Neil Shastri-Hurst MP: speeches

Speeches

• 25 Jun 2025 · Criminal Justice · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman raises an important point about court backlogs. Another factor is having the appropriate magistrates, legal advisers and so on to hear these cases. The Magistrates’ Association has raised concerns that the spending review allocation is insufficient to tackle that. Does he share those concerns?

• 19 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman speaks with a huge amount of experience and knowledge in this area. Of course, what he describes would be the default setting, but there may be scenarios in which a qualified healthcare worker is in the vicinity and can provide the support that that individual needs before the police can get there. The clause seeks to provide that flexibility. I acknowledge the split in the Committee on this, but the clause has some significant advantages: reducing police involvement in mental health crises, where that is most appropriate; improving response times, as I have just touched on; and supporting de-escalation. I accept that there are operational and legal questions to be addressed, but we are here to look at all the potential scenarios. The Minister has clearly set out the consequences of removing the clause from the Bill, but it is perfectly possible that a Government Member on the Committee will choose to support it, and I therefore seek some clarification from the Minister on the operational and legal challenges around training, oversight and the uniformity of authorised roles were the clause to remain part of the Bill. How would training standards be mandated for authorised persons and who would accredit them? How would consistency in practice be ensured across NHS trusts and ambulance services? Will the Minister also clarify the liability position in a case in which an authorised person used force or restraint during a removal?

• 19 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to speak briefly to clause 50, which expands the authority to remove individuals under Mental Health Act powers by allowing trained and authorised non-police personnel to carry out removals that previously could be carried out only by police constables. A couple of key changes arise from the clause. First, the clause provides for the inclusion of authorised persons by amending sections 135 and 136 of the 1983 Act. That will allow individuals other than police officers, if they are authorised—“authorised” is the important word—to remove and transport people under Mental Health Act powers. That provides wider operational flexibility, and includes removals under warrant, by virtue of section 135, and without a warrant in public places. It is predicated on the fact that those authorised persons are appropriately trained and designated. Prior to the clause being inserted into the Bill, only police officers could carry out removals.

• 19 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  You will be pleased to know that I will be briefer this time, Mrs Harris; I want to leave room for my Opposition colleagues. The intent of the clause is entirely sound: to treat mental health as a health issue, not a criminal one. However, the capacity of NHS services to provide timely and suitable alternatives remains in question. With that in mind, I have three questions that I hope the Minister will be able to address. First, will the Government commit to publishing the implementation plan for ensuring adequate numbers of health-based places of safety across regions before the clause comes into force? Secondly, what contingency measures are currently in place or foreseen if no place of safety is available and police powers have been limited? Thirdly, can the Minister commit to an annual publication of data on hospital-based places of safety, their capacity and their use?

• 17 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to speak in support of clauses 36 to 40, which provide critical legal clarification and technical refinements to the 1993 Act. While differing in scope and impact, each of these provisions is underpinned by a clear shared commitment to enhance public protection, uphold patient rights, and ensure that the legal framework reflects both current clinical practice and developments in case law. Let me begin with clause 36, which addresses a long-standing lacuna in the legislative architecture governing conditionally discharged restricted patients. It follows the 2018 Supreme Court ruling in the case of Secretary of State of Justice v. MM, where it became clear that the existing Mental Health Act did not permit the imposition of conditions amounting to a deprivation of liberty as part of conditional discharge. The decision created uncertainty for clinicians, tribunals and, most crucially, risk-managed patients living in the community. It is therefore pleasing to see that clause 36 seeks to address that gap. The clause introduces new statutory powers for both the Secretary of State and the first-tier tribunal, in respect of imposing deprivation of liberty conditions in the community. It does so with some stringent safeguards.

