Neil Shastri-Hurst MP: speeches

Speeches

• 24 Jun 2025 · National Security Strategy · Hansard source

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  Given the scale of foreign-influence operations, particularly those of China, does the Minister accept that Britain’s societal resilience remains far too limited? Without clear Government messaging, how can institutions or the public properly play their role? Will the Minister commit to expanding the defending democracy taskforce to include public education, support for free media, and curbing People’s Liberation Army-linked speakers at taxpayer funded events?

• 19 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I fear that I may test your patience a little further on this occasion, Mrs Harris, but I rise to address clause 48. Although much of the Bill aims to modernise and humanise our mental health framework, and in many ways it does so commendably, clause 47 presents not only an opportunity, but a challenge: to ensure that we get the balance right between liberty and protection. The clause will make an amendment to section 72(4) of the Mental Health Act 1983. As the Minister said, it will shift the burden of proof in tribunal proceedings concerning patients who are subject to a guardianship order. Under the current legal framework, it is the patient who must demonstrate that the criteria for guardianship are no longer met, by showing either that they are no longer suffering from a mental disorder or that continued guardianship is no longer necessary for their welfare or the protection of others. Clause 48 would reverse that burden. It would place the onus instead upon the local authority to demonstrate, in the mental health tribunal, that the individual still meets the statutory test. The tribunal would be required to direct a discharge unless the authority can prove otherwise. Let me be clear: I am not opposed to the principle of this reform. On the contrary, I believe that there is a strong case for rebalancing the legal dynamics in favour of the individual, particularly when we reach situations in which their liberty and autonomy are at stake. The principle of least restriction is not, or should not be, merely aspirational; it should be foundational to any mental health regime in a liberal democracy. I say with equal conviction that the practical operation of such a change requires careful thought and adequate resourcing. It must be done under clear legal parameters. Precisely on those fronts, I seek clarification from the Minister and, if I may be so bold, I seek some improvements to this aspect of the Bill. First, we must consider the legal principle at play. A reversal of the burden of proof in this context is not technical or incidental; it marks a constitutional shift in the relationship between the citizen and the state. Traditionally, as the Minister well knows, the burden of proof lies on the party making an assertion that departs from the status quo. In this case, that would ordinarily be the patient applying for discharge from the guardianship. However, when the state exercises more coercive powers—particularly powers that have an impact on an individual’s liberty and private life—it is appropriate that the state be required to justify those powers afresh, especially when challenged. That is the logic that clause 48 seeks to embrace. In broad terms, as I say, I support it. The approaches are reinforced by our obligations under article 5 of the European convention on human rights, which protects the right to liberty and security of the person. It is clear that any deprivation of liberty must be justified not just initially, but on an ongoing basis. Jurisprudence from Strasbourg has repeatedly emphasised that periodic review mechanisms must be substantive and not merely procedural in nature. The state must show continuing justification and must not rely on past assessments or presumptions in its favour. Clause 48 helps us to move closer to compliance with those principles, but the legislation, as drafted, does leave some important questions unanswered. What, precisely, is the standard of proof that local authorities must meet? Is it the civil standard on the balance of probabilities, or is it something higher, given the gravity of what is at stake? If we are to take this shift seriously, we must also give tribunals clear statutory guidance on how to interpret the new burden. Otherwise, we will fall into the trap of risking inconsistency in decision making, confusion among professionals and a potential increase in appeals and legal challenges. Secondly, and crucially, I would like to press the Minister on the question of practical implementation. Changing the legal burden is not merely a matter of legislative drafting; it requires a systematic adjustment in how evidence is gathered, how professionals prepare for tribunal hearings, and how decisions are reviewed internally within local authorities. As hon. Members will know, local authorities are already operating under intense financial and operational pressures. Mental health social workers are often working with caseloads that stretch the limits of what may be considered reasonable. Legal teams within councils are often overstretched and under-resourced; if we now place them under a legal obligation to present a comprehensive, evidentially sound case for continued guardianship—perhaps at multiple intervals across an individual’s care pathway—we must ensure that they are adequately supported to do so. What assessment have the Government made of the financial and operational impact of clause 48? Will local authorities receive new funding to enable them to meet that duty? Will social care professionals receive specific training on the evidential requirements now expected of them? Without such support, we risk not only undermining the intent of the clause, but creating a perverse outcome in which discharges may occur not because the patient no longer meets the criteria, but because the local authority lacks the capacity to make the evidential case in time. I also caution against the risk of overcorrection. Although I fully support the principle that individuals should not bear an unfair evidential burden, we must not move so far in the other direction that we weaken the legitimate protective mechanisms that should be in place. Guardianship is not detention; it is a community-based measure designed to provide oversight and structure for individuals who may struggle to live independently due to serious mental illness. It is used infrequently and only where strictly necessary.

