Neil Shastri-Hurst MP: speeches

Speeches

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  On the basis of the Minister’s clarification and reassurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn . Clauses 25 and 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 27 Driving disqualification orders: reduced disqualification period Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Mr Efford. I will speak in support of amendments 18 and 19 and, in doing so, will address clause 25 more broadly. At its heart, clause 25 concerns one of the most sensitive and important decisions in the entire service justice framework—the point at which a victim is asked to express a preference as to whether an allegation should proceed in the service justice system or the civilian justice system. For many victims, this is the first moment at which they are invited into a process that will shape not only the course of an investigation, but their experiences of justice itself. That is precisely why it is incumbent on us to get it right. I think all of us would accept that asking a victim to make a jurisdictional choice without proper, balanced and comprehensible information risks placing an unfair burden upon them at a moment of deep vulnerability. It risks substituting clarity for confusion, and it risks turning what should be an informed decision into, in effect, an uninformed guess between systems they may not fully understand. Amendment 18 seeks to address that concern directly, and it does so by placing clear statutory requirements on the nature, quality and neutrality of the information that must be provided before any preference is expressed. That principle is incredibly important because, if we are asking victims to make decisions that can affect the trajectory of an investigation, we have a duty—indeed, a moral obligation—to ensure that those decisions are properly informed.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 18, in clause 25, page 43, line 23, leave out paragraph (a) and insert— “(a) must require that, before a victim is asked to express a preference regarding jurisdiction— (i) the victim is provided with a standardised explanation of the service justice system and the civilian justice system, (ii) such information is presented in a clear, accessible and neutral manner, (iii) the information includes an explanation of the key features, processes, available support and potential outcomes of each system, sufficient to enable the victim to make an informed decision, and (iv) the victim is informed of the availability of any independent legal advice or advocacy and how it may be accessed, (b) must require that— (i) a written record is made of the information provided to the victim, and (ii) where a victim expresses a preference, a record is made of the reasons for that preference, so far as provided by the victim, (c) must not present information in a way that is misleading or lacking appropriate context.”. This amendment creates requirements for the information victims receive regarding both justice systems.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I welcome the clause. Will the Minister set out how there will be consistency in the use of these powers by commanding officers, to ensure that there is equality of justice across the board?

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in support of new clause 12 and offer broader support for clauses 5 to 9, which represent a significant strengthening of the protective framework in the service justice system. It is worth setting out the basic principle that the armed forces justice system must be capable not only of dealing fairly and effectively with wrongdoing, but of ensuring that the protection of victims and management of risk do not fall between institutional cracks. The credibility of the service justice system depends on continuity, coherence and, above all, confidence that protective measures will not be undermined by procedural happenstance. Clauses 5 to 9 make important and welcome progress. They will extend the availability and operation of sexual harm prevention orders, sexual risk orders, domestic abuse protection orders, stalking protection orders and restraining orders in the service justice system. They make provision for enforcement, variation and guidance structures, including in respect of the important role of provost marshals and service police in the exercise of those functions. The clauses will modernise the service justice landscape in a way that recognises the reality of contemporary risk management. They will ensure that service personnel and civilians subject to service discipline are not operating in a parallel system that is less capable of protecting victims or managing dangerous individuals. In particular, the extension to the service courts of protections against domestic abuse and stalking is a welcome alignment with civilian criminal justice standards, ensuring consistency of safeguarding irrespective of jurisdiction. However, as is often the case in the refinement of complex statutory schemes, there remains a narrow but important residual gap, which is precisely what new clause 12 seeks to address. The core issue is one of jurisdictional continuity. At present, protective orders in the service justice system are clearly available while an individual is subject to service law. Clauses 5 to 9 also go further by making provision for enforcement in certain circumstances in which the individual ceases to be subject to service discipline after an order has been made. A difficulty arises, however, in the transitional space where an individual is charged or even convicted while subject to service law, but ceases to be subject to service law before the protective order is imposed or finalised. Without express provision, there is a risk that such an individual, by virtue of leaving service, will fall outside the effective reach of the service court’s protective jurisdiction at precisely the point at which such orders are most necessary. New clause 12 performs a simple but important function. It would provide that where a person is charged with or convicted of an offence in the service justice system and was subject to service law at the relevant time, the service court may impose specified protective orders as if the person remained subject to service law. It is, in effect, a statutory deeming provision, preserving jurisdiction for protective purposes notwithstanding the cessation of service status. The legal merits of that approach are clear. First, it prevents what might properly be described as jurisdictional arbitrage. Without