Mark Francois MP: speeches

Speeches

• 2 Jul 2026 · Heart Disease and Stroke: Premature Deaths · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to speak in this important debate about preventing premature death from heart disease and stroke. I congratulate the hon. Member for South Ribble (Mr Foster) on securing the debate and introducing it so ably. It is courageous of him to talk about the medical challenges that he has faced, and I am sure that the whole House wishes him the very best of luck on his journey. It is also nice to be with him in Westminster Hall, having spent five months debating with him in the Armed Forces Bill Committee. Stockholm syndrome kicked in, and we even started to like each other by the end, so it is doubly pleasurable to follow him in this debate. It is great to see the shadow Health Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Daventry (Stuart Andrew)—a man I have always respected—in his place, and to see the Minister, whom I also respect. I have bumped into her in the Portcullis House lifts many times down the years, and it is wonderful to see her in a ministerial position. I wish to declare two interests. First, I am a long-time supporter of the British Heart Foundation, which does great work to research heart disease and improve the technology and techniques to combat what is still, I am sad to say, one of Britain’s greatest killers. I pay tribute to that wonderful charity. I also wish to pay tribute to my wife Olivia, who has worked in the NHS for some two decades now, and who revels in the title of lead neurointerventional radiographer. That is a bit of a mouthful, but if someone has a stroke, she is the girl they need. I say that because she works in the specialist neurointerventional radiography department at Queen’s hospital in east London. As the Minister will no doubt know, there are 26 specialist units around the country, and her team at Queen’s is very ably led by Mr Tufail Patankar, an internationally recognised surgeon and an absolute expert in his field. He has built up that team over time at Queen’s, and, from what I hear, he leads it very well indeed. The technique that the team uses is called mechanical thrombectomy. It is an emergency procedure for treating acute-onset stroke caused by a blood clot blocking a large artery in the brain—that is effectively what a stroke is. During the procedure, the interventionist neuroradiologist —the surgeon—passes a thin tube through an artery. It usually enters the body through either the groin or the wrist, goes up into the brain, finds the blocked blood vessel and then extracts the clot, which can sometimes be a couple of millimetres long—not an easy target to find. When it is withdrawn, blood flow is restored to the affected area of the brain, helping to reduce permanent disability, particularly if the procedure is performed quickly. The department has a mnemonic: “Time means brain”—the quicker the operation can be performed, the more damage is averted and the greater the likelihood of recovery without complications. This was, admittedly, an exceptional case, but the team performed one of those operations on a man in his 20s within 90 minutes of the stroke occurring. He lived locally, and he basically walked out of the hospital a few hours after the stroke none the worse. That is what that relatively new technique can achieve. As the radiographer, my wife guides the surgeon to the target. I call her the “bomb-aimer”. Last year, Queen’s had a “bring your hubby to work” day, and I was taken to work. The hospital has two operating theatres back to back, with an observation area in the middle, so we could stand there and watch the operation taking place on a large screen. We could see the instrument going up into the brain towards the clot, at which point it attached itself to the clot and withdrew it. I have to say that it was not for the faint-hearted; I was there with the hon. Member for Romford (Andrew Rosindell), and we stuck it out and saw the whole thing. It is a very odd procedure to watch, because the patient is lying anaesthetised on the operating table. One would think that all the activity happens around their head, but it does not. The surgeon stands by their groin, where they have gone in, and then uses a very fine guiding device—almost like a gaming console—to control the instrument, taking their lead from the image on the screen that is provided by my wife, the bomb aimer. That is how it works. Last year, the department at Queen’s performed something like 300 of those operations. It operates 24/7, so over the weekend the staff are on a cover rota, or on call, as they say in the NHS. If my wife is at home and the bat-phone—as I call it—goes, she has an hour to get from our home to Queen’s, get scrubbed up, fire up all the equipment and be ready to receive the patients, some of whom may be coming from as far as Norwich and some of whom arrive by air ambulance. When the bat-phone goes, there is no time to grab a cup of tea and a slice of toast; she is in the car and gone. Can I just say that the sooner they finally sort out the chronic mess at Gallows Corner, the quicker and easier that journey will become? But I digress. There are only 25 hospitals in the country that perform the procedure. The reach of the department covers Essex and goes out some way into East Anglia, at which point it hands over to Addenbrooke’s in Cambridge. The department also has friendly rivals who do the procedure at the Royal London hospital in Whitechapel, which tends to cover Kent and south London, but that is on a rota. When the Royal London is off for a given week and Queen’s covers all the areas, it is responsible for a potential patient population of over 5 million. That is a tremendous responsibility, which is why we obviously need to have 24/7 cover. The service is also growing. Anecdotally, I can say that the bat phone rings more than it used to. On one level that is a good thing, because the technology is advancing all the time and patients can now be treated who could not have been treated a few years ago. However, that obviously puts pressure on Olivia, Dr Patankar and the team. I will make a plea to the Minister, if I may. I understand that the Government are evolving their strategy for stroke, as part of the 10-year plan for the NHS. Olivia and her team are keen to see that work evolve, but they are particularly keen to know what role there is for mechanical thrombectomy in the overall strategy. I have literally seen it at work for myself. It is a wonderful, lifesaving technology and technique that the NHS has been doing for barely a decade, and we are getting better and better at it all the time. I pay tribute to the team at Queen’s, as well as all the other teams that do this work around the country, including, for the record, at the Royal London. Most of all—I hope the House will forgive my indulgence—I pay tribute to my wife. Being a Member of Parliament can sometimes be a time commitment, but being the husband of a woman who does this work can be a bit of a time commitment, too. Sometimes, when we are making plans to see people or go to dinner parties, I am not the long pole in the tent. I am very proud of what she does, I am very proud of what her team do, I am very proud of what all the people who work at Queen’s do and I am very proud of the national health service. For the record, I am also proud of the stroke unit at Southend hospital, which provides a very good service, although it does not do mechanical thrombectomy; it defers to Queen’s on that. Well done to everyone who works in this area. I thank the House for its patience and indulgence. God bless all the people who work to save lives from stroke.

• 2 Jul 2026 · Heart Disease and Stroke: Premature Deaths · Hansard source

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  I am sure that the potential new Prime Minister will have noted very carefully the commitment of the hon. Member for Southport (Patrick Hurley), who mentioned that he lost 4 lbs during the by-election; I have a pound coin, and I am happy to make it up to a round fiver to help him get his money back, if that helps.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Defence Spending and Readiness · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman is being very generous with his time. I want to turn to legacy. Our motion calls on the Government to drop the Northern Ireland Troubles Bill, which the Liberal Democrats, like the Conservatives, voted against on Second Reading. That Bill has now famously been described by the outgoing Armed Forces Minister, the hon. Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns), as “unfit for purpose”. Is the hon. Gentleman’s party, like us, still opposed to the Bill, and does that also apply to his colleagues in the House of Lords?