• 17 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Mrs Harris. I rise to speak on clauses 30 to 33, which go to the core of the rights architecture that surrounds mental health law in this country—namely, the oversight and challenge mechanisms available to individuals subject to detention, supervision or conditional discharge. I think we are all aware that the 1983 Act, although fit for its time, has failed to keep pace with the evolving understanding of mental health illness and modern expectations of legal accountability or procedural fairness. The clauses, although technical in nature, seek to rectify a number of the long-standing shortcomings in the operation of the mental health tribunal system. Clause 30 will extend and clarify the time period within which patients may apply to tribunals. Essentially, it will do two things. First, it will extend the application window for section 2 patients—those detained for assessment—from 14 to 21 days. Secondly, it will reduce the initial waiting period for section 3 patients and those under guardianship from six months to three months. Those are sensible and overdue changes, because 14 days is a narrow window for any legal action, let alone one initiated by an individual who may be experiencing acute psychological distress. Extending the application window to 21 days provides a fairer opportunity to seek representation and prepare a meaningful application. Equally, the reduction of the initial period for section 3 and guardianship patients to three months offers an important safeguard against prolonged detention without scrutiny. It restores a measure of clarity between the gravity of the detention order and the speed with which it may be challenged. The clause will also clarify the rights of conditionally discharged restricted patients who are subject to deprivation of liberty conditions—that is, those who are discharged from hospital but required to comply with supervisional residence requirements that are so restrictive that they cross the legal threshold for a deprivation of liberty. At present, those individuals occupy a legal grey zone: they are not formally detained, yet the liberty they enjoy is so curtailed that it raises significant questions as to their article 5 rights. Clause 30 will properly address that anomaly by creating a defined, regular route of appeal, initially between six and 12 months from the imposition of the deprivation of liberty conditions, and biannually thereafter. Those are measured and proportionate changes that enhance access to justice, improve compliance with human rights obligations and restore clarity to a field that has suffered, at times, from legal opacity. The reforms are not without consequences. A wider cohort of eligible applicants and more frequent review periods will inevitably increase the burden on the tribunal service, on legal aid provision and on clinical teams who must prepare documents and attend hearings. That challenge is not to be dismissed lightly.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers. I rise to speak briefly to clause 7, which in many ways is a tidying up of the other changes in the Bill to ensure alignment. In that sense, it is a necessary part of this legislation. For too long, mental health tribunals, which have an important function, have been operating under criteria that are too broad. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth pointed out, that can lead to inconsistencies with modern clinical practice. It is therefore right that we move to clearer, more risk-based criteria to ensure that detention is maintained only where absolutely necessary. There are obvious reasons behind that, such as to ensure greater consistency in tribunal decision making and strong safeguards to ensure that patients are only detained or kept under community treatment orders when absolutely necessary. I want to pick up some of the arguments my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth was developing around the demands on the tribunal service. The Minister will be well aware of the challenges facing the court and tribunal system in this country. If, as anticipated, this will lead to an increase in the number of hearings—both in first instance and potentially in appeal—what assessment has been made as to the number of not only judges, but wing members that will be required to facilitate this process? What has been determined regarding the capacity of the resources of His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service—in terms of not only physical hard standing, but the vital role that clerks and tribunal staff play in ensuring that hearings are done in a timely manner and the paperwork is completed consistently? Thirdly, what is the expectation of the sustainability of that workload as the Bill comes into fruition? I pick up on that in particular, because, given the transition arrangements that appear to be within the legislation, this will be a retrospective as well as a prospective change. I would be grateful if the Minister in summing up could address those issues.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Furniss. I rise to speak to Liberal Democrat amendments 20, 10, 22, 24 and 21, and set out why, although I think they are honourable in their intent, I am unable to support them today. I will start with amendment 20. The purpose of the amendment is to require ICBs to ensure the availability of specialist crisis accommodation for people with autism and learning disabilities. The aim is to provide a safe and therapeutic alternative to detention, which I think we would all agree is a sensible course of action. Section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 allows police to remove an individual who is experiencing a mental health crisis from a public place to a place of safety. That can, on unfortunate occasions, lead to detention in inappropriate settings, which may include police cells. That can obviously be deeply harmful, particularly to those with conditions such as autistic spectrum disorder or other learning difficulties.

• 22 May 2025 · Business of the House · Hansard source

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  The petition to protect Northern Ireland veterans from prosecution has, in a matter of days, amassed over 98,500 signatures. Will the Leader of the House commit that the petition, once it reaches the 100,000-signature threshold, will be granted debating time at the earliest opportunity?

• 22 May 2025 · Independent Sentencing Review · Hansard source

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  Public confidence in the criminal justice system—and, importantly, the confidence of victims—is paramount. Since 2010, the use of community-based orders has decreased by 61%. That is in no small part because of concerns about offender engagement in the process. If the Government are going to pursue this route, what steps has the Lord Chancellor taken to model how many will reoffend and, more importantly, that they will be rigorously reinforced?

