Mike Wood MP: speeches

Speeches

• 11 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It sounds as though the Minister is speaking to amendment 22, which would restrict his power to set a lower amount to non-fraud cases. If we agree that lower limits should apply only in cases that do not involve fraud, can we just accept the amendment?

• 11 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Perhaps the Minister can correct me if I have misunderstood, as the drafting obviously relates to the parallel provisions we debated in clause 22. My understanding is that, as currently drafted, if the Minister or the Public Sector Fraud Authority is satisfied that a loss is the result of fraud, they can impose a lump sum deduction up to 100% of the credited amount in an account. However, if they were to use a regular deduction order, each sum can be only 40%. Is there any reason, in principle or for welfare, why it is okay to take 100% of someone’s account on day one but not okay to take 50% today and 50% the following month?

• 7 Mar 2025 · Protection of Children (Digital Safety and Data Protection) Bill · Hansard source

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  Does the hon. Lady recognise that, unlike the indoor smoking ban in particular, the regulation of mobile technology and social media is very much not a one-off event? When the Bill that was to become the Online Safety Act was published, it was genuinely world-leading in many respects, but, as the hon. Member for Whitehaven and Workington (Josh MacAlister) pointed out, many countries have now introduced measures that go further. Should we not be taking action now and then continuing to develop it, rather than just introducing a series of reviews?

• 6 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  According to the House of Commons Library, one of the biggest factors in that 10% of pension credit expenditure that is lost to fraud and error is payments to people who are abroad. How will the measures on eligibility verification help to identify people who do not actually live in the country so would not be eligible for pension credit?

• 6 Mar 2025 · Ministerial Appointments · Hansard source

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  Despite the complacent response from the Minister, fewer than 250 days in, we have already had a Transport Secretary resign over her criminal record, an anti-corruption Minister resign over corruption, questions raised over the checks on the new Investment Minister, and at least three Cabinet Ministers accused of peddling dodgy CVs. The Prime Minister either cannot or will not say whether the necessary questions were not asked on appointment, whether relevant information was not disclosed on appointment, or whether he knew perfectly well about it but only took action when they were caught? Will the independent adviser conduct an urgent review of ministerial vetting?

• 6 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 64 sets out that the independent person has responsibilities to prepare and submit a report on the review. We welcome that element of transparency, but are conscious that we need to balance those publications against the privacy of individuals. It is covered within the legislation, but could the Minister further detail the measures that are being taken to ensure that the independent person’s reviews do protect the privacy of individuals involved, especially where there may not have been a legal process in which someone has been found guilty of an offence? What sort of person is considered an independent person for these purposes? Is the provision intended to create a team of civil servants in the Department who do these reviews, or will it be an individual? What oversight will there be of the independent reviewers, and what resources will they have? Will they have any other responsibilities beyond the report that they produce at the end of the period that the Minister sets out? Clause 65 allows the Minister to give direction “as to the period to be covered” by the review, and provides that the Minister “may disclose information to the independent person, or to a person acting on behalf of the independent person”. Even if the Minister is only able to set timeframes for reviews, I would still like clarity as to how independent that person is intended to be from the PSFA, the Cabinet Office and the Minister. We understand why information will need to be shared between the Minister and the independent person if they are to carry out that function, but what protections are in place to maintain privacy and protect against the sharing of unnecessary personal information that goes beyond what the independent person will require? We have some sympathy for amendment 31, tabled by the Liberal Democrats. There is clearly a need to ensure a proper and open appointment process, as choosing the right person will shape the effectiveness of many of the review mechanisms. It is therefore vital that that decision is right. The involvement of Parliament does seem to be one way of achieving that oversight, in the absence of any better proposal in the legislation. While we recognise that this role may be rather different from the others that are set out in annex D of the Cabinet Office guidance on pre-appointment scrutiny, we would be more comfortable knowing that there is going to be that scrutiny rather than relying, at some point after the legislation is passed, on conversations between whoever happens to be in the Cabinet Office at the time or whoever happens to be Chairing whichever Committee the Speaker feels is most appropriate to be conducting any such hearings.