• 23 Jun 2026 · Defence Spending and Readiness · Hansard source

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  No. [ Laughter. ] In February of this year, along with some 20 Members from this House—the largest ever parliamentary delegation to Ukraine as far as I am aware—I visited Odesa, Chernobyl and Kyiv. On 24 February, we were privileged to take part in the commemoration in Maidan Square to mark the fourth anniversary of the full-scale invasion. It is, in effect, Ukraine’s equivalent of Remembrance Sunday, and it was extremely poignant to be part of it. They lay lanterns with a candle at their memorial in much the same way as we lay wreaths in Britain. The principle is exactly the same: it is to remember those who gave their lives in defence of freedom and democracy. The Ukrainians are fighting for our values and, ultimately, for our freedom too. We absolutely stand shoulder to shoulder with them in their brave struggle, which we all hope that they will one day win. In order to help them, we need armed forces that can fight too. As the hon. and gallant Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns) reminded us in his resignation letter, we need to plan for the next war and not the last. With that in mind, I would like to ask Ministers some questions on programmatics this afternoon. Having been in government for nearly two years now, Labour has to begin to take responsibility for something. I have three very specific questions for the Minister on military capability. First, where are we on the much delayed E-7 Wedgetail programme? When, if ever, will this vitally needed eye in the sky enter Royal Air Force service? When, if ever, will Boeing actually make it work properly? Secondly, turning to the Army, there are media reports that it will cost an additional £1 billion—above the £5.5 billion already allocated—to fix the Ajax programme and bring it fully into service. Is that true? If it is, can we be assured that General Dynamics will pick up the bill, per its current £5.5 billion firm-price contract, and that not a single extra penny will fall on the British taxpayer? Incidentally, where are we on the Morpheus tactical communication system? Thirdly, how can it be that our entire fleet of Astute-class nuclear attack submarines are currently laid up for maintenance? The new Secretary of State chided me last week for discussing submarine movements on the floor of the House. I did no such thing. I was, in fact, discussing the total absence of submarine movements. Given the First Sea Lord’s increasingly, and rightly, dire warnings about Russian naval activity in the English channel and the North sea, perhaps the Minister could tell us how we are supposed to credibly deter Russia when not a single one of our £1.5 billion attack submarines is currently at sea? That brings me to the question of what has happened to the defence investment plan. The three well-respected authors of Labour’s much-vaunted strategic defence review were adamant when it was published, over a year ago now, that the price of implementing the measures in the SDR would be to spend 3% of GDP on defence. The detail of how that would be afforded and the actual programmatics were to be provided subsequently in the defence investment plan. We were faithfully promised the plan in the autumn. Then we were absolutely promised it by Christmas. Then we were definitely going to get it early in the new year. Now we are in the middle of June and still do not have the DIP. Ministers tell us that they have been working flat out. Well, they are now comatose. The new Armed Forces Minister assured the House last night that it would be published by the time of the Ankara summit in July, yet The Times reported this morning that the right hon. Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham) is minded to delay the publication of the DIP because he wants to take these decisions himself. Presumably whoever his new Chancellor turns out to be—we all pray that there will be one—will have something to say about that too. Can the Armed Forces Minister commit absolutely that after crying wolf so many times, the Government are going to stick to the timetable and publish the DIP within the next fortnight, prior to Ankara? Or is it going to slip yet again? She laughs, but this is not funny. This is about the defence of the United Kingdom. Do Ministers not realise that what little credibility they have left is rapidly disappearing? Indeed, after Cabinet this morning, and even during the course of this debate, the BBC has reported: “No new major policies or spending decisions until new PM appointed, No 10 says”. Where does that leave the defence investment plan? Who is in charge of the clattering train? Who actually runs this country? Is it the current Prime Minister or the next one?

• 23 Jun 2026 · Defence Spending and Readiness · Hansard source

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  When I served on the Defence Committee, just before the election, we went to RAF Marham and spoke to two F-35 pilots. We asked them how long it had taken since they first walked through the door of a recruiting office for them to be allowed to fly the F-35. One said he had been lucky, and it had been six years; the other said he had been unlucky, and it had been 10 years. Does my hon. Friend agree that the MFTS programme requires fundamental reform?

• 22 Jun 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  I am old school, and I was taught that in a debate, it is polite to refer to the Member who moved the lead amendment. That is what I was seeking to do. As I think the House would realise, I am making a very different point and a different argument from him. I will have to respectfully disagree, particularly given events earlier today. New clause 4, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty), has been signed by 64 MPs from across the House, including me. The law was changed many years ago to permit foreign, Commonwealth and Gurkha personnel who have served in our armed forces for four years or more to apply for UK citizenship in return for their willingness to risk their life in service of the Crown. That is now a well-established procedure. However, there is a long-running issue about their immediate family, who may also wish to apply for citizenship, being charged visa fees. Both the Conservative and Labour parties in their 2024 general election manifestos pledged to change that. Indeed, the Royal British Legion and Poppyscotland have been campaigning on it for some time. The case will no doubt be made eloquently by my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon, just as it was in Committee, if he is lucky enough to catch your eye, Madam Deputy Speaker. When we debated this issue in Committee some three weeks ago, the then Armed Forces Minister, the hon. Member for Birmingham Selly Oak, sought to offer the House some comfort that progress might be made on this issue by the time we got to Report. That being the case, and given that the Royal British Legion and Poppyscotland have been doing their best to press the case—including at an event in the House earlier today—I hope that his replacement as the Armed Forces Minister will be able to give us a positive update tonight. It is not really the money that is the impediment. We in the Conservative party have pledged that if we were in government, the Ministry of Defence would cover the additional cost of these visas, which would realistically run at most to a few million pounds a year. However, as everyone knows, the real blocker is not the MOD, but the Home Office. I very much hope that the Armed Forces Minister can tell us today that she has put some vim down the pipe, as it were, and that the Government will now accept new clause 4. If not, I feel sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon will be present to press his new clause at the conclusion of our debate. Our amendments 3, 4 and 5 are on the subjects of special educational needs, the related matters of fostering and adoption, and care in the national health service. In essence, our argument is that if military personnel who have children with special educational needs are ordered to transfer from one military garrison or base to another, any support that they have for that child—including an education, health and care plan or its equivalent in the devolved Governments—should automatically be portable from one local education authority to the one that covers their new posting. One of the two overriding principles of the armed forces covenant, which is an important aspect of the Bill, is that military personnel and their families should suffer no disadvantage as a result of their service relative to the civilian population. Given that they may sometimes be compelled to move by order from one part of the country to another, this is a perfect example of where that principle should now bite.

• 2 Jun 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  I apologise for interrupting so early, but before the Minister gets into his stride, I would like to place firmly on the record that we are debating legislation of material importance, relating to the care of our armed forces, and yet again, there is no Reform Member of Parliament present. Does the Minister agree that there is a massive irony here? These plastic patriots love to wrap themselves in the flag, but they cannot be bothered to turn up in Parliament to debate the fate of those who serve to defend it.

