Neil Shastri-Hurst MP: speeches

Speeches

• 30 Jun 2026 · Defence Investment Plan · Hansard source

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  In response to the DIP, the noble Lord Hutton, a former Labour Defence Secretary, said that “the centres of resistance across Whitehall to extra defence spending have been allowed to prosper and they haven’t been overcome.” He went on to say that, as a consequence, our armed forces will not be war-ready by the end of this Parliament. Does the Defence Secretary disagree with the noble Lord? How do the £10.7 billion in cuts to the MOD budget enhance our armed forces’ readiness?

• 22 Jun 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  I place on record that, as a veteran myself, it was a huge privilege to serve on the Select Committee that considered this important legislation. I will concentrate my remarks on new clauses 4, 9 and 11. At first glance, they may appear to concern different matters, yet, in reality, they are united by the common principle that Parliament should ensure that those who serve this country are treated fairly, and that the law recognises the unique obligations we place on them. We quite rightly celebrate the professionalism of our armed forces. We ask them to defend our interests overseas, deter our adversaries, and, when necessary, place themselves between danger and the rest of us. It is right that the first duty of any Government is the defence of our realm. It therefore follows that the first duty of Parliament towards those who discharge that responsibility is to ensure that they are treated with fairness, dignity and respect. That means understanding that military service is not simply another profession, but a vocation that places demands on individuals and their families that most of our fellow citizens will never be asked to bear. I begin with new clause 4. I have long believed that when an individual commits to service in the armed forces, the nation enters a contract with them that carries practical consequences. We ask our service personnel to accept postings away from home, to move their families at short notice, to spend long periods separated from loved ones, and, in some cases, to place themselves in danger on our behalf. When we speak of supporting the armed forces, we cannot confine our attention solely to those in uniform; we must also consider the spouses and children who support them. New clause 4, tabled by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty), addresses a concern that many Members across this House have heard repeatedly from serving personnel and veterans alike: that the financial burden imposed on families seeking indefinite leave to remain after years of loyal service to this country is too much. There is a straightforward question before us. If an individual has given years of service to our nation, why should their family then face significant financial barriers simply to secure their future here? They have worn our uniform, accepted unlimited liability in defence of our national interests, and contributed directly to our security. In those circumstances it cannot be right, having honoured their commitment to our country, that we appear reluctant to honour our commitment to them. The armed forces covenant, as my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) mentioned, rests on the principle that those who serve should suffer no disadvantage as a result of that service. It is difficult to reconcile that principle with a situation in which a family that has supported a service member throughout years of deployments and postings, is then confronted with substantial costs in order to remain together in the country for which that service was given. New clause 4 is not a radical proposition; it is a relatively modest measure that simply recognises commitment and rewards service. Crucially, it sends a clear signal that Parliament values not only those who wear the uniform but the families who stand behind them. Over the past two decades, there has been a considerable concern about the extent to which human rights litigation has affected military operations overseas. Parliament has recognised those concerns in previous legislation relating to overseas operations. That issue is not a novel one, but part of a continuing debate about how best to reconcile operational effectiveness, accountability and fairness. The argument for new clauses 9 and 11 is, at its heart, a simple one. A soldier deployed on operations is not situated in the same circumstances as a civilian living in peacetime; the realities of combat are fundamentally different. Those of us who have had the privilege to spend time with serving personnel quickly come to appreciate that military operations are conducted in conditions of danger, ambiguity and enormous pressure. Decisions are often made in moments, not months. Commanders and soldiers do not enjoy the luxury of hindsight that is available to lawyers examining events years later from the cold comfort of a courtroom.

