Miatta Fahnbulleh MP: speeches 2025

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Speeches

14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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I will respond to amendment 363 and new clause 46 before discussing clause 19. In the English devolution White Paper, the Government set out clearly our ambition to have universal coverage of strategic authorities in England. That direction of travel is clear. It is also important that the process is led locally, and that areas can submit proposals for devolution that reflect their unique circumstances at a time that makes sense for them. A centrally mandated strategy would cut across that principle, requiring areas to work to a timeline set by Government. That would not only be challenging, but go against the grain of what we are trying to do. The new clause is therefore not necessary. We have set the ambition, and we will work with areas to enable them to come forward with proposals at the appropriate time. Clause 19 amends existing requirements for the annual report on devolution to ensure that it reflects the introduction of strategic authorities as a category in law. To indicate how the report will look should the Bill receive Royal Assent in its current form, this year’s report was laid before this House and the other place earlier today, so Members can spend their evening reading the report with a glass of wine if they wish. It covers strategic authorities that were established and details of the new devolution framework as set out in the English devolution White Paper. I commend the clause to the Committee, and ask the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon to withdraw the amendment and not to press the new clause.
14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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Clause 7 is a small but important clause that supports the wiring of our new devolution framework. As hon. Members will know, the Bill introduces a systemic approach, ending one-off deals and creating a standardised devolution framework in which strategic authorities and mayors are given a clear and coherent set of functions. However, the Government recognise that it may, on very rare occasions, be necessary to tailor the exercise of specific functions to reflect local circumstances and to preserve the smooth running of public services. Clause 7 provides that existing powers that allow Ministers to modify how a function is exercised by an individual combined authority or county combined authority can continue. Exceptions will be rare, but this flexibility, where appropriate and necessary and where it reflects local circumstances, will be essential to ensure the smooth running of public services. Question put and agreed to . Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill . Clause 8 Combined authorities and CCAs: designation as established mayoral strategic authorities Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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The devolution White Paper set out our commitment to introduce a new category of established mayoral strategic authority, representing the highest level of devolution in England. The clause delivers on that commitment. It enables a mayoral strategic authority that meets the eligibility criteria set out in the English devolution White Paper to submit a written proposal to the Secretary of State for designation as an established mayoral strategic authority. Designation will provide a strategic authority with access to the highest level of powers and functions in the devolution framework, as well as the right to request additional devolved functions and eligibility to receive an integrated funding settlement. In the event that a Secretary of State decided not to designate an authority as an established mayoral strategic authority, they would be required to notify the authority in writing of the reasons for their decision. It would remain open to the authority to submit a fresh request at some future point. Importantly, once an authority has been designated as an established mayoral strategic authority, it will not be possible for Ministers to remove its status through secondary legislation. In that way, we will hardwire the powers and functions of established mayoral strategic authorities into our system of government, future-proofing arrangements against unnecessary change and ensuring permanent and enduring devolution.
14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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We are all hugely sympathetic to the funding of fire and rescue—as we see climate change, the imperative of fire and rescue services is key—but it is outside the scope of the Bill. We believe that we have the balance right between allowing precepting powers for mayors and allowing democratic accountability by which the electorate can hold any mayor and politician to account. Question put , That the amendment be made.
14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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The amendment updates the clause to ensure that mayors have the power to precept across all their functions. It replaces the provisions added to the Local Government Finance Act 1992 by the Bill, which needed clarification. The amendment will mean that, by virtue of being major precepting authorities, combined authorities and combined county authorities will have the power to precept across all their functions. It repeals provisions that previously restricted that precepting power to specific functions. The amendment more effectively meets the policy intention to allow mayors to precept for everything that they are required to do. That will give mayors more flexibility in how to fund mayoral priorities to create growth and improve local services. Government amendments 76 and 79 provide that the issuing of precepts under the Local Government Finance Act is a function exercisable only by the mayor, and that that is the case for mayoral and non-mayoral functions. By removing restrictions from the existing legislation, the amendments will establish that precepting is a function of the mayor for expenditure relating to mayoral and non-mayoral functions, meeting the original policy intention. It has always been the intention of the Government that issuing a mayoral council tax precept should be a function of the mayor alone. The amendments will ensure that that will be the case and will ensure that mayors can precept across all their functions.
14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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I would just point out to the hon. Gentleman that the mayoral precept was introduced in 2017 by a Conservative Government, and that mayors are directly elected. Like Members of Parliament, mayors are not immune to political pressures around tax rises, and examples across the country show that mayors are as thoughtful about the right balance between investing in their services and managing tax increases as national politicians—in fact, when we think about the record of the last Government, perhaps more so.