• 2 Jun 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is bearing out the point that there are real-world examples of this issue coming into play, and he has done the Committee a service by reiterating that. The Minister for Veterans and People kindly met me and my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley (Dr Shastri-Hurst) last month to discuss whether the Government might be able to do more on this subject, and in fact the Minister for the Armed Forces referred to that meeting in his remarks a few minutes ago. During the meeting with the Minister for Veterans and People, we suggested—here is the leak—that, given the announcement in the King’s Speech that there would be a new Bill on the whole topic of special educational needs, one way of achieving the aim of the amendment might be to include such a provision in that Bill—in a DFE Bill, rather than an MOD Bill. That would still, at the end of the day, achieve the same desirable outcome. The Minister undertook to go away and look at the matter, including potentially in consultation with colleagues from the DFE. Having received her letter of yesterday, I have to say, more in sorrow than in anger, that I was extremely disappointed in its tone. It was a classic civil service boilerplate reply that bore little relation to the discussion that we had in the Minister’s office. I can only ask her to look at this again, perhaps in the context of the new DFE legislation, as I have just suggested.

• 2 Jun 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. I think she may have been here just a few months ago when we had a debate about the history of the Gurkhas in British service. I echo everything she said about the bravest of the brave. I therefore look forward to her supporting the new clause in the Division Lobby this evening. The Royal British Legion and Poppyscotland have campaigned on this matter for a number of years. I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon for taking up the cudgels so effectively on their behalf this afternoon. As he argued powerfully, Governments of both colours have indicated in the past that they were minded to make this change. Indeed, it is worth reiterating that this proposal was in both the Conservatives’ and Labour’s 2024 general election manifestos, but the change has yet to come to pass. Having re-examined the issue within His Majesty’s Opposition and consulted shadow departmental colleagues, I am pleased to tell the Committee that should my hon. Friend seek to press the new clause—and should you grant that request, Madam Chairman—we on the Opposition Front Bench will support it. We encourage all hon. Members to do so, too. There would be a cost to the process, but we believe that, in return for service to this country, the Ministry of Defence should absorb that cost in its wider budget. The annual cost would be a very modest outgoing, given the scale of the defence budget. In other words, the Department would bear the cost, not those who have served or their families. People should not be disadvantaged for having offered to serve this country in uniform. My hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon put the case very well, and I will not try the House’s patience by repeating it. Suffice it to say that I believe that there is a strong moral case for doing this, and I very much hope that the Government might be prepared to accept the amendment. If they are not, I hope that my hon. Friend will press his amendment to a vote, and in that case, I hope that the whole House will find it in their heart to support it. New clauses 1 and 6 relate to the European convention on human rights and its effect on armed forces personnel, including, potentially, reservists who might be mobilised under the auspices of the Bill. How did we get to a situation in which the convention has spread to the battlefield, not just in Europe, but globally? The history is significant here; it lies behind why we tabled the two new clauses. This all came about because of something called the al-Jedda case, which was heard before the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords a couple of years or so before the United Kingdom Supreme Court was created back in 2009. The al-Jedda case was about the treatment of a prisoner detained in Iraq during Operation Telic, and was brought by a now disgraced lawyer called Phil Shiner. His name will be known to anyone who has ever served in the British Army. For the record, Shiner was subsequently convicted of fraud and struck off as a practising solicitor. Phil Shiner instructed legal counsel to put forward his case to the House of Lords. The lead appellant in that case, before he became a Member of Parliament, was one Keir Starmer QC. The Minister for Veterans and People got into some trouble over that, because when we highlighted the matter in the Commons, she was adamant that he had not been working for Shiner. Unfortunately for the Minister, we had the court records from the House of Lords, which showed very clearly that Keir Starmer, as he then was, was the lead appellant appointed and instructed—that word is used in the records—by Phil Shiner’s law firm, Public Interest Lawyers. The Minister had the embarrassment of having to come to the Commons in February to correct the record and admit that our version of events, as explained to the Commons, was true. Phil Shiner was a persistent man, particularly when money was at stake, so several years after losing in the House of Lords, he took the case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. To be clear, Keir Starmer was not acting in that action. Shiner won, so the Strasbourg Court ruled that the European convention on human rights would then apply to any theatre in which British armed forces personnel were serving. Through that judgment, an industry was effectively created, which Shiner then massively exploited. He brought literally hundreds of cases against current and past British armed forces personnel. Many of the cases were funded by British taxpayers through legal aid, and were completely and utterly fabricated for money. It was the use of the ECHR that allowed him to do that. In other debates in the Chamber, we have heard senior Ministers, including the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, say that there is no such thing as a vexatious prosecution. Self-evidently, there must be, because otherwise why was Shiner struck off and convicted of fraud by a court of law? There can be—in fact, there were—hundreds of vexatious prosecutions against British military personnel. It was, for the record, Johnny Mercer, a former Member of this House, when he served on the Defence Committee some years ago, who led a sub-Committee investigation into this issue. Its very powerful report helped to bring Shiner to book, no doubt saving the taxpayer a lot of money, and leading to Shiner’s career ending in disgrace. To come to the present day, what if there were a ceasefire in Ukraine? Let us posit a situation in which, under the auspices of the coalition of the willing, British service personnel were deployed to Ukraine. If, by some happenstance, they became involved in a firefight with Russian troops who had made an incursion across the line of ceasefire, who is to say that years—maybe decades—later, those personnel would not end up in a court of law for obeying what they believed to be perfectly legitimate orders, after some second-guessing by a human rights lawyer, perhaps with Russian assistance? In short, we cannot allow this Government’s obsession with human rights to put our armed forces at risk, either now, in the future or historically, and potentially force them to fight ruthless opponents with one arm tied behind their back. This issue will not go away, and at some point, the Government will be forced to address it, be it through the Northern Ireland Troubles Bill or some other mechanism. The purpose of these new clauses is to force them to address it today.

• 2 Jun 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  It is extremely sad that the hon. Gentleman is seeking to conflate two completely different issues, and I suspect that anyone who actually served on Operation Telic would understand that. Having made that point, let me turn to the Opposition’s new clause 2, which would require the Secretary of State for Defence to lay a defence investment plan before Parliament within a month of the passage of this Act, if it had still not been published by then, which, for reasons I will come to in a minute, is not as fantastical as it might seem. For context, today is the one-year anniversary of the publication of the Government’s much-vaunted strategic defence review. There is a lot of good in the document, but one of the criticisms made at the time was that much of the programmatic detail on which new equipment the Government intended to purchase for our armed forces was omitted. For instance, the Government talked about buying “up to” 12 new nuclear attack submarines. That could mean two. All that detail was going to be provided in the defence investment plan, but one year on, it has still not been published. This has drawn serious criticism from right across the defence industry, and also from the authors of the SDR. Indeed, the lead author, Lord Robertson, a lifelong Labour man to his fingertips, has accused the Prime Minister of “corrosive complacency” because of the ongoing delay in saying how the Government will fund the strategic defence review and its attendant equipment requirements. When we were in government, we used to publish a 10-year plan for the purchase of military equipment, universally known as the equipment plan.

• 19 May 2026 · Lord Mandelson: Government Response to Humble Address · Hansard source

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  Further to that point of order, the Minister’s excuse for not guaranteeing that the documents will be available by 18 June is that he would need to secure parliamentary time. This is news to some of us, who have been here a while and understand that the Government effectively control the timetable of Parliament. Indeed, every Thursday when the House is sitting they make a business statement to tell us what is coming up in the next two weeks. Mr Speaker, are you aware of anything in the Standing Orders or Erskine May that would prevent the Government from making a business statement on Thursday, naming a day for publication after the Whitsun recess?

