Mark Francois MP: speeches

Speeches

• 23 Jun 2026 · Defence Spending and Readiness · Hansard source

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  No. [ Laughter. ] In February of this year, along with some 20 Members from this House—the largest ever parliamentary delegation to Ukraine as far as I am aware—I visited Odesa, Chernobyl and Kyiv. On 24 February, we were privileged to take part in the commemoration in Maidan Square to mark the fourth anniversary of the full-scale invasion. It is, in effect, Ukraine’s equivalent of Remembrance Sunday, and it was extremely poignant to be part of it. They lay lanterns with a candle at their memorial in much the same way as we lay wreaths in Britain. The principle is exactly the same: it is to remember those who gave their lives in defence of freedom and democracy. The Ukrainians are fighting for our values and, ultimately, for our freedom too. We absolutely stand shoulder to shoulder with them in their brave struggle, which we all hope that they will one day win. In order to help them, we need armed forces that can fight too. As the hon. and gallant Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns) reminded us in his resignation letter, we need to plan for the next war and not the last. With that in mind, I would like to ask Ministers some questions on programmatics this afternoon. Having been in government for nearly two years now, Labour has to begin to take responsibility for something. I have three very specific questions for the Minister on military capability. First, where are we on the much delayed E-7 Wedgetail programme? When, if ever, will this vitally needed eye in the sky enter Royal Air Force service? When, if ever, will Boeing actually make it work properly? Secondly, turning to the Army, there are media reports that it will cost an additional £1 billion—above the £5.5 billion already allocated—to fix the Ajax programme and bring it fully into service. Is that true? If it is, can we be assured that General Dynamics will pick up the bill, per its current £5.5 billion firm-price contract, and that not a single extra penny will fall on the British taxpayer? Incidentally, where are we on the Morpheus tactical communication system? Thirdly, how can it be that our entire fleet of Astute-class nuclear attack submarines are currently laid up for maintenance? The new Secretary of State chided me last week for discussing submarine movements on the floor of the House. I did no such thing. I was, in fact, discussing the total absence of submarine movements. Given the First Sea Lord’s increasingly, and rightly, dire warnings about Russian naval activity in the English channel and the North sea, perhaps the Minister could tell us how we are supposed to credibly deter Russia when not a single one of our £1.5 billion attack submarines is currently at sea? That brings me to the question of what has happened to the defence investment plan. The three well-respected authors of Labour’s much-vaunted strategic defence review were adamant when it was published, over a year ago now, that the price of implementing the measures in the SDR would be to spend 3% of GDP on defence. The detail of how that would be afforded and the actual programmatics were to be provided subsequently in the defence investment plan. We were faithfully promised the plan in the autumn. Then we were absolutely promised it by Christmas. Then we were definitely going to get it early in the new year. Now we are in the middle of June and still do not have the DIP. Ministers tell us that they have been working flat out. Well, they are now comatose. The new Armed Forces Minister assured the House last night that it would be published by the time of the Ankara summit in July, yet The Times reported this morning that the right hon. Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham) is minded to delay the publication of the DIP because he wants to take these decisions himself. Presumably whoever his new Chancellor turns out to be—we all pray that there will be one—will have something to say about that too. Can the Armed Forces Minister commit absolutely that after crying wolf so many times, the Government are going to stick to the timetable and publish the DIP within the next fortnight, prior to Ankara? Or is it going to slip yet again? She laughs, but this is not funny. This is about the defence of the United Kingdom. Do Ministers not realise that what little credibility they have left is rapidly disappearing? Indeed, after Cabinet this morning, and even during the course of this debate, the BBC has reported: “No new major policies or spending decisions until new PM appointed, No 10 says”. Where does that leave the defence investment plan? Who is in charge of the clattering train? Who actually runs this country? Is it the current Prime Minister or the next one?

