Neil Shastri-Hurst MP: speeches

Speeches

• 2 Jul 2025 · Space Weather · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That this House has considered the impact of space weather on the UK. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. There are debates in this House that deal with the visible challenges of our time, such as conflict, inflation and public services, and then every so often, there are those that deal with the dangers not yet on our doorstep, but hurtling towards us all the same. This is such a debate. The threat that I raise today does not wear a uniform, cross borders or sail across oceans. It travels from the heart of our solar system, faster than sound, silent and invisible. It is called space weather, and it poses one of the gravest risks to our modern way of life. I will start with a simple truth: the sun, for all its warmth and majesty, can also be a menace. It gives us energy, light and life, but without warning it can unleash waves of electromagnetic fury so powerful and indiscriminate that they can bring nations to a standstill in a matter of minutes. This is not speculation or science fiction; it is based on history and science, and it is an urgent question of national resilience. In 1859, a solar storm known as the Carrington event ignited telegraph wires, shocked operators and lit up the skies from Canada to the Caribbean. In the 21st century, such a storm would do more than send sparks down copper wires. It would knock out GPS, disable satellites, crash the grid, blind radar systems and paralyse entire regions. In 1989, Quebec’s power grid collapsed in under two minutes; schools shut, hospitals faltered and 6 million people were left in the dark. In 2012, a storm of Carrington magnitude missed Earth by just a matter of days. After that, NASA estimated that the global cost would have exceeded $2.6 trillion. In short, we are not speculating about what might happen; we are merely observing what has already happened, just not to us—or at least not yet. In effect, we are living between bullets: one already fired, another having just missed, and a third, we must assume, now chambered. We live in a nation defined by connection. Our power grid, transport system, banks, hospitals and military platforms are all linked, all digital and all dependent on space-borne technology. It is one of the great marvels of modern Britain. But it is also, if we are frank, one of our greatest vulnerabilities. A severe solar storm would not simply inconvenience us; it would disrupt the essential machinery of civilised life. High-frequency radios used by pilots and the armed forces fail. Satellites are disabled. Navigation systems go dark. Power lines are overloaded by geomagnetic surges, and cascading failures begin. The Met Office, supported by the Royal Academy of Engineering, has warned that a major event could leave parts of the UK without electricity for days or even weeks. When the power goes, everything else follows: the supermarket tills, the mobile networks, the ventilators and the pumps that keep our water flowing. The digital backbone of our modern state is silenced. It is not just a problem for astronomers or scientists in their white coats, but a matter of national security, public health, financial stability and strategic foresight. The United Kingdom does not enter this debate empty-handed. In 2021, the Cabinet Office and the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy produced the severe space weather preparedness strategy, which was a forward-looking and well-considered document. It identified three pillars: first, assessment to improve forecasting and monitoring; secondly, preparation to support resilience planning in key sectors; and thirdly, response and recovery to co-ordinate emergency action across Government, industry and services. Those are the right foundations, but as we all know, strategies do not defend countries; implementation does, and in that sense we are not yet where we need to be. Let me identify four urgent areas for action. First, preparedness must become mandatory, not voluntary. We rightly legislate to ensure that our infrastructure can cope with floods, so why not do the same for solar storms? We have the regulators—Ofcom, Ofgem and the Civil Aviation Authority—and we need them to require, not merely recommend, that resilience plans are in place. When the warning comes, it will not arrive with some sort of grace period. Secondly, we must harden our defence capability. Our armed forces are increasingly reliant on satellite-enabled systems, whether that is for communication, targeting or navigation. Every major platform, from Type 26 frigates to F-35 jets, integrates space-dependent systems. We must invest in hardened equipment and train to operate in degraded space conditions. We must fund research into back-up navigation systems and sovereign capabilities. The reality is that our adversaries are already preparing for such an environment and we must not be found lagging behind. Thirdly, we must strengthen civil contingency planning. Local resilience forums are charged with keeping our communities safe. They plan for floods, pandemics and cyber-attacks, but in many areas, they do not yet plan for solar storms. They must be given the data, the scenarios and the authority to act. Fourthly, we must lead international co-ordination. This threat does not respect borders; the response must be global. The United Kingdom should press for a framework through NATO, the G7, the UN or the European Space Agency to share data, align early-warning systems and co-ordinate national preparedness. We have led the world in tackling threats before. Let us now do the same in the case of space weather. This is not a matter of national pride; it is a matter of global necessity. Let me bring the reality home to this House. Imagine that it is mid-January. The temperatures are freezing and the skies are dark. The sun erupts and a geomagnetic storm is en route. Local hospitals are now running on back-up power, ambulances are offline, phones are down and the grid is being rationed. Supermarkets are unable to take card payments, petrol pumps do not work, water pressure drops and air traffic is grounded. Our farmers cannot access the satellite data they need, small businesses grind to a halt, trains are suspended and mobile coverage is patchy or lost. The elderly, who are already vulnerable, are now cut off, isolated and invariably frightened. That is not fiction or dramatic exaggeration; it is foreseeable and preventable. All of that happens not because we lack the knowledge, but because we failed to act on it. Governments are judged not only on whether they see crises coming, but on how they respond to them. There are threats we cannot foresee, but there are others, like this one, where the science is established, the risk is understood and the warning is clear. This is precisely the kind of threat that distinguishes those Governments that react from those that prepare. The storm may come next year or not for a generation but, when it does, it will be too late to start preparing then. This is not the moment for drift or delay; it is the moment for decisive leadership. With that in mind, I ask the Minister to address six critical questions; they are not intended to catch anyone out but to encourage action. First, will the Government publish a delivery plan with clear targets and funding to give force to the 2021 strategy? Secondly, will Ministers bring forward statutory requirements for critical infrastructure operators to mitigate this risk? Thirdly, are the Government satisfied that our armed forces are equipped and trained to operate in the event of a space weather blackout? Fourthly, what investment is being made in forecasting capabilities, including support of the ESA Vigil mission and co-ordination with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, NASA and others? Fifthly, will the Cabinet Office require local resilience forums to prepare for this threat, as they do for other category 1 emergencies? Finally, will Britain now lead efforts to build an international framework for preparedness, starting with NATO or the G7? The case is clear, the risk is real and the time to act is now. Let us not be the generation that read the reports, saw the warnings, nodded thoughtfully and then did nothing. Let us instead be the generation that looked beyond the horizon, recognised the scale of the threat and acted with the seriousness it demands. The sun may well be 93 million miles away, but its reach is far closer than we think. When the next storm comes, let it not find us asleep at the wheel. Let it find us ready and prepared. Let it find a country that saw the storm and stood firm in the face of it.