• 19 May 2026 · Lord Mandelson: Government Response to Humble Address · Hansard source

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  Do Labour MPs not realise that it is because of high-handed behaviour like this that they suffered such a drubbing on 7 May? The Minister has said that the documents will be published after we return from Whit on 1 June, but he has repeatedly refused to answer whether or not they will be published by the Makerfield by-election on 18 June. Let me ask him yet again: can he guarantee to the House and the constituents we represent that this large batch of documents will be published in advance of the Makerfield by-election on 18 June—yes or no?

• 14 May 2026 · Supreme Court Dillon Judgment · Hansard source

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  As is traditional, I thank the Secretary of State for advance sight of his statement, in that—as he said himself—the judgment in the Dillon case is a complex one. We on the Conservative Benches certainly agree. I suspect that this judgment will be pored over and, indeed, argued over at considerable length, not least in the other place should Labour’s benighted troubles Bill ever make it there. I will just make a point about immunity, and the concept that lay behind the Conservatives’ Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023. I was serving on the Select Committee on Defence under my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis)—an excellent Chairman—when, in 2017, we produced an extremely detailed report on this complex issue. In fairness, I think the Secretary of State has read that report. What was proposed by the Select Committee is akin to what the legacy Act turned out to be, and that in turn was based on the South African truth and reconciliation commission. We never legislated for absolute immunity for anybody; we legislated for conditional immunity, so that if someone who was involved in a troubles-related fatality came forward to give evidence to the Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery—I will return to the commission in a moment—the commission could judge whether they had fully co-operated with it, such as by revealing the burial place of one of the so-called disappeared. If the commission believed that that individual had genuinely co-operated in good faith, they would be granted immunity. If not—if the commission felt that that person was lying, dissembling or trying to hide something—the commission could recommend that a prosecution still go ahead. Contrary to the Government’s position, the legacy Act and ICRIR, which the Act established, only ever allowed for conditional immunity. It is important to put that on the record this morning. I have three specific questions for the Secretary of State about his statement. First, will he say a bit more about the relationship between the Dillon judgment and the Windsor framework? He touched on it, but can he expand? Secondly, as he knows, many of the cases brought against veterans were funded by legal aid in Northern Ireland. He referred very briefly to the implications for legal aid, but can he say something more about that? Thirdly, we heard at business questions a few minutes ago that the Armed Forces Bill will be returning to the House in Committee on 2 June. I was quite involved with that Bill. Under its programme motion, the Northern Ireland Troubles Bill has two days for Committee and remaining stages. When do the Government plan to bring it back to the Floor of the House? Perhaps he could answer that specifically. I am sad to say that Labour has been cynical today. I humbly remind the Secretary of State that when we debated and voted on the related remedial order back on 21 January, almost a third of the Labour parliamentary party abstained, famously including the Minister for the Armed Forces, the hon. Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns). As we all know, he is otherwise occupied today. Even the current Prime Minister abstained. He blew the whistle and sent his troops over the top to vote for this benighted legislation that he did not have the courage to vote for himself. That brings me to encapsulating exactly what is going on today. While this Government prepare to tear themselves to pieces over a mixture of post-electoral fear and vaulting ambition, what is the Labour party’s absolute priority this morning? It is to advance legislation to facilitate the prosecution of brave Northern Ireland veterans, many of whom gave their lives to uphold the rule of law in Northern Ireland—in essence, to defend all of this around us today. That sums up the Labour party. It has clearly chosen today as a not-so-good day to bury bad news. The very bad news is that despite all its protestations to the contrary, Labour would rather help Sinn Féin chase those who fought for their country. The public will see this for what it is: not a complex legal treatise, but a disgrace.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. Clause, by leave, withdrawn. New Clause 6 National Veterans’ Commissioner (England) “After section 366 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 insert— ‘366A National Veterans’ Commissioner (England): establishment (1) Within 12 months of the passing of the Armed Forces Act 2026, the Secretary of State must appoint a National Veterans’ Commissioner for England (“the Commissioner”). (2) The Commissioner shall act independently in carrying out the functions of the office. (3) The Commissioner shall, amongst others, perform the following functions— (a) promote the interests of veterans in England; (b) monitor the operation and effectiveness of the Armed Forces Covenant in England; (c) review the effect of public policy and public services on veterans and their families; (d) identify barriers faced by veterans in accessing housing, healthcare, employment, education, and other public services; (e) make recommendations to the Secretary of State and to public authorities on improving support for veterans. (4) In exercising these functions the Commissioner may— (a) carry out reviews and investigations into matters affecting veterans; (b) consult veterans, service charities, public authorities, and other relevant organisations; (c) publish reports and recommendations. (5) The Commissioner shall prepare an annual report on the exercise of the Commissioner’s functions. (6) The Commissioner may at any time prepare a report on any matter relating to the interests of veterans in England. (7) The Secretary of State shall lay any report prepared under this section before both Houses of Parliament. (8) The Secretary of State must make arrangements for— (a) the provision of such staff, accommodation, and other resources as they consider necessary for the Commissioner to carry out their functions; (b) the publication of the Commissioner’s reports. (9) The Commissioner is to be appointed for a term of three years and may be reappointed for a further term. (10) The Secretary of State may remove the Commissioner from office only on grounds of— (a) incapacity, (b) misbehaviour, or (c) failure to discharge the functions of the office. (11) In this section— “public authority” has the same meaning as in section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998; “veteran” means a person who has served in His Majesty’s armed forces.’”— (Sarah Bool.) This new clause would require the Government to appoint a National Veteran’s Commissioner for England and sets out its functions. Brought up, and read the First time. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Well, Mr Efford, if the Chancellor signed it, there would not be any criticism. For whatever ends, she has not chosen to do so. When we had exchanges with the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry yesterday about defence spending, to which the drip—the DIP, rather—is fundamental, he gave the game away. He talked about percentages of GDP on defence, and said: “We will hit 2.6% in 2027” and “3% in the next Parliament”. —[ Official Report , 15 April 2026; Vol. 783, c. 834.] Assuming that this Parliament goes the full term, the last possible legal date for the election is August 2029, which means that we would not get to 3% for another three years. It is our policy that we should get to 3% before the end of this Parliament. As the Minister knows, we cannot deliver the SDR until we say at what point we will get to 3%, because that is the price of doing so. When we pick a year, we can put a pin on a graph and draw a line back from it, and everything underneath that line will be money that we have to spend. Until we decide what that year is, we cannot draw the line; we do not know how much money we have and we cannot pass a 10-year equipment plan. Because the Treasury will not agree on what year we will get to 3%, there is a complete institutional impasse in the Government. Do hon. Members honestly think that, at the Russian, Chinese or North Korean embassies, they have not spotted this? Do they not think we are a laughing stock in those embassies? What deterrent effect are we providing against our potential aggressors by not being able to tell them, let alone our own Parliament, when we will publish a document that is now nearly nine months overdue? How do we prevent war by doing that?