such a provision, there is a theoretical, though in practice very real, risk that individuals could seek to avoid the imposition of protective orders by leaving service prior to trial or sentencing. Even if such behaviour is not deliberately engineered, the mere existence of a gap creates inconsistency and undermines confidence in the system. The protective reach of the service justice system should not be rendered contingent on administrative status at a particular moment in time. Secondly, the new clause reflects a well-established principle in criminal justice, which is that protective orders are ancillary to the underlying offence and risk posed by the offender, not merely to their procedural status. The civilian courts retain wide powers to impose protective orders at sentencing precisely because the assessment of risk is rooted in conduct, not institutional affiliation. New clause 12 would ensure that the service courts are placed in an equivalent position, recognising that the underlying risk does not evaporate simply because service status changes. Thirdly, the new clause would promote legal certainty and coherence. Through clauses 5 to 9, the existing framework already recognises that certain orders may continue to have effect or be enforced after a person leaves service. However, enforcement is not the same as imposition. It is logically and legally cleaner to ensure that the court retains the power to make the order at the point of disposal, rather than relying on subsequent conversion or deeming mechanisms. The new clause therefore fills a structural gap and ensures that the life cycle of protective orders is not disrupted by jurisdictional transition. Fourthly, the new clause is carefully drafted in respect of its propriety. It would not create an unfettered or novel category of punitive power. Rather, it would explicitly confine the service court’s ability to make orders to those that it would have been able to make had the individual remained subject to service law. It is, in essence, a continuity provision, not an expansion of jurisdiction. Importantly, subsection (3) of the new clause would provide that such orders are to have effect “as if made by a civilian court of equivalent jurisdiction” and are “enforceable accordingly.” That is a critical safeguard. It would ensure interoperability between the service justice system and the civilian criminal justice system, avoiding the creation of parallel regimes that might otherwise give rise to confusion about enforcement authority. Subsection (4) of the new clause, enabling the Secretary of State to make regulations regarding recognition, enforcement and variation, is also welcome. It would provide necessary flexibility in an area where procedural interfaces between service and civilian jurisdictions must be capable of adjustment over time. In particular, it would allow for clarity as to which court is best placed to vary or discharge orders once a person has fully transitioned out of service life. That is a sensible delegation of secondary rule-making power, consistent with the established constitutional practice in this field.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in support of the amendment, which was tabled in the name of His Majesty’s loyal Opposition, and to set out my broader support for clause 20. I will begin with the clause itself, because it addresses the composition of the court martial. In such circumstances, it is right that we support the very sensible change that the clause sets out, with its underlying intent to ensure that the court martial is properly constituted and capable of commanding confidence across the armed forces and the wider public. Enlarging the pool of those who can sit on it is a welcome amendment. Precisely because we support that principle, however, we also need to examine whether the system is fully equipped for the realities it faces. In that context, the amendment becomes not only relevant, but in my view increasingly necessary. The amendment proposes a simple change, as set out by my right hon. Friend, to include retired holders of the relevant rank among those qualified for membership of the court martial. At first glance the amendment may appear relatively modest, but I suggest that, like many apparently modest changes in defence legislation, it subtly reflects something much more significant. It reflects a recognition of the demands placed on our armed forces justice system and how those are changing over time, and changing rapidly. We are operating in an era of increasing operational tempo—a phrase that is often used in defence debates, sometimes frequently.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Minister is right to challenge me on the case that I am making. It is about competing challenges facing those in senior rank in the armed forces. My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford gave the example of colonels or above. We have heard of very senior officers being brought before a court martial in cases that may involve, for instance, continuity of education allowance. These are senior individuals who then take out other senior individuals. They are often in a fairly small pool and have perhaps worked closely with one another during their service, but they also have increasing demands, given the global instability that we are currently facing. It therefore makes logical sense to widen that pool and take the pressure off the shoulders of those who have operational responsibilities by allowing those who have served in the past, and hold those ranks by virtue of their service, to sit within the court martial system and increase capacity. I am not suggesting that there is an inefficiency in the service—everybody involved is doing the best job they can. It is about flexing resources so that they are used most appropriately to deliver the outcomes that we need not only from a national security and defence perspective, but to maintain the integrity and speed with which service justice is administered. There is also a broader strategic point that we must not overlook, and it touches on the Minister’s point. We often speak about the importance of a whole-force concept and the idea that national defence is about not simply those currently in uniform but a wider ecosystem of reserve capability, which we will come on to later. It is also about veterans, institutional memory and those who can bring expertise from their time in service. We are, quite rightly, investing in the reserve forces. We are also increasingly recognising the value of civilian expertise in a variety of fields, such as cyber-intelligence or technology. In many respects, we are trying to build a much more flexible and adaptive defence structure, and yet, when it comes to the service justice system, we have not always applied the same logic with equal measure or consistency. We have in effect treated participation as something that must be narrowly confined to serving personnel, even when highly experienced retired officers could make a valuable contribution.