Mark Francois MP: speeches

Speeches

• 2 Jul 2026 · Heart Disease and Stroke: Premature Deaths · Hansard source

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  For many years, stroke units have had access to thrombolysis—or “the shot”, as it is known in the trade. However, that is a very rough way of doing it, and it can have side effects and impede a patient’s recovery. Mechanical thrombectomy is a far more accurate way of solving a stroke problem, and with far less risk of subsequent side effects. That is why we are so keen to see its use grow, and I second my right hon. Friend’s request to the Minister.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Defence Spending and Readiness · Hansard source

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  Absolutely; industry is exasperated, from BAE Systems down to the smallest defence suppliers in the land. When we were in government, we published—with one year’s exception, I think—a detailed equipment plan every year so that industry could plan accordingly. That is what the DIP is meant to be, but still we do not have it. Labour Ministers tell us and their own Back Benchers again and again that they are increasing defence spending to the greatest extent since the end of the cold war. That is literally untrue. The Defence Secretary told the world in his resignation letter that Labour’s spending plans envisage going from 2.6% of GDP this year to 2.68% of GDP by 2030. That is a 0.08% increase over four years. How is that the largest increase in defence spending since the end of the cold war? Help me out, someone over there. It gets worse. Labour is also seeking £3.5 billion of in-year, self-inflicted, Treasury-driven cuts to the operational and readiness spending of our armed forces. That means fewer ships at sea, fewer planes in the air and fewer exercises on Salisbury plain—and the Russian and Chinese embassies must be laughing themselves silly. If Members will not take it from me, take it from the Chief of the Defence Staff—the professional head of the armed forces—who warned just a few days ago that if Labour continues on its financial path and does not fund the DIP properly, he will have no option but to cut back on readiness and training, which is exactly the activity that is meant to deter a potential aggressor in the first place. The blunt truth—as a Brit, I take no joy in saying it—is that this Government are the laughing stock of NATO. Indeed, in NATO’s own readiness index, the United Kingdom ranks 31st out of 32 NATO countries, with the only one below us Iceland by virtue of having no armed forces to ready. As the Government disintegrate before our eyes, we can only hope that their successors are both competent and courageous and actually believe in defending this country, which clearly this collapsing Administration do not. Another area that we want to press Ministers hard on is the fate of their benighted Northern Ireland Troubles Bill. The hon. Member for Birmingham Selly Oak, who famously described it as “not fit for purpose”, spoke powerfully in his resignation letter to the Prime Minister in defence of Northern Ireland veterans. He mentioned his battle in government, where he “set out the changes I believed were necessary, and the lines which I could not in good conscience go beyond. Those lines have not been accepted. I have run out of room to argue this case honourably from inside government. A serving minister cannot ask fellow veterans to trust a process he no longer trusts himself.” He went on: “We ask soldiers to fight for this country. In return, we owe them the kit to do the job and the loyalty to stand by them when it’s done. We are failing on both.” Nine former four-star officers have told the world that the troubles Bill represents a “direct threat to national security.” A group of former SAS commanders who were at the sharp end of the battle against republican terrorism told us: “Today every British soldier deployed must consider not only the enemy in front of them but the lawyer behind them… Make no mistake, our closest allies are watching uneasily, and our enemies will be rubbing their hands.” We absolutely cannot allow this situation to continue against those who defended the rule of law. Those who served in Operation Banner stood effectively as piggy-in-the-middle for decades between two warring communities. Over 700 of them were killed and thousands more suffered life-changing injuries. They and their comrades are now to be pursued through the courts via lawfare, actively aided and abetted by a Government who for months have promised multiple times to produce amendments to the Bill to protect veterans and, just as with the DIP, we have seen nothing of substance on which the House can rely, with no amendments and no letters of comfort for them, either. It is a matter of record that a number of those regiments who served in Northern Ireland on Op Banner came from the north-west of England, including from in and around the Manchester area. I think of the Duke of Lancaster’s Regiment and its antecedent regiments, including the King’s Regiment, which traditionally recruited from Liverpool and Manchester—they did many tours of Northern Ireland. I therefore ask, in all seriousness, what is the attitude of the right hon. Member for Makerfield towards the benighted Northern Ireland Troubles Bill? If the new Prime Minister seeks some kind of reset for the Labour party, A good place to start would be to drop this dreadful piece of legislation, which threatens to put our soldiers in the dock solely to the advantage of those who sought to kill them. In lieu of that, he could agree to back the Northern Ireland Troubles (Criminal Investigations etc) Bill, the excellent new private Member’s Bill tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp), which will have its Second Reading on 4 September and which in essence seeks to curtail any further investigations, inquests or inquiries against our Op Banner veterans unless compelling new evidence as certified by a UK Supreme Court Justice is produced. Some of us on these Benches have literally spent years seeking to defend those who defended us; let us hope that the new Prime Minister will agree. There has been consensus on one point this afternoon—I heard it again and again—which is that the first duty of Government above all others is the defence of the realm, yet the Armed Forces Minister resigned, the Secretary of State for Defence resigned and now the Prime Minister has resigned. This Administration has failed. It is broken. It is going. It made many mistakes, but worst of all, it failed to defend this country. For that, it deserves to come to an end.

• 11 Jun 2026 · Legacy of Jo Cox · Hansard source

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  On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. Today an honourable man has resigned, on a matter of principle, from a Government in disarray. The former Defence Secretary, as he now is, has resigned over the Government’s continuous failure to publish the defence investment plan or even to fund it. In his letter to the Prime Minister he said, “your DIP financial settlement—which I was first given in full on Monday afternoon this week—falls well short of what is required for defence and the country at this dangerous time…it rises to just 2.68% of GDP in 2030”. That is four years from now. We have a war in Ukraine, continued instability in the middle east and a Department in total limbo. The man with day-to-day responsibility for overseeing the nation’s defence has just quit. Madam Deputy Speaker, have you been given any indication that the Government will come to the House before we rise at the conclusion of business today and make a statement on this chaotic situation and who is now in charge of the Ministry of Defence? Similarly, have you been given any indication as to when the Government will now finally, at last, publish the defence investment plan, which is essential for the security of this country? As the first duty of the Government, above all others, is the defence of the realm, they must surely come to the House in the next few hours and explain how this dreadful situation will somehow be rectified.