• 6 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the Minister for that explanation. Obviously, it is helpful for us to have what are, essentially, the chapter headings of the code of practice—the areas that it will cover. That clearly provides some degree of transparency, but it is no substitution for the detail of what will actually appear within those chapters. We heard from a range of witnesses last week who, in response to many of our questions, were unable to say whether the powers and provisions in the Bill are appropriate and proportionate because of the absence of detail about the code of practice. It would be helpful and courteous to this House, therefore, if as much detail as possible about what will appear—the actual provisions for how the code of practice will operate, rather than just the chapter headings—could be made available at an early enough stage for it to be considered during the Bill’s passage through this House. Can the Minister give more information about the input that will go into deciding what the details are within the code of practice? Which stakeholders does she expect will be engaged with? Are there any parallel equivalent codes of practice in other areas that might be expected to be a model for this code, or are we effectively starting with a blank sheet? Again, although the Minister’s explanation is extremely welcome, we continue to be disappointed that the actual detail is currently scheduled to be made available only for Members of the House of Lords to consider before legislating, rather than elected Members of Parliament. We appreciate the recognition of the importance of transparency, which we are obviously seeking to maintain throughout the Bill, but we hope that the Government will accelerate their plans to provide more information for Members of Parliament so that informed decisions can be made about this important legislation.

• 6 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  We fully support the measures in clause 68 on Crown premises and the Houses of Parliament—they seem perfectly sensible. As the Minister said, clause 70 specifies a whole string of definitions. Given the time, Members may be relieved to know that I do not have a specific response for each of them; there is very little in the definitions to quibble with. Clause 71 sets out the regulations under this part. The Minister drew attention to subsection (5), which allows for the regulations specified in the Bill to be subject to either the negative or affirmative procedure. As we said earlier in Committee, many of the cases that have been outlined will be require regulations that have potentially far-reaching consequences, both for individuals and organisations. Such consequences would strongly justify the active participation of Parliament, rather than simply relying on the negative resolution, which lacks any guarantee of a debate on an attempt to pray against. Regulations can be very difficult for Parliament to object to. We encourage the use of the affirmative procedure and hope the Government will detail their intentions on when it will be used for provisions that would otherwise be subject to the negative procedure. Beyond that, we have no objections to the clauses.

• 6 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The clause sets out how the provisions relate to data protection legislation. It is clearly an important provision to reinforce the data protection framework, given the number of concerns raised, particularly by Opposition Members, about the protections for individual privacy. The clause sets out some protection, albeit at a baseline of the existing legal provisions, to prevent breaches of any obligation of confidence owed by the people making disclosure, or of other restrictions including legal privilege. It seems eminently sensible, but will the Minister detail further the oversight mechanisms that will ensure that the safeguards are followed? What processes and avenues are available if someone believes that the requirements set out in the clause have not been followed? How should that be pursued? As the Minister said, Government amendment 3 is a technical amendment. We have no objection to it.

• 6 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  As the Minister says, the clause sets out those decisions that can be taken by an individual authorised by the Minister on their behalf. It specifies that the authorised officer must be a civil servant in her Department. Where there is a review, it must be taken by an authorised officer of a higher grade than the one who took the original decision. As we said when debating earlier clauses, the level of the original officer seems to be set at a rather lower level than in the equivalent decision-making processes in the police and other similar organisations. The measures set out in the clause appear to be sensible, but we have one or two questions about their practical aspects. In particular, how many of the decisions referred to in the clause does the Minister expect an officer to be likely to make on a weekly basis? When we were debating civil penalty notices, the Minister suggested that it might only be a few a year. This clause covers a rather wider range of notices, so some idea of the workload to be expected of authorised officers will help us to form a better picture of the detail of what we expect authorised officers to be considering. Similarly, does the Minister have any expectation at this stage of how many authorised officers across the different grades will be fulfilling these functions?