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. Like our previous debate, I fear this may be an area on which, as a Committee, we find it difficult to agree overall. Nevertheless, this is a very important subject, and I am glad that we have an opportunity to debate it in Committee this afternoon—I am sad that, again, the Liberal Democrats are not here. As it turns out, we debated this issue at Prime Minister’s questions yesterday lunchtime and in the subsequent urgent question, which I led for the Opposition, in the Commons Chamber, but it is very appropriate to debate it in the context of this Bill as well. The essence of new clause 16 is that it would require the Secretary of State for Defence to lay a defence investment plan—or DIP—before both Houses of Parliament within a month of the passage of this Act. The defence investment plan was mentioned in the strategic defence review published last June. There was some criticism of the SDR that, while it was good in parts, it did not provide much granular detail on the Government’s intentions regarding military kit. For the record, when we were in government, we published what was then known simply as the equipment plan just about every year—I think there was one year when we did not—which laid out in quite some detail the spending on military programmes undertaken, or proposed to be undertaken, by the MOD, looking a decade ahead. There was a very sensible reason for doing that, because procuring military equipment does not necessarily fit within the standard three years of a public expenditure round. Just to take two examples, it takes about four years from scratch to build a Typhoon fighter aircraft, and it can take around 10 years to build an aircraft carrier. Clearly, there has to be some kind of budget that accounts for the length of time it takes to build those kinds of kit. We therefore published that plan year in, year out, and it performed two very important functions—well, three, really. First, it allowed industry to plan. Those businesses are obviously there to win contracts, to do work for defence and to satisfy their shareholders. They could see what was—in pub English—coming down the pipe, so they could make sensible commercial investment decisions accordingly. Secondly, it was good for the morale of our armed forces, because they could see the kit that the Government of the day were planning to buy, which they would ultimately get to use. Thirdly, it had a deterrent effect, because it said to our potential adversaries: “Here we are intending to spend hard-earned taxpayer cash, in many cases on hard power in order to deter any potential aggressor from attacking us or our allies.” There was a whole host of good reasons for doing it, and that is why the Government faithfully promised that they would publish the defence investment plan to make up for that detail not being in the SDR. We were absolutely promised it for the autumn of 2025, we were faithfully promised it by Christmas, and then we were absolutely going to get it early in the new year. But here we are, in the middle of April, with no DIP. We have to ask the Government why that is, although it is an open secret: the MOD is in open warfare with His Majesty’s Treasury, and the Chancellor has repeatedly refused to sign it off. All three of the SDR’s authors were explicitly clear, when they published it, that in order to achieve the programme outlined in it the Government would have to commit to spending 3% of GDP on defence. That was, in simple terms, the price of implementing the SDR. In the last 72 hours, all three of those authors have come out very strongly against the Government. It seems to me that months of frustration has effectively boiled over, and it cannot be a coincidence that all three of them have now gone public with their criticisms. Dr Fiona Hill said there is a “bizarre” lack of urgency in Government defence planning. General Sir Richard Barrons, another co-author of the SDR, said there is “an enormous gap between where we have to be to keep the country safe…and where we actually are”. Lord Robertson, lead author of the SDR, former Labour Defence Secretary and former NATO Secretary-General, who is widely respected, spoke about a “corrosive complacency” by the Prime Minister towards defence. The attitude of Ministers is pure bluster. Basically, they have just started being rude to people. They have started talking about armchair generals. They can call me that; that is water off a duck’s back to me. It is nice to be referred to as a general, having made the dizzying heights of lieutenant in my military career. But General Sir Richard Barrons is not an armchair general, and I would caution the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry over his behaviour yesterday. For good measure, he has apparently now lost it in some interview with The Telegraph about Ajax. There are some tensions between Ministers on the fifth floor, for reasons I will not go into this afternoon, but HMS MOD is not a happy ship. It seems that the pressure is getting to the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry. Very simply, when will we get the DIP? We are fed up with being told that Ministers are working flat out, straining every sinew and all these other euphemisms. When will the Prime Minister, primus inter pares, intervene and order the Chancellor to sign it? A couple of days or so ago, the Minister for Veterans and People told the Defence Committee that they were still working on the staff work—utter nonsense. The staff work was completed months ago. It has been ready to be signed for months.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I hope that we are all much refreshed. I should say up front that, while we have been able to conduct this Committee for most of the time in a relatively consensual manner, I fear that on this subject there may be some fundamental differences of principle at stake and that therefore we may find it genuinely difficult to agree. I would have been intrigued to know the attitude of Liberal Democrat members of the Committee, as we are debating the effect of the European convention on human rights on service personnel, but unfortunately they are no longer here. Nevertheless, the essence of new clause 13 is that it would reinstate a duty removed during the passage of the Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Act 2021 to require the Secretary of State to consider derogation from the ECHR during significant overseas operations. Similarly, the essence of new clause 15 is that it would make provision for members of the reserve forces who have been deployed under the provisions of the Bill to be exempted from the ECHR for the period of that deployment. Let me say at the outset that I have never met a member of His Majesty’s armed forces, whether past or present, who believed that the military should not operate subject to legal constraint. After all, soldiers fight to defend our democratic way of life and, in Northern Ireland, they fought to uphold the rule of law. We have had for decades the law of armed conflict, which has at its heart the well-established Geneva convention. It is not as if we have never had any boundaries to control the actions of armed forces personnel. How did we get to the situation in which we are today, where the European convention on human rights has spread to the battlefield, not just within Europe but globally? The history is significant, and it lies behind why we have tabled the new clauses. It all came about because of something called the al-Jedda case, which was heard before the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords a couple of years or so before the United Kingdom Supreme Court was created. I think, from memory, that the UKSC was stood up in 2009, but this case, or at least at the first crank of the handle, as I will go on to explain, predated that. In essence, the al-Jedda case was about the treatment of a prisoner detained in Iraq. The case was brought by a now disgraced lawyer called Phil Shiner. His name will be known to anyone who has ever served in the British Army. For the record, he was subsequently convicted of fraud and was struck off as a practising solicitor, although, at least to date, he never went to jail. The Appellate Committee of the House of Lords heard this case, and Phil Shiner instructed legal counsel to put forward his case to the House of Lords. The lead appellant in that case, before he became a Member of Parliament and our Prime Minister, was one Keir Starmer QC. The Minister for Veterans and People got into some trouble over this, because when we raised it in the Commons, she was adamant that that individual had not been working for Shiner and was merely acting as a so-called third party, as a kind of expert witness to the court on a point of law. Unfortunately for the Minister, we had the court records from the House of Lords, which showed very clearly that Keir Starmer, as he then was, was the lead appellant, appointed and “instructed”—that word is used in the records—by Phil Shiner’s law firm, Public Interest Lawyers. That law firm, I am pleased to say, is no longer in business, and quite right too. The Minister for Veterans subsequently had to come to the Commons in February and go through the embarrassment of having to correct the record and admit that our version of events, as explained to the Commons, was true. How did we get from there to now? Phil Shiner was a persistent man, particularly when money was at stake, so several years after losing in the House of Lords, he took the case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. To be clear, the current Prime Minister was not involved in the case at that stage, but he clearly had been previously. Shiner won, so the ECHR, which we were then subject to, ruled that the European convention on human rights would then apply to any theatre in which British armed forces personnel were serving. Through that judgment, they effectively created an industry that Shiner was very expeditious in exploiting. He brought literally hundreds of cases against current and past British armed forces personnel—many of the cases were funded by British taxpayers through legal aid and were completely and utterly fabricated—for money. It was the use of the ECHR that allowed him to do that. In other debates in the Chamber, we have heard senior Ministers, including the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, say that there is no such thing as a vexatious prosecution. Self-evidently there is, because otherwise why was Shiner struck off and convicted of fraud by a court of law? There can be—in fact, there were—hundreds of vexatious prosecutions against British military personnel. It was, for the record, Johnny Mercer when he served on the Defence Committee some years ago, when he was the Member for Plymouth, Moor View, who led a sub-committee to look into this issue. Its very powerful report helped to bring Shiner to book, no doubt saving the taxpayer a lot more money, and led to his career ending in disgrace. But what if there was a ceasefire in Ukraine? Let us posit a situation in which, under the auspices of the coalition of the willing, British service personnel were deployed to Ukraine. If, by some happenstance, they became involved in a firefight with Russian people who had perhaps crossed the line of ceasefire, who is to say that years—maybe decades—later, those personnel will not end up in a court of law for obeying what they believed to be perfectly legitimate orders, but which were subsequently second guessed by a human rights lawyer? For the avoidance of doubt, that is why the new clauses would alleviate such a situation. In short, we cannot allow this Government’s obsession with human rights to put our armed forces at risk—either now, in the future or, indeed, historically—and potentially force them to fight ruthless opponents with one arm tied behind their back. This issue is not going to go away, and at some point the Government, be it through the Northern Ireland Troubles Bill or some other mechanism, will be forced to address it. The purpose of these new clauses is to force them to address it today. It is a shame that we are not going to hear the Liberal Democrats’ view on this, but I will be intrigued to hear the Government’s. Before that, however, I suspect that we will hear from my hon. Friend the Member for Exmouth and Exeter East.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will speak to amendments 20 to 24. As they have been grouped together in the largest individual group to be debated today, I will take them in turn, with a few brief remarks on each amendment. I begin by addressing amendment 20 and consequential amendment 21. The essence of the amendments is to further increase the maximum age of service in the reserve forces from 55 to 65, as currently proposed in the Bill, to a higher level of 67. That would mean having a maximum age limit in line with the normal male retirement age in civilian life. The Opposition appreciate the sense of increasing the maximum age for service in the armed forces from 55 to 65—for the record, that would include me, and I will opt in now. In his evidence, the Minister provided some practical examples of highly skilled personnel, such as highly experienced medics or air traffic controllers, who do not necessarily need to be as physically fit as, say, a 21-year-old infantryman to make an important contribution to defence. The point of the amendments is to ask a simple question: if that argument holds good at 65, does it not still hold good at 67, the age at which most people can draw a state pension in civilian life if they are male? If someone is a skilled surgeon in the Royal Army Medical Corps at age 65, would they not be equally skilled just two years later? Would those two additional years in their mid-60s represent significant skill fade in their ability to give medical aid? I hope the Minister can see why the Opposition have tabled these straightforward amendments to provoke a debate on the proposed age limit and the rationale for it. I look forward to hearing what he has to say on them. The essence of Opposition amendment 22 is to expand from 12 to 18 months the maximum allowable period for a recall order under the Bill. The rationale is that history shows that in a national emergency, including a peer-on-peer conflict, the war is not always over by Christmas. It is therefore not inconceivable that people who are mobilised for reserve service for up to a year might find themselves required to fight on the frontline for longer. In making this argument, I pray in aid the practical experience from Ukraine, where service personnel have been fighting on the frontline for years, some with relatively limited leave over the whole period. I visited Ukraine with UK Friends of Ukraine only a few weeks ago, and the Minister told the Committee on Tuesday that he had only recently returned from a trip to that country—again, time spent on reconnaissance is seldom wasted. It hardly needs saying, but I am sure that all Members and parties represented on the Committee will want to join me in expressing our determination to support the Ukrainians, for as long as it takes, in facing down Russia’s illegal and barbaric invasion of their country. A point made very powerfully to our delegation during our visit to Odesa, Chornobyl and Kyiv was that many in the west believe or perceive that Ukraine’s war with Russia has been going on for four years, from the date of the so-called full-scale invasion in February 2022, but in fact the Ukrainians are keen to point out that the war really began in 2014, or arguably even earlier, with the Russian occupation of Crimea in the south of the country and the occupation of significant portions of the Donbas in the east. In other words, Ukraine has been at war with Russia not for four years, but for 12. To put that into context, it is longer than the first and second world wars combined. It is immensely to the Ukrainians’ credit that they have continued to actively resist their larger and stronger neighbour to the east. The Ukrainians are fighting for western values of freedom and democracy, and they deserve our enduring support. Moreover, the Speaker of the Rada, who is a larger-than-life man in a whole range of respects, gave us a stark warning while we were there: “If we fall, you and your friends will be next.” Given all that, and bearing in mind the duration of the first and second world wars and of other conflicts such as those in Korea, Iraq and Afghanistan, it might make sense to allow a recall order to last longer than a year should circumstances demand it at the time. We have tabled amendment 22 accordingly. The essence of Opposition amendment 23 is to allow persons undertaking civilian work that the Secretary of State deems vital for defence purposes to be exempt from a recall order under proposed new section 69A of the Reserve Forces Act. This is by no means a new idea. There is an old saying in politics that there is nothing new under the sun, and this is not new either. For instance, during the second world war, many people who were eligible for military service by virtue of their age were nevertheless exempted from call-up because they were working in so-called reserved occupations—in other words, a field of civilian endeavour that was considered vital to the war effort.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 25, in clause 37, page 56, line 35, at end insert— “(4) The Secretary of State must create a plan for ensuring and monitoring the efficiency of the RFCA in carrying out its duties and its relationship with local Reserve and Cadet units. (5) The plan in subsection (4) must be laid before each House of Parliament within six months of the passage of this Act.” This amendment requires the Secretary of State to create a plan ensuring and monitoring the efficiency of the RFCA in carrying out its duties and its relationship with local Reserve and Cadet units.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I again place on record our thanks to you, Mr Efford, and to our excellent Clerks and the team who organised a very good visit down to Portsmouth, where I think we learned a lot about the operation of the service courts in practice—I certainly did. A number of issues were raised in that discussion, not least about the operation of juries in courts martial, and who serves on those jury panels, how they are selected and why. I will give two or three examples of the issues that came from that and then talk to the amendment. The current practice, when an officer is being tried for an offence, is that only officers may serve on a jury panel in a court martial. Some people raised questions with the briefers that day about why that should be, and it is an interesting issue. The book answer from the Department was that officers should be tried by a jury of their peers, and therefore it should be other officers who serve on that panel. There is an issue that follows from that about the rank of the officer being tried and the rank of the officers that then serve on the panel. We learned about a practical constraint, which is that if a relatively senior officer is being tried, let us say a colonel or above—to take an Army example—there is only a relatively small pool of people who could be trawled to sit on that panel to pass judgment on that officer. In the civilian world, we would not have a system where, if a professor were being tried, only graduates could sit on the panel. The civilian system is that people are chosen entirely at random from the electoral roll and are asked to do jury service, which they are mandated to do, with certain exceptions set out in statute. In the civilian world, people are not tried by people of—how can I put it?—an equivalent educational or social status. As the saying used to be, it is a jury of 12 good men and true; now it is, rightly, a jury of good men and women and true who assess someone’s guilt or innocence. In the military, we still carry out the process in this ranked, structured way. Let us say that we had a lance corporal who was being tried for being drunk and disorderly—perhaps he had got into a bar brawl after the end of an exercise; he had gone out at the weekend, had let off a bit of steam and this had led to him allegedly committing an offence. At present, as I understand it, only senior non-commissioned officers of the rank of the equivalent of colour sergeant or above could pass judgment on that lance corporal. That raises an interesting question: why should another corporal or lance corporal, who likes a night out on a Friday as well, not be allowed to serve on that panel? Why does it have to be a colour sergeant or equivalent? Forgive me, Mr Efford, I am using Army ranks because that is what I am most familiar with from my service, but the point holds good across all the services. Why should only a colour sergeant or above be allowed to pass verdict on a lance corporal or even a private soldier? A number of such issues cropped up from our visit. Also, as in the old saying that the Minister reminded me of, time spent in reconnaissance is seldom wasted. This was a good example of that practice. The amendment was drafted specifically to address one of those issues—the potential shortage of officers to serve on court martial panels, especially if a relatively senior officer is being tried, when by definition the pool of available serving officers to serve on a panel is limited. We have tried to come up with a practical suggestion, which is to use retired officers of equivalent rank. I am also interested to hear what other members of the Committee think of the wider issue, which is, does this have to be as hide-bound by rank as it is at the moment? I am interested in the Minister’s view as well, not least because he has been a commanding officer. If we are to keep the system in essence as we have it at the moment, however, would it not make sense to be able to draw on a pool of retired officers of the required rank, who might have a little more time on their hands? We would not be taking anyone away from ongoing operations, and we could take time from their lives in order for them to continue to serve in a military context in the important task of administering service justice. That, in essence, is the intention of the amendment, but we also tabled it to provoke, I hope, a wider debate—I am looking at one or two Labour Back Benchers in particular, because they were vocal about this when we were in Portsmouth, so now is their chance—about why we do things in the way that we do them, and whether there is some potential for change, but if not, why not? I hope that I have laid out the issue fairly clearly for the Committee.

