passion on these issues. I should start with a couple of declarations. First, my wife is a sitting employment judge, and therefore the tribunal element of the Bill pertains to her. Secondly, like many right hon. and hon. Members in this Chamber, I was a barrister immediately prior to coming into this place, and I maintain my practising certificate. I hope the hon. Lady will indulge me if I pontificate on this issue for a few moments. While I was not a criminal barrister, I did a significant amount of inquest work, so I had face-to-face, first-hand experience with jurors, and I can say without a shadow of a doubt that they are the most remarkable, ordinary people, who give up their time for civic engagement. They sit there quietly, listening to the evidence; they take their role seriously; and they sit in judgment and make findings of fact. That is a huge constitutional principle. We have talked about rights, and I am not going to pretend that there is an innate right to a trial by jury, but there is a firm constitutional principle of ensuring that justice is not merely done to the public, but that it is done with the public. We all know about the problem of court backlogs. It would be a farce to pretend that this is not a significant and serious issue—it is a failure of the state that we have got to this place. It is a failure of successive Governments, and we recognise that across the board, but the question we have to ask ourselves is not whether trial by jury should be abandoned; it is whether the reforms that are before this House, with the scrutiny that has been undertaken and the impact assessment that accompanies the Bill, constitute sufficient evidence for making such a reform to this country’s constitution. What the Bill asks for is very clear, and we have to be honest about it. We are asking for a shift in the balance between the state and its people, and that may lead to inequality before the law. Take the prime example raised by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and Tavistock (Sir Geoffrey Cox): that of two individuals who, on a factual matrix, committed precisely the same crime. Those individuals appear before the court, but one has a string of previous convictions. Are we really saying that a person should be denied the opportunity of a jury trial if they have not previously been of bad character? That is a nonsense, and it does not achieve what we should be seeking to achieve. The further point, of course, is that if we are making such a constitutional change on the basis that it will enable us to deal with the backlog in the criminal courts, why is there no sunset clause in the Bill? Why are we not saying that the purpose of the Bill is to shift the dial and make progress, but that we recognise that it should not be a blank cheque for the state? We should recognise that if this change has to be made—although I do not believe it does—it should be made on a limited basis, because if we are to change a right that is older than most institutions in this country, the least Parliament should do is base its decision on more than just an assumption in the impact assessment. Let me turn to the modelling, which was also raised by the shadow Justice Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for West Suffolk (Nick Timothy). In this House on 3 February, I asked the Lord Chancellor a question about the 20% reduction in the time taken by court hearings. He gave me a very clear answer—that he accepted Sir Brian Leveson’s findings, but that the Government would publish their own modelling alongside the Bill. However, page 10 of the impact assessment is very clear that the Government have adopted Sir Brian’s assumption. That is an assumption; it is not modelling. There is a distinct difference. Analysis is helpful, but modelling is critical, and if we are weighing up the evidence base for the Bill, we have to have more than analysis alone.

• 10 Mar 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is right. First, there is the argument that this is of such constitutional significance that it should have been in a manifesto. Secondly, there is the argument that there was a proposal within the manifesto that the Government are not bringing forward. Thirdly, this is about getting the right settlement for the public, where they are judged by a body of their peers on the evidence before them. That is as opposed to a distant judge, who perhaps at times appears aloof, which fails to achieve that balance. We are being asked today to curtail a constitutional safeguard that has been apparent for so many years, and it goes much further than Sir Brian’s report. There were many good things in that report, but this legislation goes much further than any of his suggestions. We have to ask what the real issues are. They are plain to see. There are too few judges and too few advocates able to prosecute or defend the cases. There are too few functioning courtrooms. Removing jury trials will not fix any of that. There is a further issue that the Government have failed to address, which is around the recruitment of magistrates. We know that in this country, recruitment cycles of magistrates have often not returned the numbers required. The presumption must be that the reason the Government did not adopt Sir Brian’s recommendation of having two magistrates as wing members was because they knew they could not recruit a sufficient number of magistrates to implement it. There is logic on that front, but if we are pushing more cases down to the magistrates court, who will be able to hear them and listen to them? Who will be able to draw those conclusions? My final point, which I will make briefly, pertains to parliamentary scrutiny. The Bill will be rushed through this House and through Committee. It will get a mere five days in Committee, but it is of such constitutional importance. There is strong feeling across the House both for and against these proposals. Would it not be wiser in such circumstances to adopt an approach similar to what we do for armed forces Bills, for example, where we have a Select Committee of the House? Members with experience within the law and with experience of being victims could scrutinise the legislation and come back with a report. We could then do Report stage on the Floor of the House. That way, the country can know that we have given this legislation the due regard that it deserves. There is a reason that jury trials have endured, and it is because they command the trust of the public. They ensure that the law is exercised with public participation. If the Government believe in diluting that right, they must provide the evidence for that change, and thus far they have failed to do so.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Court Reporting Data · Hansard source