• 6 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The clauses outline the steps and safeguards before the Minister may impose a penalty. Getting these provisions right, ensuring that due process is followed, affected individuals and businesses have a right to respond and penalties are not imposed arbitrarily, is crucial. Clause 56 sets out the procedural rights of a person facing a penalty. It ensures that penalties are not imposed without the affected party first being allowed an opportunity to respond. Subsection (2) requires that a notice of intent be given to any person facing a penalty, inviting them to make representations before a final decision is made. Under subsection (3), the notice of intent must include the amount of the proposed penalty, the reasons for imposing a penalty of that amount, and the means by which representations may be made, as well as the timescale for doing so. As we are approaching the end of part 1, I know that the Government will be disappointed if I do not have a long list of questions on these provisions for the Minister. A theme from Tuesday’s sessions was the time limit on representations. The Bill states that individuals and businesses must be given a minimum of 28 days to make representations. There is a little more flexibility in the provisions we debated on Tuesday, but do the Government intend to set a maximum limit, whether in the legislation or perhaps the code of practice, on the number of days that would be available for such representations? If not, how will it be ensured that the process does not become excessively prolonged, as the Minister spoke about on Tuesday? As well as causing delay for the public authority seeking to recover funds, it might cause uncertainty for businesses and individuals. We are also interested to hear about guidance that might be issued on when it would be appropriate to vary the 28 days and allow a longer period for representation in order to strike a balance. On the issue of authorised officers, and assuming that the decisions are being delegated, the Minister has previously referred to the Carltona principle whereby Ministers can delegate decision-making and executive powers to appropriate officials. In the light of the Government’s intention to repeal the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023, I am interested to know whether they have assessed the impact that might have on the operation of the Carltona principle in these circumstances. The principle is derived from pre-second world war case law, but it was significantly weakened in the Gerry Adams challenge. It was one of the things the previous Government were seeking to change, as a response to amendments in the House of Lords to re-establish the principle. In the absence of the 2023 Act, will the principle still be legally robust enough to allow the delegation that the Government intend under this Bill? We assume that the decision on whether to maintain, reduce or cancel a proposed penalty will be made by an authorised officer rather than the Minister for the Cabinet Office, so will the Minister set out the level of seniority of the authorised officers within the PSFA and how that decision was reached? What training will those officers be required to undergo for this specific function, and what steps is the PSFA expected to put in place to ensure consistency in decision making across different cases? Clause 57 outlines the process for issuing a penalty decision notice once a final decision has been made. Again, the requirements in the clause appear to be sensible and necessary if we are to ensure that individuals and organisations are fully informed of their liability and have an opportunity to challenge decisions that they believe to be incorrect or unfair, so we support the clause standing part of the Bill. Clause 58 deals with reviews of penalty decisions. I have a few questions about who in the PSFA or Government will conduct the review. Who will ensure that they are properly separate from the individual decision-making process and if the reviews are to be conducted by officials, what will be the level of seniority required? The clauses set out important procedural safeguards that seem to be appropriate to ensure penalties are not imposed unfairly. If we are given clarification regarding the degree of discretion available, the seniority, and training in decision making and the safeguards that ensure fairness, we will be content for the clauses to stand part of the Bill.

• 6 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  We support the provision that a person can appeal against a penalty to the appropriate court. This is an appropriate level of oversight for these civil penalties, and it is appropriate that the court can uphold, revoke or amend the penalty notice and make the final decision on whether an individual should be penalised for fraud. Obviously the Minister’s judgment that the behaviour was fraudulent and caused the loss to the public authority will form a part of that decision. It is clearly right that there is a role for the legal system in the appeal process. It is also sensible to have the decision by the appropriate court marked as the final decision, to prevent ongoing appeals that could frustrate the proper recovery of funds that are properly payable. The clause also allows the Minister to make further regulation via the negative procedure regarding appeals against a penalty notice. Will she explain why the negative procedure was judged appropriate in these circumstances, rather than one that would allow Parliament automatically to have its say on any proposed regulations? What further provisions does she envisage being introduced at a later date? I understand that part of the purpose of the clause is to accommodate unforeseeable changes in circumstances, so it is not always possible to see the detail, but some clarity on the kind of area or circumstances in which regulations may be needed would help the Committee to form a judgment on the clause. If no further provisions are expected and there is no reason to imagine that they may be necessary, that clearly renders that part redundant. That is a rather shorter list of questions to this clause—I am drawing to a close. I would appreciate if the Minister could provide that clarification.