• 15 Jun 2026 · Brain Cancer · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. There are countless charities that have done a huge amount of work, and what they are doing is making a tangible difference to people’s lives. Sadly, brain tumours remain one of the most challenging forms of cancer. In many instances, outcomes are no better than when I worked as a doctor in neurosurgery almost a decade and a half ago. The less survivable cancers taskforce has highlighted that one-year survival rates for less survivable cancers, which include brain cancers, remain significantly lower than the average across all cancers. Despite advances in medicine, outcomes for many patients have not improved at the pace that we would all wish to see. That is why the concerns raised by the petitioners are so important. Quite rightly, the petition calls for greater investment in research, wider access to whole-genome sequencing and stronger support for innovative treatments. Those are priorities that cannot be ignored any longer. However, before I turn to those challenges, I want to take a moment to acknowledge the progress that has been made. The National Institute for Health and Care Research has established the brain tumour research consortium, which has brought together dozens of organisations to co-ordinate research and is backed by up to £25.5 million of investment. The recently enacted Rare Cancers Act 2026 represents another significant step forward, and I want to commend the hon. Member for Edinburgh South West (Dr Arthur) for his work in bringing that legislation on to the statute book. The establishment of the national speciality lead and a dedicated cancer registry service have the potential to improve co-ordination and data collection and strengthen research. The national cancer plan has recognised rare cancers as a priority area and committed to expanding successful models such as the Tessa Jowell Brain Cancer Mission. Those developments are of course all welcome. As His Majesty’s loyal Opposition, we supported the Rare Cancers Act throughout its passage through Parliament because we recognise that patients with rare cancers deserve the same urgency, focus and ambition as those with more common conditions. However, the reality is that legislation alone does not save lives; the real test is the effectiveness of its implementation. I would therefore be grateful if the Minister could update us on what progress has been made in establishing the new structures required under the Rare Cancers Act. In particular, has the national specialty lead been appointed? When will the rare cancer registry become fully operational? How will success be measured? Patients and families deserve to know when they will begin to see tangible benefits from the legislation that Parliament has passed. The petition also raised important questions about research participation and access to innovation. The Tessa Jowell Brain Cancer Mission highlighted that fewer than 5% of eligible adult brain tumour patients were able to access whole-genome sequencing because of limitations in tissue sampling and biobanking capacity, which is deeply concerning. Genome sequencing has enormous potential to improve the understanding of tumour biology, identify personalised treatment pathways and increase participation in clinical trials. However, opportunities remain unevenly distributed across the country. The Brain Tumour Charity has also highlighted significant variations in infrastructure and staffing across neuro-oncology centres.

• 15 Jun 2026 · Brain Cancer · Hansard source

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  The hon. Lady is absolutely right that when someone is facing a devastating crisis, but has to travel excessive distances to get the treatment they deserve, there is something wrong with the system. If we are serious about accelerating research, we must ensure that every patient has a fair opportunity to participate in it. That requires investment not only in laboratories and technology, but in a workforce that supports research and clinical innovation. What specific action are the Government taking to address those disparities and ensure that advances in research can benefit patients regardless of where they live? The petition also reflects a wider frustration felt by many families facing brain cancer. When conventional options are exhausted, patients understandably look to emerging treatments and clinical trials with hope. Such hope is entirely understandable, but at the same time we must maintain rigorous standards of safety and evidence. The challenge for us as policymakers is not choosing between innovation and safety; it is ensuring that innovation can be assessed, trialled and adopted as quickly as possible, when the evidence supports it. That is why clinical research capacity and trial recruitment matter so much, and it is why access to cutting-edge treatments must remain a key priority. On that point, the Government have committed to increase spending on branded medicines, and they have set out ambitious objectives for expanding participation in commercial clinical trials. Of course those ambitions are welcome, but they must be matched by delivery. The Office for Budget Responsibility has estimated that increasing spending on branded medicines will carry significant costs over the coming years, so can the Minister explain how the Government intend to fund those commitments? Patients need confidence that the announcements we hear today will be translated into treatments tomorrow. Similarly, while we welcome the publication of the national cancer plan earlier this year, questions remain about its implementation. The shadow Health and Social Care Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Daventry (Stuart Andrew), supported the ambitions set out within the plan. However, he quite rightly called for clear, funded milestones, and those questions remain unanswered. When will the Government publish measurable targets for rare cancers, and how will progress be reported? For all the challenges that we have discussed today, it is important that we recognise the reasons for hope. Medical research continues to achieve what once seems impossible. Just a few years ago, diffuse intrinsic pontine glioma was regarded as one of the most devastating childhood brain cancers, with very few children surviving beyond two years. However, through participation in innovative clinical trials, a young boy from Belgium named Lucas Jemeljanova experienced something quite extraordinary. Having been diagnosed at six, he entered the trial and, over time, scans showed a shrinking tumour, which eventually disappeared altogether. Lucas is now 13, and he is considered cured. With every breakthrough that provides a scientific curiosity, the challenge before us as a Government, as an Opposition and as clinicians and researchers is to ensure that those breakthroughs happen more quickly and often, so that they can reach patients quicker. That is what the families behind this petition are seeking, and they deserve no less.