• 19 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman speaks with a huge amount of experience and knowledge in this area. Of course, what he describes would be the default setting, but there may be scenarios in which a qualified healthcare worker is in the vicinity and can provide the support that that individual needs before the police can get there. The clause seeks to provide that flexibility. I acknowledge the split in the Committee on this, but the clause has some significant advantages: reducing police involvement in mental health crises, where that is most appropriate; improving response times, as I have just touched on; and supporting de-escalation. I accept that there are operational and legal questions to be addressed, but we are here to look at all the potential scenarios. The Minister has clearly set out the consequences of removing the clause from the Bill, but it is perfectly possible that a Government Member on the Committee will choose to support it, and I therefore seek some clarification from the Minister on the operational and legal challenges around training, oversight and the uniformity of authorised roles were the clause to remain part of the Bill. How would training standards be mandated for authorised persons and who would accredit them? How would consistency in practice be ensured across NHS trusts and ambulance services? Will the Minister also clarify the liability position in a case in which an authorised person used force or restraint during a removal?

• 17 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will speak briefly on schedule 3, which makes a number of important amendments to the 1983 Act concerning the role of independent mental health advocates. The schedule implements several practical reforms to provide consistent and accessible advocacy and support for individuals receiving mental health care. It builds upon existing statutory provisions by extending the right to advocacy beyond detained patients and setting out clearer expectations of how and when advocacy services should be made available. One of the most notable changes is the extension of IMHA eligibility to include informal patients—individuals receiving voluntary treatment rather than under compulsion. This responds directly to the recommendations made in both the independent review and the 2021 White Paper, which identified disparities in support available to different patient groups. Under these reforms, access to advocacy is no longer limited to those detained under the Act. Instead, all qualifying patients, including informal ones, will be eligible for IMHA support where appropriate. This change reflects the recognition that voluntary status does not necessarily equate to full understanding or confidence in navigating care decisions. To ensure that eligible individuals are aware of and able to use this support, hospital managers will now be required to notify advocacy services when a patient becomes eligible. This automatic referral mechanism removes the onus from patients themselves to initiate contact, many of whom may not be aware of their rights or may face barriers to asserting them. In turn, advocacy providers will have a duty to arrange an interview with each referred patient to establish whether they wish to use the service. This helps to close the loop between eligibility and engagement, and ensures that advocacy is offered in a timely and structured manner. Schedule 3 also sets out clearer responsibilities on both hospital managers and advocacy providers. Clearly, that will improve co-ordination and ensure the consistent application of the policy across different care settings and regions. In practice, it should help to reduce gaps where eligible patients might otherwise miss out on support due to ambiguity around who holds the responsibility for initiating contact. It is worth noting that these reforms complement the broader set of changes proposed in clauses 41 to 44, which collectively aim to strengthen patient rights, increase transparency in decision making and improve the overall quality of patient experience in mental health services. This approach has a number of potential benefits. First, it is likely to improve access to advocacy for groups who have historically been underserved. These include informal patients, individuals with communication difficulties and those less familiar with the mental health system. Secondly, it enhances procedural fairness by ensuring that patients are supported in understanding their options, raising their concerns, or appealing decisions where necessary. Thirdly, it brings the statutory framework into closer alignment with human rights principles and best practice standards, particularly in terms of informed participation and supported decision making. There are, however, three specific practical challenges that I wish the Minister to acknowledge. First, these reforms will require sufficient resources for advocacy services, particularly as demand is likely to increase once eligibility is broadened. Secondly, effective implementation will depend upon robust co-ordination between hospital managers and external advocacy providers, which may vary in capacity and capability across regions. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s approach to ameliorating that. Thirdly, there is a risk of inconsistency in delivery without clear national guidance and adequate oversight mechanisms, so I would be grateful if the Minister could address the mechanisms that are intended to be put in place. These are not insurmountable issues, but they highlight the importance of a carefully planned implementation strategy, supported by training, monitoring and adequate funding. Schedule 3 represents a targeted and proportionate set of amendments that support the underlying aims of the Bill to ensure that all individuals receiving mental health care, whether formally detained or not, are able to access independent support, understand their rights and participate more fully in decisions about their treatment. [Interruption.]