• 2 Jun 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  In a moment. The plan allowed industry to make rational decisions about where to invest, helped to improve the morale of our armed forces by letting them know about the new equipment they could expect to come into service, and had an important deterrent effect on our potential adversaries by laying out exactly what we intended to buy for the defence of the realm. All those things have now been put at risk by a year of the Government’s endless prevarication and inaction.

• 2 Jun 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  The difference is that, while people in civilian life sometimes have to move jobs at the behest of their employer, service personnel are ordered to go. They really have no choice: once they have been posted, they have to go. Therefore, in ordering them to go, the state should have a moral obligation to deal with the consequences for special needs children. Does the hon. Member accept that that is a difference between service and civilian life, and that under the principle of “no disadvantage” in the covenant, the state should do the right thing?

• 2 Jun 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  I entirely agree with my right hon. Friend. We would all like to know when we are going to have it, but the reason we do not have it is simple. It is not that the staff work has not been completed—it has. It is not that the programmes have not been costed—they have. The fundamental problem is that while Ministers say they are working flat out and knocking themselves out on it, and are reduced to euphemisms about how hard they are working, it was actually done months ago. The problem is that the Chancellor of the Exchequer adamantly refuses to sign it, because if she signed it, she would have to say how she is going to pay for it. That is why MOD Ministers are completely hide-bound: the Prime Minister will not force the Chancellor to sign the equipment plan for the armed forces of the United Kingdom. The delay is becoming a farce. Indeed, we are now being widely criticised by our international partners, including, just the other day, the chairman of the NATO Military Committee. At Defence questions, the Secretary of State was adamant that the Prime Minister wanted the DIP published by the NATO summit. That raises two questions: which NATO summit, and which Prime Minister? Assuming he means the summit in Ankara on 7 to 8 July, this vital document will be delayed for yet another month. What is worse, last year there were £2.6 billion of in-year operational cuts to the defence budget, and this year there are £3.5 billion of in-year cuts. We will press new clause 2 to force a vote on a backstop plan to produce the DIP, to remind His Majesty’s Treasury that the first duty of government, above all others, is the defence of the realm. We cannot defend the realm with a lot of bluster and an equipment plan that does not exist.

• 2 Jun 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  It is extremely sad that the hon. Gentleman is seeking to conflate two completely different issues, and I suspect that anyone who actually served on Operation Telic would understand that. Having made that point, let me turn to the Opposition’s new clause 2, which would require the Secretary of State for Defence to lay a defence investment plan before Parliament within a month of the passage of this Act, if it had still not been published by then, which, for reasons I will come to in a minute, is not as fantastical as it might seem. For context, today is the one-year anniversary of the publication of the Government’s much-vaunted strategic defence review. There is a lot of good in the document, but one of the criticisms made at the time was that much of the programmatic detail on which new equipment the Government intended to purchase for our armed forces was omitted. For instance, the Government talked about buying “up to” 12 new nuclear attack submarines. That could mean two. All that detail was going to be provided in the defence investment plan, but one year on, it has still not been published. This has drawn serious criticism from right across the defence industry, and also from the authors of the SDR. Indeed, the lead author, Lord Robertson, a lifelong Labour man to his fingertips, has accused the Prime Minister of “corrosive complacency” because of the ongoing delay in saying how the Government will fund the strategic defence review and its attendant equipment requirements. When we were in government, we used to publish a 10-year plan for the purchase of military equipment, universally known as the equipment plan.

• 19 May 2026 · Lord Mandelson: Government Response to Humble Address · Hansard source

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  Further to that point of order, the Minister’s excuse for not guaranteeing that the documents will be available by 18 June is that he would need to secure parliamentary time. This is news to some of us, who have been here a while and understand that the Government effectively control the timetable of Parliament. Indeed, every Thursday when the House is sitting they make a business statement to tell us what is coming up in the next two weeks. Mr Speaker, are you aware of anything in the Standing Orders or Erskine May that would prevent the Government from making a business statement on Thursday, naming a day for publication after the Whitsun recess?