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  There is an obligation on anyone who is aware of a data breach to report it to the Information Commissioner’s Office no later than 72 hours after becoming aware of it. Can the Minister say when the MOJ was first aware of the issues relating to Courtsdesk, and when the MOJ reported those issues to the ICO?

• 3 Feb 2026 · Universal Credit (Removal of Two Child Limit) Bill · Hansard source

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  It would be a safety net if it provided a short-term boost. What it does instead is provide an endless cheque book without any checks and balances in place. If there was a sunset clause, that would be different, but there is not. The two-child limit was about more than blame; it was about balance. It recognised that a welfare system without boundaries eventually loses legitimacy altogether, and when legitimacy is lost, discourse soon follows. That is the great unspoken risk of this Bill: it does not merely expand spending, but weakens trust; it widens the gap between those who give and those who receive and, in doing so, puts the whole settlement at risk. What is fundamentally missing from this Bill is any serious strategy for mobility. Where are the plans for skills, for progression, for family stability and for moving people from welfare into work? Instead, the Bill simply offers the politics of reassurance without reform, comfort without challenge, spending without strategy and debt without direction. The Conservatives recognise the importance of lifting people up, of not holding them down and of providing opportunity and not permanent subsidy. The true measure of social justice is not how many people we support, but, crucially, how many people we no longer need to support. The question before us, therefore, is whether we will tackle poverty at its root or merely manage it year after year; whether we will build a system that strengthens families or one that substitutes for them; and whether we will choose the easy road or the responsible one. This Bill chooses the easy road—it chooses sentiment over structure, expansion over reform and today over tomorrow. I simply cannot support that choice.

• 15 Jan 2026 · Prisons: Illegal Drugs · Hansard source

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  Does the hon. Gentleman share my deep disappointment and concern about the position that the Ministry of Justice finds itself in? The research and development phase for counter-drone activity has not been strengthened, and we have frequent episodes of drones bypassing prison security.

