Matt Vickers MP: speeches

Speeches

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 3 sets out the functions of the Border Security Commander. The shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), correctly pointed out on Second Reading that the new Border Security Commander “cannot actually command anything. There are no powers at all in the Bill, merely functions. They include, in clause 3, publishing a strategic priority document and, in clause 4, a duty to prepare an annual report…the Border Security Commander has no clear powers, merely an ability to publish documents and reports.” —[ Official Report , 10 February 2025; Vol. 762, c. 69.] According to the legislation, the functions of the commander “must have regard to the objectives of…maximising the effectiveness of the activities of partner authorities relating to threats to border security, for the purpose of minimising such threats, and…maximising the coordination of those activities for that purpose.” That sounds suspiciously like a co-ordinator, rather than a commander. That is exactly what the legislation states: the commander does not appear to be empowered by the Bill to command anyone. Subsection (5) defines a partner authority as a “public authority with functions in relation to threats to border security (whether exercisable in the United Kingdom or elsewhere)”, but—in subsection (6)— “ not…the Security Service…the Secret Intelligence Service” or “GCHQ”. Will the Minister confirm what is meant by partner authorities? Does she have a list of likely organisations that the Border Security Commander should be able to direct co-operation with? How far does she think that the Border Security Commander will be able to have an impact on public authorities abroad? For example, what role might French law enforcement be expected to play in having regard to the commander’s strategic priority document? The Opposition have tabled amendment 13, which would enable the Home Secretary to direct other agencies to support the Border Security Commander’s objectives and strategic priorities, specifically Border Force, Immigration Enforcement, police and crime commissioners and the National Crime Agency. Ideally, we would like the Border Security Commander to have a meaningful role and the ability to direct other agencies. As the Government seem unwilling to do that, however, we thought it might be possible for the Home Secretary to give the Border Security Commander a little support. If the Minister does not want to accept amendment 13, I would like to understand why not. Why do the Government seem willing to allow the commander only to co-ordinate, rather than to command? Why could the Home Secretary not add some additional impetus? The clause requires the Border Security Commander to issue a strategic priority document that sets out the principal threats to border security when the document is issued, and the strategic priorities to which partner authorities should have regard in exercising their functions in relation to any of the threats to the border identified by the commander. We have tabled amendment 12 to ensure that the strategic priority document supports the Home Office’s UK border strategy. We are attempting to ensure that the Border Security Commander is aligned with the rest of the Home Office’s work to secure the border. I am interested to understand why the Minister is not willing to accept that amendment.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 10, in clause 1, page 1, line 6, leave out “designate a civil servant as the” and insert “appoint a”. This amendment would remove the requirement for the Border Security Commander to be a civil servant.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I think, in the last week, we have found that the only thing that this Government are relying on is the weather, but I will carry on. I am sure we will come back to all these things in due course; it is good to be discussing them here instead of on a news channel somewhere. As the Government are repealing the Illegal Migration Act 2023 and the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024 with this Bill, we want to make sure that the Border Security Commander is empowered to ensure that all relevant agencies are working towards taking timely decisions on any claims by illegal immigrants, and removing those who enter the UK illegally.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  At some point, Martin Hewitt will be superseded. We want to make sure that whoever is in this role is in the best possible position to do the best possible job. I do not think that these measures are necessarily about Martin Hewitt’s effectiveness or otherwise; they are about this post and its fundamental role—well, its apparent fundamental role—in delivering border security for this country.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  We will discuss when we come to the next group of amendments the aims and objectives of this role, and the fact that if we are going to have a Border Security Commander, they should have a very meaningful role that can make a real difference. I would like to press on clause 2 of the Bill, which talks about “The terms and conditions of a designation as Commander are to be determined by the Secretary of State.” I would be grateful if the Minister could explain to the Committee what those terms and conditions of designation might be? As I mentioned, the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 sets out how the Met commissioner must be suitably qualified. What sort of qualifications could we expect to see in a commander and what will those terms and conditions be?

