Neil Shastri-Hurst MP: speeches

Speeches

• 2 Jul 2025 · Space Weather · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That this House has considered the impact of space weather on the UK. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. There are debates in this House that deal with the visible challenges of our time, such as conflict, inflation and public services, and then every so often, there are those that deal with the dangers not yet on our doorstep, but hurtling towards us all the same. This is such a debate. The threat that I raise today does not wear a uniform, cross borders or sail across oceans. It travels from the heart of our solar system, faster than sound, silent and invisible. It is called space weather, and it poses one of the gravest risks to our modern way of life. I will start with a simple truth: the sun, for all its warmth and majesty, can also be a menace. It gives us energy, light and life, but without warning it can unleash waves of electromagnetic fury so powerful and indiscriminate that they can bring nations to a standstill in a matter of minutes. This is not speculation or science fiction; it is based on history and science, and it is an urgent question of national resilience. In 1859, a solar storm known as the Carrington event ignited telegraph wires, shocked operators and lit up the skies from Canada to the Caribbean. In the 21st century, such a storm would do more than send sparks down copper wires. It would knock out GPS, disable satellites, crash the grid, blind radar systems and paralyse entire regions. In 1989, Quebec’s power grid collapsed in under two minutes; schools shut, hospitals faltered and 6 million people were left in the dark. In 2012, a storm of Carrington magnitude missed Earth by just a matter of days. After that, NASA estimated that the global cost would have exceeded $2.6 trillion. In short, we are not speculating about what might happen; we are merely observing what has already happened, just not to us—or at least not yet. In effect, we are living between bullets: one already fired, another having just missed, and a third, we must assume, now chambered. We live in a nation defined by connection. Our power grid, transport system, banks, hospitals and military platforms are all linked, all digital and all dependent on space-borne technology. It is one of the great marvels of modern Britain. But it is also, if we are frank, one of our greatest vulnerabilities. A severe solar storm would not simply inconvenience us; it would disrupt the essential machinery of civilised life. High-frequency radios used by pilots and the armed forces fail. Satellites are disabled. Navigation systems go dark. Power lines are overloaded by geomagnetic surges, and cascading failures begin. The Met Office, supported by the Royal Academy of Engineering, has warned that a major event could leave parts of the UK without electricity for days or even weeks. When the power goes, everything else follows: the supermarket tills, the mobile networks, the ventilators and the pumps that keep our water flowing. The digital backbone of our modern state is silenced. It is not just a problem for astronomers or scientists in their white coats, but a matter of national security, public health, financial stability and strategic foresight. The United Kingdom does not enter this debate empty-handed. In 2021, the Cabinet Office and the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy produced the severe space weather preparedness strategy, which was a forward-looking and well-considered document. It identified three pillars: first, assessment to improve forecasting and monitoring; secondly, preparation to support resilience planning in key sectors; and thirdly, response and recovery to co-ordinate emergency action across Government, industry and services. Those are the right foundations, but as we all know, strategies do not defend countries; implementation does, and in that sense we are not yet where we need to be. Let me identify four urgent areas for action. First, preparedness must become mandatory, not voluntary. We rightly legislate to ensure that our infrastructure can cope with floods, so why not do the same for solar storms? We have the regulators—Ofcom, Ofgem and the Civil Aviation Authority—and we need them to require, not merely recommend, that resilience plans are in place. When the