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, who from his time as a Defence Minister knows well how to keep tabs on those who have served our country but are now retired. The pension scheme is an obvious way to do so. In addition, he makes an important point about the willingness of individuals to engage in the process. These are people who have given enormous service to their country, and often wish to continue giving service long into their years of retirement from active service. Our armed forces are more stretched and more globally engaged than before, and they are more frequently deployed than at almost any point in recent decades. The spectrum of threats facing our country is widening, from state-based adversaries to hybrid war, cyber-operations and persistent instability in regions where British forces are called to act with precision and professionalism. As I have set out, when operational tempo increases every part of the system is affected. It is not just about equipment, logistics or personnel numbers, but about the justice system that underpins discipline, accountability and command authority. The question, therefore, is a relatively simple one: does our current system of service justice have the flexibility, depth and resilience required to meet that demand? Amendment 9 is one attempt to ensure that it does. It recognises that we are asking a great deal of a relatively small pool of serving officers. We are asking them not only to command forces in complex environments but, where necessary, to sit in judgment in court martial proceedings, including in cases involving senior rank, complex evidence, and often significant reputational consequence for all involved. That is not to say that these individuals are incapable of doing those tasks, but that is a heavy burden on any system. It becomes more difficult still when we consider the practical realities of availability. Senior serving officers are, by definition, in high demand. They are deployed, rotated, assigned to strategic planning roles or engaged in operational command responsibilities that cannot simply be paused or rescheduled. At the same time, the court martial system requires a bench that is credible, experienced and capable of understanding the realities of service life. It is not enough that those sitting in judgment are legally competent to interpret the evidence; they must also understand the context in which decisions are made, the pressures under which orders are given and the operational environments in which conduct is assessed. That combination of legal competence and operational understanding is not easily found, and it is here that amendment 9 can make a tangible contribution. By extending eligibility to retired officers of appropriate rank, we end up expanding the pool of individuals who can bring that essential combination of experience and judgment to the court martial system. I want to be clear about what the amendment seeks to do and what it does not seek to do. It is not an attempt to dilute standards. On the contrary, it is an attempt to strengthen them by widening the field of those who meet them. It is not an attempt to undermine the authority of serving officers; it is an attempt to relieve them of some of the competing pressures that now fall on them in an increasingly demanding environment. It is not an attempt to create a separate or parallel justice system where some are tried by those who are still in active service and some are held in judgment by those who have retired. It is merely an attempt to ensure that the existing system has the necessary capacity to function effectively.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman makes a helpful challenge. Clearly, there is no impact assessment with the amendment. However, there is a joint service publication, the RARO—regular army reserve of officers—list, and there are those letters I receive annually asking me to update my address and contact details. There are already mechanisms by which individuals can be identified and recalled for this service. Given the operational tempo that I have described, it makes sense that we ameliorate the pressure on those who are currently in active service while not impacting the flow of justice through the service justice system.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I welcome the hon. Member’s intervention. If he is suggesting that we should look at going wider than the confines of this specific amendment, I would welcome that conversation. It is about increasing the flexibility and agility of the court martial system so that it reflects the challenges for those who currently serve in uniform.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I fear that recollections may differ. My interpretation of the evidence that we heard is not that this is a failing system—far from it. I gently suggest to the hon. Member that the civilian Crown courts and magistrates courts may not be the best benchmark against which to compare its performance. There is a wider issue, which the hon. Gentleman has touched on: this should not be merely about fixing a problem that exists now. There should be some horizon-scanning for the emerging challenges for the armed forces, not only in the present day but in the years ahead, and safety-proofing of the system against those challenges. That is the specific intent behind the amendment. My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford and I have spent time making the argument about the more senior pool of officers. That is a fair position to take, because they will be under much greater demands, with extensive challenges. Given the threat levels we face—there was a statement in the main Chamber yesterday about events in the middle east—we are living in a much more unstable world, with much greater demands on our armed forces. One can foresee increasing difficulty in constituting panels for cases, particularly those involving senior officers. It would be a dereliction of duty if, instead of planning for those threats and the challenges that they might pose to our armed forces, the Committee and the House more widely sought only to react to them in future. It is