• 16 Apr 2026 · NHS Federated Data Platform · Hansard source

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  If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I will not. I want the Minister to have sufficient time to respond to the multiple contributions there have been today. I ask the Minister the following questions. How are the Government ensuring that the NHS is not locked into a single supplier over the long term? What is the plan for maintaining genuine competition in this space? How easy would it be in practical terms to move to an alternative system if that was ever required? There is then the issue of resilience. Some have argued that the FDP creates a single point of failure, while others have argued that the current fragmented system is itself a weakness and that greater coherence improves security and oversight. Both arguments deserve to be taken seriously. But practical questions remain: how resilient is this system to cyber-attacks or technical failure? What safeguards are in place? What happens if something goes wrong at scale? The last matter I wish to address is that of governance. With the abolition of NHS England, there is now a question about where the responsibilities for the FDP properly sit. That matters because accountability cannot be diffuse. I take this opportunity to ask the Minister: who is responsible for the programme now, where does that accountability lie, and how will Parliament be able to scrutinise its performance going forward? Better use of data has a real role to play in NHS reform, and the FDP may well prove to be part of that answer. Success will depend on more than just delivery; it will depend on confidence within the system: confidence from clinicians that the system helps rather than hinders them, confidence from patients that their data is properly protected and confidence from the public that our decisions are transparent, proportionate and properly accountable. If those conditions are met, this reform can succeed. If they are not, even the best designed system will struggle. We, as His Majesty’s loyal Opposition, will support what improves care and welcome what works, but will continue to ask questions that ensure reform is done properly in a way that sustains public trust. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in support of new clause 12 and offer broader support for clauses 5 to 9, which represent a significant strengthening of the protective framework in the service justice system. It is worth setting out the basic principle that the armed forces justice system must be capable not only of dealing fairly and effectively with wrongdoing, but of ensuring that the protection of victims and management of risk do not fall between institutional cracks. The credibility of the service justice system depends on continuity, coherence and, above all, confidence that protective measures will not be undermined by procedural happenstance. Clauses 5 to 9 make important and welcome progress. They will extend the availability and operation of sexual harm prevention orders, sexual risk orders, domestic abuse protection orders, stalking protection orders and restraining orders in the service justice system. They make provision for enforcement, variation and guidance structures, including in respect of the important role of provost marshals and service police in the exercise of those functions. The clauses will modernise the service justice landscape in a way that recognises the reality of contemporary risk management. They will ensure that service personnel and civilians subject to service discipline are not operating in a parallel system that is less capable of protecting victims or managing dangerous individuals. In particular, the extension to the service courts of protections against domestic abuse and stalking is a welcome alignment with civilian criminal justice standards, ensuring consistency of safeguarding irrespective of jurisdiction. However, as is often the case in the refinement of complex statutory schemes, there remains a narrow but important residual gap, which is precisely what new clause 12 seeks to address. The core issue is one of jurisdictional continuity. At present, protective orders in the service justice system are clearly available while an individual is subject to service law. Clauses 5 to 9 also go further by making provision for enforcement in certain circumstances in which the individual ceases to be subject to service discipline after an order has been made. A difficulty arises, however, in the transitional space where an individual is charged or even convicted while subject to service law, but ceases to be subject to service law before the protective order is imposed or finalised. Without express provision, there is a risk that such an individual, by virtue of leaving service, will fall outside the effective reach of the service court’s protective jurisdiction at precisely the point at which such orders are most necessary. New clause 12 performs a simple but important function. It would provide that where a person is charged with or convicted of an offence in the service justice system and was subject to service law at the relevant time, the service court may impose specified protective orders as if the person remained subject to service law. It is, in effect, a statutory deeming provision, preserving jurisdiction for protective purposes notwithstanding the cessation of service status. The legal merits of that approach are clear. First, it prevents what might properly be described as jurisdictional arbitrage. Without such a provision, there is a theoretical, though in practice very real, risk that individuals could seek to avoid the imposition of protective orders by leaving service prior to trial or sentencing. Even if such behaviour is not deliberately engineered, the mere existence of a gap creates inconsistency and undermines confidence in the system. The protective reach of the service justice system should not be rendered contingent on administrative status at a particular moment in time. Secondly, the new clause reflects a well-established principle in criminal justice, which is that protective orders are ancillary to the underlying offence and risk posed by the offender, not merely to their procedural status. The civilian courts retain wide powers to impose protective orders at sentencing precisely because the assessment