Neil Shastri-Hurst MP: speeches 2025

Speeches

• 24 Mar 2025 · NATO Defence Industrial Capacity · Hansard source

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  8. What discussions he has had with his NATO counterparts on increasing defence industrial capacity across the alliance.

• 18 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McVey. I will speak briefly to this group of amendments, setting out why I support amendments 462, 497 and 498, but oppose amendment 463. My hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire set out very eloquently the reasons behind amendment 462. On the one hand, there is a cogent argument that it is not strictly necessary in the light of the provisions set out in subsection (4)(b) and (c), which set out that the individual wishing to have an assisted death must have “a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life” and is “requesting provision of that assistance voluntarily”. However, it appears to me a logical and entirely appropriate extension of the intentions behind clause 18(4) to express that in slightly more explicit terms in the Bill by adopting my hon. Friend’s amendment 462. It strikes me that, after doing so, the Bill would provide a further check and balance that creates no greater onus on either the individual seeking an assisted death nor the co-ordinating doctor who is assisting them. In those circumstances, it appears eminently sensible to improve the Bill in that way. From the indications we have already heard, it appears that there is significant support for that amendment. I struggle with amendment 463, which would remove paragraph (c) from clause 18(6). The effect would be to prohibit the co-ordinating doctor from providing assistance to the person seeking an assisted death, either through ingestion or other self-administration of that substance, in any circumstance. In my view, the amendment would make the operation of the Bill, were it to become an Act, unnecessarily restrictive. Clause 18(7) already stipulates that “the decision to self-administer the approved substance and the final act of doing so must”— I stress the word “must”— “be taken by the person to whom the substance has been provided”. On any interpretation of the construct of that, it is clear that the person seeking an assisted death must be the active participant in the process; it is mandatory. There is no discretion in that, by virtue of the word “must”. Were we to remove clause 18(6)(c) and the Bill passed into law, it would have the effect, in what is an entirely legal process, that a doctor would be unable to aid a patient in any circumstance. For example, they would not be allowed to hold a glass or steady a straw as a patient moved towards it to imbibe a substance. Those are circumstances that are entirely foreseeable, when through the ravages of an illness, somebody is limited in what they are physically able to do. Of course, assistance could be provided in alternative ways—for instance, through assistive technology, which we have seen being used in other jurisdictions. The Swiss, for example, use a significant amount of assistive technology in administering and assisting the process of self-administration at the end of life.

• 18 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  That is why clause 18(7) is so important: the final act must be undertaken by the person seeking an assisted death. The example my hon. Friend gives of tipping tablets into a mouth is a final act. Pushing a syringe is a final act. There is a significant distinction between an individual or practitioner holding a cup with a straw and the person seeking an assisted death moving their mouth towards the straw, sucking from it and imbibing the substance and the passive act of a substance being raised to that individual’s lips and poured in without any movement by the individual seeking an assisted death themselves.

• 18 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I agree entirely with the right hon. Member’s interpretation of the Bill. There is a further unintended consequence of the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire, which I am sure is not his intention but would sadly be the effect: were an individual to qualify under the Bill, should it pass and were the amendment to be adopted, they would inevitably be forced to take the final decision at an earlier stage. If there is a restriction that they can have no assistance whatsoever in performing the act, they will end up making the decision when they know that they have the entire physical strength available for them to do it, and that actually brings forward the point at which they choose to die to an earlier stage.

• 18 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My right hon. Friend makes an important and powerful point. I think there is a consensus among the Committee that there is no desire for people to take this ultimate step at an earlier stage than is absolutely necessary for them. My very real fear is that, were we to adopt this amendment, we would bring forward that point of decision.

• 18 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is very clear from subsection (7) that this must be an active step taken by the individual. There is a risk that we go down a rabbit hole in terms of— [ Interruption. ] I am sure my hon. Friend would like me to finish my point. We risk going down a rabbit hole in drawing examples. I raised the example of a cup, but of course there are much wider assistive technologies that can be used and are used in different jurisdictions. I gave the example to illustrate the point that this is an active act, not a passive act.