always better to do things proactively in a calm manner and think about the implications, rather than doing things retrospectively and hurriedly because an issue has arisen. I will dwell a little more on cases involving the higher ranks. When they do arise, it is often necessary for the panel to include officers of either equivalent or higher rank, but the pool of serving officers is by definition limited. As I hope I have described, that can create genuine operational and logistical difficulties in assembling boards that are both appropriately constituted, given the demands on their make-up, and able to proceed without undue delay. Retired officers of the relevant rank represent an obvious and sensible extension of the pool that would help us to proof the system. They would bring not only rank equivalence, but often a broader perspective. Having stepped back from the pressures of immediate command, they might bring a degree of reflective judgment that is particularly valuable in the complex and sensitive cases that invariably involve more senior officers, by virtue of the nature of the offences of which they are accused. I speak as someone who has developed a healthy respect over the years for the ability of retired officers to express opinions with a greater level of clarity than they may have done in post. That brings a refreshing breadth to the system. There is something about leaving service—I certainly found this myself—that appears to improve one’s ability to identify precisely what everyone else should have done differently. Stepping away from the pressures and challenges of day-to-day service life enables individuals to take a wider and more holistic approach. I am mindful of the fact that I am probably trying your patience, Mr Efford, so I will wind up shortly. I do not pretend that amendment 9 is perfect in every detail. The hon. Member for South Ribble provided a helpful challenge in relation to whether its scope should be wider. There are certainly questions about eligibility criteria and the mechanism for appointment, although I think that there is an obvious mechanism for identifying potential appointees. Those questions will need careful consideration, but that is not a particularly unusual position to be in at this stage of the legislative process. The purpose of Committee is not necessarily to produce final answers, but to test the direction of travel. I think the direction of travel is sound when it comes to ensuring that the system is foolproof. This is about the resilience of our justice system and about making better use of experience that already exists in our wider armed forces community. It is about ensuring that the demands of the increasing operational tempo are not inadvertently creating bottlenecks in the very system designed to uphold discipline and fairness. Ultimately, that is the balance that we are trying to strike: on the one hand we want armed forces that are operationally effective, globally deployable and able to meet the demands of a more dangerous and uncertain world, but on the other hand we want a service justice system that is robust, timely and capable of functioning without becoming a constraint on our operational effectiveness. Those two objectives should not be in tension. We need to think carefully about how we design institutions that can support them both. Clause 20 is an important part of that architecture: it will ensure that the court martial remains properly constituted and legally sound. Amendment 9 would strengthen that approach by ensuring that it remains practically workable under conditions of increasing demand. I urge the Government to accept the amendment, because I suspect that as operational pressures continue to rise and as we ask more of our armed forces across multiple domains, the need for flexibility in our service justice system will only become more rather than less pressing. If we get it right now, we will not only improve efficiency and effectiveness, but strengthen confidence in the system. That is ultimately what we should be trying to achieve in the Bill.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will confine my remarks to amendment 6, tabled by the hon. Members for North Devon and for Tunbridge Wells. Although I have real sympathy with its purpose, I am hesitant about its drafting, and recognise that, in this place, we sometimes develop what could be described as an unhealthy instinct to overcomplicate what, at its heart, is a very simple objective—that serious allegations are handled properly, consistently and in a way that commands the public’s confidence. I will start with where I hope and think we all agree: that allegations of sexual offences and domestic abuse are among the most serious that any justice system will have to confront. They demand to be treated with urgency, professionalism and, above all, trust. I do not think it is controversial to say that victims, whether serving in uniform or not, should not feel that the system is treating them differently depending on administrative geography or institutional habit. That is the spirit in which I understand that the amendment seeks to ensure that such cases are not left solely within the service channels, but are referred immediately to civilian police forces, with the implication that civilian investigation would become the default route. I understand why Members are attracted to that clarity. There is a certain political comfort in having bright lines. I must confess that I have often found myself drawn to them, but that is usually just before discovering why lawyers or police officers prefer slightly more shaded ones. I support the principle underlying the amendment, but I have reservations about the way in which it seeks to achieve it. My first concern is practical. The amendment requires that where service personnel, or the tri-service serious crime unit, are made aware of an allegation, they must immediately refer it and transfer the investigation to civilian police. “Immediately” is one of those words that looks quite reassuring in legislation but behaves rather less co-operatively in real life. In practice, the first hours of an investigation are often the most sensitive. Evidence is fragile, scenes need securing and victims may need safeguarding. Crucially, the question of who is best placed to take operational control may depend on facts that are not yet fully known. There will be cases where civilian forces are clearly the best placed from the outset—I suspect that they may be the majority—but there will also be cases where service police are already on the ground, embedded in the environment and uniquely placed to stabilise the situation before any handover, if necessary, can sensibly take place. What worries me slightly is that we risk turning a sensible presumption of civilian involvement into a rigid statutory trigger that may inadvertently disrupt good policing practice at exactly the wrong moment. The second concern is more about coherence than timing. The amendment fixes jurisdiction by reference to the area where the offence took place. Again, that will work perfectly well in many cases, but the armed forces are not always known for their geographical neatness. People move, units deploy and conduct straddles locations. Investigations often involve a mixture of service personnel and civilians across different parts of the country. My concern is not that the principle is wrong but that a rigid allocation rule may create friction between agencies at precisely the moment when co-ordination matters the most. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, I have concerns about the role of service policing itself. The service police and the Defence Serious Crime Command are not an inferior version of civilian policing. They are specialised and professional, and they often operate in environments that civilian forces are simply not structured to manage at first contact. If we were starting from scratch, we would not design two parallel systems and hope they never meet; we would design integrated systems with clear rules on information sharing, handover and joint working. That is where the real answer to this question lies. What I do not want us to do—however well intentioned the amendment is—is accidentally create a system where the service police are required to stand down too early or where information is transferred without the structured co-ordination that makes investigations effective. That is a defence not of silos, but of joined-up working between different agencies. This is where I come to what I think would improve the Bill more than the amendment. What we really need is not just a duty to refer but a clear statutory expectation of mandatory information sharing and structured joint working between service police and civilian forces when dealing with sexual offences and domestic abuse. That would achieve the spirit of the amendment, and I think it would do so more reliably, without removing operational discretion at the earliest and most sensitive stage of any investigation. With that in mind, I gently press the Minister on this point. I do so in the spirit of someone who, prior to coming to Parliament, has sat through enough briefings to know that when everybody says, “Of course, we already share information effectively,” the definition of “effectively” remains quite different in different organisations. Will the Minister give a clear commitment that the Government will ensure mandatory enforceable information sharing arrangements between the service police and civilian police forces in all cases involving sexual offences and domestic abuse? If that commitment is forthcoming, a great deal of the concern behind the amendment would arguably fall away. It would ensure that civilian forces are engaged early, that victims do not fall between systems, and that service police are not left operating in isolation or ambiguity. Although I support the broad intent of amendment 6 and its aims of ensuring serious allegations are handled properly and consistently, I am afraid that I am not persuaded that the current drafting is the best way to achieve that aim. I worry that it may constrain operational judgment in ways that are not fully intended. I am, however, keen that we do not lose sight of the objective. I would strongly welcome the opportunity to work with colleagues across the House to refine this approach, potentially on Report, in a way that better balances mandatory co-operation with operational flexibility. If we get that right, we will do two important things at once: we will strengthen confidence in the handling of the most serious allegations, and we will ensure that those responsible for investigating them are not inadvertently placed in a straitjacket that makes their job harder rather than easier. On that basis, I hope the Government will engage constructively and I look forward to continuing this conversation.

• 13 Apr 2026 · SEND Provision and Reform · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to my constituency neighbour for giving way. I was in the same meeting, and one of the big concerns was the loss of the special school planned for Tamworth Lane. Does my hon. Friend agree that that not only detracts from parents and pupils who would benefit, but puts additional pressures on mainstream schools?

• 13 Apr 2026 · Middle East · Hansard source

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  The Prime Minister is absolutely correct to praise the service of our armed forces personnel, and I join him in doing so, but they are being let down by the failure to deliver the defence investment plan. That failure can only be the result of either inertia or incompetence within the Government. Which one is it?

• 25 Mar 2026 · Engagements · Hansard source

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  Thank you, Mr. Speaker. On 21 November last year, Robert Clancy, a hugely valued and much loved member of my staff, took his own life. He was 29. While successive Governments have done a great deal to deal with the scourge of suicide in this country, there is much more that can be done. Will the Prime Minister personally commit to meeting me to discuss how we can prevent others from experiencing the unimaginable pain that Rob’s family and friends have endured?

• 24 Mar 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the Minister for indulging me. I do not disagree that, to a greater or lesser extent, this is a matter of education, but there is the issue of guidance being guidance and not being mandatory. If a definition were included in the Bill, it would provide a much stricter framework—alongside the education piece for local authorities—to ensure that we are getting this right. Does he agree?

• 24 Mar 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  I promise the Minister that this will be the last time I intervene.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is making a very powerful speech. Does he not consider one advantage of these action plans to be shared learning across local authorities, as those with more experience can aid those with less experience in improving the standard and delivery of support for veterans and the armed forces community?