• 26 Mar 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  The purpose of amendment 14 is to make improving customer satisfaction a specific objective of the Defence Housing Service. I will attempt to give credit where it is due. For context, the quality of service quarters, and in particular the maintenance of those quarters—especially maintenance of boilers and heating, dealing with mould, and suchlike—has been a constant bugbear for many service personnel and their families for decades. It is something that I went into considerable detail about in the “Stick or Twist?” report in 2020, to which I shall refer in more detail later this morning. The previous Conservative Government entered into a new housing management contract—the future defence infrastructure services programme, or FDIS—prior to the last general election. It is probably fair to say that there were quite a number of teething problems when that contract went live. Indeed, I expressed a number of reservations about FDIS in the “Stick or Twist?” report before it came in. However, the information I have is that after persistent pressure from Ministers—initially Conservative Ministers, especially my hon. Friend the Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge), and now Labour Ministers, including the Minister on the Committee, to give credit where it is due—the performance of contractors under the FDIS contract has improved. We heard as much from the families federations—from the customer side of the equation, as it were. It can also be seen in the ratings, which are recorded annually in the armed forces continuous attitude survey, or AFCAS, which allows us to track customer satisfaction with the quality of maintenance of SFA. There is a specific question on that every year. Again I give credit where it is due for the introduction of a charter for the homes of service personnel and their families. Of course, it is the families who have to put up with the frustration of any failures, particularly if their loved ones are deployed away from base for any operational reason for any period of time. The families back home have to deal with the problems on a day-to-day basis, so if it is getting better, that is clearly to be welcomed. Clause 3 sets out a number of objectives for the Defence Housing Service and its functions, including “(a) improving the supply and quality of defence housing, (b) managing land or other property used (or formerly used) for defence purposes, (c) securing the regeneration or development of such land or other property, and (d) supporting in other ways— (i) the creation, regeneration or development of service communities, and (ii) the continued wellbeing of those communities.” I am sure that no one on the Committee will object to any of those objectives. But given the history I just outlined, the essence of amendment 14 is to introduce a fifth objective: “improving the satisfaction of service families with the accommodation provided.” Although I have no doubt that those who came up with the proposed Defence Housing Service fully intended to do this, the aim of the amendment is to place that objective firmly on the face of the Bill and, in so doing, establish it as an additional, clearly defined objective of the Defence Housing Service. Then, with the customer charter and assuming that we continue to ask similar questions in the armed forces continuous attitude survey every year, it should be possible to use that objective as an accurate metric to establish whether or not the Defence Housing Service is actually meeting one of its declared functions. If we amend the Bill as I am suggesting, we could use it to hold the management of the Defence Housing Service and, I dare say, Ministers to account for the performance of the new service. It seems to us that this is quite a common-sense way to proceed. Therefore, I rather hope that the Minister will be prepared to accept this amendment without my having to divide the Committee.