• 16 May 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her intervention. That is a very powerful personal story from Noah, who I think reflects the maturity of many young people when dealing with these challenging issues. By imposing, in effect, a statutory gag in this one area, new clauses 1 and 2 risk infantilising terminally ill patients, creating a chilling effect on communication at the very moment when clarity and compassion are most needed. If anything, new clauses 1 and 2 may result in harm to patients, forcing them to suffer in silence, unaware of lawful options simply because they do not know how to ask. Finally, I turn to new clause 9, which presents a number of issues. In the first instance, subsection (1) would permit there to be, in effect, two different standards of proof. That must be legal nonsense. The boundaries of any legal test or hurdle must be clear. A failure to do so creates a great deal of uncertainty. Furthermore, the proposal to shift the standard of proof from the civil to the criminal, requiring panels to operate on the standard of beyond reasonable doubt, is deeply inappropriate. The balance of probabilities is the cornerstone of medical and civil decision making. To adopt a criminal threshold risks freezing the entire process, creating a very risk-averse system.

• 16 May 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman for his intervention. These are individuals who are making this ultimate choice for themselves. My fear is that this well-intentioned new clause would make the Bill so unusable as to become ineffective. We are not prosecuting a crime here; we are enabling a choice under tightly prescribed circumstances. While I accept that each of these new clauses in their own way seeks to improve the Bill, we must be cautious about layering protections to the point of paralysis. The Bill as drafted is not a blank cheque—it contains safeguards, panel oversight and rigorous eligibility criteria. Let us not bury its moral clarity under legal clutter. In defending this legislation, we are not abandoning care; we are affirming dignity. Let us do so with confidence and reject these amendments.

• 15 May 2025 · Recalled Offenders: Sentencing Limits · Hansard source

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  Has the Ministry of Justice conducted an impact assessment for this policy? If so, will it release that to the House as soon as possible? If not, can the Lord Chancellor confirm how she knows what impact the policy will have on victims and the wider public?

• 1 Apr 2025 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  T4. What further information did the Foreign Secretary have that led him to make a decision that differed from the detailed objections of the police, the security services and our allies, and to support the new Chinese super-embassy? Will he share that information with the House?

• 18 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Although I have certain sympathies with these amendments, I do not feel that they are necessary or desirable. They are not necessary because of the provisions that are already stipulated in clause 18(6)(b), which provides the co-ordinating doctor with the ability to prepare “a medical device which will enable that person to self-administer the substance”. That subsection, in effect, negates the scenario that is put forward in amendment 350 around dysphagia or the loss of a limb. It would permit, for example, the use of a nasogastric tube or a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy feeding tube to be used for the administration of the substance in the case of dysphagia. In the case of the functional loss of limbs, as was discussed in the debate on the previous group, a range of assisted technologies are available that would remove the barriers that that would present. Beyond the necessity, or lack of necessity, of these amendments, I fear that they create legal uncertainty, which is clearly undesirable and, in this instance, could have a serious and significant unintended consequence through the amendments’ interaction with clause 24. Subsection (3) of that clause inserts proposed new section 2AA of the Suicide Act 1961, which is an exemption to that Act in respect of the assistance provided under this Bill. In effect, proposed new section 2AA disapplies sections 2(1) and 2A(1) of the Suicide Act where the provision of assistance is done in accordance with the Bill. Those sections specifically relate to an act “capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another person”. Introducing the concept of additional assistance, as these amendments would, creates a legal uncertainty. The word “additional” creates a further concept that is beyond assistance but is, thus far, ill defined. Would it go as far as, for example, the clinician taking full control of administering the substance? It is entirely unclear. It would therefore place the clinician in an invidious position as to what it would mean for them to provide additional assistance in such circumstances. As I read the interplay between the Suicide Act and the proposed legislation, the clinician would not then be exempt by virtue of clause 24(3), leaving them open to prosecution under the Act.