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thought that we would get a bit further through the Bill before we got into records. In real terms, there has been a marked increase in the number of people coming here since this Government took office—small boat crossings are up by 28%. We now have 8,500 more people staying in hotels across the country—up by nearly 29%. We were closing hotels. The hon. Member talks about the number of people being deported, but they are voluntarily going back. In real terms, the number of people who have arrived on small boats being returned went down, and in the most recent figures, it has gone down again. We have not been sending back those people who have arrived in small boats since this Government took office—that is just not the case.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  When we talk about the Border Security Commander role, if we think it is going to “smash the gangs”, sort out all these problems and play a huge part in creating a secure border for this country, it is important that we allow it some element of independence and gravitas. We have talked about the commander being tied into the strategic priorities of the Home Office, but this amendment is about empowering them to make the difference that we want them to make. We want them to succeed. As I was saying, removing that requirement would allow the Border Security Commander to act decisively. We must avoid unnecessary bureaucratic wrangling and ensure that, in this critical matter, they have the freedom they need to deliver results.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  If we are to have a Border Security Commander, we want an effective one who can publish a strategy without being subject to a political veto, who has priorities aligned to the UK border strategy, and whom Home Secretaries can direct agencies to follow. We wish to press the amendments to a Division. Amendment proposed : 12, in clause 3, page 2, line 36, at end insert— “(2A) The strategic priority document issued under subsection (2) must support the Home Office’s UK Border Strategy.”— (Matt Vickers.) This amendment would require that the Border Security Commander’s strategic priority document supports the UK Border Strategy. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 3 Functions of the Commander

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have not come across Chief Commissioner Miekelson before, but I will endeavour to catch up on Netflix or iPlayer.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  If we are to have such a position, we want it to be effective and have the relevant powers, but we also want it to be aligned with the other priorities of the Home Office and the work going on there. I think that is clear. Amendment 11 would remove the requirement for the Border Security Commander to obtain the consent of the Secretary of State before issuing the strategic priority document. We would like to understand the operational benefits of the Secretary of State having to sign off the strategic priority document, which again highlights the lack of a meaningful role for the Border Security Commander. Although the strategic policy document should set out what are, in the commander’s view, the principal threats to border security and the strategic priorities to which partner authorities should have regard, in reality the document is a diktat from the Secretary of State about the Secretary of State’s views, and that arguably exposes a lack of influence and gravitas in the Border Security Commander’s role. Allowing the commander to issue a strategic priority document without seeking prior permission from the Secretary of State would provide a welcome level of independence for the role. The oversight and consultation of the board would ensure confidence in the Border Security Commander’s ability to take all necessary steps to stop the crossings. There may be occasions when the commander believes it is necessary to act swiftly and to implement changes without delay. Removing the requirement to have ministerial consent would allow them to act decisively. That approach, I am sure, could subsequently be supported by the Secretary of State.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I think there is an opportunity to strengthen this role so that it can provide that real fundamental change that we are apparently looking for in this Bill. I would not necessarily want to comment on the individual. We have tabled new clause 21 to set out some clear and measurable objectives for the Border Security Commander, to attempt to give this co-ordinator some clear direction. New clause 21 would set out that, in exercising their functions, the commander “must have regard to the objectives of…preventing the boarding of vessels, with the aim of entering the United Kingdom, by persons who require leave to enter the United Kingdom but are seeking to enter the United Kingdom…without leave to enter, or…with leave to enter that was obtained by means which included deception”. In effect, we want it in black and white in the Bill that the commander will be given the objective of reducing illegal entry to the country, and that is what new clause 21 would achieve. Since 2018, when the figures were first recorded, more than 150,000 people have arrived in small boats. As of 29 January, 1,098 people had crossed the channel since the start of 2025. In 2024 as a whole, 36,816 people were detected making the crossing. I would like to understand why the Government do not think it is worthwhile to give the Border Security Commander the direct objective of reducing or even ending those arrivals. We also wish to ensure that those who arrive in this country illegally will not be able to stay. We know that effective returns agreements work as a deterrent. When in government, we cut the number of Albanian illegal migrants coming to the UK by small boat crossings by more than 90%, thanks to our returns agreement. In 2022, 12,658 Albanian illegal migrants arrived in the UK by small boat, but that fell to just 924 in 2023, following our landmark returns agreement with Albania. We have therefore included in new clause 21 the objective for the Border Security Commander to ensure that a decision on a claim by a person who has arrived in the UK illegally is taken within six months of the person’s arrival, and for the commander to make arrangements with a safe third country for the removal of people who enter the UK illegally. It is up to the Government to put in place an effective deterrent to people crossing the channel in small boats.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I could not, but I could tell the hon. Lady that the backlog is even bigger now than it was when this Government took office. If the Government were serious about tackling illegal crossings and creating an effective deterrent, they would support new clause 21. We also want to make sure that the Border Security Commander is transparent with the public about how best to stop illegal and dangerous channel crossings, which is why this new clause includes a requirement for the commander to make an assessment of the most effective methods for deterring illegal entry into the UK, the most effective methods for reducing the number of sea crossings made by individuals without leave to enter the UK, and the most effective methods for arranging the removal, to the person’s own country or a safe third country, of a person who enters the UK illegally. Again, if the Government were serious about protecting borders, they would support the new clause. Clause 9 specifies that the Border Security Commander must “comply with directions given by the Secretary of State about the exercise of the Commander’s functions under this Chapter.” Can the Minister explain what sort of guidance the Secretary of State is likely to want to give the commander? Can she explain how the Secretary of State wishes to exercise the powers in the clause? The SNP’s amendment 1 would confirm that the commander must have full regard to the Human Rights Act and the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. Given that the commander’s role, as drafted by the Government, includes no real power or responsibility, I am not sure what that amendment would actually achieve.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  We want to see how effective the offences will be. The Government have set that out in part, but not for the new offence of endangering lives at sea, which has great consequence. Amendment 14 would also require the Border Security Commander to report on the number of people identified as entering the United Kingdom via sea crossing without leave to remain; how many of them are detained pending deportation or a decision on deportation; and how many are deported to a country of which the person is a national or citizen, or to a country or territory to which there is reason to believe that the person will be admitted. We believe it is important to have transparency about the role of the Border Security Commander in facilitating removals. If they are charged with minimising threats to the border, removing those who enter this country illegally with no reason to remain is a big part of successfully achieving that objective.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship on your first outing, Mr Stuart. Clause 5(3) requires those who are co-operating with the commander in the exercise of their functions to put in place arrangements governing co-operation between the commander and that person. Does the Minister have a view about what those agreements will look like and what sort of obligations will fall on both parties?