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  On the issue of recruitment and retention, the Committee will recall from an earlier debate that I produced a report called “Stick or Twist?” for a previous Prime Minister, which was submitted in February 2020, just one month before the nation went into lockdown. The essence of that report, which contained multiple recommendations—all but one were eventually adopted by the Ministry of Defence, to varying degrees—was that there are a variety of reasons why people twist, or leave HM armed forces. However, the overwhelming reason, which has been consistent for a number of years, is the overall effect of service life on family life. People can be picked up for short-term deployment, sometimes overseas, and not see their partners and children as often as they would like. Sometimes, the cumulative effect of that—the pressure—becomes too much. For the record, there are a number of other factors, and it is often a decision in the round—normally, it is a combination of factors that persuades someone eventually to leave—but sometimes there is one straw that breaks the camel’s back. I gave the example in a previous debate of someone who had to miss his best friend’s wedding because he was trawled to the British Army Training Unit Suffield as a watchkeeper. He was a rising cavalry officer, who spent nights sitting in a tent with a laptop or reading a novel, and he came back and basically told the Army to stuff it. That was a very poor leadership decision by somebody. Other factors could include pay, childcare and the expense and difficulty of obtaining it, housing—we have debated that previously at some length—and spousal employment, as people sometimes leave because of the effect on their partner’s career rather than on their own.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. Clause, by leave, withdrawn. New Clause 6 National Veterans’ Commissioner (England) “After section 366 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 insert— ‘366A National Veterans’ Commissioner (England): establishment (1) Within 12 months of the passing of the Armed Forces Act 2026, the Secretary of State must appoint a National Veterans’ Commissioner for England (“the Commissioner”). (2) The Commissioner shall act independently in carrying out the functions of the office. (3) The Commissioner shall, amongst others, perform the following functions— (a) promote the interests of veterans in England; (b) monitor the operation and effectiveness of the Armed Forces Covenant in England; (c) review the effect of public policy and public services on veterans and their families; (d) identify barriers faced by veterans in accessing housing, healthcare, employment, education, and other public services; (e) make recommendations to the Secretary of State and to public authorities on improving support for veterans. (4) In exercising these functions the Commissioner may— (a) carry out reviews and investigations into matters affecting veterans; (b) consult veterans, service charities, public authorities, and other relevant organisations; (c) publish reports and recommendations. (5) The Commissioner shall prepare an annual report on the exercise of the Commissioner’s functions. (6) The Commissioner may at any time prepare a report on any matter relating to the interests of veterans in England. (7) The Secretary of State shall lay any report prepared under this section before both Houses of Parliament. (8) The Secretary of State must make arrangements for— (a) the provision of such staff, accommodation, and other resources as they consider necessary for the Commissioner to carry out their functions; (b) the publication of the Commissioner’s reports. (9) The Commissioner is to be appointed for a term of three years and may be reappointed for a further term. (10) The Secretary of State may remove the Commissioner from office only on grounds of— (a) incapacity, (b) misbehaviour, or (c) failure to discharge the functions of the office. (11) In this section— “public authority” has the same meaning as in section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998; “veteran” means a person who has served in His Majesty’s armed forces.’”— (Sarah Bool.) This new clause would require the Government to appoint a National Veteran’s Commissioner for England and sets out its functions. Brought up, and read the First time. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Well, Mr Efford, if the Chancellor signed it, there would not be any criticism. For whatever ends, she has not chosen to do so. When we had exchanges with the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry yesterday about defence spending, to which the drip—the DIP, rather—is fundamental, he gave the game away. He talked about percentages of GDP on defence, and said: “We will hit 2.6% in 2027” and “3% in the next Parliament”. —[ Official Report , 15 April 2026; Vol. 783, c. 834.] Assuming that this Parliament goes the full term, the last possible legal date for the election is August 2029, which means that we would not get to 3% for another three years. It is our policy that we should get to 3% before the end of this Parliament. As the Minister knows, we cannot deliver the SDR until we say at what point we will get to 3%, because that is the price of doing so. When we pick a year, we can put a pin on a graph and draw a line back from it, and everything underneath that line will be money that we have to spend. Until we decide what that year is, we cannot draw the line; we do not know how much money we have and we cannot pass a 10-year equipment plan. Because the Treasury will not agree on what year we will get to 3%, there is a complete institutional impasse in the Government. Do hon. Members honestly think that, at the Russian, Chinese or North Korean embassies, they have not spotted this? Do they not think we are a laughing stock in those embassies? What deterrent effect are we providing against our potential aggressors by not being able to tell them, let alone our own Parliament, when we will publish a document that is now nearly nine months overdue? How do we prevent war by doing that?