of risk is rooted in conduct, not institutional affiliation. New clause 12 would ensure that the service courts are placed in an equivalent position, recognising that the underlying risk does not evaporate simply because service status changes. Thirdly, the new clause would promote legal certainty and coherence. Through clauses 5 to 9, the existing framework already recognises that certain orders may continue to have effect or be enforced after a person leaves service. However, enforcement is not the same as imposition. It is logically and legally cleaner to ensure that the court retains the power to make the order at the point of disposal, rather than relying on subsequent conversion or deeming mechanisms. The new clause therefore fills a structural gap and ensures that the life cycle of protective orders is not disrupted by jurisdictional transition. Fourthly, the new clause is carefully drafted in respect of its propriety. It would not create an unfettered or novel category of punitive power. Rather, it would explicitly confine the service court’s ability to make orders to those that it would have been able to make had the individual remained subject to service law. It is, in essence, a continuity provision, not an expansion of jurisdiction. Importantly, subsection (3) of the new clause would provide that such orders are to have effect “as if made by a civilian court of equivalent jurisdiction” and are “enforceable accordingly.” That is a critical safeguard. It would ensure interoperability between the service justice system and the civilian criminal justice system, avoiding the creation of parallel regimes that might otherwise give rise to confusion about enforcement authority. Subsection (4) of the new clause, enabling the Secretary of State to make regulations regarding recognition, enforcement and variation, is also welcome. It would provide necessary flexibility in an area where procedural interfaces between service and civilian jurisdictions must be capable of adjustment over time. In particular, it would allow for clarity as to which court is best placed to vary or discharge orders once a person has fully transitioned out of service life. That is a sensible delegation of secondary rule-making power, consistent with the established constitutional practice in this field.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, who from his time as a Defence Minister knows well how to keep tabs on those who have served our country but are now retired. The pension scheme is an obvious way to do so. In addition, he makes an important point about the willingness of individuals to engage in the process. These are people who have given enormous service to their country, and often wish to continue giving service long into their years of retirement from active service. Our armed forces are more stretched and more globally engaged than before, and they are more frequently deployed than at almost any point in recent decades. The spectrum of threats facing our country is widening, from state-based adversaries to hybrid war, cyber-operations and persistent instability in regions where British forces are called to act with precision and professionalism. As I have set out, when operational tempo increases every part of the system is affected. It is not just about equipment, logistics or personnel numbers, but about the justice system that underpins discipline, accountability and command authority. The question, therefore, is a relatively simple one: does our current system of service justice have the flexibility, depth and resilience required to meet that demand? Amendment 9 is one attempt to ensure that it does. It recognises that we are asking a great deal of a relatively small pool of serving officers. We are asking them not only to command forces in complex environments but, where necessary, to sit in judgment in court martial proceedings, including in cases involving senior rank, complex evidence, and often significant reputational consequence for all involved. That is not to say that these individuals are incapable of doing those tasks, but that is a heavy burden on any system. It becomes more difficult still when we consider the practical realities of availability. Senior serving officers are, by definition, in high demand. They are deployed, rotated, assigned to strategic planning roles or engaged in operational command responsibilities that cannot simply be paused or rescheduled. At the same time, the court martial system requires a bench that is credible, experienced and capable of understanding the realities of service life. It is not enough that those sitting in judgment are legally competent to interpret the evidence; they must also understand the context in which decisions are made, the pressures under which orders are given and the operational environments in which conduct is assessed. That combination of legal competence and operational understanding is not easily found, and it is here that amendment 9 can make a tangible contribution. By extending eligibility to retired officers of appropriate rank, we end up expanding the pool of individuals who can bring that essential combination of experience and judgment to the court martial system. I want to be clear about what the amendment seeks to do and what it does not seek to do. It is not an attempt to dilute standards. On the contrary, it is an attempt to strengthen them by widening the field of those who meet them. It is not an attempt to undermine the authority of serving officers; it is an attempt to relieve them of some of the competing pressures that now fall on them in an increasingly demanding environment. It is not an attempt to create a separate or parallel justice system where some are tried by those who are still in active service and some are held in judgment by those who have retired. It is merely an attempt to ensure that the existing system has the necessary capacity to function effectively.