• 26 Mar 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Gentleman for his kind comment—every dog has its day. Yes, I think it should, and that is partly the purpose for tabling the amendment. For the avoidance of doubt, I accept in principle that, given the very large amounts of money we spend on equipment procurement—potentially more than £0.25 trillion over the next decade—paying someone quite a lot of money to get it to work is inherently not an unreasonable thing to do. Nevertheless, the appointment did raise eyebrows across the civil service. To be fair, as I understand it, the chief executive of BAE Systems earns about £10 million a year—although if we look at what he has done to its share price, a shareholder might argue that it is a pretty good investment. Charles Woodburn is widely regarded in the industry as knowing what he is about, and is a highly professional leader of that company. None the less, I have sympathy with the question posed by the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells. If this is part of the bonus arrangements, what are the metrics? If he were to get a bonus for the performance of Defence Housing Service, how do we know how much he will get? And how would we judge whether it is value for money, not just for the taxpayer but for the rent payers—the customers—of the Defence Housing Service? I hope the Committee will understand there is a genuine point at issue here. We would be very interested to know what element, if any, of the NAD’s salary, and specifically the bonus payment, is related to the performance of the Defence Housing Service. By the same token—I hope the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells is with me here—if the Defence Housing Service were to underperform, what would happen to the NAD’s base salary? Would it be docked? It is a really serious question. To summarise, could the Minister explain why the Department decided to manage it in this way? There must be a rationale, and the Committee would like to know what it is. Could he also explain how these bonus arrangements will work and how transparent all of it will be?