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. Like our previous debate, I fear this may be an area on which, as a Committee, we find it difficult to agree overall. Nevertheless, this is a very important subject, and I am glad that we have an opportunity to debate it in Committee this afternoon—I am sad that, again, the Liberal Democrats are not here. As it turns out, we debated this issue at Prime Minister’s questions yesterday lunchtime and in the subsequent urgent question, which I led for the Opposition, in the Commons Chamber, but it is very appropriate to debate it in the context of this Bill as well. The essence of new clause 16 is that it would require the Secretary of State for Defence to lay a defence investment plan—or DIP—before both Houses of Parliament within a month of the passage of this Act. The defence investment plan was mentioned in the strategic defence review published last June. There was some criticism of the SDR that, while it was good in parts, it did not provide much granular detail on the Government’s intentions regarding military kit. For the record, when we were in government, we published what was then known simply as the equipment plan just about every year—I think there was one year when we did not—which laid out in quite some detail the spending on military programmes undertaken, or proposed to be undertaken, by the MOD, looking a decade ahead. There was a very sensible reason for doing that, because procuring military equipment does not necessarily fit within the standard three years of a public expenditure round. Just to take two examples, it takes about four years from scratch to build a Typhoon fighter aircraft, and it can take around 10 years to build an aircraft carrier. Clearly, there has to be some kind of budget that accounts for the length of time it takes to build those kinds of kit. We therefore published that plan year in, year out, and it performed two very important functions—well, three, really. First, it allowed industry to plan. Those businesses are obviously there to win contracts, to do work for defence and to satisfy their shareholders. They could see what was—in pub English—coming down the pipe, so they could make sensible commercial investment decisions accordingly. Secondly, it was good for the morale of our armed forces, because they could see the kit that the Government of the day were planning to buy, which they would ultimately get to use. Thirdly, it had a deterrent effect, because it said to our potential adversaries: “Here we are intending to spend hard-earned taxpayer cash, in many cases on hard power in order to deter any potential aggressor from attacking us or our allies.” There was a whole host of good reasons for doing it, and that is why the Government faithfully promised that they would publish the defence investment plan to make up for that detail not being in the SDR. We were absolutely promised it for the autumn of 2025, we were faithfully promised it by Christmas, and then we were absolutely going to get it early in the new year. But here we are, in the middle of April, with no DIP. We have to ask the Government why that is, although it is an open secret: the MOD is in open warfare with His Majesty’s Treasury, and the Chancellor has repeatedly refused to sign it off. All three of the SDR’s authors were explicitly clear, when they published it, that in order to achieve the programme outlined in it the Government would have to commit to spending 3% of GDP on defence. That was, in simple terms, the price of implementing the SDR. In the last 72 hours, all three of those authors have come out very strongly against the Government. It seems to me that months of frustration has effectively boiled over, and it cannot be a coincidence that all three of them have now gone public with their criticisms. Dr Fiona Hill said there is a “bizarre” lack of urgency in Government defence planning. General Sir Richard Barrons, another co-author of the SDR, said there is “an enormous gap between where we have to be to keep the country safe…and where we actually are”. Lord Robertson, lead author of the SDR, former Labour Defence Secretary and former NATO Secretary-General, who is widely respected, spoke about a “corrosive complacency” by the Prime Minister towards defence. The attitude of Ministers is pure bluster. Basically, they have just started being rude to people. They have started talking about armchair generals. They can call me that; that is water off a duck’s back to me. It is nice to be referred to as a general, having made the dizzying heights of lieutenant in my military career. But General Sir Richard Barrons is not an armchair general, and I would caution the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry over his behaviour yesterday. For good measure, he has apparently now lost it in some interview with The Telegraph about Ajax. There are some tensions between Ministers on the fifth floor, for reasons I will not go into this afternoon, but HMS MOD is not a happy ship. It seems that the pressure is getting to the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry. Very simply, when will we get the DIP? We are fed up with being told that Ministers are working flat out, straining every sinew and all these other euphemisms. When will the Prime Minister, primus inter pares, intervene and order the Chancellor to sign it? A couple of days or so ago, the Minister for Veterans and People told the Defence Committee that they were still working on the staff work—utter nonsense. The staff work was completed months ago. It has been ready to be signed for months.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  As I understand it, it is not merely a Government decision; it is partly a concession that is offered by the railway industry. Some uncertainty has been put to us that, as we transition to GB Railways, which is to be a holding organisation for the railway network, there may be some changes to concessionary fares. What we are trying to achieve is an assurance that the withdrawal of these railcards will not be one of those changes. It is really about the avoidance of doubt, so all the Minister needs to pop up and say is, “As far as the Government are concerned, these two railcards will continue”, and I am hopeful that the railway industry will take note of the Minister’s intention. It is really as straightforward as that, but if we cannot get an assurance on that, we will most assuredly vote on it.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  For the absolute avoidance of doubt, I never said that, and the hon. Gentleman is putting words in my mouth. I never said, or even implied, that our armed forces are a laughing stock—absolutely not. They are still, man for man and woman for woman, among the best in the world, if not the best. It is the Government they serve who are now the laughing stock, not the military personnel. It is a Government who cannot take a fundamental decision about defence spending, whose own MOD Ministers are privately at each other, and who have an MOD and a Treasury that cannot agree. The only way that that is resolved in the British system is when the first among equals intervenes and knocks heads together, and the Prime Minister will not do that because he is terrified of what happens to him if he does. We have an impasse in which the Government, not the armed forces, are regarded as a laughing stock, not just in Washington but in the capitals of our adversaries. That being the case, I ask the Minister in all sincerity to tell us this afternoon when the defence investment plan will be published.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. The essence of the new clause is that changes that are under way in our national railway industry, including the taking back into public ownership of a number of rail franchises and the gradual evolution of an overall entity known as Great British Railways, should not disadvantage either serving or former armed forces personnel and their families by discontinuing the popular HM forces and HM veterans railcards. In highlighting that issue, I should immediately declare an interest, as I hold a veterans railcard. Indeed, I can attest to the Committee that the railcards represent excellent value for money, having cost, from memory, something like £70 for three years, but in return allowing for a discount of a third on almost all rail journeys, significantly including both the morning and evening peak periods; it is not just an off-peak railcard. Moreover, those holding a veterans railcard can also travel in company with their partner, who then qualifies for much the same discount on the same journey. It is an extremely positive measure, and I hope the Minister can give us a cast-iron assurance that the major changes under way within the railway industry will not somehow lead to either of the cards—or, worst of all, both—being discontinued. It was, admittedly, in their manifesto that the Labour party intended to take the railways back into public ownership. However, it was not in their manifesto that armed forces personnel, veterans or their families should suffer as a result.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Good morning to you, Mr Efford, and to all members of the Committee. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again today. I will lead for my party in this section on reserve forces. I will begin by offering some comments on Liberal Democrat amendment 7, which relates to retention and transfers between regular and reserve forces, and will follow with a few remarks on clause 31. In one of our evidence sessions, I raised the potential complexity when people wish to leave the regular armed forces and transfer into the reserves. That point is often a good time to catch them, as many people who have enjoyed their regular service but wish to earn their living in a different way are still often tempted to transfer to the reserves to keep their hand in and to continue to serve the nation and maintain the bonds of comradeship and friendship they have developed as regulars. However, in recent years, that transfer has often proved to be administratively difficult. I have heard anecdotal horror stories of former regular personnel who have attempted to re-enlist in the reserves when their regular service has come to an end but have had to overcome an assault course of bureaucracy to do so. In fact, I spoke relatively recently to a reserve officer who had had to fight his way through what he described as “the Capita circus”. The Minister sought to reassure the Committee in evidence by saying that this will be dealt with as a relatively straightforward administrative matter. That flies in the face of much of the anecdotal evidence to the contrary. If someone tries to initiate the transfer while they are still serving, it seems that the process works better, but if they leave it until after they have left the regulars, or if they perhaps have a change of heart after having left the regulars and decide that they want to re-enlist as a reservist after a few years, it is really difficult. In fact, I have been told that in some cases it is worse than if they just tried to join the reserves straight off, ab initio, as a civilian. I pressed the Minister specifically on whether the new tri-service armed forces recruitment programme—the AFRP—contract was written in such a way as to allow the contractor to facilitate the process in an effective and efficient manner. Again, the Minister sought to offer the explanation that it could all be done via administrative procedures. I want to press the Minister on how exactly these administrative procedures are intended to apply in practice. Under the new contract, what, in practical terms, will be different from the rather cumbersome arrangements that we still have in place? In short, how will the creases in this system, which everyone agrees exist, be ironed out to make the transition sufficiently smooth that those leaving the regulars are not put off by mind-numbing bureaucracy if they wish to convert to reserve service? Those are my comments on the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells, which he introduced very well. I now turn to clause 31. Reserves are a fundamental part of our armed forces, as both the Minister and I can attest, having served in the reserve forces at different times in our careers—although I handed back my kit shortly after the Berlin wall came down in 1989, whereas the Minister is still undertaking reserve service. Indeed, we understand he has been on manoeuvres only recently. However, it is a fact that compared with many other nations, we still have very small numbers of reserves, with some 26,000 in the active Army Reserve and many fewer in the Royal Naval Reserve and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force and related reserves. If we put those numbers in context and compare them with the United States, which has both an army reserve and large numbers of national guard—they are organised on a state-by-state basis and report to governors in peacetime, but they can be federalised in wartime—or the reserve elements of the Chinese and Russian armies, they pale by comparison, even though, as the Minister often likes to remind us, we had very large citizen armies in both the first and second world wars. The Army Reserve can be augmented by what is now generally referred to as the Strategic Reserve. For the avoidance of confusion, that is former regular soldiers and officers who would be liable for recall to service with the colours in a national emergency up to and including full-scale war. Indeed, the Bill extends the provision for recalling the Strategic Reserve to up to 18 years, I believe, from leaving the colours of the regular armed forces. For the record, we very much support that measure. When asked in evidence for his estimate of the size of the Strategic Reserve, the Minister gave a definitive figure of approximately 95,000. However, to put it in context, the 2021 census—after much campaigning over quite a few years by the Royal British Legion and some MPs who backed the proposal—specifically asked respondents whether they had ever served in His Majesty’s armed forces, and just over 2 million people positively answered the question. Since then, sadly, a number of those veterans will have passed away, but given that the question was not included in the census forms dispatched to Northern Ireland, which has historically proved a very healthy recruiting ground for our armed forces, it seems not unreasonable to assume that the current number is still probably somewhere around 2 million living veterans, or relatively close to it. Moreover, the Minister also revealed to the Committee, assisted by witnesses from the Ministry of Defence, that about 1 million of those people are still of what he called employment age. I take it that he means males aged up to about 67. I cite those figures to try to estimate the maximum theoretical strength of the Strategic Reserve—or, in military parlance, the absolute right of arc—if all those living veterans were included. Of course, in practice they would not be if they were in their 80s or 90s. For the avoidance of doubt, I do not think we are proposing to put Chelsea pensioners in the Strategic Reserve. We can discern from that calculation that the absolute maximum is theoretically about 2 million—assuming for a moment that we also include veterans who have also served in the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, because they will have ticked the same box. If we cut it differently and include only those of employable age, the Strategic Reserve would come out at about 1 million. If we believe that 95,000 is too small a Strategic Reserve to act as a credible deterrent, particularly given the darkening international situation that we face at present, could we, as it were, draw a line or establish a set of criteria that would achieve a Strategic Reserve of somewhere between 95,000 and, for the sake of debate, a quarter of a million? That would be a much more credible figure in deterrent terms. I ask the question deliberately to provoke debate about how we could, if we chose, expand the Strategic Reserve from the Minister’s 95,000 figure. If he cannot answer that question off the top of his head, perhaps he could write to me, to you, Mr Efford, and to other members of the Committee prior to Report about where, at least theoretically, a line could be drawn—perhaps defined by age or some other criterion—to create a Strategic Reserve of about a quarter of a million troops, rather than just under 100,000. Moreover, if we were to consider something as ambitious as that in order to provide a greater deterrent effect, how would we track and communicate with those people, above and beyond access to the His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs database that Ministers have prayed in aid before? For instance, if we assume that quite a number of those veterans are in receipt of a military pension of one type or another, presumably they would be known to Veterans UK and at least their basic details would be recorded on the MOD’s joint personnel administration system. Could we not use that as a means of tracking down those people?