14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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All holders of public office have to adhere to public standards; that is as true for national Government as it is for regional and local government. We expect those standards to apply, and the safeguards we are putting in place by enabling the mayor to terminate based on performance or poor conduct will ensure that they are upheld. Question put and agreed to. Clause 9, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 3 Commissioners
14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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I beg to move amendment 70, in schedule 3, page 111, line 33, at end insert— “(d) excepted fire and rescue functions.” This would prevent a commissioner appointed by the mayor of a CCA from exercising “excepted fire and rescue functions” (defined in Amendment 71).
14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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Clause 16 will prevent individuals from being a Member of Parliament, or of the devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland, and a mayor of a strategic authority at the same time. The Government are clear that mayors are central to delivering the growth, economic prosperity and change that local communities want. Already, the impact of our mayors, from West Yorkshire to the North East, from Greater London to the West Midlands, is being felt clearly. However, their responsibilities will only increase once this Bill is in law. It is right that the role of mayor receives the officeholder’s full time and attention. Both MPs and mayors have a duty to represent the constituents that elected them. Fulfilling two different democratic roles could lead to conflicts of interest, given the differences in public expectations for each role and the differing responsibilities of a mayor and an MP. Clause 16 prevents that conflict and will ensure that regions benefit from their mayor’s full time and attention.
14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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The amendments will prevent a commissioner from exercising certain fire and rescue functions that should be reserved as functions of the mayor, as head of the fire and rescue authority in the area. The effective delegation of fire and rescue functions to a commissioner can ease capacity constraints on the mayor, by ensuring that there is a dedicated individual with the time and expertise to focus on executing those functions. Fire and rescue functions are already delegated successfully to deputy mayors for policing and crime in Greater Manchester and in York and North Yorkshire. The ability to delegate to a commissioner, without the need for secondary legislation, simplifies that process. If they wish, mayors will be able to make an existing deputy mayor for policing and crime the public safety commissioner, meaning that individual could lead on both policing and fire. However, certain functions should be the sole responsibility of an elected mayor, as head of the fire and rescue authority. The retained functions are those with the most significant bearing on the strategic direction of the fire service, such as its budget, its risk plan, and the appointment or dismissal of the chief fire officer. It is important that these decisions are taken right at the top, and that the person taking them is accountable at the ballot box. These amendments provide for the effective delegation of fire and rescue functions. They ensure that decisions are taken at the right level and support the Government’s commitment to ensure that our communities are safe. Amendment 70 agreed to. Amendment made: 71, in schedule 3, page 112, line 3, at end insert— “(6) In this paragraph “excepted fire and rescue functions” means— (a) functions under the following provisions of the FRSA 2004— (i) section 13 (reinforcement schemes); (ii) section 15 (arrangements with other employers of fire-fighters); (iii) section 16 (arrangements for discharge of functions by others); (b) the functions of— (i) appointing, suspending or dismissing the chief fire officer; (ii) approving the terms of appointment of the chief fire officer; (iii) holding the chief fire officer to account for managing the fire and rescue service; (c) approving— (i) the community risk management plan; (ii) the fire and rescue declaration; (d) approving plans, modifications to plans and additions to plans for the purpose of ensuring that— (i) as far as reasonably practicable, the CCA is able to perform its fire and rescue functions if an emergency occurs, and (ii) the CCA is able to perform its functions so far as is necessary or desirable for the purpose of preventing an emergency or reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of an emergency, or taking other action in connection with it; (e) approving any arrangements for the co-operation of the CCA in relation to its fire and rescue functions with other Category 1 responders and Category 2 responders in respect of— (i) the performance of the CCA’s duty as a fire and rescue authority under section 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (duty to assess, plan and advise); (ii) any duties under subordinate legislation made in exercise of powers under that Act. (7) In sub-paragraph (6) and this sub-paragraph— “Category 1 responder” and “Category 2 responder” have the meanings given in section 3 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (section 2: supplemental); “chief fire officer” means the person with responsibility for managing the fire and rescue service; “community risk management plan” means a plan which— (a) is prepared and published by the combined authority in accordance with the Fire and Rescue National Framework, and (b) sets out for the period covered by the document in accordance with the requirements of the Framework— (i) the combined authority’s priorities and objectives, and (ii) an assessment of all foreseeable fire and rescue related risks that could affect its community, in accordance with the discharge of the combined authority’s fire and rescue functions; “emergency” has the meaning given in section 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (meaning of “emergency”); “fire and rescue authority” means a fire and rescue authority under the FRSA 2004; “fire and rescue declaration” means a document which— (a) is prepared and published