• 25 Jun 2025 · National Armaments Director · Hansard source

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  Today this House is quite properly considering the scale and seriousness of the threats we face, from those requiring conventional deterrence in Europe to those of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. The case for strengthening our armed forces is not just compelling but essential. However, we must be honest about how we fund this renewal, and what we are willing to sacrifice to do so. Let me be clear: the case for increased defence spending is self-evident. Like many others, I have long argued that we must invest more in our sovereign capability, critical munitions, advanced deterrence and national resilience, including by expanding both the remit and the resourcing of the national armaments director. The strategic significance of that role has grown substantially. In today’s volatile security environment, the national armaments director is not merely a procurement official; they are the principal architect of our defence industrial strategy, responsible for ensuring that our armed forces are equipped not just adequately, but decisively. Their portfolio spans capability planning, acquisition reform, exportability and the stewardship of our defence supply base, from the factory floor to the frontline. In an age of contested logistics, technological disruption and rapid rearmament by authoritarian regimes, the role is fundamental to preserving both operational readiness and sovereign capability. Delivering a credible deterrent in today’s world means accelerating procurement cycles, building in modularity and adaptability, strengthening domestic supply chains, and driving long-term collaboration between government, industry and academia. It means ensuring that we can surge production in a crisis, replenish stockpiles at speed and invest in the innovation that gives us the strategic edge. That cannot be done in isolation or as an afterthought. That work must be led, co-ordinated and embedded across defence planning, not in spite of fiscal pressures, but because of them. If we are serious about resilience, readiness and regeneration, we must empower the national armaments director with the authority, capacity and resources to act not simply as a technical overseer, but as a strategic enabler at the heart of defence policy. Only then can we translate increased spending into real-world capability, and ensure that British power is not only credible on paper, but deliverable in practice. However, this investment must not come at the expense of our international development commitments. Funding defence by slashing foreign aid is a false economy. Worse, it risks undermining the strategic posture that we seek to build. Aid is not an indulgence. It is not a soft option, and it is certainly not a luxury for easier times. It is an instrument of national strategy—a projection of British values, a tool of soft power, and a forward-deployed asset in the defence of the realm. When Britain pulls back from the world, our adversaries do not hesitate to step in. China in particular has understood this dynamic. It does not wait for crises to send in troops; it sends in investment, infrastructure and influence, often to the very regions from which we have retreated. When we reduce aid, we do not save; we cede ground and create vacuums that others are all too willing to fill. Let us be frank: foreign aid and defence are not in conflict. They are complementary. One builds resilience, prevents crises and supports our allies; the other protects us as those crises unfold. A truly strategic posture requires both, because real security does not start when the first shot is fired. It starts in the classrooms of conflict zones, in the clinics of fragile states, and in the partnerships we forge before troubles take root. If we choose to retreat from the world, we shall find that the world does not retreat from us.