• 17 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend makes a pertinent point. We all know, from our casework or personal experiences outside of this place, about the pressures on the Courts and Tribunals Service. Mental health tribunals are not exempt from that pressure. Changing the timeframe on which tribunals operate, and the frequency with which reviews take place, will inevitably increase the burden on the service. Therefore, although these changes are broadly welcome, it is important that we are cognisant of their impact on the resources that will be required, the number of judges and wing members that will be needed, and of course the hard standing of the court and tribunal infrastructure that will need to be made available. Other issues, such as those around the digitalisation of the service, will also need to be addressed. Clause 31 will recast the regime for automatic tribunal referrals, replacing the prior six-month structure with the concept of “a relevant period”. For detained patients, referrals will now occur at three months, then 12 months, and annually thereafter. For community patients, they will occur at six months, then 12 months, then annually. Most significantly, hospital managers will be under a new duty to refer a case when no review has occurred in 12 months, regardless of whether an application has been made. That is a sound reform. The clause will introduce coherence to a previously fragmented system, and establishes a minimum standard of legal oversight. The inclusion of a backstop provision—that no individual should go more than 12 months without review—is essential. In a system in which patients may not always have the means or capacity to apply for a review themselves, it offers a critical safety net. Clause 31 will also repeal section 68A of the 1983 Act, which has become unwieldy and duplicative. By streamlining the referral process, the Bill enhances legal clarity and administrative efficiency, but I would caution that the increased complexity of the new timeframes may require significant training of those responsible for their implementation. Clause 32 will provide for restricted patients who are subject to deprivation of liberty conditions. It goes further than clause 30 by imposing mandatory referral duties on the Secretary of State. Under the clause, a tribunal must be convened after 12 months, every two years thereafter, and at four years if no review has occurred. Crucially, the clause also codifies the tribunal’s powers. It may now vary or impose conditions, including those that constitute a deprivation of liberty, provided that they are necessary to protect the public from serious harm and are no more restrictive than hospital detention. That clause introduces a principled, proportionate framework for balancing public protection with patient liberty, and avoids vague or discretionary use of such powers. Finally, clause 33 will apply the same principles to restricted patients not subject to deprivation of liberty orders. Such individuals, although under fewer constraints, are none the less subject to significant legal orders. The new requirement for a tribunal review at two years, and every four years thereafter, ensures that oversight is regular and non-discriminatory. All four clauses are united by a clear objective to rationalise tribunal access, enhance procedural safeguards and bring the Mental Health Act into alignment with modern standards of fairness and proportionality. However, I will close with a caveat: rights without resourcing are hollow. If we are to place greater demand on the tribunals service, and to rely on it as the guardian of liberty for thousands of individuals, it must be adequately funded, staffed and supported. Legal representation must be accessible. Tribunal members must be properly trained. Hospital managers must be equipped to meet their new responsibilities. With those reservations, I broadly welcome clauses 30 to 33 as a necessary recalibration of our mental health law. They reflect the dignity of the individual, the demands of public safety, and the enduring principle that no one should be deprived of liberty without fair or timely review.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 56, in clause 3, page 3, line 19, at end insert— “(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations update the definitions in subsection (2) in response to scientific advancements. (5) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.” This amendment would allow the definitions for mental disorder, autism, learning disability and psychiatric disorder to be updated by secondary legislation as science evolves. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers. I rise to speak to amendment 56, which is in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer), who has extensive clinical experience. The amendment provides for a narrowly drawn but important power, namely, to update, via regulations and subject to affirmative procedure, the statutory definitions in clause 3, in response to developments in scientific and clinical understanding. I recognise that any clause that confers powers on the Executive to amend the statutory definitions must be treated with due caution. There could be concerns that changes could be made without broad clinical consensus. However, on this occasion, I believe that my hon. Friend, who brings to the debate the weight of his clinical expertise, has struck the right balance. The proposed power is tightly scoped. It is triggered only by new scientific knowledge. It cannot be exercised on ministerial whim. Crucially, it is subject to the full rigour of parliamentary approval under the affirmative resolution procedure. It is not a case of Executive overreach; it is a recognition that the pace of medical and neuroscientific research is such that legislation risks obsolescence unless we allow for responsible adaptation. One need only look at the evolution of our understanding of conditions such as autism spectrum disorder and complex post-traumatic stress disorder to appreciate how quickly definitions can move on. Clearly, any change must reflect best practice and take place under broad consultation. However, I argue that we are not opening the back door to arbitrary change; we are safeguarding the front door against stagnation. For that reason, I support the amendment.

