Matt Western MP: speeches

Speeches

• 19 Mar 2026 · UK Steel Strategy · Hansard source

  More

  I thank my right hon. Friend for his statement. As he says, steel is national security and economic security. Can I just say, it is terrific at long last to hear a Government showing some mettle? [Hon. Members: “Oh.”] The array of measures in the strategy is impressive, from tariffs to procurement and scrap, but there are some concerns among our precious automotive sector. Could my right hon. Friend outline some detail about how this will relate to EU measures and how it will support UK manufacturers facing “made in Europe” tariffs?

• 19 Mar 2026 · National Security Strategy, Political Finance and Foreign Influence · Hansard source

  More

  The Committee very much hopes that a new service will be able to accommodate that recommendation. We hope that there can be a centralised service, using whichever is the most appropriate vehicle; whether that be within the National Crime Agency or separately within the police service is for others to decide. The most crucial thing is that we do not have a disparate mix of agencies working in the same arena. The critical thing that we uncovered was how the Electoral Commission—which much of the investigation was about and where so much of the concern originates—often cannot access data and information from other agencies for GDPR reasons, and therefore it is frustrated in its work and many opportunities to prosecute or bring cases are not enabled.

• 19 Mar 2026 · National Security Strategy, Political Finance and Foreign Influence · Hansard source

  More

  I am pleased to present the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy’s third report of this Parliament, on political finance and foreign influence, and I am grateful to the Backbench Business Committee for granting time for this. Let me outline why this issue matters. First, the UK’s political finance system was designed for a more innocent age when state threats were lower and the “good chaps” theory of politics resonated more strongly, both at home and abroad. The scale of loopholes facilitating the flow of foreign money into UK politics is now recognised, and Transparency International UK estimates that it runs to tens of millions of pounds. Furthermore, US intelligence has estimated that Russia spent over $300 million to influence politicians in 24 countries between 2014 and 2022. Here, we have seen a British politician jailed for taking Russian bribes, alongside MI5 interference alerts about Christine Lee, who made around half a million pounds in political donations. This is all deeply concerning. The Government deserve credit for addressing the basic failures through the new Representation of the People Bill, alongside other work, but our Committee established that they need to go further. We have not yet seen a collapse in the integrity of our democratic processes, but we worry that a moment of reckoning may be coming. Indications suggest that foreign state threats are growing, and the possibility of an acute crisis can no longer be ruled out. Efforts to influence UK political positions on critical issues will likely increase between now and the next general election. Democracies around the world are under threat, and as democratic norms erode, so will corporate behaviour. That will only be made easier by new technologies that enable firms to evade due diligence checks. There is also deepening uncertainty about the trajectory of the current United States Administration, who have ambitions to shape the political direction of their allies. Wealthy individuals are a concern too: Elon Musk, for example, has reportedly considered a £75 million donation to a UK political party. As our political landscape becomes more fragmented, the likelihood of tight and unpredictable electoral races is growing. Adversaries could try to create the impression of having influenced a few races, even if they do not actually change outcomes, simply to make the losers doubt the legitimacy of the process. Our political finance system is not designed to withstand a major effort by foreign actors to circumvent the rules, and what happens if political actors in the UK decide that they are not going to respect the rules and constitutional precedents? Presently, I have little confidence that the system would hold. Safeguards and deterrence are completely inadequate. Responsibilities and capabilities are fragmented. Too much problematic activity is apparently allowed or impossible to prove. Thresholds for criminal investigations are too high. Prison sentences are too low. The police are under-resourced, the Electoral Commission lacks the basic powers to do its job, and the general enforcement toolkit is slow, timid and retrospective. That all feeds the public perception that our politics is open to external influence—a belief that is corrosive. Already, Electoral Commission data shows that public trust is worryingly low. All of this matters right now because the Government have brought forward the Representation of the People Bill. There is much to like, and I commend the Government for their willingness to grapple with a politically sensitive topic. The Committee also welcomes the forthcoming Rycroft review on foreign interference. Our Committee concluded on six recommendations for change. First is the need for a new enforcement lead. Presently, responsibilities for foreign financial influence risks are split across MI5, Counter Terrorism Policing, the National Crime Agency, the Metropolitan Police Service, local police forces and the Electoral Commission. That hardly inspires confidence that risks are being investigated proactively, with the right expertise in the right place at the right time. The Government should use the police service reforms to create a new centralised political finance enforcement unit, staffed with expert secondees. Second is the need to fix basic loopholes. For example, the Bill proposes a cap on donations linked to UK-generated cash but then allows companies to donate their entire limit hundreds of times over to individual candidates and campaigners. We heard anecdotally that the rationale was to limit reporting burdens for business, which is a little bizarre. It is not hard to record making a donation—it is a matter of public record. That needs fixing. Third is the need for tougher declarations and penalties. For example, the Government have committed to commencing section 54A of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, which requires donors to declare money they have received in connection with a donation. But why does that only apply above £11,180, and why is it such a bizarre figure? Why are the penalties so low, and why is the threshold for a police investigation still so high? We therefore suggest introducing the measures through the Representation of the People Bill instead, which would allow the Government to lower the declaration limit to £500, widen the scope and increase maximum penalties to three years in prison. Fourthly, the Electoral Commission needs new powers to do its job. It must be able to require information from financial institutions about the source of a suspicious donation. Currently, the commission faces a Catch-22 situation: it cannot get that information without a major formal investigation, and it will not have grounds to launch an investigation without that kind of information. The Government need to fix that conundrum, so that the Electoral Commission has access to data. Fifthly, we must address crypto donations. We heard arguments for and against, but found no democratic imperative to allow crypto donations right now. The risks are way too high and the benefits too low, and the resource burden of trying to implement safeguards is disproportionate. We therefore call for a ban—a moratorium—until proper rules are in place, and the Electoral Commission should develop adequate safeguards ahead of the next general election. Sixthly, we need to be mindful of resourcing. The Government should ensure that the new national policing unit is properly staffed, and that the Electoral Commission has specialists and the appropriate tools for complex investigations—because they are complex. Finally, we must ensure that any changes are proportionate. Our report is very targeted and seeks to strike the right balance. It is important to note that we did not look at other contentious areas—for example, second jobs, think-tanks, media outlets and online campaign outfits, which also deserve scrutiny. I have tabled amendments aligned to these recommendations. I trust that this report is helpful to the Bill Committee and to the wider House.