• 22 Jun 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Lady for a very helpful intervention. I will come to the NHS in a moment, but during the Bill’s earlier stages we have suggested that if the Government do not feel that they can accept this amendment—amendment 3—in this primary legislation, which was our preferred route, now that we know there will be a new Bill on special educational needs, they should seek to address the problem in that Bill, and because it is a Department for Education Bill, hopefully local education authorities will then give it considerable weight. So we are in absolute agreement about that route, and, if I may say so, what the hon. Lady has said about education Ministers is heartening. Amendment 4 makes, in a sense, the same argument as we have made on the EHCPs with regard to fostering or adoption by service personnel. Amendment 5 argues, in a similar vein, that military personnel who transfer from one military location to another should not lose their place on any NHS waiting list as a result. Again, there is forthcoming legislation on NHS reorganisation, and we hope that this issue can be tackled via that legislative route. I believe this is a relatively straightforward moral argument, in all three cases, and I hope that the Government may yet accept the logic of what we are putting forward this evening. Let me now turn to the subject of funding for the proposed new Defence Housing Service. As I said during the Select Committee stage of the Bill, there is almost universal agreement that we want to improve the quality of accommodation for service personnel and their families. The remaining area of contention is how best to achieve that, given that there is almost complete unanimity on the desired end state. Nevertheless, following media reports—especially in The Sunday Times —Opposition Members are increasingly concerned about the possibility that money for capital improvements, and even maintenance, may now be taken away from the Defence Housing Service before it is even born, and reallocated to other priorities in Labour’s very long-awaited defence investment plan. We know from evidence sessions on the Bill that there is already a plan for the Defence Housing Service to reduce the spending on housing maintenance by 25%, compared to current practice. That sounds worrying, although officials, and indeed the previous Minister, were keen to stress that they believed the new Defence Housing Service would be able, by renegotiating certain contracts and the actual operation of maintenance, to do this more efficiently. The proof of the pudding for all that will be very much in the eating. However, what we understand is now being proposed is that the capital allocations for the Defence Housing Service will be raided in order to fund other defence priorities elsewhere. That process will only be exacerbated if, as has been widely reported, the amount of money that will be available for the DIP—if and when it is finally published—will be the lowest of the three options widely canvassed in the press, namely an additional £10 billion of spending on defence over the next four years. Given the challenges faced by defence—which were laid out starkly by both the former Defence Secretary and the former Armed Forces Minister in their powerful resignation letters—£10 billion over four years will not even touch the sides. Let me humbly remind Labour Members that all three authors of the strategic defence review, which was published over a year ago on 2 June 2025, were adamant that the price tag for delivering Labour’s much-vaunted SDR would be defence spending of at least 3% of GDP. What is on offer is clearly nowhere near that. Indeed, in his scathing resignation letter, the former Defence Secretary said that all that was being offered to him was an increase in defence spending from 2.6% of GDP this year to 2.68% of GDP by 2030—in other words, a 0.08% increase over four years. Those numbers completely and utterly demolish Labour’s constantly repeated mantra that they are now funding “the biggest…increase in defence spending since the Cold War.” That is simply not true. However, the situation is even worse than that. In addition to the headline “increases”, which are now minuscule, as the resignation letter starkly reveals, last year, at the Treasury’s behest, the Labour Government introduced a target of making efficiency savings—“cuts” in plain English—of some £2.6 billion from operational and revenue spending in the Ministry of Defence. What that means in practice is fewer ship days at sea, fewer hours for our pilots to fly, and fewer exercises on Salisbury plain. Incredibly, in this financial year—2026-27—the efficiency savings target has now been increased to £3.5 billion of cuts, which means even more operational and revenue spending reductions than last year. For Labour to continue the mantra that it has provided the largest increase in defence spending since the cold war, in the face of these self-imposed, Treasury-driven in-year cuts, simply destroys any credibility that the Government had that they really are striving to keep this country safe. This is not the result of enemy action—unless one regards the Treasury as the enemy, which many in the military now do. This is a self-inflicted wound brought about by a Labour Government who are completely paralysed by inaction, and who now have no idea whatsoever of how to credibly fund the defence of this country. In the light of today’s events, it remains to be seen whether the right hon. Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham) will attempt to introduce any order into this chaos. If he does, he and his new Chancellor—whoever that turns out to be—will still have to say how the Labour Government are going to pay for it. Are they going to increase borrowing, which will frighten the bond markets, or are they going to cut welfare, which would probably provoke a Back-Bench revolt?

• 27 Apr 2026 · Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill · Hansard source

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  May I take this opportunity to congratulate my right hon. Friend and Lord Nash on a hard-fought but important campaign? We now have a commitment in principle from the Government that they will ban the use of social media by under-16s, which will be welcomed across the country by concerned parents. Can she reassure me and the House that all that fighting was worth it?