• 16 May 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her intervention. That is a very powerful personal story from Noah, who I think reflects the maturity of many young people when dealing with these challenging issues. By imposing, in effect, a statutory gag in this one area, new clauses 1 and 2 risk infantilising terminally ill patients, creating a chilling effect on communication at the very moment when clarity and compassion are most needed. If anything, new clauses 1 and 2 may result in harm to patients, forcing them to suffer in silence, unaware of lawful options simply because they do not know how to ask. Finally, I turn to new clause 9, which presents a number of issues. In the first instance, subsection (1) would permit there to be, in effect, two different standards of proof. That must be legal nonsense. The boundaries of any legal test or hurdle must be clear. A failure to do so creates a great deal of uncertainty. Furthermore, the proposal to shift the standard of proof from the civil to the criminal, requiring panels to operate on the standard of beyond reasonable doubt, is deeply inappropriate. The balance of probabilities is the cornerstone of medical and civil decision making. To adopt a criminal threshold risks freezing the entire process, creating a very risk-averse system.

• 28 Apr 2025 · School Costs and Employer’s National Insurance Contributions · Hansard source

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  Can the Minister solve this equation? VAT is pushing more students into the state sector and increases in national insurance are squeezing staff budgets, yet the Government say their ambition is to improve school standards and staff retention. How does that add up?