• 6 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The clause contains provisions on setting up the Public Sector Fraud Authority on a statutory basis. As I said at the beginning of Committee stage, we support the Government’s work to strengthen the PSFA’s role. The form in which it has been operating since it was established under the previous Government offers an opportunity to see how its functions can be exercised more effectively to recover a greater amount of public money that has been lost either to fraud or to error. Although we have a range of concerns, which we have discussed, about the exercise of some of the functions and, in particular, about the oversight of some of them, we think the decision to have a Public Sector Fraud Authority is the right one, and agree that there may be future circumstances in which those functions could be performed more effectively were the authority placed on a statutory basis, so we do not oppose schedule 2. As we have reached the end of part 1 of the Bill, and so probably the end my exchanges with the Minister, I thank her for the answers she has given. We will seek to follow up on some of those answers during the passage of the Bill, but for now we are happy for clause 69 and schedule 2 to be part of the Bill.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Given the Minister’s reassurances, I will not press amendment 19 to a Division now, but we may wish to come back to the matter on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Clause s 22 and 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 24 Bank’s administrative costs Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 26 places significant responsibilities on banks once a direct deduction order has been issued. The bank must ensure that the account is not closed while a deduction order is active, prevent transactions that would reduce the balance below the required deduction amount—for example, the transfer of funds—and ensure that these actions do not cause disadvantage to the liable person. I have a few questions about those responsibilities. How are banks expected to assess disadvantage or hardship, based on what is likely to be very limited information available to them about their account holders? What guidance or criteria will be provided to banks to determine what constitutes a disadvantage to the liable person? How can banks assess the potential immediate impact of blocking transactions, including preventing spending on essentials—for example, food or utility bills—and any consequences that might arise from that? How will they consider longer-term financial obligations, such as rent or mortgage payments, disruption to which could cause significant hardship? The lack of a code of practice makes it difficult to properly scrutinise these measures. The code of practice is expected to provide crucial details on how banks should balance enforcement with protecting individuals from undue harm, but we will have to wait until after we have made decisions in Committee and in the Bill’s remaining stages to see it. It would be helpful if the Minister could clarify how these concerns will be addressed in the code of practice and provide as much specificity as possible. Clause 27 states that account holders must not take actions that frustrate the direct deduction process, such as closing the account, moving funds elsewhere to evade the deduction or engaging in other actions that undermine the effectiveness of the recovery process. The matter of penalties for non-compliance needs to be looked at carefully. What penalties will be imposed if an account holder deliberately frustrates the deduction order? Would non-compliance be treated as a civil offence, or could it lead to criminal penalties in cases of deliberate obstruction? If the financial institution failed to prevent it, would that be a civil offence, or would it be seen as a regulatory issue? Is there an appeal mechanism if an account holder can prove that a transaction was necessary and not an attempt to evade the deduction? For example, what would happen if someone urgently needed to pay rent or buy medicine and did not realise it would interfere with the deduction order? Would there be any flexibility in cases of financial difficulty, and how would that be assessed? Given the significant responsibilities placed on banks and the potential impact on individuals, further clarity is needed on how banks will be guided in assessing disadvantage and hardship, how the code of practice will address these concerns and ensure practical implementation, what penalties will apply if an account holder frustrates the deduction process or if a financial institution fails to prevent such frustration, and what appeals or exceptions exist for necessary transactions that unintentionally interfere with the deduction order. Those clarifications are essential for ensuring that the system is both effective and fair.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 19 grants the Minister significant powers to obtain financial information from banks before making a direct deduction order, including the ability to request three months of bank statements, or perhaps statements covering a longer period where specified. The power to issue an account information notice requires banks to provide statements to determine what deduction should be made, and the power to issue a general information notice requires banks to disclose an individual’s account details, balances and correspondence addresses. Clearly, in many investigations there will be good reason why some or all of that information is necessary, appropriate and justified. Of course, some of the information will be extremely sensitive, so we need necessary safeguards and appropriate oversight to ensure that sensitive information is requested and subsequently shared only where it is directly necessary to the investigation, and where the Minister or PSFA has justifiable grounds to think either that an error is costing the public sector significant amounts of money or that there has been a case of deliberate fraud. As I said about the previous