• 18 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  This gets to the root of how the law has operated in another jurisdiction, Switzerland, where Dignitas has managed this scenario over the past 40 years or so. The key—these are the words that its own guidance uses—is ensuring that the power of control remains with the person seeking the assisted death. That provides the individual who is making the choice with the ultimate autonomy at the end in controlling the circumstances and the manner in which they pass. I have set out why I feel that although amendment 463 arises from good intentions, it would not achieve what is intended. There is a real risk that the constraints that adopting the amendment would create would lead to the regrettable unintended consequence of individuals being forced to have an assisted death at an earlier stage than they would otherwise have wished. I can deal with amendments 497 and 498 in short order. They would tighten up the Bill by providing greater clarity around the circumstances in which the substance would be removed from the presence of the individual who had previously indicated a wish to have an assisted death. Amendment 497 specifies that the individual would need to set out to the co-ordinating doctor that they no longer desired to go through with the process. In my view, that is eminently sensible. Amendment 498 elaborates on the Bill to provide greater clarity to those who will be operating it. It will make it a much more workable piece of legislation. I support both amendments.

• 18 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend hits the nail on the head, because it is the patient who is driving the decision. They are making that act by activating the electronic device—the computer or whatever it may be in terms of assistive technology—but they have the power and control over that decision-making process, which is completely distinct from a clinician doing that act. It is distinct because it is activated by the patient—by the person making that decision—and that is why I draw the distinction. My hon. Friend may not agree, but that is my rationale for drawing a distinction between the two.

• 18 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am being ambushed by the left.

• 18 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Although I have certain sympathies with these amendments, I do not feel that they are necessary or desirable. They are not necessary because of the provisions that are already stipulated in clause 18(6)(b), which provides the co-ordinating doctor with the ability to prepare “a medical device which will enable that person to self-administer the substance”. That subsection, in effect, negates the scenario that is put forward in amendment 350 around dysphagia or the loss of a limb. It would permit, for example, the use of a nasogastric tube or a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy feeding tube to be used for the administration of the substance in the case of dysphagia. In the case of the functional loss of limbs, as was discussed in the debate on the previous group, a range of assisted technologies are available that would remove the barriers that that would present. Beyond the necessity, or lack of necessity, of these amendments, I fear that they create legal uncertainty, which is clearly undesirable and, in this instance, could have a serious and significant unintended consequence through the amendments’ interaction with clause 24. Subsection (3) of that clause inserts proposed new section 2AA of the Suicide Act 1961, which is an exemption to that Act in respect of the assistance provided under this Bill. In effect, proposed new section 2AA disapplies sections 2(1) and 2A(1) of the Suicide Act where the provision of assistance is done in accordance with the Bill. Those sections specifically relate to an act “capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another person”. Introducing the concept of additional assistance, as these amendments would, creates a legal uncertainty. The word “additional” creates a further concept that is beyond assistance but is, thus far, ill defined. Would it go as far as, for example, the clinician taking full control of administering the substance? It is entirely unclear. It would therefore place the clinician in an invidious position as to what it would mean for them to provide additional assistance in such circumstances. As I read the interplay between the Suicide Act and the proposed legislation, the clinician would not then be exempt by virtue of clause 24(3), leaving them open to prosecution under the Act.

• 18 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful for that helpful and thoughtful intervention. For the reasons I have set out, I consider that the amendments create unnecessary and highly undesirable legal confusion, so I shall not support them.

• 18 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Given that valid consent requires a voluntary and informed decision, can my hon. Friend set out why that would not involve being consulted on the matter in any event?

• 18 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. My hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire was mid-intervention when the Committee adjourned this morning, and I would not want to pull the rug from underneath him. Does he wish to intervene again?