• 13 Feb 2025 · Reform of Private Family Law Hearings · Hansard source

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  It is a sad reality of life that marriages fail. It can happen for a variety of reasons, and I do not seek to provide a critique on the underlying causes in today’s debate. However, one of the tragic consequences of divorce is the disruption and pain that it causes to children. It is evident that an amicable relationship between parents would enable arrangements in respect of where a child resides following a divorce to be made without the intervention of the courts, avoiding much additional heartache and the adversarial nature of contested hearings; but such contested hearings cannot be avoided in each and every case. While it may be the intention of the system to protect the privacy of individuals and families during these hearings, the reality is an increasingly inefficient and, at times, unresponsive system that fails to place the emotional and psychological needs of the parties at its centre. The flaws in the present system are regrettably clear for all to see, and in failing to address them, parties are left with a system that undermines the very values that it seeks to uphold—values such as fairness and natural justice, with the wellbeing of children at their core. This is such a vast topic that it would be inconceivable to address all the issues in the course of an Adjournment debate, and I will therefore focus on the constitution of those on the bench who hear child arrangement order cases. The reason is simple: the anchor point in all family law cases involving a child should always be that child’s best interests, and the creation of an outcome that supports and promotes the child’s safety and emotional and psychological wellbeing and protects his or her future prospects. It is almost inevitable that each and every Member of this House will have had experience of child arrangement orders in some way, shape or form, whether through constituency casework, personal experience or family and friends, because such cases are sadly far from rare. If you will indulge me, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will tell the story of one such case, which I suspect will resonate with many up and down the country, because it is sadly an all-too-familiar experience. This is the story of a young child who, by virtue of their age, cannot fully articulate their wants or desires, whose loyalty is split in two, who does not want to be seen to betray either parent, who is already dealing with their world being turned upside down and whose future is decided in a sterile magistrates court, often as a mere timetabling exercise. That child now faces birthdays, Christmas and Easter all split in half, with weeks cut in two and weekends alternating between one household and another, leaving them with no sense of oikophilia—the love of home. This is a child who feels different from their classmates because they are forced to go to school with their overnight bag; a child who constantly lives with the anxiety of turning up to school without their sports kit because it is at the other parent’s house; a child who feels nomadic, often confused and invariably distressed. The scale of the problem can be seen starkly in the figures from the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service. As of 31 August last year, there were 16,671 open private law children’s cases involving 25,670 children. In the first quarter of 2024, the average time for such cases to reach a final order was some 44 weeks. During that period, children are left with uncertainty. Magistrates have formed an integral element of the England and Wales legal system since the 12th century and the reign of Richard I, who appointed the first keepers of the peace. Almost 200 years later, pursuant to the Justices of the Peace Act 1361, the term “justice of the peace” was formally introduced. I do not propose reform of the role of magistrates lightly. However, I have reached the view that there is an overwhelming policy argument for doing so. I am not for one moment suggesting that magistrates do not have an important role to play in the justice system; self-evidently, that would be a fallacy. However, I am increasingly convinced that the nature and focus of their work should be reconsidered, and in the case of child arrangement orders, it is my overwhelming view that the magistrates court should no longer play a role. The reason for mounting this argument is simple: there is an inequality in our legal system when it comes to private law family cases. These are cases that decide the nature and degree of contact a child has with each parent, determine the long-term future of a child and, by their very nature, have a significant, lasting impact upon any child. Presently in this country, private law children’s cases can be heard before a bench of three magistrates or a district judge with a family ticket. Magistrates are a lay bench who, well-meaning as they may be, are not required to hold any formal legal qualification. While magistrates undergo some specific training following their appointment, it is not more than a handful of days a year. In comparison, a district judge hearing such cases undergoes much more rigorous training and must have a law qualification as a prerequisite. The stakes in cases such as these could not be higher. This singular, most important decision, if misjudged, can set in motion a truly devastating series of events, thereby irreversibly damaging a child and their life chances. Let us contrast that with the role of magistrates in the criminal courts. The maximum sentence that magistrates can hand down is 12 months. Sentences beyond that are remitted to the Crown court to be heard by a circuit judge. In comparison, a decision about a child’s domestic arrangements until adulthood are frequently made by individuals with no specialist knowledge or training in family law. Furthermore, in the absence of formal legal training, subconscious bias is likely to run higher among magistrates than among members of the judiciary. We can also take note of the approach taken by other courts in England and Wales. Specialist judges preside over employment, immigration, business and property, and social entitlement cases. Even in cases where a panel of three hears the case, it is a legally qualified, specialist judge who sits in the chair. Given the importance of such decisions to a child’s long-term prospects, the outdated practice of magistrates hearing private law children’s cases should, in my humble opinion, be abolished. It is an inefficient and unreliable system of dispensing justice in the modern world, and it runs the risk of reaching inconsistent decisions of varying and questionable quality. Far too often, one hears of cases simply being decided as a timetabling exercise, and of a child’s weekly diary being carved up without proper thought or consideration of the impact on that child. Removing the role of magistrates in private law family cases, and ensuring that all such cases are heard by a specialist family judge, would ensure greater consistency of decision making, applying a more judicious and impartial approach. On this most consequential of issues, we should ensure that those who preside over family cases are not only appropriately legally trained but well versed in the emotional, psychological and social factors at play. There should be much greater focus on ensuring that decision makers are trained in childhood development, domestic abuse dynamics and trauma-informed practices. The system in England and Wales is virtually unique in permitting lay magistrates to determine such matters, with most jurisdictions across the world entrusting the decision to a suitably qualified judge. In more complex cases, we should consider the use of specialised panels, as deployed in other tribunals. Such panels could have a judge as chair and suitably qualified wing members, who may include experts in child psychology. By adopting this model, the panel can take a more holistic approach to decision making. My ask of the Minister is very simple. If we aim to create a better future for our children, if we truly believe in progress and not merely maintaining the status quo, and if we are to be believed when we talk of improving life chances for generations to come, the Minister should commit to reforming this outdated and harmful system, and ensure that all child arrangement cases are appropriately considered by a qualified judge.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Has the GMC undertaken a legal assessment of the openness to legal challenge around that Montgomery point—if those conversations were not initiated and patients say that they were not given all the options available to them? Mark Swindells: We have not done a forensic legal assessment of that nature, but obviously Montgomery is in case law, and Parliament has the power to set primary law. I listened to what the chief medical officer said and what Dr Green says about how restrictive or otherwise that might be in terms of the doctor’s role with the patient.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I want to stick with clause 18, because as it stands there can be some assistance by the clinician but there cannot be total delivery or administration by the clinician. You could end up with a scenario where, for instance, you have somebody who is tetraplegic and then gets a terminal diagnosis, has capacity to make the decision and wants to end their life, but they do not have the physical means of doing so. Do you think that is open for challenge on grounds of discrimination? Sir Max Hill: I would not look at it on grounds of discrimination. What I would do is put that clause alongside what are generally referred to as the slippery slope arguments in other jurisdictions. In other jurisdictions—Canada might be one and some of the US states might be another—the provision of life-ending medication is expressed in a form of treatment by a doctor. This is not that. We are clear when reading clause 18 that it is not a permission to administer; in fact, it is a prohibition on administration. It is making available in certain tightly defined circumstances and then standing by—not necessarily in the same room, as stated in subsection (10)—while the self-administered medication takes effect. Having said that, I am absolutely clear that there is only so far a Bill or Act of Parliament can go as primary legislation. There is then further distance that must be covered by the provision of practical and professional rules, under the auspices of the national health service here, to indicate precisely the circumstances in which this will physically happen. I do not see that as discriminatory; we are dealing with a tight category of defined individuals to whom this applies and it does not apply to anybody outside that, as we have just discussed. But it is not prone to the slippery slope arguments of something that is generally to be made available in the course of treatment. In fact, the Bill has been couched in a very different way.