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  As the title of clause 30 is “Commissioner’s functions in relation to Royal Fleet Auxiliary”, I will ask the Minister something about the commissioner and then something about the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. It would appear that, after some time, the Government have now announced someone to fill the position of commissioner. I wonder whether the Minister can confirm that. There are reports in the media that the appointment has been made, but I hope the Minister will put that firmly on the record and say a bit about the individual and how they came to be selected. What was the process by which they got that important job? Has the Defence Committee been involved in the appointment in any way?

• 26 Mar 2026 · Gurkha Veterans · Hansard source

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  As former Officer Cadet Francois 24663730, and latterly Lieutenant Francois, 5th Battalion, the Royal Anglian Regiment (Volunteers), I am proud to be asked to sum up for His Majesty’s official Opposition in this important debate about Gurkhas and their welfare. I congratulate the hon. and gallant Member for Tewkesbury (Cameron Thomas), not just on securing this important debate, but on introducing it so very ably. As some Members of the House may know, I am something of a military history buff, so I have at least some appreciation of the noble and valiant service that the Gurkhas have provided to the British Crown for over 200 years. We have heard a number of important Back-Bench speeches this afternoon, including from the right hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell), and the hon. Members for Rochester and Strood (Lauren Edwards), for Tiverton and Minehead (Rachel Gilmour), for Doncaster Central (Sally Jameson), for Reading Central (Matt Rodda), for Bracknell (Peter Swallow), for Nuneaton (Jodie Gosling), for Ashford (Sojan Joseph), and for Esher and Walton (Monica Harding). The right hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington made the point that, in an important debate on this subject, 27 Back-Bench rebels made the difference on the day. He cited that as an example of how Back Benchers can affect the future. I remember how 28 Tory MPs changed the future on meaningful vote three in 2019—although, for our trouble, we were nicknamed “the Spartans” by the media, and not “the Gurkhas”. The Gurkhas celebrated their 200th anniversary in British service in 2015, when a very striking memorial was unveiled on Horse Guards Avenue, just across the road from the Ministry of Defence. As a number of hon. Members have mentioned today, the inscription on that memorial bears repetition in this context: “Bravest of the brave, most generous of the generous, never had country more faithful friends than you.” The Gurkhas entered British service in 1815, when a battalion of Gurkha troops was formed under the auspices of the East India Company. They continued in British service, and during the Indian rebellion of 1857, Gurkhas fought on the British side, and they became part of the British Indian Army on its formation. They remained in the British Indian Army, and fought valiantly in both the first and second world wars. In his brilliant book “Defeat into Victory”, which was written after the end of the second world war, and is arguably one of the greatest works ever written on the subject of generalship, one of the Gurkhas’ most famous officers, Field Marshal Viscount the Lord Slim, fondly recalled his association with the Gurkhas in the following terms: “I was able to visit my old Battalion, the 1st/6th Gurkha Rifles, in which I had served for many happy years. It was good to see them again, and to be told by the divisional commander that they had done well in the Bridgehead fighting. I spoke to Gurkha officers who I had first known 20-odd years before, when I was adjutant, and they were chubby recruits straight from the from the Nepal hills. Now they were subadars, commanding companies and platoons on a hard-fought field. Real soldiers and real leaders.” What a marvellous tribute to the Gurkhas from Bill Slim, an absolutely exceptional leader. The Gurkhas continued to fight valiantly in British service, including in the Malayan emergency and during the Falklands war, when a battalion of Gurkhas were part of the British taskforce that liberated the Falkland Islands from Argentinian occupation in 1982. The hon. Member for Tewkesbury rightly paid tribute to Ghanendra Limbu, who was part of that successful campaign. We thank all those who have served proudly in the Gurkhas for their service. The Gurkhas still form a fundamental part of the British Army today, serving in what is now known as the Brigade of Gurkhas, a collective term that refers to all serving Gurkha units. It includes three infantry battalions, one of which is based in Brunei. The second is in the United Kingdom, and there is now a third, smaller, specialist infantry battalion at Aldershot, as part of what is known as the Specialised Infantry Group. In addition, the Gurkhas have a number of other units, including signals, engineer and logistics regiments, and, interestingly, from 2025 onwards, there has been the new King’s Gurkha Artillery, which was based at Larkhill. Despite some disputes over welfare issues, which I will come to in a moment, recruitment from the Gurkhas’ ancestral homeland of Nepal is still very healthy. To this day, we recruit several hundred Gurkhas every year, and those places are massively oversubscribed. Many young men from Nepal still strive to emulate their forebears and join one Gurkha regiment or another to serve the Crown, and long may that continue. However, in the post-war period, the basis of the Gurkhas’ service was the 1947 tripartite agreement between Nepal, the United Kingdom and India, which established terms and conditions of service for Gurkhas in the British armed forces. Under the arrangement, Gurkhas served in the British Army on distinct terms and conditions. They also had access to a Gurkha pension scheme, first introduced in 1948, which, in essence, followed the Indian army model. It provided Gurkha soldiers with an immediate pension after 15 years’ service, but, as has been pointed out, at equivalent Indian army rates. In 2007, the Labour Government introduced the Gurkha offer to transfer—or GOTT, as it was sometimes referred to—offering Gurkhas who served after July 1997 the option to transfer their eligible service into the United Kingdom’s armed forces pension scheme, or AFPS. I remember much debate about the AFPS when I was a Minister, and about the different benefits provided by the different generations of the scheme, whether it was AFPS 1975, 2005 or 2015—I see the Minister nodding in acknowledgement. Significantly in this context, following the handing back of Hong Kong in 1997, the Gurkhas transferred their main base from that former colony back to the United Kingdom, where they are mainly deployed today. After 2009 and a sustained campaign led by, among others, Joanna Lumley—the daughter of a former Gurkha officer—the then Government amended the immigration rules, in essence to allow those who had served in the Brigade of Gurkhas for four years or more to settle themselves and their immediate families in the United Kingdom. That effectively remains the position today. As a result, there are now clusters of Gurkhas and their families living in the UK, mainly in current or former garrison areas, but some are dispersed further afield. For some time, there has been a campaign to amend the pensions of Gurkha veterans who served many years ago and still draw a pension, so that they are at the equivalent AFPS rate, rather than based on the comparable Indian army rate. The traditional argument is that because most Gurkhas returned to Nepal on the conclusion of their service, where costs were lower, it was appropriate to pay them under the old arrangements. However, after the end of their basing in Hong Kong and the switch of the brigade to the United Kingdom—and, indeed, given that many Gurkhas now avail themselves of the option of settling in the UK with their immediate family following their period of service—the question arises of whether the pension arrangements should be altered, including for older Gurkha veterans. I commend the hon. Member for Tewkesbury for advancing their arguments in the way he has done this afternoon. He has been a strong advocate of their case. I am afraid that I cannot, standing at the Dispatch Box, make an immediate spending commitment on behalf of my party to satisfy the hon. Member—

• 5 Mar 2026 · Commonwealth Troops: First World War · Hansard source

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  As the son of a man who fought in the second world war, I am privileged to be able to sum up on behalf of His Majesty’s loyal Opposition in this debate about those who fell in the first world war and the vital contribution made by Commonwealth troops during that epic conflict. The first world war turned out to be a manpower-intensive conflict in which the contribution of Commonwealth troops was invaluable. The National Army Museum at Chelsea estimates that over 3 million soldiers and labourers from across what was then the British empire, today the Commonwealth, served alongside the British Army in multiple theatres of operations. We have heard a number of erudite and touching tributes from hon. Members to that effect this afternoon, and I will refer to a few of them, but before I do there is one other important point I want to make. Where is Reform? We are here to debate the contribution of people from all nations, of all colours, of all cultures, made 100 years or more ago, to defending the freedom of what was then the empire and is now the Commonwealth. Why is Reform’s Bench yet again empty when we debate defence-related matters? If those plastic patriots who love to wrap themselves in the flag aspire to be a party of government, let them at least come to this House and behave like it. Turning to the contributions of Members, I commend the hon. Member for Ilford South (Jas Athwal) for securing this debate and, if I may say so, for introducing it so brilliantly. He spoke memorably about the extraordinary contribution of the Indian Army—Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs all joined together as one army fighting for freedom against tyranny. He said that honour transcends borders. He was right. My hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon (Rebecca Smith) spoke very knowledgably about the vital work of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, not least because she worked for it. She highlighted the commission’s marvellous endeavours to commemorate the sacrifices that were