• 19 Mar 2026 · Air Pollution · Hansard source

  More

  The Minister will know that in Warwick and Leamington, we have suffered extreme chemical pollution in the atmosphere from Berry Polymers. More recently, we have had an application from Bellway Homes that proposes dumping the equivalent of an Olympic-size swimming pool of building waste for every day that the development is being built, which will be several years. The common theme here is, of course, the Environment Agency, so will she agree to meet me and the Environment Agency urgently to resolve this pressing issue?

• 19 Mar 2026 · Banking Services: Accessibility · Hansard source

  More

  Very briefly. I would not normally allow this.

• 19 Mar 2026 · Banking Services: Accessibility · Hansard source

  More

  I remind Members that this is the summing up by the Member in charge, not an open debate.

• 19 Mar 2026 · Banking Services: Accessibility · Hansard source

  More

  I remind the hon. Member that he will have time to wind up at the end. Perhaps the Minister could start to conclude her remarks.

• 18 Mar 2026 · Fuel Duty · Hansard source

  More

  rose —

• 18 Mar 2026 · Fuel Duty · Hansard source

  More

  The shadow Secretary of State is talking about how money may be spent from taxation. I highlight that local authority road maintenance budgets halved from £4 billion to £2 billion in the 13-year period from 2006 to 2019. If we look at inflation, Bank of England data shows that from 2006 to 2026, overall inflation ran at 74%, but fuel inflation was just 58%.

• 18 Mar 2026 · Fuel Duty · Hansard source

  More

  Will the right hon. Gentleman give way on that point?

• 18 Mar 2026 · Fuel Duty · Hansard source

  More

  Will my hon. Friend give way?

• 5 Mar 2026 · Energy Markets · Hansard source

  More

  My right hon. Friend talks about the lessons learned. Despite my youthful good looks, I recall the 1979 Iranian revolution—the last Iranian revolution—which led to a fuel crisis globally. The importance of what we are doing is underlined by the need for the energy transition and the need to improve our domestic energy resilience. That is why we need to see more renewables and to roll out Rolls-Royce small modular reactors urgently and take a lead globally on that. My right hon. Friend talks about household support. What does he think President Trump was thinking about the impact that this situation would have on businesses and the humble motorist?

• 4 Mar 2026 · NHS Capital Spending · Hansard source

  More

  I call Josh Taylor—sorry, I got that wrong; I call Luke Taylor.

• 4 Mar 2026 · NHS Capital Spending · Hansard source

  More

  The next speaker will have five minutes. Thereafter, I am afraid I will have to drop to four minutes.

• 4 Mar 2026 · NHS Capital Spending · Hansard source

  More

  I now call Josh Babarinde.

• 4 Mar 2026 · NHS Capital Spending · Hansard source

  More

  Order. I remind Members that they must bob if they wish to be called in the debate. I first call Gareth Thomas, who will be followed by Steve Darling.

• 4 Mar 2026 · NHS Capital Spending · Hansard source

  More

  I expect speeches to be around five minutes so that we can get everyone in. Please be respectful to colleagues.

• 4 Mar 2026 · China: Foreign Interference Arrests · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the Minister for his immediate update to the House, given the recency of this breaking news. He will know that the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy did its report on the case of Cash and Berry, in which it made certain recommendations. The National Security Act 2023 is now fully in place. That is post the original Official Secrets Act 1911, which related to what was undertaken, allegedly, by Cash and Berry. Would the Minister agree that, given the essence of the grain of rice strategy pursued by China, we could see many more cases such as this, involving intelligence gathering by the Chinese as they seek to undermine our democracy and political system?