• 13 Jan 2026 · Emergency and Life-Saving Skills (Schools) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That leave be given to bring in a Bill to require the teaching in schools of skills relating to emergency situations, including life-saving skills; and for connected purposes. This Bill seeks to ensure that every child leaving school possesses the knowledge and skills to respond effectively in emergencies, including life-threatening situations. It is about equipping young people with capabilities that matter beyond the classroom—skills that can preserve life and, in certain circumstances, protect communities. Every year, thousands of people in England find themselves at the centre of sudden, chaotic emergencies, such as a child at the roadside following a road traffic collision, a victim of knife crime bleeding out, or a medical emergency unfolding while onlookers wait for an ambulance, watching as precious minutes slip away. All they want to do is help, but too many do not know how. Not infrequently, the question asked afterwards is not what went wrong, but why no one present knew what to do. Most emergencies do not happen in hospitals; they happen in our homes, on our streets and on our roadsides. It is in those first critical moments, before professional help arrives, that outcomes are often determined—not by advanced medicine, but by whether those present can recognise what is happening, act decisively, and summon help effectively. Evidence consistently shows that early recognition and rapid intervention save lives. Delay, confusion or failure to communicate accurately with the emergency services can be fatal, but despite this, our education system still leaves too much to chance. At present, whether a young person is taught how to recognise an emergency, to remain calm under pressure, to summon help accurately, or to apply basic lifesaving interventions depends largely on postcode, school discretion or family circumstance. Some pupils receive that knowledge, but many do not—there is simply no guarantee. That is not a criticism of our schools or our teachers, who already shoulder enormous responsibility; it is simply a recognition that we have not set a clear, national expectation that these skills matter. This Bill seeks to close that gap. The Bill is built around three core aims. The first is to ensure that pupils can recognise emergency situations quickly and accurately. The difference between an accident and an emergency is not always obvious, particularly under pressure, so training pupils to assess severity, identify immediate danger and understand when urgent action is required is foundational. Secondly, the Bill seeks to prioritise effective summoning of emergency assistance. Knowing how to contact the emergency services, what information to provide, how to remain calm, and how to follow instructions given by call handlers is not always instinctive; it must be taught. Clear communication saves time, and time saves lives. Thirdly, the Bill seeks to ensure pupils receive practical, hands-on instruction in the most critical lifesaving interventions, with particular emphasis on the management of catastrophic bleeding. Uncontrolled haemorrhage is one of the leading causes of preventable death in trauma. Pupils should learn how to identify severe bleeding, apply direct pressure, use tourniquets where appropriate, and act decisively to stabilise a casualty while prioritising their own safety. This should include formal “stop the bleed” training. These lifesaving skills are not, of course, confined to domestic accidents. In mass-casualty scenarios, such as terrorist-style attacks, the rapid recognition of danger, safe decision making and early bleeding control can save multiple lives before the emergency services arrive. What is equally important is that pupils should be trained to assess risk to themselves, to avoid secondary harm and to act only when it is safe to do so. It is not about encouraging recklessness, but fostering informed, disciplined action. The importance of that cannot be overstated. In emergencies, well-intentioned but untrained bystanders can inadvertently worsen outcomes or place themselves in danger. The training envisaged under this Bill should instil practical resilience: knowing when to act, how to act and when not to act. Evidence shows that repeated practice and realistic simulations significantly improve retention and the likelihood of effective intervention under pressure. The Bill’s objectives are reinforced by the work of such organisations as citizenAID, which has led the way in educating young people on safe responses to major incidents. CitizenAID was founded by two of my former bosses: Professor Sir Keith Porter and Major General Tim Hodgetts. I had the pleasure of hosting them for a drop-in event in Parliament last year. Its programmes demonstrate that pupils can learn to recognise threats, manage catastrophic bleeding, communicate effectively and act without panic. Its work shows that structured training builds competence and confidence, particularly in high-stress scenarios. This Bill is not about turning children into paramedics; it is not about overloading the curriculum; and it is not about replacing professional emergency services. It is about ensuring that every young person leaves school equipped with a core set of practical, age-appropriate skills: how to recognise an emergency, how to respond safely, how to communicate clearly with emergency services and, critically, how to provide basic lifesaving assistance until help arrives. Preparedness is not a niche concern, but a matter of resilience. One day, any one of us may depend not on a professional, but on a passer-by. That passer-by may be a young person standing there, willing and wanting to help, but uncertain what to do in the circumstances. That uncertainty is not inevitable. Importantly, this Bill does not propose radical change. Many countries already include emergency response skills within their education systems. Here, we teach elements of first aid and health and safety in different ways, but we lack consistency and the assurance that every child will receive that education. Concerns about pressure on the school curriculum are understandable, but the Bill does not require wholesale reform, nor does it impose excessive burdens. Training can be delivered through a combination of classroom teaching, practical workshops and simulations, all supported by qualified instructors, the emergency services and voluntary organisations. The focus must be on gaining those essential, high-impact skills. The intent behind the Bill reflects a broader societal responsibility. It is not about ideology; it simply recognises that preserving life is a fundamental public good. Pupils trained in these skills will carry them into their homes, their workplaces and their communities, thereby having a multiplier effect. In doing so, schools will contribute directly to national resilience and public safety. This Bill proposes clarity and coherence: a national expectation that lifesaving knowledge is a fundamental part of the curriculum, as much as literacy or numeracy, when it comes to preparing young people for the real world. International experience reinforces that argument. Countries that embed emergency response training in schools see higher levels of bystander intervention, improved survival rates and greater public confidence. It also reflects a broader truth that resilience begins long before a crisis occurs and is built through education, confidence and preparation. By equipping young people with these skills, we not only improve outcomes in emergencies, but foster responsibility, calm decision making and a willingness to act for others. This Bill is deliberately rooted in prevention rather than reaction, and in empowerment rather than fear. No legislation can prevent every tragedy, but we can ensure that when emergencies happen, as they inevitably will, the people closest are not left powerless. This Bill does not ask the House to make a dramatic leap in policy; it asks us to take a sensible, proportionate step to ensure that our education system reflects the realities of the world our young people will face. The hardest burden for any of us to carry is not that we tried and failed, but that a life was lost while we stood by, not through indifference, but through the absence of knowledge this House could have chosen to provide. Question put and agreed to. Ordered, That Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst, John Cooper, Lincoln Jopp, Charlie Dewhirst, Blake Stephenson, Bradley Thomas and Jim Shannon present the Bill. Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst accordingly presented the Bill. Bill read the First time; to be read a Second time on Friday 29 May, and to be printed (Bill 362).