• 24 Mar 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the hon. and gallant Member for his intervention. This is about placing a clear, time-bound duty on the Secretary of State to secure continuity of secondary care for dependants within six months. We want their clinical need to transfer horizontally across, as opposed to vertically downwards. That is the nuisance that amendment 10 is intended to address. Amendment 10 sets out the substance of the regulations that I have suggested that the Secretary of State introduce. They are deliberately straightforward. First, where a patient is already receiving treatment, their status should be preserved when the responsibility for their care is transferred to a different health authority—that is, a horizontal move across. In practical terms, it would mean that a patient should not lose their place in the system because they crossed administrative boundaries. Instead, they should have a seamless transfer of care. Secondly, the amendment would ensure that patients are not required to obtain a new referral solely by virtue of having moved, which would be ridiculous. The need for a referral is, and should remain, a clinical matter. It should not be triggered by geography and movement. Requiring a new referral in those circumstances adds delay, creates duplication and serves no meaningful clinical purpose. Thirdly, the amendment calls for clear guidance on the practical steps necessary to support continuity, including the timely and efficient transfer of patient records, the recognition and continuation of existing treatment pathways, and the preservation of procedures that have been booked or recommended. Those are not novel concepts; in many ways, they are already part of good administrative practice. What is lacking is the consistency of application across the country. It is perhaps worth emphasising what amendment 10 would not do, as much as what it would. It would not confer preferential treatment on service families. It would not seek to move them ahead of others in the queue, nor to secure access to services beyond what is clinically necessary. Its purpose is much more modest: to ensure that service families are not disadvantaged as a result of circumstances beyond their control. That is entirely in keeping with the armed forces covenant, which commits to removing disadvantage, not to creating advantage. In that context, the disadvantage is clear; it arises not from clinical need, but from the intersection of mobility and administrative fragmentation. Addressing it is therefore both entirely justified and absolutely necessary. There is also a broader point about fairness and the implicit contract between the nation and those who serve. Service personnel accept a range of constraints and obligations that do not apply to the general population. They relinquish a degree of control over where they live, where they move and how they organise their family life. In return, it is entirely reasonable for them to expect that the state will take reasonable steps to ensure that those constraints do not translate into avoidable hardship for their families. Continuity of healthcare is a particularly important aspect of that understanding. Health is not a peripheral concern; it is central to the wellbeing and stability of service families. Disruption to care can have a cascading effect on education, employment and the overall resilience of the family unit. In that sense, addressing the issue is a matter not only of fairness, but of operational effectiveness. A serviceperson who is worried about the health of their family cannot fully focus on their duties. At a time of critical need, their ability to do so is absolutely essential. Some may raise questions about the practicalities of implementing such a system, particularly in the context of devolved health systems across the United Kingdom. It is therefore important to be clear about the scope and intent of amendment 10. It would not seek to override devolved competencies or impose a uniform model of service delivery. Rather, it would require that whatever the organisational arrangements are, mechanisms be in place to ensure continuity when patients move between them. In many respects, the steps required are administrative rather than structural. They involve ensuring that information flows effectively, that existing clinical decisions are recognised, and that waiting positions are honoured, based on clinical need. These are matters of co-ordination, communication and guidance; they do not require wholesale reform of the system. There are already examples of good practice in this area. In some parts of the country, arrangements have already been put in place to facilitate the transfer of patients between trusts with minimal disruption to their care. The amendment seeks to ensure that such practice becomes the norm rather than the exception. It is also worth noting that the increasing digitalisation of healthcare records and the development of more integrated healthcare systems provide a foundation upon which this kind of continuity can be built. In many cases, the infrastructure already exists; what is needed is a clearer expectation, backed by regulation, that it should be used to support service families consistently and reliably.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful, as always, to my right hon. Friend for his intervention, because he has hit the nail on the head. This is not something novel; it is merely codifying—formalising in the Bill—what has already been written in evidence to us, which seems eminently sensible. It is important to consider the practical impact of the amendment on public bodies. The definition would not impose a new or onerous requirement. Public bodies are already accustomed to taking into account statutory duties and policy considerations in their decision-making processes. A requirement to think about the covenant and give it appropriate weight would fit squarely within that existing framework. It would not require extensive additional processes or resources. It would not mandate detailed reporting or specific outcomes. Instead, it would provide a clear instruction about how the covenant should be treated alongside other relevant factors. In practice, that may involve ensuring that decision makers are aware of the covenant and understand its implications. It may involve considering how policies affect members of the armed forces community and whether adjustments are needed to avoid disadvantage. Those seem eminently sensible and wise factors to put in this piece of legislation. In education, that could mean taking into account the particular challenges faced by a service child who moves schools frequently. In healthcare, it could involve considering continuity of care for families who relocate. In housing, it could involve recognising the impact of service-related mobility on access to accommodation. In each of those cases, the duty does not require a specific result; it requires