warning comes, it will not arrive with some sort of grace period. Secondly, we must harden our defence capability. Our armed forces are increasingly reliant on satellite-enabled systems, whether that is for communication, targeting or navigation. Every major platform, from Type 26 frigates to F-35 jets, integrates space-dependent systems. We must invest in hardened equipment and train to operate in degraded space conditions. We must fund research into back-up navigation systems and sovereign capabilities. The reality is that our adversaries are already preparing for such an environment and we must not be found lagging behind. Thirdly, we must strengthen civil contingency planning. Local resilience forums are charged with keeping our communities safe. They plan for floods, pandemics and cyber-attacks, but in many areas, they do not yet plan for solar storms. They must be given the data, the scenarios and the authority to act. Fourthly, we must lead international co-ordination. This threat does not respect borders; the response must be global. The United Kingdom should press for a framework through NATO, the G7, the UN or the European Space Agency to share data, align early-warning systems and co-ordinate national preparedness. We have led the world in tackling threats before. Let us now do the same in the case of space weather. This is not a matter of national pride; it is a matter of global necessity. Let me bring the reality home to this House. Imagine that it is mid-January. The temperatures are freezing and the skies are dark. The sun erupts and a geomagnetic storm is en route. Local hospitals are now running on back-up power, ambulances are offline, phones are down and the grid is being rationed. Supermarkets are unable to take card payments, petrol pumps do not work, water pressure drops and air traffic is grounded. Our farmers cannot access the satellite data they need, small businesses grind to a halt, trains are suspended and mobile coverage is patchy or lost. The elderly, who are already vulnerable, are now cut off, isolated and invariably frightened. That is not fiction or dramatic exaggeration; it is foreseeable and preventable. All of that happens not because we lack the knowledge, but because we failed to act on it. Governments are judged not only on whether they see crises coming, but on how they respond to them. There are threats we cannot foresee, but there are others, like this one, where the science is established, the risk is understood and the warning is clear. This is precisely the kind of threat that distinguishes those Governments that react from those that prepare. The storm may come next year or not for a generation but, when it does, it will be too late to start preparing then. This is not the moment for drift or delay; it is the moment for decisive leadership. With that in mind, I ask the Minister to address six critical questions; they are not intended to catch anyone out but to encourage action. First, will the Government publish a delivery plan with clear targets and funding to give force to the 2021 strategy? Secondly, will Ministers bring forward statutory requirements for critical infrastructure operators to mitigate this risk? Thirdly, are the Government satisfied that our armed forces are equipped and trained to operate in the event of a space weather blackout? Fourthly, what investment is being made in forecasting capabilities, including support of the ESA Vigil mission and co-ordination with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, NASA and others? Fifthly, will the Cabinet Office require local resilience forums to prepare for this threat, as they do for other category 1 emergencies? Finally, will Britain now lead efforts to build an international framework for preparedness, starting with NATO or the G7? The case is clear, the risk is real and the time to act is now. Let us not be the generation that read the reports, saw the warnings, nodded thoughtfully and then did nothing. Let us instead be the generation that looked beyond the horizon, recognised the scale of the threat and acted with the seriousness it demands. The sun may well be 93 million miles away, but its reach is far closer than we think. When the next storm comes, let it not find us asleep at the wheel. Let it find us ready and prepared. Let it find a country that saw the storm and stood firm in the face of it.