by the combined authority in accordance with the Fire and Rescue National Framework, and (b) contains a statement of the way in which the combined authority has had regard, in the period covered by the document, to the Framework and to any community risk management plan prepared by the combined authority for that period; “fire and rescue functions” means— (a) functions of a fire and rescue authority which the combined authority has by virtue of an order under section 105A, or (b) functions which the combined authority has as a fire and rescue authority by virtue of section 1(2)(f) or (g) of the FRSA 2004; “Fire and Rescue National Framework” means the document prepared by the Secretary of State under section 21 of the FRSA 2004; “fire and rescue service” means the personnel, services and equipment secured for the purposes of carrying out the functions of a fire and rescue authority under— (a) section 6 of the FRSA 2004 (fire safety); (b) section 7 of the FRSA 2004 (fire-fighting); (c) section 8 of the FRSA 2004 (road traffic accidents); (d) any applicable order under section 9 of the FRSA 2004 Act (emergencies); (e) section 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (duty to assess, plan and advise) and any applicable subordinate legislation made under that Act; (f) any other provision of, or made under, an enactment which confers functions on a fire and rescue authority; “FRSA 2004” means the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004.”— (Miatta Fahnbulleh.) This would define the “excepted fire and rescue functions” which a commissioner appointed by the mayor of a CCA would be prevented from exercising by Amendment 70.
14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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On Hampshire and Solent, for example, our conversation was very candid. The leaders were clear about some of the debates that they had had within the council; as the Minister, I said what opportunities would be open to them, and I expressed the fact that in the context of the Isle of Wight, the name was completely down to the constituent authorities. We support constituent authorities working together collaboratively to ensure that all the constituent parts are happy with the deal and the proposal. On Cornwall, I believe that the Secretary of State, my boss, had those conversations, but I have also had some with MPs. We absolutely recognise the uniqueness of Cornwall and its identity. There are clear things that we know Cornish MPs and the council want, such as protection for the Cornish language, which we are in discussion about. There are clearly opportunities to build on the existing devolution deal. The previous Government provided a devolution deal for Cornwall in recognition of that exception. Another issue might be housing, which is big in Cornwall, for example, and the area is especially exercised about that, in particular in the context of the impact of tourism. We are happy to have a conversation about continuing to support the local authority to make inroads on some of those issues. Question put, That the amendment be made.
14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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It is vital that the devolution framework works for the unique circumstances of London’s governance, which we have talked about in this Committee. That is why the Bill will enable Government to confer functions on the Mayor of London, the Greater London Authority and its functional bodies. Previously, the Government could change the powers of the Greater London Authority only via primary legislation. This clause brings London into line with other strategic authorities by enabling the Government to change its powers via secondary legislation. This will ensure that the Greater London Authority benefits from the devolution framework and can deepen its powers over time.
14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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Commissioners can and will support mayors in getting the job done for their communities. They are not compulsory. There is no obligation on a mayor to appoint commissioners, but it gives the mayor the option of increasing capacity and expertise to do that. The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion talked about the example of Greater Manchester, where they have council leaders who are portfolio leads. It is worth pointing out that Manchester also uses commissioners—for example, on active travel—so it can be complementary or can supplement. It is just giving them an additional set of levers in order to respond. It is also worth pointing out that there will be some roles that the mayor has accountability for that they simply cannot delegate to councillors—for example, strategic planning powers, where direct delegation to a commissioner might expand the mayor’s capacity to dispense with that responsibility. However, to the point about checks and balances, which has been made time and again, it is important to be clear that we completely agree on the need for accountability for commissioners. They will be accountable to the mayor for their performance, who has the power to terminate their appointment, and the combined authority or combined county authority must also agree before any non-mayoral functions are delegated to the commissioner. Critically, the combined authority or combined county authority overview and scrutiny committee will also have the power to recommend the termination of commissioners if they think the commissioner is not performing or delivering. A two-thirds majority of members of the authority is required to accept that recommendation.
14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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We are trying to create empowered mayors with huge responsibility over transport, housing, infrastructure and skills. That is a full-time job—bigger even, candidly, than that of an individual Minister. It is absolutely right that they should, if elected to do that job, be doing that job. Hon. Members have made important points about how we get the transition right in order not to have disruption. I thank the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner for his encyclopaedic knowledge of the history of local and national government and the precedent that Ministers used to resign their seats. We will reflect on that and think about how we get the transition right.