consideration of the relevant factors, including the covenant, and a balanced decision based on those factors. Amendment 8 would therefore support decision making without constraining flexibility. We often hear concerns that defining duties in legislation may increase the risk of legal challenge. In my view, in this case, the greater clarity that the amendment would introduce is more likely to reduce that risk and be a protective factor. Where duties are clearly defined, public bodies are better able to understand and comply with them, which reduces the likelihood of disputes arising from uncertainty about what is required. Conversely, where duties are unclear, there is a greater risk of inconsistent application and challenge. By setting out what due regard means in this context, the amendment would provide a clearer basis for compliance. Importantly, it would reduce ambiguity. It is also relevant that the definition is framed in general terms; it does not describe details or steps that must be followed in every case. That would allow public bodies to apply the duty in a way that is proportionate to the circumstances that they face. That flexibility is important given the range of functions and decisions to which the duty will apply. The amendment aligns with the overall purpose of the Bill. The intention is to embed the principles of the armed forces covenant in the work of public bodies. A clearly defined duty would support that objective by ensuring that the covenant is considered in a consistent and meaningful way. If the duty is left undefined, there is a risk that its impact will vary significantly between organisations, which would undermine the aim of the Bill. The amendment would strengthen the Bill by supporting a more effective and consistent implementation. It would also reflect the practical realities of service life. Members of the armed forces and their families frequently experience moves and disruption as part of their service. They rely on public services in different parts of the country and need those services to respond in a consistent and informed way. A clear definition of due regard would help to support that consistency, providing a common framework for decision making that recognises the particular circumstances of the armed forces community. It is not about giving preferential treatment in all cases; it is about ensuring fairness in line with the principles of the covenant. That includes avoiding disadvantage and, where appropriate, providing additional support. The amendment would ensure that those principles are properly taken into account. Amendment 8 would make a targeted and practical improvement to the Bill. It would support a more consistent application of the armed forces covenant by public bodies, provide greater clarity for decision makers and those affected by their decisions, strengthen accountability, and reduce the risk of inconsistent interpretation. Most importantly, it would help to ensure that the covenant is applied in a way that has a real effect on day-to-day decision making. For those reasons, I view the amendment as a useful and proportionate clarification that would strengthen the operation of the duty as set out in the Bill.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the Minister for setting out his broad support for the intent of my amendment, if not for its practical workings. I am grateful for the invitation to meet him and his ministerial colleague to see how we can reach a settlement to ensure equality for armed forces personnel on this issue. On the basis of his reassurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  That was a lawyer’s promise; the Minister can read it as he wills. Does the Minister not think that having a definition of due regard in the Bill would assist the courts in interpreting its application in cases where a public body’s decision is challenged by a member of the armed forces community?

• 24 Mar 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is an enormous pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. I want to focus my remarks on amendment 8, which, as my hon. Friend the Member for Exmouth and Exeter East set out, seeks to provide a clear and practical definition of due regard in the Bill. If Parliament is placing a legal duty on public bodies to have due regard to the armed forces covenant, it is only right that it should be clear what that duty requires in practice. The Bill places a duty on specified public bodies to have due regard to the principles of the armed forces covenant when exercising certain functions, as set out in proposed new section 343AZA(5) of the Armed Forces Act 2006, including in areas such as healthcare, housing, education, transport and pensions. However, the term “due regard” itself is not defined in the Bill or elsewhere, which creates a very real risk of inconsistent interpretation or application. Amendment 8 would resolve that uncertainty by defining due regard as requiring public bodies to “think about and place an appropriate amount of weight on the principles of the Armed Forces Covenant when they consider all the key factors relevant to how they carry out their functions.” That would not represent a change of policy; it would merely clarify how the duty is to operate. It would make explicit what many would assume is already intended, but which is not currently set out in the Bill. The armed forces covenant itself is well understood by many. It reflects the principle that those who have served our armed forces, and their families, should not be put at a disadvantage compared with other citizens in accessing public services. It also recognises that, in some cases, special consideration may be appropriate. I think those principles are widely supported not just in this place but among the wider public. The purpose of the Bill is to ensure that they are also reflected in the decision-making processes of public bodies. The effectiveness of the duty to have due regard to the covenant depends in large part on how due regard is understood and applied. In the absence of a definition, there is scope for variation. Some public bodies may interpret the duty as requiring active and meaningful consideration of the covenant in their decision-making processes; others may take a more limited approach, treating it as a procedural requirement that can be satisfied with relatively minimal engagement. That variation matters in practice. Members of the armed forces and their families frequently move between different parts of the country, and they rely on services provided by local authorities, healthcare systems and other public bodies. A lack of consistency in how the covenant is applied can result in uneven access to support in those circumstances. Let us take the example of a service family who move from one area to another. They may encounter different approaches to school admissions, healthcare provision and housing allocation. If due regard is interpreted differently in every