• 13 Feb 2025 · Reform of Private Family Law Hearings · Hansard source

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  It is a sad reality of life that marriages fail. It can happen for a variety of reasons, and I do not seek to provide a critique on the underlying causes in today’s debate. However, one of the tragic consequences of divorce is the disruption and pain that it causes to children. It is evident that an amicable relationship between parents would enable arrangements in respect of where a child resides following a divorce to be made without the intervention of the courts, avoiding much additional heartache and the adversarial nature of contested hearings; but such contested hearings cannot be avoided in each and every case. While it may be the intention of the system to protect the privacy of individuals and families during these hearings, the reality is an increasingly inefficient and, at times, unresponsive system that fails to place the emotional and psychological needs of the parties at its centre. The flaws in the present system are regrettably clear for all to see, and in failing to address them, parties are left with a system that undermines the very values that it seeks to uphold—values such as fairness and natural justice, with the wellbeing of children at their core. This is such a vast topic that it would be inconceivable to address all the issues in the course of an Adjournment debate, and I will therefore focus on the constitution of those on the bench who hear child arrangement order cases. The reason is simple: the anchor point in all family law cases involving a child should always be that child’s best interests, and the creation of an outcome that supports and promotes the child’s safety and emotional and psychological wellbeing and protects his or her future prospects. It is almost inevitable that each and every Member of this House will have had experience of child arrangement orders in some way, shape or form, whether through constituency casework, personal experience or family and friends, because such cases are sadly far from rare. If you will indulge me, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will tell the story of one such case, which I suspect will resonate with many up and down the country, because it is sadly an all-too-familiar experience. This is the story of a young child who, by virtue of their age, cannot fully articulate their wants or desires, whose loyalty is split in two, who does not want to be seen to betray either parent, who is already dealing with their world being turned upside down and whose future is decided in a sterile magistrates court, often as a mere timetabling exercise. That child now faces birthdays, Christmas and Easter all split in half, with weeks cut in two and weekends alternating between one household and another, leaving them with no sense of oikophilia—the love of home. This is a child who feels different from their classmates because they are forced to go to school with their overnight bag; a child who constantly lives with the anxiety of turning up to school without their sports kit because it is at the other parent’s house; a child who feels nomadic, often confused and invariably distressed. The scale of the problem can be seen starkly in the figures from the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service. As of 31 August last year, there were 16,671 open private law children’s cases involving 25,670 children. In the first quarter of 2024, the average time for such cases to reach a final order was some 44 weeks. During that period, children are left with uncertainty. Magistrates have formed an integral element of the England and Wales legal system since the 12th century and the reign of Richard I, who appointed the first keepers of the peace. Almost 200 years later, pursuant to the Justices of the Peace Act 1361, the term “justice of the peace” was formally introduced. I do not propose reform of the role of magistrates lightly. However, I have reached the view that there is an overwhelming policy argument for doing so. I am not for one moment suggesting that magistrates do not have an important role to play in the justice system; self-evidently, that would be a fallacy. However, I am increasingly convinced that the nature and focus of their work should be reconsidered, and in the case of child arrangement orders, it is my overwhelming view that the magistrates court should no longer play a role. The reason for mounting this argument is simple: there is an inequality in our legal system when it comes to private law family cases. These are cases that decide the nature and degree of contact a child has with each parent, determine the long-term future of a child and, by their very nature, have a significant, lasting impact upon any child. Presently in this country, private law children’s cases can be heard before a bench of three magistrates or a district judge with a family ticket. Magistrates are a lay bench who, well-meaning as they may be, are not required to hold any formal legal qualification. While magistrates undergo some specific training following their appointment, it is not more than a handful of days a year. In comparison, a district judge hearing such cases undergoes much more rigorous training and must have a law qualification as a prerequisite. The stakes in cases such as these could not be higher. This singular, most important decision, if misjudged, can set in motion a truly devastating series of events, thereby irreversibly damaging a child and their life chances. Let us contrast that with the role of magistrates in the criminal courts. The maximum sentence that magistrates can hand down is 12 months. Sentences beyond that are remitted to the Crown court to be heard by a circuit judge. In comparison, a decision about a child’s domestic arrangements until adulthood are frequently made by individuals with no specialist knowledge or training in family law. Furthermore, in the absence of formal legal training, subconscious bias is likely to run higher among magistrates than among members of the judiciary. We can also take note of the approach taken by other courts in England and Wales. Specialist judges preside over employment, immigration, business and property, and social entitlement cases. Even in cases where a panel of three hears the case, it is a legally qualified, specialist judge who sits in the chair. Given the importance of such decisions to a child’s long-term prospects, the outdated practice of magistrates hearing private law children’s cases should, in my humble opinion, be abolished. It is an inefficient and unreliable system of dispensing justice in the modern world, and it runs the risk of reaching inconsistent decisions of varying and questionable quality. Far too often, one hears of cases simply being decided as a timetabling exercise, and of a child’s weekly diary being carved up without proper thought or consideration of the impact on that child. Removing the role of magistrates in private law family cases, and ensuring that all such cases are heard by a specialist family judge, would ensure greater consistency of decision making, applying a more judicious and impartial approach. On this most consequential of issues, we should ensure that those who preside over family cases are not only appropriately legally trained but well versed in the emotional, psychological and social factors at play. There should be much greater focus on ensuring that decision makers are trained in childhood development, domestic abuse dynamics and trauma-informed practices. The system in England and Wales is virtually unique in permitting lay magistrates to determine such matters, with most jurisdictions across the world entrusting the decision to a suitably qualified judge. In more complex cases, we should consider the use of specialised panels, as deployed in other tribunals. Such panels could have a judge as chair and suitably qualified wing members, who may include experts in child psychology. By adopting this model, the panel can take a more holistic approach to decision making. My ask of the Minister is very simple. If we aim to create a better future for our children, if we truly believe in progress and not merely maintaining the status quo, and if we are to be believed when we talk of improving life chances for generations to come, the Minister should commit to reforming this outdated and harmful system, and ensure that all child arrangement cases are appropriately considered by a qualified judge.