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 8 allows for an interim Border Security Commander to be designated. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that this is essentially a stopgap either because a Border Security Commander is going to step down without a replacement yet secured, or for reasons of temporary incapacity to carry out their functions. Subsection (2) specifies that the interim Border Security Commander can be designated for such period as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate.” I would like the Minister to explain whether there is a limit to what could be regarded as appropriate. This is, on the face of it, a temporary measure, so what counts as temporary for these purposes? What are the safeguards against an interim appointment carrying on indefinitely? Subsection (3) says that the temporary designation can last no “longer than the period for which no Commander is designated or (as the case may be) the Commander is incapacitated or unavailable”, but no time limit is set out in the Bill. Are there any minimum qualifications the Minister would expect an interim commander to have?

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 6 states: “The Commander must establish and maintain a board to assist the Commander in the exercise of the Commander’s functions.” It is all quite open-ended: the chair will be the commander, and the board will be made up of one or more representatives from each relevant partner authority. Will the Minister explain on what basis the commander might decide to have representatives from partner authorities? Why do all partner authorities not need to be represented? Subsection (6) states: “The Commander must hold meetings of the Board at such intervals as the Commander thinks appropriate.” Does the Minister have any views about how regular the meetings should be? What sort of matters does she envisage the board will deal with?

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 7 makes provision about the delegation of the commander’s functions. Subsection (1) provides that “The functions conferred on the Commander by this Chapter may be exercised by any civil servant authorised by the Commander for that purpose.” This is further evidence, were any needed, that the post of commander might not be a serious one. We have already seen that the Bill does not specify any minimum qualifications or experience for the commander, and we have seen why: they are not really in charge of anything. There are serious questions to answer on the delegation of functions. What sort of functions does the Minister envisage the commander potentially delegating under this clause? Can any specific functions be named? The Bill does not specify any level of seniority for those the commander might delegate functions to. Is there any grade within the Home Office that the Minister thinks it would not be appropriate for the commander to delegate to? What oversight will there be of any delegation process?

• 4 Mar 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 10 makes it clear that this chapter does not apply to the naval, military or air forces of the Crown. Clause 11 is an amendment to the Data Protection Act 2018 to allow the Border Security Commander to be added to the list of competent authorities in relation to the processing of personal data carried out for a law enforcement purpose. Given how toothless the Border Security Commander appears to be, will the Minister explain why this measure needs to be added to schedule 7 of the Data Protection Act, as well as what law enforcement purposes the commander will have and for what purpose they will be processing personal data?