• 25 Jun 2025 · National Armaments Director · Hansard source

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  Today this House is quite properly considering the scale and seriousness of the threats we face, from those requiring conventional deterrence in Europe to those of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. The case for strengthening our armed forces is not just compelling but essential. However, we must be honest about how we fund this renewal, and what we are willing to sacrifice to do so. Let me be clear: the case for increased defence spending is self-evident. Like many others, I have long argued that we must invest more in our sovereign capability, critical munitions, advanced deterrence and national resilience, including by expanding both the remit and the resourcing of the national armaments director. The strategic significance of that role has grown substantially. In today’s volatile security environment, the national armaments director is not merely a procurement official; they are the principal architect of our defence industrial strategy, responsible for ensuring that our armed forces are equipped not just adequately, but decisively. Their portfolio spans capability planning, acquisition reform, exportability and the stewardship of our defence supply base, from the factory floor to the frontline. In an age of contested logistics, technological disruption and rapid rearmament by authoritarian regimes, the role is fundamental to preserving both operational readiness and sovereign capability. Delivering a credible deterrent in today’s world means accelerating procurement cycles, building in modularity and adaptability, strengthening domestic supply chains, and driving long-term collaboration between government, industry and academia. It means ensuring that we can surge production in a crisis, replenish stockpiles at speed and invest in the innovation that gives us the strategic edge. That cannot be done in isolation or as an afterthought. That work must be led, co-ordinated and embedded across defence planning, not in spite of fiscal pressures, but because of them. If we are serious about resilience, readiness and regeneration, we must empower the national armaments director with the authority, capacity and resources to act not simply as a technical overseer, but as a strategic enabler at the heart of defence policy. Only then can we translate increased spending into real-world capability, and ensure that British power is not only credible on paper, but deliverable in practice. However, this investment must not come at the expense of our international development commitments. Funding defence by slashing foreign aid is a false economy. Worse, it risks undermining the strategic posture that we seek to build. Aid is not an indulgence. It is not a soft option, and it is certainly not a luxury for easier times. It is an instrument of national strategy—a projection of British values, a tool of soft power, and a forward-deployed asset in the defence of the realm. When Britain pulls back from the world, our adversaries do not hesitate to step in. China in particular has understood this dynamic. It does not wait for crises to send in troops; it sends in investment, infrastructure and influence, often to the very regions from which we have retreated. When we reduce aid, we do not save; we cede ground and create vacuums that others are all too willing to fill. Let us be frank: foreign aid and defence are not in conflict. They are complementary. One builds resilience, prevents crises and supports our allies; the other protects us as those crises unfold. A truly strategic posture requires both, because real security does not start when the first shot is fired. It starts in the classrooms of conflict zones, in the clinics of fragile states, and in the partnerships we forge before troubles take root. If we choose to retreat from the world, we shall find that the world does not retreat from us.

• 23 Jun 2025 · UK Military Base Protection · Hansard source

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  When organisations such as Palestine Action break into military bases, damage secure facilities and put our personnel at risk, they are not just protesting but sabotaging. With that in mind, if any other extremists had carried out those tasks they would rightly be described as domestic terrorists. Does the Minister agree that this is not legitimate protest, it is domestic terrorism and that any attack on our armed forces’ infrastructure should be seen thus?

• 22 May 2025 · Diego Garcia Military Base · Hansard source

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  The Government’s position appears to be predicated on a hypothetical judgment to a hypothetical claim. In this hypothetical scenario, why would the Government not simply appeal?

• 24 Apr 2025 · Ukraine War: London Talks · Hansard source

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  Can the Minister update the House on whether yesterday’s meeting involved discussion of any potential future co-operation between the US and Russia on energy? If it did, did he impart to his US counterparts that such an arrangement would be a folly?

• 22 Apr 2025 · Ukraine Update · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the Secretary of State for his statement. Will he set out what recent steps have been taken by the Government to support the Ukrainian prosecutor general in investigating and prosecuting domestic war crimes?

• 1 Apr 2025 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  T4. What further information did the Foreign Secretary have that led him to make a decision that differed from the detailed objections of the police, the security services and our allies, and to support the new Chinese super-embassy? Will he share that information with the House?

• 24 Mar 2025 · NATO Defence Industrial Capacity · Hansard source

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  I concur with my hon. Friend the Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge) that it is deeply disappointing that France has blocked European Union countries from allowing SAFE—Security Action for Europe—funds to be used for the procurement of British weapons. With that in mind, what has the Minister done to ensure that actions are being taken to guarantee a multilateral, NATO-wide procurement strategy, with the UK at its centre?

• 24 Mar 2025 · NATO Defence Industrial Capacity · Hansard source

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  8. What discussions he has had with his NATO counterparts on increasing defence industrial capacity across the alliance.

• 3 Mar 2025 · Ukraine · Hansard source

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  May I join others in commending the Prime Minister for his diplomatic leadership over the last few days? Can he set out what steps he is taking to discourage third nations from providing hardware that the Russian military can use to prosecute its illegal war?