• 26 Mar 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 17, in clause 3, page 7, line 16, at end insert— “(4) The Defence Housing Service will operate within a budget which must be set out in any Defence Investment Plan published by the Secretary of State.” This amendment would ensure that Defence Housing Service’s budget is set out in any Defence Investment Plan published by the Secretary of State. Good morning, Mr Efford. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again as we move on to clause 3, which concerns the proposed new Defence Housing Service and associated matters. I will speak to amendment 17 in my name. There are no Liberal Democrats in the room yet, but I am sure they will be joining us at some point. We have been assisted in examining this topic by our very helpful evidence sessions with Mr David Brewer, the putative head of the new Defence Housing Service, and Ms Natalie Elphicke Ross, a former parliamentary colleague of ours on both sides of the House, who has materially assisted the Government with their review and the creation of their new plan. We acknowledge her efforts. We also had a very informative Defence Infrastructure Organisation briefing during our visit to Portsmouth, where we visited a number of dwellings in a military patch outside the wire. That included houses representing both before and after, as it were: those that had been refurbished to an obviously good standard, and those that were still awaiting that work. I place on record our thanks to members of the DIO and to the Clerks for what was, as I hope the whole Committee will agree, an extremely informative visit. Before we get into the meat of the debate, I will take it as read that all members of the Committee share the same objective: an improved quality of service family accommodation for our valued armed forces personnel and their families. Again, for the record, we thank them for their service. We would also like to see good-quality accommodation for senior service personnel. The debate is therefore not so much about the objective, which I think we all share, as about the best way of achieving it. That is where we may have some genuine differences of opinion this morning, but hopefully for the right reasons. Amendment 17 focuses on the budget for the proposed new Defence Housing Service. Its essence is that the Defence Housing Service’s budget should be clearly set out in any defence investment plan published by the Secretary of State. [Interruption.] Good morning! The Liberals are now with us. There is an obvious historical context for the amendment. I think it is fair to say that down the years, under Governments of both colours—three colours, if we include the coalition Government of 2010 to 2015—there has been a constant tension in the funding of the defence housing estate. On the one hand, there has been a desire to provide capital to upgrade it; on the other hand, there have been general pressures on the defence budget. It has not been unknown for capital expenditure to be deferred from one year to another to free up resourcing for other operational priorities that were deemed more pressing or urgent by Ministers at the time. The aims and objectives of the new Defence Housing Service are rightly ambitious, which raises questions about how to secure the money and what safeguards there are, if any, against any future Government raiding that substantial pot of cash for other priorities should the circumstances arise. Both Mr Brewer and Ms Elphicke Ross were very clear in their evidence on the subject on 4 March: they said that after considerable discussion with the Treasury, a sum of some £9 billion had been put aside to create the Defence Housing Service and enable it to achieve its objectives laid out in the Bill. Nevertheless, during the same evidence session, it was established after some detailed—indeed, forensic—questioning from my hon. Friend the Member for Exmouth and Exeter East that the money had not been formally signed off by His Majesty’s Treasury. That is because the sum is currently included in the defence investment plan, which itself has not been signed off by His Majesty’s Treasury. As we all know, the defence investment plan has not been published, although Parliament was initially promised it by last autumn. I do not intend to labour—no pun intended—the point this morning, as we debated it at some length in the main Chamber on Tuesday evening. Suffice it to say that when the Government published the strategic defence review in July last year, they deferred many of the crunchy equipment and capability decisions to a subsequent defence investment plan. We were promised that it would be published in the autumn. We were then faithfully promised that it would be published by Christmas. We were then absolutely promised that it would be published fairly shortly thereafter. Here we are on 26 March, the day on which the House rises for the Easter recess, and still it has not been published. That leads to an additional problem, including for the Defence Housing Service. Part of the DIP, presumably including service accommodation in Scotland and Wales, could be affected by the outcome of the forthcoming Scottish Parliament and Welsh Senedd elections, at least indirectly. If the DIP is not published extremely shortly, it is likely to be caught by the purdah rules on those national elections. The putative date for the King’s Speech seems to be settling on or around 13 May. That means that the DIP is unlikely to be published until the second half of May, nearly two months from now, by which time the Defence Housing Service is meant to be under way. In essence, we are debating a plan based on a long-term budget that has not yet been agreed by the Treasury because, bluntly, the Ministry of Defence is at war with it. That is why the DIP has not been published. It is conceivable—although, for the record, I hope that this will not be the case—that whenever final negotiations are eventually concluded, the Treasury may insist on further reductions in the DIP, which in turn could lead to further reductions to the £9 billion currently allocated for the programme. That is why we tabled amendment 17, which states that the budget for the Defence Housing Service must be very clearly set out in the defence investment plan, whenever it is published, not least so that in subsequent iterations of the plan we can see whether the funding allocation is being reduced or increased. Will the Minister guarantee to the Committee that, as of 26 March 2026, the £9 billion in the forward programme has been formally signed off by His Majesty’s Treasury? In other words, can he guarantee that it is ringfenced in the DIP? If he cannot, can he at least tell us when the DIP will finally be published? A fortnight ago, I said privately to a Labour peer that waiting for the DIP was like waiting for Godot. He replied, “Yes, Mark, but at least Godot finally turned up.” Will the Minister answer those questions so that the Committee can take a view on the surety of the funding on which this admittedly very ambitious plan undoubtedly rests?

• 24 Mar 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Having been a Member of Parliament for 25 years in June, I have learned not to look a gift horse in the mouth. I say that in the nicest possible way, so I will take the hint, and having gone to the trouble of writing the speech, I will definitely submit it. To continue, if a service family were based at Tidworth and, perhaps after some considerable time, had secured an EHCP from Wiltshire as the local education authority, but were then posted to Catterick, they would potentially have to go through the process all over again in Yorkshire. It could be another two years of agony to get back to where they already were before they moved. As the Minister pointed out in his helpful letter to the Committee of 9 March, the Department for Education has produced—here is that word again—“guidelines” that should help facilitate the passporting, in effect, of EHCPs from one military garrison or equivalent airbase or naval base to another in a different LEA area, so there is already a process in place to do that. The problem, however, is that those guidelines are facilitative rather than mandatory. In other words, if the receiving LEA—in Yorkshire, in our example—was already under serious financial pressure and already had delays in its system for granting EHCPs, it is possible that, despite the armed forces covenant, the receiving LEA might yet be unreasonable and still force the service family to go back to square one and start all over again. Without taking the Committee for granted in any way, I strongly suspect that Members from all parties would find that situation highly undesirable.

• 24 Mar 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  I do not want to labour the point, but in reality, a lot often comes down to the calibre of the armed forces champion in a particular council; I am sure that the hon. Member for North Devon was an excellent one. If such a champion were in a debate in full council—on how to amend housing policy to advantage veterans, say—it would be far more effective for them to be able to point to a section in an Act of Parliament than to paragraph 212B(III) of some Government circular. An argument is far more effective in a council chamber if a person can wave an Act of Parliament; I have seen people do it. Does the Minister not accept that if we are trying to empower armed forces champions to deliver at ground level, having a definition in the Bill would be very helpful?