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will confine my remarks to amendment 6, tabled by the hon. Members for North Devon and for Tunbridge Wells. Although I have real sympathy with its purpose, I am hesitant about its drafting, and recognise that, in this place, we sometimes develop what could be described as an unhealthy instinct to overcomplicate what, at its heart, is a very simple objective—that serious allegations are handled properly, consistently and in a way that commands the public’s confidence. I will start with where I hope and think we all agree: that allegations of sexual offences and domestic abuse are among the most serious that any justice system will have to confront. They demand to be treated with urgency, professionalism and, above all, trust. I do not think it is controversial to say that victims, whether serving in uniform or not, should not feel that the system is treating them differently depending on administrative geography or institutional habit. That is the spirit in which I understand that the amendment seeks to ensure that such cases are not left solely within the service channels, but are referred immediately to civilian police forces, with the implication that civilian investigation would become the default route. I understand why Members are attracted to that clarity. There is a certain political comfort in having bright lines. I must confess that I have often found myself drawn to them, but that is usually just before discovering why lawyers or police officers prefer slightly more shaded ones. I support the principle underlying the amendment, but I have reservations about the way in which it seeks to achieve it. My first concern is practical. The amendment requires that where service personnel, or the tri-service serious crime unit, are made aware of an allegation, they must immediately refer it and transfer the investigation to civilian police. “Immediately” is one of those words that looks quite reassuring in legislation but behaves rather less co-operatively in real life. In practice, the first hours of an investigation are often the most sensitive. Evidence is fragile, scenes need securing and victims may need safeguarding. Crucially, the question of who is best placed to take operational control may depend on facts that are not yet fully known. There will be cases where civilian forces are clearly the best placed from the outset—I suspect that they may be the majority—but there will also be cases where service police are already on the ground, embedded in the environment and uniquely placed to stabilise the situation before any handover, if necessary, can sensibly take place. What worries me slightly is that we risk turning a sensible presumption of civilian involvement into a rigid statutory trigger that may inadvertently disrupt good policing practice at exactly the wrong moment. The second concern is more about coherence than timing. The amendment fixes jurisdiction by reference to the area where the offence took place. Again, that will work perfectly well in many cases, but the armed forces are not always known for their geographical neatness. People move, units deploy and conduct straddles locations. Investigations often involve a mixture of service personnel and civilians across different parts of the country. My concern is not that the principle is wrong but that a rigid allocation rule may create friction between agencies at precisely the moment when co-ordination matters the most. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, I have concerns about the role of service policing itself. The service police and the Defence Serious Crime Command are not an inferior version of civilian policing. They are specialised and professional, and they often operate in environments that civilian forces are simply not structured to manage at first contact. If we were starting from scratch, we would not design two parallel systems and hope they never meet; we would design integrated systems with clear rules on information sharing, handover and joint working. That is where the real answer to this question lies. What I do not want us to do—however well intentioned the amendment is—is accidentally create a system where the service police are required to stand down too early or where information is transferred without the structured co-ordination that makes investigations effective. That is a defence not of silos, but of joined-up working between different agencies. This is where I come to what I think would improve the Bill more than the amendment. What we really need is not just a duty to refer but a clear statutory expectation of mandatory information sharing and structured joint working between service police and civilian forces when dealing with sexual offences and domestic abuse. That would achieve the spirit of the amendment, and I think it would do so more reliably, without removing operational discretion at the earliest and most sensitive stage of any investigation. With that in mind, I gently press the Minister on this point. I do so in the spirit of someone who, prior to coming to Parliament, has sat through enough briefings to know that when everybody says, “Of course, we already share information effectively,” the definition of “effectively” remains quite different in different organisations. Will the Minister give a clear commitment that the Government will ensure mandatory enforceable information sharing arrangements between the service police and civilian police forces in all cases involving sexual offences and domestic abuse? If that commitment is forthcoming, a great deal of the concern behind the amendment would arguably fall away. It would ensure that civilian forces are engaged early, that victims do not fall between systems, and that service police are not left operating in isolation or ambiguity. Although I support the broad intent of amendment 6 and its aims of ensuring serious allegations are handled properly and consistently, I am afraid that I am not persuaded that the current drafting is the best way to achieve that aim. I worry that it may constrain operational judgment in ways that are not fully intended. I am, however, keen that we do not lose sight of the objective. I would strongly welcome the opportunity to work with colleagues across the House to refine this approach, potentially on Report, in a way that better balances mandatory co-operation with operational flexibility. If we get that right, we will do two important things at once: we will strengthen confidence in the handling of the most serious allegations, and we will ensure that those responsible for investigating them are not inadvertently placed in a straitjacket that makes their job harder rather than easier. On that basis, I hope the Government will engage constructively and I look forward to continuing this conversation.