• 27 Feb 2025 · War in Ukraine: Third Anniversary · Hansard source

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  I start by congratulating my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) on securing this important debate, and saluting him for the incredible work he has done in leading on this issue. As always, it is hugely heartening to see so many colleagues from across the House in the Chamber. It serves as a timely reminder of the united approach that we have taken on this issue and of our resolute and undiminished support for the Ukrainian people. In my constituency, we have welcomed many Ukrainian families, and I am always touched and moved by their stories of resilience in the face of the greatest hardship. Many Members have spoken before me—not just in this debate, but through the course of the week—about the importance of the Government’s welcome announcement of increased defence spending and the need for our allies also to step up to the plate. While I do not intend to repeat those arguments today, I will add that we alone do not determine our defence spending: it is our enemies too, but it is also our allies. With the United States announcing a potential step back from their support for Ukraine, it is clear that we as a nation have an overriding obligation not only to Ukraine but to our citizens and the wider world to step up and keep Putin’s war machine at bay. If we fail to do so, we will be opening the gates to totalitarian regimes across the world. The reality is that the United Kingdom has armed forces that are fit for peace. However, over the past eight months or so, we have entered a much more dangerous arena, and we need to be ready for any outcome. In the time available to me, I want to raise two further points. First, I reiterate the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green on the increasingly pressing need to release the $300 billion in frozen Russian assets to aid the Ukrainian Government in the rebuilding of their country. Secondly, I want to pick up on my right hon. Friend’s comments about what we can and must learn as an armed forces from this conflict and from the heroic efforts of the Ukrainian military, with many making the ultimate sacrifice in defence of the sovereignty of their country. The war has shown a clear shift in the nature of warfare and in the nature of each serving person’s working realities. War is now in a much more hybrid state, fought not only in traditional land and maritime realms, but back in bases in remote locations, yet we still follow traditional medical guidelines setting out who can serve and who does not have the opportunity to do so. This where I feel we can learn from Ukraine, which, very early on in the conflict, amended and adjusted many of the medical requirements for its serving personnel. In our military, there is often a mindset of “soldier first”, which may well exempt someone who has suffered a knee injury while playing sport at school, anyone with Raynaud’s phenomenon, for example, or anyone wearing glasses over a certain prescription. Rather than making a generic medical exemption list for the whole force, I invite the Minister at least to consider tailoring the medical requirements to the position being applied for. For example, what are the chances of a person’s glasses being blown off if they are operating from a chair in a drone centre hundreds of miles away? What is the reality of an intelligence officer in a remote location looking at satellite information losing the feeling in their fingers due to the cold because of Raynaud’s phenomenon? What are the chances of a Royal Navy dental officer not being able to complete a check-up because of pain in his knee? We need to be much more flexible. Although I accept that there is a certain degree of hyperbole in my argument, the point I am making is a serious one. If we are to turn the tide on our recruitment policy and difficulties in this country, we need to tailor the medical requirements to the specific role. We must become more versatile and adaptive as a fighting force—like our friends in Ukraine. As a country, we are often guilty of preparing for the war that we have had, rather than the war that we will face in the future. As we reflect on the three years since Putin’s illegal invasion, I say to the Government that we should not waste any more time or waste what we have learned at the cost of so many thousand Ukrainian lives.

• 19 Dec 2024 · Ukraine · Hansard source

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  I thank the Minister for his statement and welcome the announcement on our ongoing military support. It is critically important that those who wage Putin’s illegal war face the legal consequences for their actions. With that in mind, will the Minister set out the steps that the Government are taking to support the Ukrainian domestic legal system to ensure that these cases are prosecuted in their own courts?

• 18 Dec 2024 · Financial Assistance to Ukraine Bill · Hansard source

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  At a time of existential threat to Ukraine, I have been heartened by the tone from across the House towards the Ukrainian people. It is critical at this moment in history that this House and all European Governments step up and do not give up. While I welcome the details of this short Bill, we should be focusing on the untapped countermeasure and counter-offensive that is at our disposal. Like a number of colleagues, I gently say to the Minister that we should think about the use of frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine in its non-violent economic and political reconstruction. The UN General Assembly has already endorsed an international mechanism for compensating Ukraine, but we cannot wait for the war to be over before we enact that countermeasure. Back in 2022, Ukraine lost 29% of its GDP, so if it only receives its compensation at the end of the war, that will be far too late.