• 11 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty First sitting) · Hansard source

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  You will be delighted to learn that I have nothing further to add to this debate, Ms McVey. Amendment 93 agreed to. Amendment proposed : 305, in clause 9, page 6, line 3, after “about death” insert “and any other effects in addition to death.”— (Danny Kruger.) This amendment would require the assessing doctor to explain effects the provided substance would have in addition to death. Question put , That the amendment be made.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty First sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member makes an important point. In practice, one would of course discuss the side-effect profile of any medication or substance to be administered. I do not feel that specifying that in the Bill, as amendment 305 is drafted, would achieve its purpose. The amendment refers to “any other effects”, but it does not specifically mention side effects. In any event, it must flow from the interaction between clause 9(2)(b)(iv) and clause 9(2)(c) that the conversation about complications as a result of the administration of a substance will encompass a conversation about side effects. It is worth noting that all substances have a side-effect profile; what the side effects are will be specific to the substance in question. I do not think it a helpful improvement to the Bill to presuppose what the side effects may be. Amendment 305, although imperfect, is therefore preferable in my view to amendment 362, which would require that specific side effects be set out and which presupposes a scenario involving a particular set of medication. Nevertheless, I remain concerned about the wording of amendment 305. I would be grateful if the hon. Member for Spen Valley provided some reassurances as to the steps she has taken to honour the intention of the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for York Central and achieve a tighter piece of legislative drafting. I turn to amendment 142, tabled by the hon. Member for Broxtowe. It seeks to ensure that the discussion with the assessing doctor includes a discussion of how the substance will be administered. Although it may not be strictly necessary, because that should be a conversation that takes place when someone is going through an informed consent process, I do not consider that its inclusion would undermine the operability of the Bill. I am therefore minded to support the amendment. I do not consider that it will be restrictive should the circumstances change, because there may be a broad conversation about the variety of substances that can be administered, depending on the circumstances. As the drafting of the Bill does not preclude or prohibit such a wider discussion, it would be eminently sensible to include the route of administration. Amendment 306, in the name of the hon. Member for York Central, would require the assessing doctor to include the escalation of medical intervention in their discussion should complications arise. In many ways, that issue is covered by clause 9(2)(c), so the amendment would not aid the operability or interpretation of the Bill. It would be much better dealt with under the code of conduct, to avoid the Bill becoming overly prescriptive and to allow flexibility as scientific and medical knowledge adjusts and adapts over time.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty First sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McVey, and to speak to this group of amendments. Amendments 93, 305, 142 and 362 relate to clause 9(2)(b)(iv); amendment 306, tabled by the hon. Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell), relates to clause 9(2)(c). Clause 9(2)(b)(iv) stipulates: “The assessing doctor must…explain to and discuss with the person being assessed…the nature of the substance that might be provided to assist the person to end their own life (including how it will bring about death)”. My amendment 93 would replace “might” with “is to”. In my view, the word “might” creates an air of possibility. The Oxford English Dictionary gives the following definition: “A possibility as distinct from a certainty”. The Cambridge Dictionary goes somewhat further, defining “might” as the expression of a “possibility that something will happen or be done, or that something is true although not very likely”. In the context of the Bill, I consider that the use of “might” would create too ill-defined a concept. For a patient to provide informed consent, it is necessary that the healthcare professional set out the relevant information in sufficient detail to enable that person to make an educated decision. In the circumstances of providing a substance, it follows that that information must include what that substance is. In my submission, it is insufficient simply to inform a patient that they might be provided with a substance, although they are just as likely, if not more likely, to receive another substance. Changing “might” to “is to” would provide greater certainty and precision in the wording of the Bill. I recognise the concerns that have been raised that adopting amendment 93 would overly restrict which substance can be used, which may create an issue if the substance needs to be changed, for example if it was to be taken orally but has to be administered via a different route because the individual is no longer able to ingest orally. To my mind, however, the amendment would not prohibit a clinician from setting out to the individual a range of substances that could be used to provide them with the ability to end their own life, as long as the clinician includes the substance that is used and, crucially, the person seeking an assisted death indicates that in those circumstances they are content for that particular substance to be used. For example, it would be entirely open to an individual to inform a clinician that they are happy with regimes A, B and C, but not D.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty First sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 93, in clause 9, page 6, line 1, leave out “might” and insert “is to”.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty First sitting) · Hansard source