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Thank you, Mr Efford. I just wanted to know who got the job. Turning to the RFA, I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Truro and Falmouth for what she has done to raise the profile of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. The issue is clearly extremely close to her heart. I believe that she was trying to advance a private Member’s Bill, having done well in the ballot, but there has been a slight problem with that, because—almost exceptionally, other than during covid—the Government’s business managers have hardly provided any time at all in this Session for private Members’ Bills. All those Members who had Bills that were important to them never really got a chance to make their case, so it is good that she has had the opportunity to put something on the record today. The commissioner has important powers, as my hon. Friend the Member for Exmouth and Exeter East said, and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary has a very important role. From memory, it was created in 1905. The Minister, from his time as the chief of staff of the carrier group, knows how important it is. Technically, its personnel are not members of the armed forces, but members of the merchant navy. However, it is fair to say that the Royal Navy could not operate without them, as was well said by the hon. Member for Truro and Falmouth, who understands these matters. The RFA has a slightly unusual constitutional position, but is a vital part of Britain’s defence none the less. Indeed, a few days ago, a number of Russian shadow fleet tankers were shadowed through the English channel by the RFA Tidespring, because no escort was operationally available. That is pretty embarrassing for the Government, when the Prime Minister has talked so tough about boarding shadow fleet tankers but has boarded precisely none of them. We touched on that point in the Chamber yesterday. Perhaps the Minister can update us. Why we did not have a warship available to undertake the task, when the Russians had a warship to escort their own shadow fleet? The middle of the channel is international waters. Where are we on all this?

• 26 Mar 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  For the record, that was the one recommendation in the “Stick or Twist?” report that was not adopted. All the other recommendations were adopted, including spending a lot of money on wraparound childcare because, again, childcare was a very important point for retention. Ben Wallace told me that he used the report to get quite a bit of cash out of the Treasury, so that recommendation about childcare was one that we did manage to get through. For the record, this was the one recommendation that was too much for the system to bear.