made in defence of freedom. On behalf of my party, I would like to commend the Commonwealth War Graves Commission for everything that it does. The hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden (Yasmin Qureshi) spoke powerfully about the contribution of the Indian Army, and especially its Muslim regiments. The hon. Member for Leicester South (Shockat Adam) followed her in a similar vein and spoke in particular about the Sikh regiments who have a proud martial tradition in British service, not least in the first world war. The hon. Member for Alloa and Grangemouth (Brian Leishman) made, if I might say, a very socialist contribution, but he also paid tribute to those who served. The hon. Member for Glasgow North (Martin Rhodes) paid a fulsome tribute to Commonwealth troops. The Liberal Democrat spokesman, the hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Monica Harding), reminded us that after the largely regular British Expeditionary Force was wiped out while holding the line in 1914, it was eventually citizens’ armies, including from the Commonwealth, who replaced it to win the war. As there were multiple contributions from across the empire and the Commonwealth during the First World War, it would be invidious to attempt to highlight any one as more important than the others. It might be better to attempt to summarise briefly—in the few minutes that I have to cover a war that lasted four years—some of the national contributions to the wider war effort. I begin with the Canadians. Following the outbreak of the war, Canada established the Canadian Expeditionary Force, principally for service on the western front. The Canadians fought in many of the major battles in that theatre, including the second Ypres, the Somme, Vimy Ridge and Passchendaele. In so doing, they were supported by troops from Newfoundland, although that did not formally become part of Canada until after the second world war. The Newfoundland regiment also fought at Gallipoli and then on the western front, including in the so-called last hundred days when the allied armies—the British Army in particular, but with Commonwealth support—broke the back of the German army in the field. That victory, fully utilising the principle of combined operations including infantry, artillery, tanks and aircraft working in concert, should not be underestimated. It is often highlighted by military historians as a significant feat of arms, completely contrary to what might be called the “Blackadder” version of the history of the first world war.

• 14 Jan 2026 · Ajax Programme · Hansard source

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  I have with me the actual minute of the Committee’s 2022 visit, which confirms exactly what my hon. Friend said. Ajax’s genesis goes back several decades, under Governments of multiple colours. It effectively began life in the 1980s under the Conservatives as an Anglo-American reconnaissance vehicle programme called TRACER—the tactical reconnaissance armoured combat equipment requirement. Eventually that programme broke down, and the United States continued to develop the Bradley family unilaterally. Back in Britain, under Tony Blair’s Labour Government, the programme evolved into the future rapid effect system—FRES—which itself ran into considerable trouble. As the Defence Committee report of February 2007—I have it here—brutally concluded: “This is a sorry story of indecision, constantly changing requirements and delay...It is high time the MoD decided where its priorities lay.” That was 19 years ago. Following much criticism, FRES was abandoned and eventually re-emerged as the Ajax family of armoured vehicles, with six variants. In March 2010, during the dying months of the Brown Government, the decision was taken to meet the requirement by purchasing the vehicle known as ASCOD, which was also being procured by the Spanish army, in Spain, from US contractor General Dynamics. Crucially, this was originally intended to be an off-the-shelf procurement, with minimal design modification, to enter service in 2017. The coalition Government, at the Cardiff NATO summit in 2014, announced that Ajax would be manufactured in Merthyr Tydfil, using hulls imported from Spain. In short, Labour originally ordered Ajax, but the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats decided where it would be built. Unusually, this was to encompass both a development and production contract running simultaneously. Moreover, an early decision was taken to up-gun Ajax from a 30 mm to a 40 mm weapon, involving a major redesign of the turret. In all, the Army eventually insisted on an incredible 1,200 additional requirements, totally contrary to the off-the-shelf principle. Concerns regarding vibration and noise-related injuries to crews were first flagged by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory as far back as 2014, but it was not until November 2020—six years later—that Ministers were first informed that trials had been suspended over safety concerns. Defence Equipment and Support, after much internal angst, then issued a formal stop notice in June 2021. Ajax trials were eventually restarted in 2022, but not before the programme had been subject to trenchant criticism from the Defence Committee, the Infrastructure and Projects Authority, the National Audit Office—which famously concluded that Ajax was “flawed from