area, the level of support available may itself vary significantly. Amendment 8 would support a more consistent and coherent approach. By defining due regard clearly, it would establish a common standard that can be applied across different public bodies. The proposed definition is deliberately balanced: it would require public bodies to think about the covenant and give it appropriate weight, but it would not require a particular outcome in any given case, and it would not override other relevant considerations. It would simply ensure that decision makers exercise judgment and balance competing factors. At the same time, it would ensure that the covenant is not overlooked or treated as an afterthought. It requires active consideration—that is the way it must be interpreted. The reference to appropriate weight would make it clear that the covenant must be taken seriously, even if it is not determinative. That reflects the approach taken in other areas of public law where due regard is applied, in which contexts the courts have been very clear that the duty involves more than simple awareness; it requires informed and timely consideration of the relevant principles as part of the decision-making process. Amendment 8 would adopt that well-established understanding and apply it in the context of the armed forces covenant, providing a much clearer framework within which public bodies can operate. It is worth reminding ourselves that clarity is important not only for public bodies, but for those affected by their decisions. Members of the armed forces community need to know what they can reasonably expect when engaging with public services. A clearly defined duty would help provide that assurance to them and their families. It would also support accountability. Where a duty is clearly defined, it is easier to assess whether it has been properly discharged. With the proposed definition in place, Parliament and others would be better placed to scrutinise how public bodies are applying the covenant in practice. Without a definition, that scrutiny becomes much more difficult; it is less clear what standard is being applied, and therefore harder to identify when that standard has not been met. Amendment 8 would strengthen both the operation of the duty and the ability to hold public bodies to account for its delivery.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  It continues to be a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. I will confine my remarks to amendment 10, concerning the continuity of NHS secondary care services for the dependants of members of the armed forces. The amendment addresses an issue that has very real consequences for the health and wellbeing of service families, and therefore for the broader integrity of the commitment we make to those who have served and do serve. At the heart of this amendment lies a simple maxim: those who serve their country, and the families who support them, should not be placed at a disadvantage when accessing essential public services as a result of the demands placed upon them by service life. That principle is, of course, recognised in the armed forces covenant; the question is whether we are giving full and consistent effect to it in practice. The difficulty arises from a defining feature of military service: members of the armed forces are required to move. They are often asked to move frequently, often at short notice, sometimes across significant distances within the United Kingdom, and sometimes further afield. Those moves are not discretionary; they are intrinsic to the operational readiness and effective functioning of our armed forces. And when service personnel move, invariably their families move with them. That reality carries with it a number of challenges, but one of the most pressing, and one that is too often overlooked, is the disruption to ongoing medical treatment for their dependants. While primary care is generally able to accommodate patient movement with relative ease, the same cannot be said for secondary care. Hospital treatment, specialist pathways and waiting lists are typically organised on a regional or trust basis. When a family crosses those organisational boundaries, continuity is not guaranteed. The consequence, in too many cases, is that dependants find themselves required to re-enter the system. A child undergoing specialist treatment, a spouse awaiting elective surgery or a family member under the care of a consultant may be told that because they have moved into a new area, they must obtain a new referral, join a new waiting list and effectively begin the process again from the start. It is important to be clear about what that represents—not a clinical judgment or a decision taken in the interests of patient care, but an administrative consequence of the way services are structured and commissioned across different parts of the NHS. It is in effect a failure of co-ordination. For the individuals concerned, however, it has a much more significant impact. It can mean delayed diagnoses, prolonged pain, deterioration in conditions that require timely intervention, and significant anxiety for families already managing the pressures of service life. It can also undermine confidence in the system and create a perception, justified or otherwise, that service families are being treated less favourably. The amendment seeks to address that problem in a proportionate manner. It does not attempt to redesign the structure of the NHS—that would be a fool’s errand—nor does it impose a rigid requirement on how services should be delivered.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  My right hon. Friend is absolutely right: this is about not only streamlining the process, but giving more heft to those who wield the power to ensure that we get improved patient outcomes at the end of it. That is what we should all be seeking. Ultimately, the question before us is very straightforward: are we content to allow a situation to persist in which service families can lose their place in the healthcare system simply because they are required to move in the course of service, or do we consider it reasonable to take targeted steps to prevent that outcome? In my view, the answer is clear. Where treatment has begun, it should continue. Where a place on a waiting list has been earned, it should be respected. Administrative boundaries should not dictate clinical outcomes. They certainly should not impose additional burdens on those who have little choice but to cross them. The amendment provides a measured and practical mechanism to achieve that objective. It respects the structure of the NHS, acknowledges the reality of devolution and focuses squarely on the removal of a specific and identifiable disadvantage. In doing so, it gives tangible effect to the principles of the covenant. It recognises that our obligations to service families are not merely symbolic; they require a practical expression in the design and operation of public services.