• 17 Mar 2026 · Jury Trials · Hansard source

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  The Government’s case for curtailing trial by jury is based on an impact assessment that rests on assumptions, rather than hard evidence. Is it not the truth that the Government are asking Parliament to give up and weaken a fundamental safeguard on the basis of hearsay alone?

• 10 Mar 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bolsover (Natalie Fleet). Although she is on the opposite side of the debate from me, she always speaks with huge passion on these issues. I should start with a couple of declarations. First, my wife is a sitting employment judge, and therefore the tribunal element of the Bill pertains to her. Secondly, like many right hon. and hon. Members in this Chamber, I was a barrister immediately prior to coming into this place, and I maintain my practising certificate. I hope the hon. Lady will indulge me if I pontificate on this issue for a few moments. While I was not a criminal barrister, I did a significant amount of inquest work, so I had face-to-face, first-hand experience with jurors, and I can say without a shadow of a doubt that they are the most remarkable, ordinary people, who give up their time for civic engagement. They sit there quietly, listening to the evidence; they take their role seriously; and they sit in judgment and make findings of fact. That is a huge constitutional principle. We have talked about rights, and I am not going to pretend that there is an innate right to a trial by jury, but there is a firm constitutional principle of ensuring that justice is not merely done to the public, but that it is done with the public. We all know about the problem of court backlogs. It would be a farce to pretend that this is not a significant and serious issue—it is a failure of the state that we have got to this place. It is a failure of successive Governments, and we recognise that across the board, but the question we have to ask ourselves is not whether trial by jury should be abandoned; it is whether the reforms that are before this House, with the scrutiny that has been undertaken and the impact assessment that accompanies the Bill, constitute sufficient evidence for making such a reform to this country’s constitution. What the Bill asks for is very clear, and we have to be honest about it. We are asking for a shift in the balance between the state and its people, and that may lead to inequality before the law. Take the prime example raised by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and Tavistock (Sir Geoffrey Cox): that of two individuals who, on a factual matrix, committed precisely the same crime. Those individuals appear before the court, but one has a string of previous convictions. Are we really saying that a person should be denied the opportunity of a jury trial if they have not previously been of bad character? That is a nonsense, and it does not achieve what we should be seeking to achieve. The further point, of course, is that if we are making such a constitutional change on the basis that it will enable us to deal with the backlog in the criminal courts, why is there no sunset clause in the Bill? Why are we not saying that the purpose of the Bill is to shift the dial and make progress, but that we recognise that it should not be a blank cheque for the state? We should recognise that if this change has to be made—although I do not believe it does—it should be made on a limited basis, because if we are to change a right that is older than most institutions in this country, the least Parliament should do is base its decision on more than just an assumption in the impact assessment. Let me turn to the modelling, which was also raised by the shadow Justice Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for West Suffolk (Nick Timothy). In this House on 3 February, I asked the Lord Chancellor a question about the 20% reduction in the time taken by court hearings. He gave me a very clear answer—that he accepted Sir Brian Leveson’s findings, but that the Government would publish their own modelling alongside the Bill. However, page 10 of the impact assessment is very clear that the Government have adopted Sir Brian’s assumption. That is an assumption; it is not modelling. There is a distinct difference. Analysis is helpful, but modelling is critical, and if we are weighing up the evidence base for the Bill, we have to have more than analysis alone.