the start”—and the Public Accounts Committee to boot. In 2022, Defence Secretary Ben Wallace, rightfully exasperated by the endless delays and the quality of advice being given to Ministers, commissioned the wholly independent Clive Sheldon KC to undertake a detailed review of Ajax. Sheldon’s 172-page review—I have it here—was excoriating. To summarise it in one sentence, it painted a picture of a completely dysfunctional UK procurement system, in which serious concerns articulated at junior level were routinely ignored or explained away by senior managers. Nevertheless, the Army began preparing to bring Ajax into operational service. On 5 November last year, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry headed up a major media event at General Dynamics’ Ajax production facility in Merthyr Tydfil to declare that Ajax had successfully achieved “Initial Operating Capability”. Given the controversial history of the programme, the Minister—who cannot be here today, but who is no fool—did exactly what I would have done, which was to ask for written assurances that the programme was safe, including from the Chief of the General Staff and the National Armaments Director. One key question, incidentally, is: who told both of them that it was safe? Armed with letters from both of those very senior gentlemen confirming that Ajax was indeed ready to enter service safely, the Minister went ahead—we believe in good faith—and declared to the media that Ajax is “a vehicle that is safe, effective and truly cutting-edge.” I can therefore only imagine his horror when, on 22 November, a major regimental exercise on Salisbury plain to test Ajax’s battle-worthiness—involving two squadrons of Ajax vehicles, along with command and support variants, some 60 vehicles in all—had to be rapidly abandoned after 23 crew members reported serious vibration and noise-related injuries. Subsequently, the Minister even halted trials on individual Ajax test vehicles, after further injuries to test crews were discovered. The response of GD UK, in the form of Mr Robert Skivington, one of its then managers, was—disgustingly—to blame the Army’s crews and their commanders in an expletive-ridden social media post. In my sorry, decade-long experience of General Dynamics, that just about sums up their management—not their workers. Moreover, I had a chance encounter with the Ajax senior responsible owner, Mr Chris Bowbrick, at the Defence and Security Equipment International exhibition last September, during which he categorically assured me that Ajax was now safe—and he even shook my hand on it. If the Minister feels angry that he was misinformed, I feel exactly the same way. Everyone agrees we simply cannot go on with this endless stop-start cycle regarding Ajax, not least as it represents the Army’s largest procurement programme at £5.5 billion for acquisition, or £6.3 billion including life-cycle costs. It is also the Army’s biggest chunk of the long-delayed defence investment plan. In short, as safety is paramount, Ministers now have one of two stark options over Ajax: either they must fix it or fail it once and for all. Let us look at both. Ajax has always been too big to fail. Many senior generals, senior civil servants and GD directors have their careers effectively invested in the programme. Indeed, Sheldon relates in some detail the reluctance over a long period of DE&S senior management to even admit that there were serious failings with the vehicle. I am not a qualified engineer, so I cannot pronounce on whether the problem is fixable. Some analysts argue that the vehicle is now so heavy—at up to 43 tonnes it is just two tonnes lighter than a world war two Panther main battle tank—and flawed that it cannot be saved, short of a fundamental redesign which would cost billions of pounds. However, if this really can be sorted by technical means, then conceptually we surely need a deep fix which effectively puts the problems to bed definitively. If that can somehow be achieved at GD’s expense, then all well and good. Nevertheless, the risk is that the MOD and GD merely tweak the vehicle yet again and then rerun that exercise—perhaps six months from now—with almost exactly the same outcome. In that context, I would humbly remind the Minister of Einstein’s definition of madness, which is doing the same thing over and over again and somehow expecting a different result. Conversely, if it emerges that Ajax is somehow fundamentally flawed and cannot be fixed, then the other option is to end the cycle of denial, rip off the plaster and fail it. That would then involve the Ministry of Defence in potentially tortuous negotiations with General Dynamics, in essence, to get its money back so that it could spend it on something else, such as the BAE CV90, which now successfully serves in many NATO countries—and which lost out to Ajax in the first place. If GD was not willing to accept liability, although many think it should, the MOD would probably have no recourse other than to sue it for liquidated damages for delivering a vehicle that was demonstrably not fit for purpose. To conclude, that could involve the Department in a highly aggressive court case potentially lasting years, but which would no doubt also be highly injurious to the reputation of General Dynamics as a global defence manufacturer. This cannot go on; Ministers must fix it or fail it once and for all.