• 24 Apr 2025 · Ukraine War: London Talks · Hansard source

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  Can the Minister update the House on whether yesterday’s meeting involved discussion of any potential future co-operation between the US and Russia on energy? If it did, did he impart to his US counterparts that such an arrangement would be a folly?

• 3 Apr 2025 · UK-US Trade and Tariffs · Hansard source

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  It is estimated that 25,000 jobs directly linked to the automotive sector are at risk due to reduced exports to the United States. That is a deep concern to many of my constituents who work at either JLR in Solihull or Aston Martin in Gaydon. Can the Secretary of State set out what specific steps he is taking to protect those jobs, and whether it will involve reforming the regulatory environment in which they operate?

• 11 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It may well have been the way that I phrased it, but the point I was seeking to make was that the Mental Capacity Act, as it currently operates, can be used for those patients who choose to refuse food and water. My view would be that that is a distinct group of people who are refusing active treatment. Given the hon. Lady’s distinction between those who refuse treatment in the conventional sense and those who are seeking assisted dying and her view that for the latter group the MCA is not the appropriate mechanism, is she saying that for that group of individuals who refuse food and water—effectively choosing to end their life through starvation—the MCA is not an appropriate mechanism to assess their capacity?

• 4 Dec 2024 · Farming and Inheritance Tax · Hansard source

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  Will the hon. Gentleman set out how many farmers he has spoken to since the Budget and, of those, how many support the Government’s policy?

• 4 Dec 2024 · Farming and Inheritance Tax · Hansard source

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  Will the Minister give way?

• 4 Dec 2024 · Farming and Inheritance Tax · Hansard source

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  rose —

• 4 Dec 2024 · Farming and Inheritance Tax · Hansard source

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  Will the Minister give way?

• 4 Dec 2024 · Farming and Inheritance Tax · Hansard source

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  Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

• 4 Dec 2024 · Farming and Inheritance Tax · Hansard source

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  Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

• 21 Oct 2024 · Employment Rights Bill · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to follow several excellent maiden speeches this afternoon. For an economy to thrive, both employers and employees must feel protected. Protections enable both parties to draw comfort. However, this Bill does not uphold that principle. In its approach and in its drafting, this Bill has fallen off its axis. It has, without doubt, landed in a place where it overwhelmingly favours the employee, to the detriment of any working balance with the employer. This should come as no great surprise. After all, given the paucity of private sector experience in the Cabinet, it was almost inevitable that this Bill would be seen through the prism of trade union bias. Having studied the Bill, one cannot fail to conclude that the Ministers who commissioned it have no understanding of the struggles faced by small and medium-sized businesses up and down the country. While there is much to be derided in the Bill, there are two points I wish to raise for Ministers’ consideration. First, the abolition of the qualifying period for bringing an unfair dismissal claim will inevitably mean a rise in the number of claims presented to the employment tribunal. This will flood an already overwhelmed system. I ask the Minister: what true impact assessment has been made of that? Under this Bill, bringing a claim for unfair dismissal becomes, to all intents and purposes, a day one right. There is a lack of clarity about the length of any probation period and the obligations on an employer when seeking to dismiss in that period. Inevitably, these obligations will increase the burden on SMEs, which will not have the depth of resources of their larger counterparts. The predictable consequence is that small businesses are likely to sink under the weight and cost of these additional requirements. My second point relates to the proposed changes in respect of industrial action and trade union relations. By repealing the Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Act 2023, lowering the ballot threshold for union action and requiring employers to direct their staff towards unions, the Government have demonstrated their willingness to bow down to their union paymasters, to the detriment of hard-working businesses and industry. The public will see this for what it is: a cheap effort to curry favour with the unions while lining the pocket of the Labour party. It is clear from my conversations with small business owners in Solihull West and Shirley that the Government’s proposals will only hinder growth and productivity. These measures fail to strike the balance between employer and employee. They will choke our courts, cripple small businesses and stifle employment growth.