• 4 Mar 2026 · China: Foreign Interference Arrests · Hansard source

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  I know how seriously the Minister takes national security; he will feel keenly any interference with our democracy. However, the news that officials being are démarched will be cold comfort for the 4,500 Hongkongers who live in the borough of Solihull. Can the Minister guarantee that the Chinese ambassador to the UK will be summoned by the Foreign Secretary for an interview without coffee?

• 5 Jan 2026 · Northern Ireland Troubles Bill: Armed Forces Recruitment and Retention · Hansard source

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  The Minister has more experience than most with the global threats facing this country. In those circumstances, we need to be recruiting the brightest and best to our armed forces and retaining them. He has set out current retention levels with certain detail, but that is before the Bill passes through Parliament and, as the Government hope, becomes enacted as law. Does he not recognise that the inequality of arms under the legal system for our veterans is likely to have a significant impact upon retention?

• 1 Dec 2025 · Evacuation Chairs: Schools and Colleges · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman is making a powerful speech, and Lucas’s poem really resonates with that. In my constituency, we have Evac+Chair, which creates evacuation chairs like the ones we have in Parliament. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the current legislation, the stay-put policy from an outdated era—1962—does not recognise that the technology has moved on?

• 12 Nov 2025 · Taxes · Hansard source

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  This debate is much broader than mere numbers on a spreadsheet buried in the Treasury; it is about trust, stewardship and the future of our country. That matters because, at the last general election, the now Government and all those elected on their manifesto said they would not raise taxes on “working people”, yet at last year’s Budget, they did precisely that. They introduced £40 billion-worth of tax rises—under the guise of national insurance in the majority of cases—which have a trickle-down effect on working people up and down the country. To compound matters, on 25 November last year the Chancellor addressed the Confederation of British Industry and made a cast-iron promise: no more borrowing, and no more taxes. That was a pledge to every family, every community and every business in this country, yet we are now on the precipice of the Government breaking their promise. To do so would irreversibly damage the public’s confidence in the Government’s ability to manage our economy. Simply put, every tax rise hits families, pensioners and small businesses. There is a simple maxim: borrowing today is merely debt for tomorrow. Every pound borrowed has to be repaid, and it has to be repaid with interest. I know that those on the Government Benches do not necessarily regularly take the words of Margaret Thatcher to heart, but she said: “Pennies don’t fall from heaven. They have to be earned”. That is what people up and down this country are doing every day: they are grafting to provide for their families and their future. She was absolutely right. History teaches us that unchecked spending commitments undermine growth, reduce confidence and erode the state’s ability to serve those who are most vulnerable. By contrast, having control over public expenditure is not an ideology or something to be feared; it is simply common sense. It is about cutting waste, and it is about making hard choices today so that future generations are not saddled with crushing debt. That is responsible government. It was Churchill who said that “the price of greatness is responsibility”. When the Government came into power with great fanfare, there was a sense that they wanted to be a great reforming Government. Well, is there any greater responsibility than to families, who budget carefully; to citizens, who trust the Government to keep their word; and to the public, who expect manifesto promises to be kept? People live within their means.