14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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As the local transport authority, combined authorities and combined county authorities deliver a range of local transport functions across their area. Each combined authority or combined county authority agrees its own transport budget for the year and, in many cases, constituent councils contribute to this through a transport levy. This is because constituent councils receive funding for some transport functions directly from Government. The clause standardises the power for combined authorities and combined county authorities to levy such funding from their constituent councils to cover the cost of their transport functions, where they are not otherwise met. This power has proved effective in supporting transport delivery in local areas. For example, each of the seven councils of the West Midlands combined authority pays a levy based on its population figures, which goes on to fund a range of functions from subsidised bus services to the English national concessionary travel scheme, which provides free bus travel for eligible older and disabled people. This power complements clause 39, which provides combined authorities and combined county authorities with the power to pay grants to constituent councils. Together, these powers support partnership working between combined authorities and combined county authorities and their constituent members.
14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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I will take the other interventions.
14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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I beg to move amendment 68, in clause 9, page 11, line 19, leave out from “function” to “, or” in line 20. This would omit this wording is because of its replacement by the new section 30A(2) of LURA 2023 (see Amendment 220).
14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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The clause will ensure that all combined authorities and combined county authorities can pay their members an allowance where they take on special responsibility for the combined authority or the combined county authority. Constituent council members regularly take on important additional responsibilities, particularly leading on policy portfolios such as housing or transport. We heard from the leader of Manchester city council about the important role she plays for that combined authority. They are crucial in driving forward local policy, ensuring that it meets the needs and aspirations of our communities. Indeed, their role will grow in importance as we increase the powers and functions available to combined authorities and combined county authorities. However, currently, constituent council members can be paid for such special responsibilities only by their council, not the combined authority or combined county authority. This simply is not right; members should not be expected to do important work for free, and constituent councils should not foot the bill for work done in service of another body. Ensuring that the combined authority or combined county authority can pay its members creates a fairer system, allowing areas to recognise and reward hard work that delivers for communities. To ensure transparency and accountability, pay will be determined following a report by an independent remuneration panel.
14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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Clauses 17 and 18 make technical but necessary changes to existing legislation. As hon. Members will know, some functions conferred on combined authorities or combined county authorities are exercisable only by a mayor acting on behalf of the authority. Clause 17 clarifies that, where a function is conferred on a mayor, it should be taken to be a function of the underlying authority that is exercisable only by the mayor acting on behalf of the combined authority or combined county authority. This is because mayors of strategic authorities are not corporate entities in themselves; therefore, all functions must be conferred on the underlying authority. Clause 18 clarifies the meaning and extent of the “general functions” of mayors in combined authorities and combined county authorities. The term “general functions” here refers to non-police and crime functions. It is appropriate for the mayor alone to be able to exercise their judgment in certain cases, and to be held fully accountable for those decisions and ultimately to the public. I commend these clauses to the Committee. Question put and agreed to. Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 19 Report under section 1 of the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016
14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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Simply, these amendments set out the ways in which a commissioner’s appointment can end. Specifically, it can end if the appointment is invalid, if the person becomes ineligible, if the term of the appointment ends, if the appointment is terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions, if a recommendation to terminate the commissioner’s appointment is accepted, or if the commissioner passes away. We have talked about the accountability mechanisms that we are putting in place to ensure that commissioners play the role they should play, but they are accountable to the mayor. We have also talked about the role of the scrutiny committee in providing oversight and recommendations about termination. Amendment 72 agreed to. Amendments made: 73, in schedule 3, page 116, line 40, at end insert— “(d) excepted fire and rescue functions.” This would prevent a commissioner appointed by the mayor of a combined authority from exercising “excepted fire and rescue