• 11 Dec 2024 · Finance Bill · Hansard source

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  A particular subset of pupils affected by this policy are those in receipt of the continuity of education allowance. The revised figures for the CEA, released recently, do not fully protect those pupils from the uplift on VAT on school fees. What assessment have the Government made of the impact of this policy on retention and recruitment into our armed forces and our diplomatic service?

• 2 Dec 2024 · Chagos Islands: UK-US Defence Relationship · Hansard source

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  Will the Minister set out how he intends to implement safeguards against China establishing military capabilities and surveillance capacity in the British Indian ocean territories?

• 25 Nov 2024 · Israel-Gaza Conflict: Arrest Warrants · Hansard source

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  I have a degree of sympathy with the Minister, who has been asked to substitute in lieu of the Foreign Secretary today, so I will ask him a question of fact. Does he recognise that pursuant to section 23(6) of the International Criminal Court Act 2001, representatives of a non-state party to the Rome statute will remain immune from prosecution unless that non-state party expressly waives that right to the ICC?

• 8 Oct 2024 · Independent Schools: VAT and Business Rates Exemptions · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Caroline. At the outset, I must declare a personal financial interest in relation to this issue. There is a multiplicity of reasons why the Government plan to impose a 20% VAT levy on private education is a fundamentally poor choice. It plays to the idle trope that independent schools are the preserve of the privileged and the wealthy when, as many of my own constituents will attest, that is simply not the case. It is a policy that lacks nuance in its pursuit of an ideological desire to level down rather than lift up the standard of education across the board. The detrimental effect of this ill-conceived policy is nowhere better illustrated than in the cohort of pupils whose parents are in receipt of continuity of education allowance. CEA is critical for military and diplomatic service families, who need boarding schools to provide a stable education. A societal and moral contract exists between the state and our military, a golden thread that runs through our society and binds the two together. The Government’s proposals threaten not just to shake that bond, but to break it. To date, the Government have provided no assurances that the policy will exempt those service families in receipt of CEA. Combine with that the rushed decision to implement the plan by January 2025, and it is little wonder that service families are deeply distressed by the ongoing uncertainty. If the Government fail to grip the situation, the cost of a suitable education for many armed forces children will become unaffordable. Many parents will be forced to withdraw their children from the school they currently attend and, in the worst-case scenario, many will make the decision that service life is no longer compatible with their family and leave, risking our national security. By failing to act with competence, the Government are failing to uphold the contract between the state and our armed forces. My request to the Minister is to provide the service community with reassurances that they will not be left high and dry.

• 5 Sept 2024 · Business of the House · Hansard source

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  There are many excellent military charities in this country, including Troop Aid in my constituency. Given their vital work, will the Leader of the House set aside Government time for us to debate what further support can be provided to them?

• 5 Sept 2024 · SEND Provision · Hansard source

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  I will not give way, purely because of the amount I have to get through in the time. Aside from family members, children spend most of their developing lives with their teachers. It is important that the teaching curriculum is sufficiently flexible to enable children to reach their true potential. I would also like to make special reference to those military families whose children suffer from special educational needs. Having served in the military myself, I know of several families who have encountered adverse effects as a result. With regular school moves, often between different local authorities, there is an inevitable need to reapply for an EHCP, thereby delaying access to the provision that is so desperately needed. My final request to the Minister comes as no surprise: to achieve all these improvements, it is important that local authorities receive the funding they need. In particular, I ask that my own council receive its fair share of funding, because Solihull council presently takes in SEND children from Birmingham but receives much less funding per pupil. That matter needs to be rectified. Those three things—awareness, training and funding—will have a real, tangible impact on young people, their families and their life chances.