grouping, a prohibition on banks informing the liable person that an information notice has been issued is a sensible measure to prevent that person from taking action to frustrate attempts to recover money that ought to be recovered—they could, for example, empty their account before deductions could take place. In principle, we support powers designed to ensure effective debt recovery under the right circumstances and when used in the right way, but there are several concerns regarding proportionality and oversight when it comes to protecting legitimate privacy rights. First, on the unlimited timeframe for bank statements, clause 19 states that the Minister must obtain at least three months’ worth of statements, but can request a longer period if specified in the notice. What criteria will determine whether more than three months of statements is needed? Is there a reason why no upper limit is specified within the clause on how far back those requests can go? Clearly, the further back that requests are made for a bank statement, the greater the risk that they could lead to overly intrusive requests that may not be entirely necessary for the debt recovery. On the broad information-gathering powers, the general information notice allows the Minister to demand a full list of all accounts held by the liable person, their details and their addresses. Presumably, that is for the specific financial institution that the notice refers to. Are there any safeguards to prevent excessive or disproportionate use of those notices? Must there be a reasonable suspicion or at least a threshold to be met before those powers can be exercised? The Bill states that the Minister can only request information to exercise their core functions, but that is obviously a very broad measure so could be interpreted very broadly. Banks would be prohibited from informing the liable person that an information notice had been issued. Although that prevents individuals from evading deductions, it means that they may be unaware of a Government investigation into their finances even after the event. Are there any circumstances in which the liable person might be informed that their financial data has been accessed—perhaps after an investigation has been closed? Does the Minister envisage any independent oversight to ensure that those powers are used proportionately? On the burden on banks and financial institutions, on which my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon and I have tabled amendments to be debated later in the proceedings, these powers will require banks to process and respond to Government information notices, likely adding costs and administrative burdens to those institutions. Have the Government consulted with financial institutions to assess how proportionate the kinds of requests envisaged under the Bill are, the ease or the difficulty of compliance, and the estimated cost to banks and the financial sector? During evidence last week, some financial institutions did not seem to have any idea of what scale of burden that would be putting on their members. Again, a large part of this came back to the lack of visibility of draft codes of practice. On privacy and data protection concerns, although the Bill states that the Minister can only request relevant information, that can be interpreted broadly. What legal protections exist to ensure that financial data is accessed and used appropriately for the very narrow purposes for which these clauses are intended? Will there be an independent review mechanism to assess whether those powers are used lawfully and proportionately? Finally, given the wide-ranging implication of the powers, further clarity and safeguards are needed to balance effective debt recovery against individual privacy rights. I would welcome further details from the Minister on those critical issues, so that we can be comfortable going forward that the wide-ranging powers that we would be granting to the Minister and the PSFA cannot be misused and that individual privacy rights will be protected and respected.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 19, in clause 22, page 14, line 27, leave out from “applies,” to “and” in line 28 and insert “the amounts credited to the account in the relevant period,”.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  In the case of non-fraudulent claims, where the Minister is not satisfied that there has been fraud on the part of the liable person, I would be inclined to go with the Government’s figure of 20%. That is reasonable in the case of errors, and it obviously allows for longer-term recovery where a genuine mistake has been made. Where there is deemed to have been fraudulent activity, it does not make sense to give those responsible the protection of protecting 60% of the money that they have stolen.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The clause outlines the procedure when a bank account does not contain sufficient funds to fulfil a direct deduction order. The key provisions are as follows. For lump sum deduction, if the full amount is not available, no deduction is made and the Minister is notified. For regular deductions, if the necessary funds are not available, an attempt is to be made again on the same day the following week. If funds remain insufficient, no deduction is made and the Minister is notified. I have some key questions and concerns as to what happens next. Once the Minister is notified, what are the next steps? Does the notification trigger further action to recover the money through other means? Is there a set timeframe in which the Minister must decide on further steps? Does the Minister have discretion to determine the best course of action, or are there prescribed steps that must follow? If funds are unavailable in the specified account, is there a process to check whether the liable person has other accounts in their name with other financial institutions that may have sufficient funds? Would the Minister have the power to issue a further general information notice to a bank in order to identify other accounts that could be used for recovery?