functions” (defined in Amendment 74). Amendment 74, in schedule 3, page 117, line 10, at end insert— “(6) In this paragraph ‘excepted fire and rescue functions’ means— (a) functions under the following provisions of the FRSA 2004— (i) section 13 (reinforcement schemes); (ii) section 15 (arrangements with other employers of fire-fighters); (iii) section 16 (arrangements for discharge of functions by others); (b) the functions of— (i) appointing, suspending or dismissing the chief fire officer; (ii) approving the terms of appointment of the chief fire officer; (iii) holding the chief fire officer to account for managing the fire and rescue service; (c) approving— (i) the community risk management plan; (ii) the fire and rescue declaration; (d) approving plans, modifications to plans and additions to plans for the purpose of ensuring that— (i) as far as reasonably practicable, the CCA is able to perform its fire and rescue functions if an emergency occurs, and (ii) the CCA is able to perform its functions so far as is necessary or desirable for the purpose of preventing an emergency or reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of an emergency, or taking other action in connection with it; (e) approving any arrangements for the co-operation of the CCA in relation to its fire and rescue functions with other Category 1 responders and Category 2 responders in respect of— (i) the performance of the CCA’s duty as a fire and rescue authority under section 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (duty to assess, plan and advise); (ii) any duties under subordinate legislation made in exercise of powers under that Act. (7) In sub-paragraph (6) and this sub-paragraph— ‘Category 1 responder’ and ‘Category 2 responder’ have the meanings given in section 3 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (section 2: supplemental); ‘chief fire officer’ means the person with responsibility for managing the fire and rescue service; ‘community risk management plan’ means a plan which— (a) is prepared and published by the combined authority in accordance with the Fire and Rescue National Framework, and (b) sets out for the period covered by the document in accordance with the requirements of the Framework— (i) the CCA’s priorities and objectives, and (ii) an assessment of all foreseeable fire and rescue related risks that could affect its community, in accordance with the discharge of the CCA’s fire and rescue functions; ‘emergency’ has the meaning given in section 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (meaning of ‘emergency’); ‘fire and rescue authority’ means a fire and rescue authority under the FRSA 2004; ‘fire and rescue declaration’ means a document which— (a) is prepared and published by the CCA in accordance with the Fire and Rescue National Framework, and (b) contains a statement of the way in which the CCA has had regard, in the period covered by the document, to the Framework and to any community risk management plan prepared by the CCA for that period; ‘fire and rescue functions’ means— (a) functions of a fire and rescue authority which the CCA has by virtue of regulations under section 19, or (b) functions which the CCA has as a fire and rescue authority by virtue of section 1(2)(f) or (g) of the FRSA 2004; ‘Fire and Rescue National Framework’ means the document prepared by the Secretary of State under section 21 of the FRSA 2004; ‘fire and rescue service’ means the personnel, services and equipment secured for the purposes of carrying out the functions of a fire and rescue authority under— (a) section 6 of the FRSA 2004 (fire safety); (b) section 7 of the FRSA 2004 (fire-fighting); (c) section 8 of the FRSA 2004 (road traffic accidents); (d) any applicable order under section 9 of the FRSA 2004 Act (emergencies); (e) section 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (duty to assess, plan and advise) and any applicable subordinate legislation made under that Act; (f) any other provision of, or made under, an enactment which confers functions on a fire and rescue authority; ‘FRSA 2004’ means the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004.” This would define the “excepted fire and rescue functions” which a commissioner appointed by the mayor of a combined authority would be prevented from exercising by Amendment 73. Amendment 75, in schedule 3, page 117, line 31, leave out from beginning to end of line 36 and insert— “Ending of appointment 8A The appointment of a person as a commissioner ends if— (a) the appointment ceases to have effect in accordance with paragraph 2(2), 4(3) or 5, (b) the appointment ends— (i) in accordance with the terms and conditions included by virtue of paragraph 6(1), or (ii) in accordance with paragraph 6(2), (c) the appointment is terminated in accordance with its terms and conditions— (i) by the mayor for the area of the combined authority (whether that is the person who made the appointment or a successor), or (ii) by the commissioner, (d) the appointment ceases to have effect in accordance with paragraph 10(4), or (e) the commissioner dies.”— (Miatta Fahnbulleh.) This would state the ways in which the appointment of a commissioner can end . Schedule 3, as amended, agreed to. Clause 10 Combined authorities and CCAs: allowances for members with special responsibilities Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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I beg to move amendment 77, in clause 11, page 15, line 15, at end insert— “(b) in subsection (4)(a), for the words from “consists” to the end of that paragraph substitute “includes a separate component in respect of the mayor’s PCC functions,”.” This provides for flexibility where the mayor of a mayoral combined authority has PCC functions as to how the components of the authority’s council tax calculation which relate to the authority’s other functions (both mayoral and non-mayoral) are to be set out.