• 21 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  I, too, commend the hon. Member for Spen Valley for her efforts in pulling together this list; it is an unenviable task, given the number of contributions that were made. It is important that we do not let the perfect become the enemy of the good. There is a wide range of individuals and organisations that we would all benefit from hearing from, but given the time available to the Committee—which is much more extensive than most private Members’ Bills have, by some margin—we are not in a position to hear oral evidence from all of them. But there is an open invitation for everyone to contribute written evidence and for us, as my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire noted, to speak to engaged parties outside the Committee to feed into our thought processes and deliberations. On the amendments tabled, I understand the reasons for amendment (b) on the Royal College of Psychiatrists, but I have to say that I disagree. The hon. Member for Bradford West said it was about coercion. I could understand if she were making an argument that we need to hear from the Royal College of Surgeons about the issue of capacity, so I do not think that this is universally confined to psychiatrists; it is something, as a surgeon, I dealt with every day when I was getting consent for operations. We have to think about how we get a wide range of opinions on the subject: we have the Chief Medical Officer, who can comment on such issues from a policy perspective; we have the BMA, which I am sure will send representatives who will be most able to deal with the questions that are to be asked; and, of course, we have the General Medical Council, which is the ultimate regulator and arbitrator of this issue. The Committee is also about ensuring that this legislation is as fit and as robust as possible when it goes back to the House for consideration. That is where I think that having a legislator from a jurisdiction in which this has been implemented is crucial. Not having the member for Sydney in the New South Wales Parliament—where they have implemented this, and have dealt with some of the thorny issues that the Committee and subsequently the House will have to deal with—would be a mistake. Likewise, having more geriatricians and palliative care physicians is a better balance than having those with some other expertise—well-meaning as they may be, they are not necessarily dealing with this at the coalface. I do not support the amendments for those reasons.