• 11 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend makes a valid point. I have concerns about public confidence in the Bill without that additional safeguard, as this is such a consequential decision, but of course any advance directive would be predicated on having gone through those two stages first before capacity is lost. I feel that on this occasion additional tightening is necessary so that the public can be confident that a robust process has been gone through. The MCA is a tried and tested piece of legislation used by practitioners up and down the country. The hon. Member for Stroud uses it every day in his practice; I have to say that I did not, but I was not consenting patients for surgery every day. Every time I did so, however, I had those conversations. Capacity lies on a spectrum: if I am doing major abdominal surgery, the level of capacity required to make a decision will be much greater than if I am removing a small bump or lump on an arm. As well as having been tried and tested by medical practitioners, the MCA has been tested in the courts, as the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge said. It has been right up to the highest court in this land, it has been robustly tested and it has been found to be good legislation. The risk we now face is that it will be replaced not only with a new legal concept, but with an entirely different process for assessing capacity in this setting. Although there may be good intentions to improve the system, that will only add to the folly of it and overcomplicate the issue.

• 30 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I will direct this question initially to Mr Greenwich. The issue of coercion has been a significant concern to many in the debate. In line with the New South Wales legislation, the Bill as proposed does not provide a definition of coercion, either explicitly or by reference to other legislation. Have you found that to pose a difficulty in your jurisdiction? Alex Greenwich: In New South Wales, our legislation deals with and goes through coercion in quite some detail, with pathways to assess it. It deals specifically, for example, with a situation in which someone is under coercion from a person who is a beneficiary of their will; obviously, the person seeking voluntary assisted dying then becomes ineligible. In the space of coercion, that is a key part of the training for a doctor who will be a consulting or co-ordinating practitioner. We have made it a criminal offence in New South Wales, and indeed our board will report on it and on whether eligibility for access to voluntary assisted dying has been denied to someone. Our most recent report indicates that it has. The overwhelming experience is that having voluntary assisted dying in place is itself a safeguard from coercion for people with a terminal illness. If someone wants to end their life quickly, voluntary assisted dying through a regulated process is not the option that they are going to take. Someone engaging in voluntary assisted dying will be assessed against coercion and against decision-making capacity, and will have to make sure it is an enduring decision. When we talk about coercion, and the concern that people may currently have in the UK about people with a terminal illness feeling in any way coerced, the experience in New South Wales and elsewhere in Australia is that voluntary assisted dying has provided a safeguard in that regard. Our legislation, the training and the reporting is very clear on that.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Good morning, gentlemen. The initial discussion is dealt with in clause 4 of the Bill. There has been some significant concern about whether doctors should be initiating that conversation with patients who are terminally ill. The Bill states, in subsection (1): “No registered medical practitioner is under any duty to raise the subject of provision”. What are your views on the compatibility of that element of the Bill with the principles under Montgomery consent? Dr Green: Both of these items came about because of things that were in our policy, and we are pleased to see them in the Bill. You are right that assisted dying must not become just another tick-box thing that doctors mention to patients. That must not happen, and that is why we believe that it should not fall within those two Supreme Court judgements that you mentioned. But there is another side to that coin: we think that there are some circumstances in which doctors should be able to mention this to their patients. I will just explain why that might happen. The consultation shows that some patients find it very difficult to bring up sensitive subjects with their doctors, even when those are the most important thing on their mind. Doctors are aware of that, and I hope that we get very good at reading between the lines of what patients say to get at what is left unsaid. In those circumstances, we need to be able to open the door for the patient, so they can go into a safe space and have those difficult discussions. That is what we are talking about here. As a clinician, it is very difficult to know when to have those conversations. When we are battling with that internally, the last thing we would want is to feel the weight of legislation behind us, so please do not pass legislation that makes it harder for doctors to understand their patients. That is why it is important that in particular circumstances we should be able to gently raise the subject. Mark Swindells: The GMC sets guidance on decision making and consent, as you will know. That is based on the existing law, including the case law on Montgomery, so it puts a lot of weight on the patient’s autonomy, the patient’s role and the doctor’s role in supporting that in the provision of information on different options, including the option of no treatment. Our guidance follows the law, so were the law to change, we would look at it and accommodate. We do not have a formulated view on what the eligibility should be, but we know the BMA’s stance.