• 16 Jul 2025 · RAF E-7 Wedgetail Programme · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Sir Christopher, as we examine the progress—or rather the sheer lack of it—of the RAF’s E-7 Wedgetail programme. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Dumfries and Galloway (John Cooper) on introducing the debate in such an articulate manner, with a touch of humour to boot. As a battle of Britain buff, I enjoyed his historical analogies with that epic conflict in 1940 and the critical importance of radar and early warning. I also congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Meriden and Solihull East (Saqib Bhatti), in whose constituency the valuable work of converting Boeing 737s into the Wedgetail variant is under way. A couple of years ago, when I served on the Defence Committee—it is great to see the Chairman of the Committee in his place—I had the privilege of visiting the facility in Meriden where the work was being conducted. My hon. Friend the Member for Meriden and Solihull East has been an assiduous constituency MP in standing up for the highly skilled workforce undertaking the conversion. I do have a number of serious concerns about the status of the Wedgetail programme, however, as he is about to hear. I state for the record that none of this is aimed at the workforce in Meriden, but much more at the senior management of Boeing, a company now facing massive reputational issues in both civilian and defence areas. I would like to have congratulated the Reform MP who contributed to this debate but, as ever, they are not here because Reform don’t do defence. We live in an increasingly dangerous world. The head of the British Army stated almost a year ago that we need to prepare for the possibility of a peer-on-peer conflict with Russia by 2027. If that is so, having a modern airborne early warning control aircraft, such as Wedgetail, in operational service would be vital. Moreover, if there were to be a ceasefire in Ukraine, Ministers have told us several times that it might involve not just boots on the ground but jets in the air. They also need eyes in the sky to protect them from a potential Russian threat. In short, we do not currently have any. Part of the purpose of today’s debate is to elicit from the Government when E-7 Wedgetail will finally enter operational service with the RAF. That really matters. Experience in Ukraine shows the heavy propensity of Russia to attack targets with long-range cruise missiles. In the event of a peer conflict with Russia, it is highly likely that most of our fixed RAF radar stations would fall victim to cruise missile attacks within the early few days, or even hours, of such a conflict. At present, we can supplement those with a limited number of mobile radars. It is also unclear whether in wartime other airborne warning assets, such as via satellite and other overseas facilities, would also remain available for long. In such a scenario—one which, as the international sky continues to darken, we are increasingly forced to contemplate—having mobile airborne early-warning such as Wedgetail would be critical to maintain the integrity of the UK’s air defences, plus covering RAF aircraft abroad. That brings me to the current sorry state of the Wedgetail programme, which is running years late and has now unfortunately been rated red by the Infrastructure Projects Authority. To remind hon. Members, a red rating is defined as a project that “reflects serious concerns about the project’s ability to meet its objectives. Immediate corrective actions are needed to address fundamental issues, as the project is unlikely to succeed without significant changes or interventions.” So, where are we today? Three 737 airframes are being converted at Meriden, including retrofitting them with the MESA radar. One of those aircraft has been completed, while the other two are still in work. However, according to a freedom of information request answered on 12 June, the first aircraft has flown only three times—two of them to get painted—and MESA, which is the whole point of the aircraft, has not even been turned on yet in flight. Why? Moreover, as the hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr Bailey), a member of the Defence Committee, revealed at a meeting of that Committee two weeks ago, the lead aircraft is struggling to achieve certification. He said: “We were going to buy five, and then three, E-7s. They are horrendously late and overpriced. We have got one in with a special clearance, meaning that there is something that we do not know about that, which means that it cannot have a normal clearance.” I appreciate that the Minister is likely to say that the previous Conservative Government should have made greater progress on Wedgetail, and I accept that we are not without blame in this field. Nevertheless, the new Government have now had a year to sort it out. The MOD and Boeing have been locked in complex negotiations over the so-called full business case that would allow Wedgetail to enter service, but those negotiations have still not been brought to a fruitful conclusion. Indeed, whereas the original concept was to service and maintain the Wedgetail aircraft in the United Kingdom, there are some media reports that it will now take place in the US instead. Can the Minister confirm whether that is true, and if it is—I