• 15 Sept 2025 · Employment Rights Bill · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to have the opportunity to speak to two specific Lords amendments proposed in turn by Lord Burns and Lord Sharpe in the other place. While addressing different clauses, both amendments essentially come down to the same principle: defending fairness, transparency and democratic legitimacy against narrow sectional interests. On Lords amendment 61, in 2016, after long and at times fraught debate, Parliament reached a carefully constructed settlement on the question of trade union political funds. That settlement was not only fair and balanced but, crucially, was broadly accepted by all sides. The compromise was a simple one: it resulted in new members contributing to a union’s political fund only if that member gave their active, informed consent. In contrast, existing members were left untouched and, importantly, unions were required to remind all members annually of their right to change their decision. This is both a fair and a balanced settlement. It is not a carve-up; it is a genuine compromise. It respected both the collective strength of unions and the personal liberty of individuals. Yet what do we see now? We see a Government seeking to dismantle that settlement, and the result is a return to an era where consent was assumed and where individuals found themselves supporting causes they did not share simply because the rules made it cumbersome to say otherwise. That is not a positive reform; it is regression. In every walk of life—whether a subscription service, an insurance policy, or a mobile phone contract—the public quite properly expect clarity in respect of the terms they are committing to. Why should those standards of fairness be cast aside when it comes to political funds of unions closely bound to the governing party? Lords amendment 62 deals with the threshold for industrial action. Strikes have consequences. We have seen that only in the last week, with transport links across London brought to a standstill, commutes drastically prolonged, and the consequential significant disruption to people’s day-to-day lives. As a former doctor who, I should point out, did not go on strike in years gone by, I have seen at first hand the consequences of medics taking industrial action: operations cancelled; out-patient appointments postponed; and the provision of healthcare delayed. When the livelihoods and wellbeing of citizens up and down this country are so significantly impacted, it is neither unreasonable nor undesirable that such action rests upon a clear majority. The 50% threshold is precisely that safeguard. It serves as a clear assurance that industrial action has broad legitimacy and is not just the preserve of a militant minority. Yet this Government seek to sweep away that protection by voting down this very sensible and considered improvement to the legislation. Both these amendments remind us that democracy depends upon consent, transparency and legitimacy. Those values have been the bedrock of Britain for generations. It would be a poor bargain indeed if they were set aside to placate the financial and political interests of a narrow few.

• 2 Sept 2025 · Defibrillators · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. I also congratulate the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Sam Rushworth) on securing this important debate, and I start by sending my condolences to George Smith’s family at this very difficult time. Many Members may know that, before coming to this place, I was both a doctor and a barrister. As a doctor, I worked predominantly in acute care, so I have seen the brutal speed with which cardiac arrest can lead to death. But as a barrister, I specialised in inquests and clinical negligence, and I also saw what happened when people did not get timely interventions, and the devastating consequences that arose. As many Members have set out, the stark reality is that every minute counts. Every minute reduces life expectancy by 10%. If someone gets prompt intervention, their survival rate can be as high as 70% if their defib is within 200 metres of their location. That is a three-to-five-minute brisk walk there and back. But the stark reality is that out-of-hospital arrests have a survival rate of less than one in 12. Compared with in-hospital arrests, the survival rate to discharge is in the region of 25%. That is why this was an important focus for me when I was elected to Parliament for Solihull West and Shirley. Despite the fact that my constituency has a mix of urban and semi-rural places, only 40.32% of our defibs are within the recommended distance and there are only seven public defibs per 10,000 people, which is well below the national recommendation. Across the United Kingdom, the per-population count for defibs is approximately five to 10 times lower than it is in a country such as Japan. That cannot be right in this day and age, which is why, for one of my office fundraisers this year, we all went and did the Solihull way. We walked 20-odd miles in the day, and raised money for two defibs and some bleed kits on behalf of a brilliant charity called the Daniel Baird Foundation. It was particularly moving to be able to donate one of those defibs to the Wave café in my constituency, where a valued member of the community had sadly died some months earlier because they did not have access to a defib. I am going to reiterate a couple of calls that have already been made to the Minister, who I know has been listening carefully. First, we should exempt defibs from VAT—it is ridiculous. For every five defibs that are currently bought, we could afford another if we got rid of VAT.