• 26 Mar 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 17, in clause 3, page 7, line 16, at end insert— “(4) The Defence Housing Service will operate within a budget which must be set out in any Defence Investment Plan published by the Secretary of State.” This amendment would ensure that Defence Housing Service’s budget is set out in any Defence Investment Plan published by the Secretary of State. Good morning, Mr Efford. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again as we move on to clause 3, which concerns the proposed new Defence Housing Service and associated matters. I will speak to amendment 17 in my name. There are no Liberal Democrats in the room yet, but I am sure they will be joining us at some point. We have been assisted in examining this topic by our very helpful evidence sessions with Mr David Brewer, the putative head of the new Defence Housing Service, and Ms Natalie Elphicke Ross, a former parliamentary colleague of ours on both sides of the House, who has materially assisted the Government with their review and the creation of their new plan. We acknowledge her efforts. We also had a very informative Defence Infrastructure Organisation briefing during our visit to Portsmouth, where we visited a number of dwellings in a military patch outside the wire. That included houses representing both before and after, as it were: those that had been refurbished to an obviously good standard, and those that were still awaiting that work. I place on record our thanks to members of the DIO and to the Clerks for what was, as I hope the whole Committee will agree, an extremely informative visit. Before we get into the meat of the debate, I will take it as read that all members of the Committee share the same objective: an improved quality of service family accommodation for our valued armed forces personnel and their families. Again, for the record, we thank them for their service. We would also like to see good-quality accommodation for senior service personnel. The debate is therefore not so much about the objective, which I think we all share, as about the best way of achieving it. That is where we may have some genuine differences of opinion this morning, but hopefully for the right reasons. Amendment 17 focuses on the budget for the proposed new Defence Housing Service. Its essence is that the Defence Housing Service’s budget should be clearly set out in any defence investment plan published by the Secretary of State. [Interruption.] Good morning! The Liberals are now with us. There is an obvious historical context for the amendment. I think it is fair to say that down the years, under Governments of both colours—three colours, if we include the coalition Government of 2010 to 2015—there has been a constant tension in the funding of the defence housing estate. On the one hand, there has been a desire to provide capital to upgrade it; on the other hand, there have been general pressures on the defence budget. It has not been unknown for capital expenditure to be deferred from one year to another to free up resourcing for other operational priorities that were deemed more pressing or urgent by Ministers at the time. The aims and objectives of the new Defence Housing Service are rightly ambitious, which raises questions about how to secure the money and what safeguards there are, if any, against any future Government raiding that substantial pot of cash for other priorities should the circumstances arise. Both Mr Brewer and Ms Elphicke Ross were very clear in their evidence on the subject on 4 March: they said that after considerable discussion with the Treasury, a sum of some £9 billion had been put aside to create the Defence Housing Service and enable it to achieve its objectives laid out in the Bill. Nevertheless, during the same evidence session, it was established after some detailed—indeed, forensic—questioning from my hon. Friend the Member for Exmouth and Exeter East that the money had not been formally signed off by His Majesty’s Treasury. That is because the sum is currently included in the defence investment plan, which itself has not been signed off by His Majesty’s Treasury. As we all know, the defence investment plan has not been published, although Parliament was initially promised it by last autumn. I do not intend to labour—no pun intended—the point this morning, as we debated it at some length in the main Chamber on Tuesday evening. Suffice it to say that when the Government published the strategic defence review in July last year, they deferred many of the crunchy equipment and capability decisions to a subsequent defence investment plan. We were promised that it would be published in the autumn. We were then faithfully promised that it would be published by Christmas. We were then absolutely promised that it would be published fairly shortly thereafter. Here we are on 26 March, the day on which the House rises for the Easter recess, and still it has not been published. That leads to an additional problem, including for the Defence Housing Service. Part of the DIP, presumably including service accommodation in Scotland and Wales, could be affected by the outcome of the forthcoming Scottish Parliament and Welsh Senedd elections, at least indirectly. If the DIP is not published extremely shortly, it is likely to be caught by the purdah rules on those national elections. The putative date for the King’s Speech seems to be settling on or around 13 May. That means that the DIP is unlikely to be published until the second half of May, nearly two months from now, by which time the Defence Housing Service is meant to be under way. In essence, we are debating a plan based on a long-term budget that has not yet been agreed by the Treasury because, bluntly, the Ministry of Defence is at war with it. That is why the DIP has not been published. It is conceivable—although, for the record, I hope that this will not be the case—that whenever final negotiations are eventually concluded, the Treasury may insist on further reductions in the DIP, which in turn could lead to further reductions to the £9 billion currently allocated for the programme. That is why we tabled amendment 17, which states that the budget for the Defence Housing Service must be very clearly set out in the defence investment plan, whenever it is published, not least so that in subsequent iterations of the plan we can see whether the funding allocation is being reduced or increased. Will the Minister guarantee to the Committee that, as of 26 March 2026, the £9 billion in the forward programme has been formally signed off by His Majesty’s Treasury? In other words, can he guarantee that it is ringfenced in the DIP? If he cannot, can he at least tell us when the DIP will finally be published? A fortnight ago, I said privately to a Labour peer that waiting for the DIP was like waiting for Godot. He replied, “Yes, Mark, but at least Godot finally turned up.” Will the Minister answer those questions so that the Committee can take a view on the surety of the funding on which this admittedly very ambitious plan undoubtedly rests?

• 24 Mar 2026 · Defence · Hansard source

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  If I may, I will make just one more point and then give way. Moreover, Labour claims repeatedly that it is introducing the largest increase in defence spending since the cold war, but that is simply not true. In the current financial year, it has actually done precisely the opposite. It has introduced a £2.6 billion efficiency savings programme that viciously cuts operational spending across the British armed forces at the Treasury’s behest. That means fewer ships at sea and longer times to regenerate them, as with HMS Dragon; fewer training hours for our pilots; and fewer exercises on Salisbury plain. So here we are, with two wars under way, and nine months later this completely dysfunctional Cabinet is still unable to publish a forward equipment programme for the British armed forces. Do Labour Members not realise that they can also see this in Moscow, in Beijing and, indeed, in Tehran? If Labour Members believe, as I always have, that the role of the armed forces is to save life by preventing war and by persuading any potential aggressor that they could not succeed were they to attack us or our allies, how in God’s name are we supposed to deter the likes of Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping if we are unable to publish the forward equipment plan for our own armed forces that is now nearly a year overdue? On what planet do Labour MPs think that this is an act of credible and effective deterrence? To be fair to the Government, they have published something today. Just a few hours ago, they published the defence diplomacy strategy. They have been working flat out on it for months. They have been absolutely knocking themselves out to get that one away. I apologise to the House that I have not had the opportunity to read it yet, but I hope that it contains one very firm recommendation: “If you are going to maintain effective diplomatic relations with your strongest ally, the United States, whatever you do, don’t send to Washington an ambassador who had to resign from the Cabinet not once but twice for effectively being a crook and who has now had to be fired third time around.”