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the Minister for giving us some clarification on that, but the direct deduction is different from an earning attachment where there is likely to be another similar amount coming in the following month. The Minister suggested I might have £200,000 in my account, which I think would raise a few eyebrows all around. But if all £200,000 had been the result of fraud from the public sector, and I chose to put that regular direct deduction order in place, my understanding of clause 22(3) is that in the first month the maximum that could be deducted would be 40% of £200,000—which is £80,000.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  As the Minister said, the clause allows for deductions from a liable person’s account to include reasonable costs incurred by the bank in processing the deduction order. While the clause will ensure that banks can recoup legitimate administrative expenses, several important questions arise about fairness, oversight and overall financial impact.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  That would leave £120,000, which would mean that in the second month, presumably the most that could be deducted if no further money had been paid into the into the account would be £48,000.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  As the Minister said, clause 15 establishes that a payable amount is a recoverable amount as defined in previous provisions of the legislation, while clause 16 further grants the Minister the power to apply to the county court for a recovery order. That ensures that a recoverable amount is treated as an enforceable payment under section 85 of the County Courts Act 1984, or as if it was directly ordered by the court. While the mechanism for recovery is now clear, there are important practical questions about its implementation. First, we would like further reassurance about the impact on the county court system. What projection have the Government made regarding the number of cases that they expect to be brought under these provisions? Given the existing backlog in county courts, what assessment has been made of the additional burden that these measures will place on the system? Has the Minister engaged with her colleagues at the Ministry of Justice and His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service to ensure that county courts have the capacity and resources to handle these cases efficiently and in a timely manner? To develop further the issue of efficiency and speed of resolution, what is the expected timeframe for these cases to be resolved once an application is made? Do the Government anticipate delays due to a high caseload in county courts, and if so, what mitigations are they putting in place to help to deal with those delays? Will the Government publish guidance or at least a framework on the expected process and timeline for obtaining a recovery order? It is essential that these powers do not result in undue delays, excessive court burdens, or legal uncertainty for those subject to a recovery order. Further clarification from the Minister would help to ensure that this system functions fairly and efficiently—balancing the need for enforcement and fairness to the taxpayer to recover sums that are owed, with the available judicial capacity.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Obviously, the Bill allows for sums to be recouped through regular earnings. Where money is in a bank account, we have established that the money is there from the information notices and other measures in the Bill. If the full amount that has been defrauded is available within the account, it seems to make little sense not to be able recover that sum from the account, rather than relying on a deduction of earnings order. Clause 23(5) requires banks to comply with direct deduction orders. Have the financial institutions been consulted on those obligations and are they content with them? As was said earlier, the evidence that we heard last Tuesday suggested that many financial institutions did not seem to have a grasp of what those obligations and burdens might look like, as well as the costs that would arise. To conclude, the effectiveness of these provisions will depend heavily on the codes of practice on staff training and on fair procedures. Further clarification is needed to ensure deductions are proportionate, transparent and do not cause undue hardship, particularly in cases of fraud and financial vulnerability. But where there has been demonstrable fraud, the Opposition see no reason to protect 60% of credit in a bank account where it may be linked to conscious efforts to defraud the taxpayer. I would welcome the Minister’s response to those concerns.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 22 outlines how much can be directly deducted from a liable person’s bank account, while clause 23 specifies the information that must be included in direct deduction orders. These provisions are central to the enforcement mechanism and yet there are many questions that remain about their practical implementation and fairness. As we have said many times in Committee, it is very difficult to assess how the system will work without seeing a draft code of practice. As Anna Hall from the Money and Pensions Service said when giving evidence last Tuesday, “the code of conduct will be the critical thing. One of the things is that if frontline staff are not picking up vulnerabilities, or they are not trained in how to sort out affordability, in empathic listening or in all the protocols about how to have different types of conversations with people in different types of