• 4 Mar 2026 · Work Capability Assessment Timescales · Hansard source

  More

  Order. I remind hon. Members to refer to each other as hon. Members, as opposed to “you”, which is, of course, me.

• 2 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill · Hansard source

  More

  The Bill introduces timely reforms, such as extending the right to vote to young people, and it addresses the rising and ever more concerning issues of harassment and intimidation. With foreign interference expected to intensify the deterioration of the international security environment, and given the threats posed by wealthy donors, crypto and AI, I encourage the Government to go further. That is where I will focus my remarks. Last September, the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy heard from Spotlight on Corruption that there has been foreign interference in 21 elections across Europe in recent years. Research from a 2022 US intelligence assessment estimated that Russia has spent $300 million on political influence in 24 countries. Beyond direct state influence, there is the issue of obscenely wealthy donors and corporations. Corporate donations have tripled over the last three elections in the UK, rising from £14 million in 2017 to £42 million in 2024. Beyond those challenges, the Bill introduces valuable provisions. The political finance reforms are good, and it creates a new “know your donor” requirement to ensure that political parties conduct the necessary due diligence. It requires parties to verify that companies that wish to donate can demonstrate sufficient revenue and a qualifying connection to the UK or Ireland, and it will enable the Electoral Commission to issue significantly increased penalties—up to £500,000. I would like the Bill to go further on business and corporate donations. I want there be a longer qualifying period and a profit measure to protect the system more against phantom businesses and shell companies. Elsewhere, our Committee is calling for a temporary moratorium on accepting crypto donations until the Electoral Commission produces statutory guidance and stronger systems. We want the Electoral Commission to have stronger powers, including the ability to compel financial institutions to provide information relating to funds connected to donations so that they can be investigated more fully. We want a single police lead for political finance and foreign interference, and a review into the sentencing of political finance offences. Personally, I think we need to look more at the role of think-tanks and how they are funded. I would like the Bill to go further, with a longer qualifying period and profit measures to protect the system. I want a donation cap on corporate and personal donations. I want consideration to be given to amending the schedule of penalties to make it more proportionate to the donor’s wealth. We must ensure that the fees and salaries that companies pay MPs in whatever field, but particularly in media, fall under political finance regulations. I absolutely welcome the Bill. We need much tighter regulation across our political finance, including to address the interference with which states and individuals wish to influence our democracy. I very much look forward to working with the Ministers in the coming weeks.

• 28 Jan 2026 · Local Authority Children’s Services · Hansard source

  More

  Order. I remind Members that they should bob if they wish to speak in the debate. Clearly, there are quite a few Members so, on the basis of what I have seen, I ask Members to speak for four to five minutes—an informal application of a time limit—and we will see how we get on.

• 28 Jan 2026 · Local Authority Children’s Services · Hansard source

  More

  The four to five minutes was not kept to as tightly as I would have hoped, so we will have to go to a formal four minutes for speeches because of the number of Members who have indicated that they wish to speak.

• 8 Jan 2026 · Subsea Telecommunications Cables: Resilience and Crisis Preparedness · Hansard source

  More

  I thank my hon. Friend for serving on the Committee and for the work he is doing in chairing the Defence Committee, and he is absolutely right. There are several elements to this. One is, as we have seen in the Baltic and around our shores, the nature of the threats. The attacks on cables are proving provocative, and we have to demonstrate a more muscular approach to how we view them. It is interesting to see that some of our peers in NATO have taken this a bit further, and we should look closely at that, but we are constrained by international law. I have mentioned the Submarine Telegraph Act 1885, which is not fit for purpose. There needs to be some thinking along the lines of what we can do within our territorial waters to address any threat that is presented, such as we saw last year with the Yantar and other ships. Work needs to be done on the legal side, but also on the hardware that we can deploy. As an island nation, this should be something on which we can develop a huge sovereign capability, which would also boost our exports.

• 8 Jan 2026 · Subsea Telecommunications Cables: Resilience and Crisis Preparedness · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his service on the Committee over so many years, which was hugely valued, and his point is absolutely fair. I have not seen the specific report that was published today, but it echoes the points that we have made in this report. We do not want to be alarmist, but we cannot accept any complacency about what the threats are, because there is a genuine risk. The truth is that there is the potential to reroute cables. There is a significant amount of traffic across the Atlantic—some of it comes into Ireland, some of it into mainland Europe, and some of it into the UK—so it is always possible for data communications to come through to us in different ways and, in an extreme crisis, for us to turn to satellites, although that capacity is significantly lower. I am sure there are some very valid points in that report, and I will look at it more closely.

• 8 Jan 2026 · Subsea Telecommunications Cables: Resilience and Crisis Preparedness · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the hon. Gentleman, and I will keep my comments brief. I absolutely agree that the legal side of this urgently needs to be addressed, and I understand from the Government that they will look very closely at it in their defence resilience Bill.