• 24 Mar 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  I appreciate the hon. Lady’s point. Having looked at the White Paper in a fair bit of detail, I have tried to incorporate how the system will change into what I am going to say. There is still a fundamental problem, however, which I hope I can explain to her satisfaction. I have come to understand at least a bit about the complexities of the situation, including the important fact that some 99% of appeals to SEN tribunals for an EHCP to be granted are eventually approved anyway. That is a phenomenally high percentage. It struck me that the system was expending a tremendous amount of resource in trying to exercise the judgment of Solomon as to whether child A was marginally more entitled to a scarce SEN school place than child B. That can apply to the children of service personnel as well. It therefore seemed to me, after some years of experience, that the only way to cut the Gordian knot was to increase the supply of special needs education. With all the SEN schools in south Essex already heavily oversubscribed, that meant creating a new special needs school from scratch. I spent three years trying to do exactly that. I am delighted to tell the Committee that Wolsey Park school, the first ever SEN school in the Rochford district, is now under construction and will hopefully open in the spring of next year for 150 children with severe or profound learning difficulties—the most challenging SEN cases—in Rayleigh. There will also be an annexe with a further 100 places on the former Chetwood primary school site in South Woodham Ferrers. The school will be called Wolsey Park, although light-heartedly I thought “Francois academy” had a certain ring to it. Others, unfortunately, disagreed. It should provide high-quality education for those very special children. As a result of that process, I have been on an educational journey that has taught me quite a lot about the complexities and challenges of the whole area, which of course also applies to service personnel who have a child, or in some cases children, with special educational needs. I know that this can sometimes be an emotive subject, not least for parents, but I hope I can convince the Committee that what I am attempting to do is not any kind of partisan initiative, but will hopefully be to the benefit of all service personnel and their families in this category. The hon. Member for Truro and Falmouth raised the new White Paper. In February 2026, the Government published a long-awaited White Paper on this subject, “Every child achieving and thriving”. There are a number of positive suggestions in that document, and I should like to touch on them, as they potentially affect armed forces personnel. According to the latest estimates, by which I mean the gov.uk statistics concerning SEN and EHCP provision in England for the academic year 2024-25, there are 482,640 children with an education, health and care plan in England. Obviously, the number increases when Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are included in the total; they have different names for the document, but they are essentially quite similar. The definition of special educational needs, which is included in the SEND code of practice for England, is brief and very clear: “A child or young person has SEN if they have a learning difficulty or disability which calls for special educational provision to be made for him or her.” At present, that provision, whether it is in a mainstream educational setting or a dedicated SEN school, is often supported in the most challenging cases by an EHCP. The White Paper estimates that around 5.3% of children in England, or just over one in 20, currently qualify for an EHCP. Although I have not seen specific statistics relating to the military community, it seems logical that the proportion is unlikely to be lower, so at least one in 20 service children, and perhaps even more, qualify for an EHCP. One of the challenges of dealing with SEN children—this point relates directly to amendment 11—is that providing the additional support they require is often relatively resource-intensive. Local education authorities are therefore often reluctant to speedily grant EHCPs because of the financial pressure that it adds to their budgets, even though 99% of those cases tend to be settled in favour of the parents and the child concerned anyway, sometimes after a gruelling and time-consuming appeal process. Because of the funding pressures placed on local authorities by the growing demand for SEN support and for EHCPs in particular, several years ago the then Conservative Government introduced what was known as the statutory override for local authority budgets. In essence, it meant that although local authorities are required by law to set a balanced budget each year—would that central Government had to live by such discipline!—the one exception whereby they are allowed to run a deficit deliberately is the case of costs arising from SEN education. As we have local elections approaching, it is fair to say—without being partisan or going into the cases of individual councils—that rising SEN costs have placed a number of local authorities that are also local education authorities, such as county councils or metropolitan or London boroughs, under considerable financial strain in recent years. As a result, under the Conservative Government, the statutory override that was introduced in March 2020 and was initially meant to run until March 2023 was extended to the end of March 2026. Now I am about to give this Labour Government some credit. The question of what would happen when the statutory override ran out is obviously still pertinent. In June 2025, they announced that the statutory override would stay in place until the end of the financial year 2027-28—so they extended it. Moreover, in autumn 2025, the Treasury announced that the Government would absorb the cost of the statutory override through central budgets—in other words, via general taxation—once the override expires in 2028. As the Library briefing notes on this subject point out: “Future funding implications will be managed within the overall government DEL envelope, such that the government would not expect local authorities to need to fund future special educational needs costs from general funds, once the Statutory Override ends at the end of 2027-28.” In February this year—last month—the Government further announced that they would be writing off 90% of councils’ historic SEND-related deficits, at least up to the year 2025-26. All of that is very costly in terms of general taxation, and I have yet to see a comprehensive estimate of exactly how it will be paid for, but the Committee might feel that, in these very particular and emotive cases, the money is none the less well spent.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is making an extremely good speech. As he and the Committee know, there is a major reform of NHS England going on. At the ground level, it means that there will be far fewer integrated care boards. In Essex, we are going from three to one, and that approach is mirrored across the country. Is not my hon. Friend’s amendment therefore very timely, because—this should appeal to the Minister—we are trying to slim down NHS bureaucracy and give ICBs more power within the system? Would my hon. Friend’s proposal not tie in extremely well with the reorganisation of integrated care boards, which hold much of the budget within the NHS?

• 2 Mar 2026 · Power to Cancel Local Elections · Hansard source

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  I have two responses to the hon. Gentleman, whom I have a great deal of time for, as he knows. First, the Chairman of the Petitions Committee laid out clearly the responsibilities of local government, so I shall not try your patience, Mr Mundell, or that of the rest of the Chamber by repeating them, but it is everything from planning to housing, adult social care and education. These things affect people’s everyday lives, and they are really important. People should have a democratic right to decide which councillors run those services, which they pay for as customers via their council tax. So of course there should be elections. Secondly, and on a personal note, and I hope that the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) and other colleagues here will understand this: nobody delayed the general election. I went into battle 20 points behind in the polls. No one gave me a bye; I had to fight to be here. I had to convince my employers, in my constituency, to renew my contract of employment to represent them, and so did everyone else in this House this evening, so why should it be different for local councillors? Why do they not have to get their contract of employment, in effect, renewed by their employers at the ballot box? I thank the Minister for the fact that the local elections will now go ahead. She may recall that we had some sparky exchanges in the Commons Chamber about this, but we have ended up with the right decision, albeit after far too long. So if the people of Essex wish to support the Government’s bonkers housing targets—mandatory and top-down, imposed by some Whitehall civil servant who could not find Essex with a TomTom, and supported by a mad computer algorithm—they can go and vote for that. If, conversely, they want to vote for Conservative councillors, who care about the area they live in and want to defend the green belt and carry on providing good services to people at a cost that they can afford, they have the chance to vote Conservative—although, for the record, other products are available. People can actually have elections in Essex and pass a verdict, and I very much hope that in my corner of the world—for Essex county council, for Rochford district council and for Basildon borough council—they will vote Conservative. But however they vote, whomever they choose, whomever they give the very important mandate to run those really important services to, the fundamental point is that they will be allowed to exercise their right to choose. It was this Government who very nearly took that away and we should never let them forget it. Other than that, I have no firm view on the matter.