vulnerable situations—if those things are not in place—some of the processes in the Bill will not be as effective. It comes down to the training for frontline staff, and the capacity and processes to then follow up on what has actually been disclosed, that will enable those repayment plans to be put in place before those later processes. If those are not in place, that could cause some real issues. How successful this Bill is will come down to the code of conduct, as many have said.” –– [ Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 30, Q49.] The Minister kindly promised during earlier sessions that: “As for the development of the codes of practice, as I hope the Committee will see today, I will refer to the measures that are to be put in the code of practice as we go through the clauses, so that we can have some discussion about that.” –– [ Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 92.] This is another occasion where it would be helpful, as the Minister suggested, to know a bit more about the code of practice, to enable us to scrutinise the provisions better. As witnesses have said, the code of practice is key to how effective the provisions will be. The effectiveness of the Bill will depend on matters such as the training for frontline staff on assessing affordability and vulnerabilities, the processes to evaluate hardship and to create fair payment plans, and the protocols to identify and support people in vulnerable situations. Can the Minister provide further information about the code of practice, when it will be available for scrutiny and how it will relate to those elements of these clauses? How will the direct deduction system work in practice? As I say, this is a question about staff training and decision making; it will be an operational matter rather than something that can necessarily be directed from Westminster or Whitehall, so how will staff determine a suitable recovery amount and timeline? What principles will guide repayment plans, and how will assessments be made to ensure that affordability and prevent hardship? Without knowing those matters, it is difficult to judge the appropriateness of some parts of these clauses, because there obviously will be some vulnerable individuals who might be subject to some of the measures in these clauses. What safeguards will be in place for those who require additional support? Will special provisions exist for individuals facing mental health issues, financial abuse or crisis situations? I turn to the limits on deduction amounts. This is an area where we think the Government are possibly not going far enough: they are setting a maximum deduction limit even when sufficient funds exist and even when the Minister is satisfied that there has been deliberate fraud and an intention to deprive the taxpayer of money that should rightfully be being spent on public purposes. Obviously, there are some safeguards in the clauses relating to hardship and essential living costs. The legislation states that deductions must not “cause…hardship in meeting essential living expenses,” but just how is that hardship to be assessed? Would someone who fraudulently obtained money be allowed to retain it if they successfully argued that they would suffer hardship from repaying it, even if they were never entitled to the money in the first place? And where does that line fall? Presumably, we would not expect them to be able to retain money to allow them to lead a certain quality of life that they may be used to, but that is obviously very different to being able to pay essential bills. Under the Bill, in cases of fraud, only 40% of credited amounts can be deducted in the relevant period. We are not sure why that cap is in place when the individual was never entitled to the money. If a person has sufficient funds and there has been a conscious—perhaps even organised—attempt to defraud the public sector, why limit recovery rather than allowing full repayment? That brings me to amendment 19, which stands in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon. It proposes removing the 40% cap to ensure full recovery under this legislation where possible and subject, obviously, to the safeguards to which I have referred—the hardship test and the independent oversight that is contained within the clauses. Mrs Lewell-Buck, if you had defrauded the taxpayer out of £100,000—I am not for a moment suggesting that you would—and £100,000 happened to be visible within your bank account, and the Minister was satisfied that that was the result of a conscious course of action on your part to defraud the taxpayer and that there was no reason to imagine that losing it was going to cause you obvious hardship, why should you be allowed to keep £60,000 of that £100,000 in your bank account, even though the money was simply not yours? In that hypothetical situation—I ought to repeat that—it would be stolen money. It does not seem right that the legislation appears to protect 60% of defrauded money and prevents recovery through these mechanisms, so I intend to push amendment 19 to a Division. Who is subject to the safeguards in the clause? If the Government are confident that those safeguards are robust enough to apply to the first 40%, it seems that they ought to be robust enough to apply to the remaining 60% as well. Returning to clause 22, what happens if too much is deducted? The Bill states that the Minister must not deduct more than the payable amount, which is a sensible and logical bar to set. However, what mechanisms exist to correct over-deductions? What recourse does a liable person have if an error is made and they suffer loss as a result of an over-deduction?