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  In the scenario that I envisage, as we have seen in other jurisdictions, there are a variety of regimes that could be used in the given circumstances. It would be appropriate for an approved list of medications and substances to be a delegated matter for the Secretary of State. As medical and pharmacological studies progress, there may be changes to those regimes, so I do not propose putting a list on the face of the Bill. The way I envisage it operating, if the Bill comes into law, is that there would be an approved list of substances that would be open to use. There would have to be a range; we are acutely aware that there are supply chain issues at times, so limiting it to just one regime would be impracticable. I believe that amendment 93 would strengthen the wording of the Bill to provide greater certainty that the nature of the substance to be provided will be explained to and discussed with the person who is seeking an assisted death. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for indicating his broad support for the amendment. I turn to amendment 305, tabled by the hon. Member for York Central. I appreciate the premise of the amendment, but I have some concerns about the precision of the drafting. It would require the assessing doctor to explain the effects of the provided substance, in addition to how it would bring about death. In its current form, the Bill requires the discussion with the assessing doctor to set out how the provided substance will result in death. My understanding is that the intent of amendment 305 is that they set out the side effects beyond those directly related to the mechanics of bringing about death; this would include any wider discussion around side effects.

• 5 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eighteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman makes a powerful argument about doctors being vilified in the press, but does he believe there is a risk that it may go further and present a genuine safety risk to those doctors?

• 5 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Nineteeth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your leadership, Mrs Harris. I will speak to this octet of amendments and set out why I cannot support them. In my view, they are a classic example of legislative embroidery. If we wanted a better example, we could not find one. Sadly, they would achieve nothing but add a great deal of confusion to the situation. Throughout the Bill, a clear set of criteria must be fulfilled in order to move from one stage of the process to another. To lay on, additionally, a frankly woolly and ill-defined legal test that has not been set out in in this legislation and that overrides those criteria, without any reasoning to underpin it or any sense of purpose behind it, is simply confusing. The test would make the Bill less operable in reality, and it undermines everything that comes before it—there is no purpose to having criteria that we have to move through if we are then to say, “Actually, that is null and void, because I have a sense that I am just not comfortable with it.” If one is not comfortable with one stage of the criteria, that is enough for it to fall or to be referred to someone else—for example, to a capacity assessment, as has been suggested. The amendment is legal nonsense. I see where it is coming from, but it is legal nonsense in how it is drafted, and it does not assist in making a more meaningful or operable Bill. Therefore, I cannot support it.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Seventeenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  That would satisfy me. The reason I say that is because at the moment the wording is too broad and ill-defined. The question is: is this about the closeness and proximity of a relationship? The suggested wording that my hon. Friend just put forward would be much closer to that and much clearer, and more akin with the language of medical registration. When someone turns up in A&E, they are asked to give the name of their next of kin. That defines the closeness, the proximity and the permanency of that relationship. If my hon. Friend was perhaps to consider withdrawing this amendment and tabling it again in an alternative form, or rewording it, that would certainly be something that I would be open to supporting. I have outlined why, as the amendments currently stand, I cannot support them.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Seventeenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to set out why—reluctantly—I cannot support amendments 403 and 404, which have been tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire. It is not because of the principle involved, because my hon. Friend was very clear in setting out the amendments. They would not provide for a prescriptive situation where an individual must tell their family. A range of options are set out, which I anticipate that any sensible and responsible doctor or clinician would take a patient through, encouraging them to involve their family in their decision making. The issue that I have is around the legal clarity of the wording of the amendments, because under the English and Welsh legal system there is no statutory definition of “family”. There is a concept of family, but the concept of family to me may be very different from that of my neighbour, or from that of someone who lives in another city. For example, for some people stepbrothers, stepsisters and step-parents are very much part of their family; for others, they are not. For some people, unmarried couples with children are a family; for others, they are not. For some people, unmarried couples without children are a family; for others, they are not.

• 3 Mar 2025 · Ukraine · Hansard source

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  May I join others in commending the Prime Minister for his diplomatic leadership over the last few days? Can he set out what steps he is taking to discourage third nations from providing hardware that the Russian military can use to prosecute its illegal war?