• 7 Jan 2026 · Jury Trials · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman is entirely right: there is no mandate for this decision. It represents such a significant constitutional change to our legal system, and it is being made without reference to the will of the people. Justice delayed is indeed justice denied, but justice expedited at the cost of constitutional principle may prove a far greater denial still.

• 7 Jan 2026 · Jury Trials · Hansard source

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  The hon. Lady is right to a degree: there has been failure by successive Governments to invest in the criminal justice system. If we were serious about this issue in this place, we would look at cutting welfare, which spends the entirety of the Ministry of Justice’s annual budget in just two weeks. We need to prioritise spending, and the criminal justice system has been left high and dry for far too long by Governments of all colours. It is now routine for trials to be adjourned because defendants either arrive late or do not arrive at all, with juries discharged, witnesses turned away and days of court time lost as a consequence. These delays have nothing whatsoever to do with the presence of a jury, and everything to do with operational failure in the system. The next point I wish to make, and possibly the most grave, is about the erosion of the criminal Bar. We face a serious shortage of suitably qualified advocates both to prosecute and to defend. Cases are delayed because no one of appropriate experience is available or willing to take them on. That is not inefficiency, but attrition. Curtailing jury trial risks mistaking the symptom for the disease. Worse, it risks creating a system that is perhaps faster, but thinner, and ostensibly more efficient, but unquestionably less legitimate. I think of the words of Lord Hailsham, a former Lord Chancellor and one of the greatest legal minds of the previous century, who warned this very House of the dangers of an “elective dictatorship”, and the slow accretion of power to the state at the expense of the citizen. The jury trial is one of the great counterweights to that tendency, ensuring that the coercive power of criminal law is exercised only with the consent of the community. Juries do much more than merely find facts; they embody public confidence, guard against institutional complacency and remind us that justice is not something merely administered to the people, but done with them. If the Government believe that it is right to curtail that right, they must show clear evidence that jury trials cause the delay, that alternative modes of trial would be demonstrably faster, and that fairness, legitimacy and public confidence would not be diminished.

• 7 Jan 2026 · Jury Trials · Hansard source

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  The right to trial by jury is not some procedural convenience capable of being abridged when the administrative weather turns foul; it is one of the great constitutional expressions of liberty under the law. It is overwhelmingly legitimate, because it places the citizen, and not the state, at the heart of criminal judgment. When the state proposes to narrow the circumstances in which it must persuade 12 of a defendant’s peers, it is not merely managing a backlog; it is fundamentally recalibrating the balance between the individual and the Crown. There is no doubt that the criminal justice system is under acute strain. Victims and defendants wait too long. Justice is stretched thin. However, the issue before us is not whether reform is necessary, but whether this reform is justified, proportionate and supported by evidence.

• 7 Jan 2026 · Jury Trials · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is entirely right, and I will touch on some of those points in a moment. There has quite rightly been much reliance on Sir Brian Leveson’s report; he is a jurist of great distinction, and his work deserves careful reading, rather than convenient citation. Notwithstanding his analysis, this is a fundamental change to our legal system, and what is conspicuously absent from the Government’s argument is compelling evidence that jury trials are the principal driver of delay. If we are serious about confronting the backlog, we must look unflinchingly at the real causes: the prosaic but decisive failures of capacity, of which the jury trial is merely the most visible casualty. The first issue is judicial sitting days. Courts cannot hear cases without judges. For too long, we have rationed judicial time as though it were a luxury, rather than the lifeblood of the system. Courtrooms stand idle not because juries cannot be summoned, but because there are no judges available to sit. The second issue is the court estate. In too many parts of the country, criminal courts are dilapidated, unreliable and, frankly, unfit for purpose. Trials are delayed because of leaking roofs, broken technology and inadequate facilities.