14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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I understand the concerns expressed by the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner and the context in which that could arise. Our judgment is that if the independent remuneration committee does its job, we can mitigate around that. There is always a balance. We are trying to live the spirit of the Bill and to create as much autonomy, space and power for the mayor and constituent authorities to make such decisions, rather than us specifying nationally. As we get representations from strategic authorities going through the process, we will reflect that in statutory guidance, but we think we have the right balance. The important role that the remuneration committee will play will help to mitigate some of the risks the hon. Member mentioned. On the specific example raised by my hon. Friend the Member for North West Cambridgeshire, we are not prohibiting elected members from sitting on the combined authority. It is within the gift of the combined authority. Again, we are giving as much flexibility as possible for an authority to come up with measures that work for a particular local area. Question put and agreed to . Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill . Clause 11 Mayoral combined authorities and CCAs: precepts
14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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I will respond to the amendment to clause 48, and then I will pick up the specific questions from the hon. Member. The GLA has a different and long-established governance model. In London, the mayor is elected by the people of London to make decisions; the Assembly’s role is to scrutinise those decisions. As a London MP, I think that model has worked well for London for well over 25 years. It is tested and it strikes the right balance between the executive authority of the mayor and the scrutiny of the Assembly.
14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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I thank the hon. Member for his thoughtful contribution on this critical question of how to ensure value for money in the remuneration of commissioners. It is important that allowances paid to commissioners accurately reflect the work they do but also represent value for money. We completely agree with that principle. That is why the Bill, as drafted, has a clear process for setting the allowances of commissioners. The relevant authority must consider a report by a relevant remuneration panel, and payments cannot exceed the amount specified in that report. Ultimately, what commissioners are paid is a local decision, and we have crafted the measures for that, but it is a decision that needs to be made in alignment with recommendations, as is the practice across local government. Adding a further requirement that commissioners cannot be paid more than directors would reduce local autonomy in decision making and would pre-emptively undermine the relevant remuneration panel. The Bill is about empowering places, but what we can and will consider is how we set up statutory guidance to provide clarity about what is possible and to deal with some of the potential pitfalls that the hon. Member has raised. Amendment 292 seeks to place a duty on remuneration panels to consider and make recommendations about the local government pension scheme. Again, I understand the intent behind the amendment and the importance of ensuring that public officials in local government are properly remunerated and incentivised. However, I do not believe the amendment necessarily advances that. We value the work that remuneration panels do to make considered recommendations about allowances that should be paid locally. However, overall access and eligibility to the local government pension scheme is dealt with at national level. It is therefore not clear what value the amendment would add, which is why I ask the shadow Minister to withdraw it.
14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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To answer the specific question, yes, in-year balancing will apply. The purpose of the precepting function is to allow the mayor to invest in key things that will drive the economic prosperity of the area and the core functions that we have set out in the Bill. It would be a very brave mayor who chose to raise the precept not to deliver on that. In the end, they are democratically elected, and it will be for their residents and constituents to show them the consequences of that at the ballot box. Amendment 77 agreed to. Amendments made: 78, in clause 11, page 15, line 15, at end insert— “(b) in subsection (5)(b), after ‘functions,’ insert ‘or the other functions of the authority (other than any PCC functions that are exercisable by the mayor), or both’.” This enables the Secretary of State to require the mayor of a combined authority to prepare an annual budget in relation to the authority’s functions, excluding any mayoral PCC functions, either separately to or in combination with the budget relating to the mayor’s general functions. Amendment 79, in clause 11, page 15, line 17, at end insert— “(b) in subsection (2), omit ‘in respect of mayoral functions’.” This provides that the issuing of precepts under the Local Government Finance Act 1992 in respect of expenditure relating to the functions of a mayoral CCA is a function exercisable by the mayor acting on behalf of the CCA. Amendment 80, in clause 11, page 15, line 17, at end insert— “(b) in subsection (4)(a), for the words from ‘consists’ to the end of that paragraph substitute ‘includes a separate component in respect of the mayor’s PCC functions,’.” This provides for flexibility where the mayor of a mayoral CCA has PCC functions as to how the components of the CCA’s council tax calculation which relate to the CCA’s other functions (both mayoral and non-mayoral) are to be set out. Amendment 81, in clause 11, page 15, line 17, at end insert— “(b) in subsection (5)(b), after ‘functions,’ insert ‘or the other functions of the CCA (other than any PCC functions that are exercisable by the mayor), or both’.”— (Miatta Fahnbulleh.) This enables the Secretary of State to require the mayor of a CCA to prepare an annual budget in relation to the CCA functions, excluding any mayoral PCC functions, either separately to or in combination with the budget relating to the mayor’s general functions. Clause 11, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 12 Power to borrow

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