• 27 Feb 2025 · War in Ukraine: Third Anniversary · Hansard source

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  I start by congratulating my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) on securing this important debate, and saluting him for the incredible work he has done in leading on this issue. As always, it is hugely heartening to see so many colleagues from across the House in the Chamber. It serves as a timely reminder of the united approach that we have taken on this issue and of our resolute and undiminished support for the Ukrainian people. In my constituency, we have welcomed many Ukrainian families, and I am always touched and moved by their stories of resilience in the face of the greatest hardship. Many Members have spoken before me—not just in this debate, but through the course of the week—about the importance of the Government’s welcome announcement of increased defence spending and the need for our allies also to step up to the plate. While I do not intend to repeat those arguments today, I will add that we alone do not determine our defence spending: it is our enemies too, but it is also our allies. With the United States announcing a potential step back from their support for Ukraine, it is clear that we as a nation have an overriding obligation not only to Ukraine but to our citizens and the wider world to step up and keep Putin’s war machine at bay. If we fail to do so, we will be opening the gates to totalitarian regimes across the world. The reality is that the United Kingdom has armed forces that are fit for peace. However, over the past eight months or so, we have entered a much more dangerous arena, and we need to be ready for any outcome. In the time available to me, I want to raise two further points. First, I reiterate the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green on the increasingly pressing need to release the $300 billion in frozen Russian assets to aid the Ukrainian Government in the rebuilding of their country. Secondly, I want to pick up on my right hon. Friend’s comments about what we can and must learn as an armed forces from this conflict and from the heroic efforts of the Ukrainian military, with many making the ultimate sacrifice in defence of the sovereignty of their country. The war has shown a clear shift in the nature of warfare and in the nature of each serving person’s working realities. War is now in a much more hybrid state, fought not only in traditional land and maritime realms, but back in bases in remote locations, yet we still follow traditional medical guidelines setting out who can serve and who does not have the opportunity to do so. This where I feel we can learn from Ukraine, which, very early on in the conflict, amended and adjusted many of the medical requirements for its serving personnel. In our military, there is often a mindset of “soldier first”, which may well exempt someone who has suffered a knee injury while playing sport at school, anyone with Raynaud’s phenomenon, for example, or anyone wearing glasses over a certain prescription. Rather than making a generic medical exemption list for the whole force, I invite the Minister at least to consider tailoring the medical requirements to the position being applied for. For example, what are the chances of a person’s glasses being blown off if they are operating from a chair in a drone centre hundreds of miles away? What is the reality of an intelligence officer in a remote location looking at satellite information losing the feeling in their fingers due to the cold because of Raynaud’s phenomenon? What are the chances of a Royal Navy dental officer not being able to complete a check-up because of pain in his knee? We need to be much more flexible. Although I accept that there is a certain degree of hyperbole in my argument, the point I am making is a serious one. If we are to turn the tide on our recruitment policy and difficulties in this country, we need to tailor the medical requirements to the specific role. We must become more versatile and adaptive as a fighting force—like our friends in Ukraine. As a country, we are often guilty of preparing for the war that we have had, rather than the war that we will face in the future. As we reflect on the three years since Putin’s illegal invasion, I say to the Government that we should not waste any more time or waste what we have learned at the cost of so many thousand Ukrainian lives.

• 26 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fifteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. I wish to concentrate my remarks on new clause 6, which I tabled, but also to speak to amendments 8 and 124. To be clear, new clause 6 is a probing amendment that was tabled to air the debate on the record. I tabled it because of the interplay between the Bill as currently drafted and section 26(1) of the Mental Capacity Act, which sets out that a “decision has effect as if” the individual “had made it, and had had capacity to make it, at the time when the question arises whether the treatment should be carried out or continued.” Of course, an advance directive relates to decisions around the removal of treatment. The mischief that I was seeking to address is that there are patients who, were this law to be enacted, would continue with their palliative care treatment right to the very end, before they chose to have an assisted death. Technically, there could be a scenario where that person, from the point at which they have gone through the two-stage assessment by a doctor and it is been approved by the panel—if that is approved in subsequent amendments—loses capacity after they have set out a desire to end their life through an assisted death, but there would be the option to remove the palliative treatment options at that point. There is a conflict in respect of an advanced directive that would enable the assisted death to take place, which would involve the removal of care.