• 3 Mar 2025 · Draft Immigration (Biometric Information etc.) (Amendment) Regulations 2025 Draft Immigration and Nationality (Fees) (Amendment) Order 2025 · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. These two very different instruments underline the importance of funding and creating a secure border. The Border Force states in its 2025 strategy that it wants the UK border to be “the most effective in the world.” We all agree on that goal, but a significant amount of work is needed to make it a reality. On biometrics, we fully support the Government in updating the regulations to introduce measures that allow the retention of photographs and elements such as fingerprints within our border system. It is a necessary step in the modern world to secure that information. The question is whether these regulations go far enough to create the border of the future. Does the Minister believe that the retention of information will be sufficient to progress towards a contactless border, which the Government state is an aim in the explanatory notes? Additionally, how will the system help with enforcement? The current gap between inbound and outbound movements is a problem. Ultimately, it would be beneficial to have a system capable of identifying those who arrive and flagging overstayers. Although that would require a range of work, we know that biometrics can play an important role. Ultimately, we support this step by the Government, but we would appreciate further clarity about how that information will be used. We should all want the UK to make progress towards a system that effectively utilises biometric information, making our country safer in the process. I know that the Minister will have given some thought to that, so I would appreciate hearing how the Government intend to effectively use that information. On fees, we recognise the importance of securing funds to pay for our border and immigration system. It is right that the system generates funds and ensures that those who benefit most from immigration contribute to its costs. I recognise that this order is based on the principle of increasing the maxima and that further regulations will be required to implement these changes. It would be helpful if the Government outlined when they intend to bring forward consultations and assessments on this matter. Additionally, do they believe there are sufficiently robust systems in place to measure the impact of these changes and determine the extent to which they have affected the system? Furthermore, given the Government’s failure to stem illegal migration so far, do they anticipate that they will need to extend the maxima in the future? For example, given that more than 28% more people are in hotels, is the Minister concerned that costs to the Home Office will remain high? I know that falls under the responsibility of another member of the Home Office team, but does the Minister acknowledge that the measures proposed so far might not be sufficient?

• 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I am sure that we could spend all day arguing about the pros and cons of Rwanda, but specifically, we see the effectiveness of returns agreements where those are in place. For countries where we cannot return people, if those people are not going to Rwanda, where will the Government put them? Dame Angela Eagle: First, we will always seek to return people if they fail the asylum system, and have had all their claims and appeals, as soon as it is safe to do so. That is the first thing to say, and we must never lose sight of that. Situations in particular countries change—sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse, as the hon. Gentleman knows. We never give up on that. Clearly, if people are here and have failed, we want them to leave, and we will facilitate them to leave.

• 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q On the obligation to remove people who arrive here illegally, whether it is in that Act or in the Bill being brought forward, why are we removing that as a principle? Dame Angela Eagle: The issue was that we did not think it was possible to make the suite of legislation, which involved the Rwanda Act and the Illegal Migration Act, work together coherently. Its effect was essentially to allow people into the country but make it illegal to process them and leave them stuck in an ever-lengthening backlog and in limbo. The whole approach established by the interplay of those two Acts of Parliament, one of which was barely commenced even though it was on the statute book, had to be taken away so that we could bring some order to the chaos that we inherited from the previous Government, as a result of the practical outcomes of those two pieces of legislation.

• 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Are there any lessons that we are failing to learn from abroad? Professor Brian Bell: I do not think so, in the sense that I do not think any country has experienced these issues and dealt with them particularly successfully. There are different approaches—obviously, Australia has taken a different approach—but I do not think that any country would claim that it has really succeeded in significantly addressing this kind of problem. To me, it is very much the same kind of problem as any sort of criminal activity. You can change the sanctions and the effectiveness of the police, and that has some effect. The evidence tends to suggest on this sort of thing that it has a fairly small effect. The deterrence effect tends often to be quite small with these policies, so in the end the right response will almost certainly be about changing the incentives as well, in terms of both what is the attraction to come to the UK and whether there are ways we can encourage people to stay in France, in this case, instead of wanting to make those journeys.

• 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Are there any lessons from abroad that we are failing to learn? David Coleman: The lesson that everyone cites is the example of Australia, which, depending on which Government are in power, has a policy of diverting people right across the other side of the Pacific to an island where they were notionally safe, but where they were not able to enjoy being in Australia. That is supported or not supported depending on which Government is in power, which is one of the problems with migration policy. Generally speaking, whether the doors are tight shut, half open or fully open depends very much on the swings and balances of electoral change and is rather unpredictable. That is inevitable.

• 27 Feb 2025 · Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Are there any lessons from abroad that we are failing to learn at this point? Tony Smith: One thing I have raised is the possibility of a biometric entry/exit system, which we do not have in this country. I chair a lot of conferences around the world, on border developments, border security and border technologies. Your face will become your passport sooner or later—sooner in some countries than here. If we had the powers and authority, we could capture a digital biometric image of everybody entering and exiting the country, and we could require the carriers to do likewise—we do not have physical embarkation controls. This is happening in America. It is happening in Dubai. It is happening in Singapore. We are going to Curaçao, which now has a walk-through border. All it does is capture your face. It matches you to the API data that you already have, uploads it into the cloud and recognises you straightaway, so you have a more seamless border. It will give proper figures on who is in this country and who is not. Your net migration figures will be a lot more accurate than they are currently, provided that we have the powers to capture and retain everybody’s facial image. That means UK passports, Irish passports, electronic travel authorisations and visas, and permanent residents. I think that is achievable, and I would love to see it happening in this country.