hope it is not—will he say what the additional cost will be? To be clear, we need E-7 Wedgetail in RAF service, but we need it now, not in several years’ time. The US, which also has to replace a large number of its ageing E-3 aircraft, was planning to do that with E-7, but the programme is likely to be cancelled. As a stopgap, the US is now apparently even considering buying several dozen E-2D Hawkeye aircraft, which, as the hon. Member for North Devon (Ian Roome) said, originally entered service in the ’60s. They were famously featured in “Top Gun: Maverick”, guiding the attacking F-18s into the target. What exactly has gone wrong with the programme in the United States? Why is the Department of Defence apparently going to junk Wedgetail in favour of Hawkeye, and later, space-based systems? If it does, what are the implications for the RAF Wedgetail programme? Apparently, Boeing is now claiming that what was originally an off-the-shelf purchase of E-7 for the RAF is now turning into a development programme. Can the Minister explain exactly what that means? Can he reassure the House that if the US does withdraw, we are not going to ask the Royal Air Force to pay a vast amount of money to develop E-7, when the United States has refused to do so? The Government have been running a competition for a national armaments director—the NAD. If media reports are to be believed, they have now narrowed it down to two remaining candidates. As the NAD will have to deal with the problem of Wedgetail, can the Minister update the House on exactly where we are on the appointment? Who are the two remaining candidates? Is it true that one of them is holding out for more money? When can we expect a definitive announcement on the appointment? It would appear that, despite extended tortuous negotiations between the RAF and Boeing, the matter has still not been brought to a conclusion. It may mean that the incoming NAD has to knock heads together to finally achieve some progress, which the 12,500 employees at Defence Equipment and Support do not appear to have managed to do. If it were me, I would start as I mean to go on. I would tell Boeing that it will not be granted any further contracts with the Ministry of Defence, be it for more helicopters or advanced jet trainers, unless and until it has introduced its project—its product, E-7 Wedgetail—successfully into operational service. On 25 June, when the House debated the new NAD role, the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for North Cotswolds (Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown), raised Wedgetail as a specific programme requiring more scrutiny. So concerned have I become while researching for this debate, and having considered the matter overnight, I asked this morning for a meeting with the Chair of the PAC, who wanted to be here this afternoon but unavoidably has to be elsewhere. He too was concerned, and he has authorised me to say that he is minded to write to the permanent secretary at the Ministry of Defence to ask what on earth is going on—his words—regarding Wedgetail, and to request a meeting about the programme. In summary, as someone who served on the Defence Committee for seven years and was consistently highly critical of the Army’s Ajax programme—which I note in passing has still not entered operational service—I am afraid to say that, put bluntly, Wedgetail has now turned into the RAF’s very own Ajax. Here we are with another example of a highly complex, exquisite programme that, like Ajax, has not run massively over budget, but which is nevertheless years late, and there is still no guarantee that it even works properly in RAF service. This is threatening to become a £2 billion white elephant in the room. May I conclude by asking the Minister three direct questions? I hope he can provide clear and ambiguous answers, given that he is covering for the Minister for Defence Procurement and Industry this afternoon, while the Minister for Veterans and People remains on resignation watch. Question one: what is the exact status of the flight trials programme of the E-7 Wedgetail aircraft, and when will active trials of the MESA radar commence and conclude? Question two: what is the issue regarding certification of the airframe? What is meant by “limited certification”, and when are the aircraft expected to be fully certified by the Military Aviation Authority? Question three: when is E-7 Wedgetail finally expected to enter operational service with the RAF, and when are the second and third aircraft anticipated, to provide full operational capability? All experience suggests that if we are to maintain one aircraft consistently on task for any length of time, we would need all three aircraft in operational service in order to guarantee it. I say again: when we were in government, we should perhaps have done more to accelerate the progress of this programme. But now that Labour is running the show, and has been for over a year, we need to know what the Labour Government are going to do about it. We cannot contemplate the possibility of war with Russia in which we would be virtually blinded within the opening hours. Wedgetail is now absolutely critical to the defence of the UK, so when, oh when are the RAF and Boeing going to get their collective house in order and bring this absolutely vital capability into service?