• 19 Dec 2024 · Knife Offences · Hansard source

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  I congratulate the Solicitor General on taking up her position. As a former trauma surgeon, I have seen at first hand the devastating effect of knife and other serious violent crime, so I welcome the Government’s specific commitment to halving knife crime within a decade. However, on the broader commitment on serious violent crime, no specifics have been provided to date. Will the Solicitor General tell the House which crimes are to be included, and the date by which that will be achieved?

• 12 Dec 2024 · Prison Capacity Strategy · Hansard source

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  This strategy does little more than commit to deliver the 14,000 places that the previous Government committed to delivering, except that it will cost more and take longer. To what extent have the Government factored in optimism bias when working out the delivery timeframe?

• 10 Dec 2024 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  Since the beginning of this year, 17 inmates have died at HMP Parc. It has been under the control of G4S since opening in 1997. What consideration has the Lord Chancellor made of returning the prison to the Ministry of Justice?

• 25 Nov 2024 · Israel-Gaza Conflict: Arrest Warrants · Hansard source

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  I have a degree of sympathy with the Minister, who has been asked to substitute in lieu of the Foreign Secretary today, so I will ask him a question of fact. Does he recognise that pursuant to section 23(6) of the International Criminal Court Act 2001, representatives of a non-state party to the Rome statute will remain immune from prosecution unless that non-state party expressly waives that right to the ICC?

• 14 Oct 2024 · Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill · Hansard source

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  I join others in the House in paying tribute to Figen Murray and her fellow campaigners, who have been tireless advocates for positive change. I also congratulate two new Members on their maiden speeches. I can tell the hon. Member for Tiverton and Minehead (Rachel Gilmour) that we could all do with a team of terrific stalwarts. I am sure that Mabel and Jesse will both be looking down, incredibly proud of her comments. I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Forest of Dean (Matt Bishop) for his service as a police officer and the courage that he showed in carrying out his duties. There can be no doubt in anyone’s mind about the importance of today’s debate. The horrific events that took place at Manchester Arena are forever etched in our collective memory. My thoughts are with all those affected by those and other terrorist attacks that we have sadly witnessed in recent years. When we are shaken by such egregious events, that reinforces the fact that the first responsibility of any Government, and of all of us on the green Benches, is the protection and safety of our citizens. It is incumbent on us to take action to prevent these tragic moments in history from repeating themselves. That is why I believe that the Bill is necessary to bring peace of mind and reassurance, and to enable us to stand up to those who seek to harm us and tear our communities apart. Notwithstanding my overarching support for the Bill, I note the significant requirements it places on the events, entertainment, and hospitality industries. Many in these industries are still recovering from the legacy of the pandemic. The financial requirements for compliance with the Bill add further pressures. I therefore invite the Minister to consider offering financial and logistical support, especially to smaller organisations that struggle to predict footfall. That is particularly pertinent to those premises that experience seasonal peaks and troughs over the course of the year. As the Bill currently stands, those local establishments will still fall under qualifying premises, as defined in clause 2(2)(c), and will be required to put in extra measures at personal cost. Terrorist attacks evolve at a rapid pace—much faster, as we have seen recently, than the time it takes for legislation to pass through the House. I therefore ask the Minister, first, what consideration has been given to accommodating that? Secondly, will there be regular reviews of the threats and countermeasures through the governing body? Finally, in its current state, the Bill does not accommodate organisations run by volunteers and temporary staff. Large places of worship and sporting venues rely on the good will of volunteers and paid agency staff at peak times. I therefore ask the Minister to engage with such organisations, to find a training arrangement that suits their capabilities as well as meeting the threshold of safety and security sought in the Bill. Those queries aside, I welcome the introduction of the Bill.