• 27 Nov 2024 · Finance Bill · Hansard source

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  May I start by congratulating the hon. Member for South Derbyshire (Samantha Niblett) on her excellent maiden speech? Not only will her daughter have been inspired by her words, but so too will countless other young women. I must declare a personal financial interest in relation to independent school fees. I want to start by telling a story of aspiration, sacrifice and hard work. This story was told to me by a parent who is going into Christmas feeling devastated. They have worked tirelessly, missing valuable time with their child, and sacrificing holidays and any form of luxury because of an aspiration to give their child an education that otherwise would have been out of reach. This parent said to me, “I am not a rich person; I hustle every day to make the money I need to send my child to this school.” This parent will now see all those sacrifices come to nothing, as her child faces the upheaval of moving schools in the middle of the academic year. Let us imagine that child’s first day in their new state school, their school year having been disrupted, and their efforts to catch up on the missed learning as a consequence of being forced to change schools part way through the academic year. They join 35,000 other students across the country who are expected to do the same as a consequence of this policy. Their classroom sizes swell as the promise of 6,500 new teachers remains years away from becoming a reality, and the school struggles to stretch its existing budget to accommodate the new intake. There are not enough textbooks, computers or teachers. Let us imagine the child with special educational needs and disabilities. Their routine having been overhauled, they start to fall behind in their class. Despite the very best efforts of their teachers, who want to provide the extra support so desperately needed, they simply do not have the bandwidth. The consequences of that are children’s future prospects slipping through their fingers every day, because the school they now attend has not been adequately resourced for the arrival of them and their fellow new classmates. Imagine being the parents of these children. They are not rich; they just want the best for their child. As a consequence of one ill-conceived, ideologically driven policy, that dream has been snatched away, with no consideration of the impact it will have on families, on schools and on teachers, who will be left redundant. While the Government speak of a hope to bring aspiration to all, their policy to charge VAT on independent school fees will do the precise opposite. It will not deliver high standards across the board. This is not a policy that lifts up; on the contrary, it will deliver the worst for all children. It is the very definition of levelling down. A Government cannot be expected to get things right all the time, but it is not unreasonable to expect a Government to recognise when they have got something wrong. It is not unreasonable to expect a Government to hold up their hands and to pause, reflect and recalibrate. If the Government’s true endeavour is to bring about policies for positive change, they must be willing to recognise when they need to change course, and this is that moment. I ask the Government to demonstrate some moral courage, admit that they have erred and abandon this policy of folly.