• 25 Feb 2026 · Ukraine · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and it was great to have him as a colleague on that visit. He brought his great knowledge of defence and foreign affairs to our trip. I can also report to the House that my right hon. Friend the Member for Beverley and Holderness exchanged some humorous words with President Zelensky, but they are probably best left to posterity. We visited at a very difficult time. As well as being in Kyiv, we initially visited Odesa via Moldova, which was under drone and missile attack for part of the time we were there. We visited Chernobyl, which I am pleased to report was not under drone or missile attack, although it was attacked by Russian drones some months ago, incredibly irresponsibly. We then moved on to Kyiv, which again was under bombardment for part of our time there. We had burner phones—I do not think I am giving away any secrets by saying that—and they put an app on them that goes off if there is an air raid warning. When that happens, it is quite sobering, but there is also an all-clear, and with typical Ukrainian humour and defiance, when they play the all-clear, it is followed by the words, “May the Force be with you.” We had multiple meetings while we were there. As the House knows, people come and go on these delegations, but between us we were there for the best part of a week. We met senior staff from the Office of the President, who gave us an up-to-date briefing on the state of the ceasefire negotiations. We met a dozen Ukrainian MPs from the UK friendship group, and we had an intelligence briefing from the Ukrainian military. We visited several bombed-out residential apartments, including, I am sad to say, one on Kyiv’s left bank, which has suffered particularly heavily as it is an industrial area and a logistics centre where there is a large amount of working-class housing—a bit like the east end of London in some ways. We visited one apartment where, tragically, 23 innocent people were killed, including several children, in a Russian strike. We think that it was aimed at the railway marshalling yards nearby, but because this was a drone it was not as accurate as a hypersonic missile, and those people were tragically murdered. We also attended a veterans’ rehabilitation centre. As the Secretary of State, who is with us, will know, when I was the Veterans Minister I had a bit to do with that, and I am proud of the fact that we managed to provide the Genium prosthetic for our wounded. We saw the Ukrainian equivalent of a rehabilitation centre, and I understand that this is one area in which Britain has been able to provide some advice and expertise, which was clearly warmly welcomed during our visit. We attended the official opening of the Ukrainian Parliament, the Rada. I am pleased to report to the House that its Speaker, who is a big man in every sense, acknowledged all the international delegations one by one, but the loudest applause was for the Polish delegation and the British delegation. It was probably impossible to tell between the two, but I think that the MPs in the Rada were under no illusion about who had backed them to the hilt. It was a difficult time, and at all those different meetings three themes emerged consistently. We were asked to report them to the House, so I will perform that solemn, duty now. First, our interlocutors were clear about the fact that although we were formally celebrating—or, I should say, commemorating—the fourth anniversary of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine was originally invaded by Russia in 2014. It has been at war with Russia not for four years but for 12, which, to put it into perspective, is longer than the first and the second world wars put together. I think that Ukraine’s resistance for over a decade, in the face of the most brutal attacks from a larger and more powerful neighbour, deserves the respect and admiration of every single Member of this House and every single citizen in this country. The Ukrainians are fighting for us. They are fighting for the same values: for freedom, democracy, and the right to decide their own destiny. Their fight is our fight. We spoke a great deal to people about morale, and I think it is realistic. There are many in Ukraine who long for peace, for very understandable reasons, but they were all clear on one thing, namely that they would not accept peace at any price. Too much blood has been shed by the youth of Ukraine for them to accept a purely unilateral solution proposed by Russia. That theme emerged many times. The second theme concerned sanctions. Most of the Ukrainians whom we spoke to in those meetings were understandably keen for an extension of sanctions by the western democracies, not least with regard to frozen Russian assets, a subject that we have debated in the House on numerous occasions. Many Ukrainians feel that now really is the time for the western democracies to bite the bullet and use those $300 billion or so of frozen Russian assets to help Ukraine. However, they also made had a particular point about the shadow fleet, and here I ask for the Minister’s special attention. The sale of hydrocarbons, whether oil or gas, ultimately props up the Russian economy, which allows Putin to spend about 40% of Russia’s budget on its military and to recruit mercenaries to fight in the Russian armed forces. In some cases, mercenaries are being offered up to $38,000 as a signing-on fee to fight in the Russian armed forces, but according to Ukrainian intelligence officers—they said we could say this—the average life expectancy of those mercenaries is four months. The Ukrainians would like to see much greater sanctioning of the shadow fleet. The Minister knows that some of those vessels are uninsured, but many are insured and, moreover, many are insured by syndicates at Lloyd’s of London. Surely there is more that we could do to cramp the activities of the shadow fleet by working with Lloyd’s and other insurers to make sure that those ships cannot have insurance, which would make it difficult for them to visit at least some of their destination points. I make a particular point of that, because I am trying to do justice to the Ukrainians, who raised this issue with us again and again and again. They are really hard over on this, and I hope the Minister can say something in his summing up.

• 26 Jan 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  No. Secondly, with regard to readiness, as the international skies darken, we fail to see how we can improve our deterrence posture through the Government’s imposing £2.6 billion of in-year spending cuts in the MOD’s operating budget this year, thus reducing training exercises, sea days and flying hours, all in the name of short-term cash control. The Government constantly claim that they are increasing defence spending while concurrently slashing our own armed forces’ operational spending and also stalling on the defence investment plan, which we were faithfully promised last autumn. Similarly, we have been promised a defence readiness Bill, which is not ready yet. It is like a serious defence strategy turning into “Waiting for Godot”. With those two important provisos, we welcome the Bill. I genuinely look forward to hearing the Minister’s reply, including on why he abstained last Wednesday.