Mark Francois MP: speeches

Speeches

• 2 Jul 2025 · Armed Forces Commissioner Bill · Hansard source

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  I rise to address the Lords amendments, following yet another Government defeat in the other place. As I said last month when we last debated this important Bill, His Majesty’s official Opposition are driven by a commitment to ensure that our brave servicemen and women receive the robust, transparent and fair support they deserve. The Bill, which aims to establish an independent Armed Forces Commissioner with Ofsted-like powers to gain access to military sites and information, holds the potential to improve the welfare and accountability framework for our armed forces. If implemented effectively, it could significantly enhance public confidence in the way in which the concerns of service personnel are addressed. I believe that this vision enjoys broad support across the House—although yet again I have to place on record that when we are discussing important legislation that affects the welfare and wellbeing of armed forces personnel and their families, no Reform Member of Parliament is in the Chamber of the House of Commons. They cannot spend the whole of their lives on TikTok, particularly as it is a Chinese system. Our duty as His Majesty’s Opposition is to ensure that the Bill delivers on its promises without introducing unnecessary complexity. We must scrutinise the way in which the commissioner’s role integrates with the existing complaints systems, and what it means for those navigating them. Today we focus again on the key issue of whistleblowing, which was debated extensively in the other place and which now lies before this House yet again. Our amendments, championed by Baroness Goldie, sought to empower the commissioner to investigate whistleblowing concerns related to welfare and service issues, while guaranteeing anonymity for those who come forward, be they service personnel, their families or others. This is not a radical proposal but a reasonable compromise, incorporating the exact wording of the Government’s Commons amendment on anonymity in reports, alongside our whistleblowing duty. The Government argue that existing mechanisms—a confidential hotline, investigation teams and improved complaints processes—are sufficient, and that our amendment does not confer additional powers. That stance is, I am afraid, both inconsistent and unconvincing. The Minister’s own “Dear colleague” letter of 30 May generously acknowledged that Baroness Goldie’s amendments had sparked an important debate, yet the Government resist embedding a clear, statutorily protected whistleblowing function. Such a provision is essential to ensure that vulnerable service personnel can raise concerns without fear of reprisal. Lord Coaker, speaking for the Government in the other place on 11 June, claimed that the terms “whistleblower” and “whistleblowing” might deter individuals from coming forward, citing Cabinet Office guidance. That suggestion is plainly daft. If the term “whistleblowing” is truly a barrier, why does the national health service successfully operate its “Freedom to Speak Up” policy, which explicitly uses the term? Why does the Children’s Commissioner issue an annual whistleblowing report? Those examples demonstrate that the term is not a deterrent, but a recognised and effective framework for protecting those who expose wrongdoing. To argue otherwise undermines the very concept of whistleblowing regimes across multiple sectors and public services in the United Kingdom. The Government further contend that whistleblowing lacks a clear legal definition. That is simply untenable. Section 340Q of the Armed Forces Act 2006 is entitled “Investigation of concerns raised by whistle-blowers”, and section 29D of the Police Reform Act 2002 provides another clear statutory precedent. Those Acts show that including whistleblowing in legislation adds tangible value, ensuring protections for those who raise concerns. If whistleblowing is robust enough for the Police Reform Act and for the very Act that this Bill amends, how can the Government claim that it lacks clarity or value in this instance? That is totally inconsistent. The Government’s position is riddled with contradictions. In Committee, our broader amendment to empower the commissioner was dismissed by the Ministry of Defence as being too wide-ranging. In a spirit of compromise, we narrowed it to focus on welfare and service issues. Now the Government claim that the revised amendment is too narrow and lacks sufficient powers. Lord Coaker argued that our amendment, if passed, would limit the commissioner’s investigations to the same scope as current powers, without enabling access to sites, information or documents, or requiring the Secretary of State to co-operate or report to Parliament. If the Government believe that our amendment does not go far enough, why do they not support it and propose their own broader amendment to enhance the commissioner’s powers, which would almost take us back to the status quo ante? This inconsistency suggests a reluctance to engage constructively, as if arguments were being plucked out of thin air to block progress. Lord Coaker—with whom I dealt when he was in this place, and for whom, for the avoidance of doubt, I have immense respect—also claimed that our amendment excluded family members and terms of service issues, and would apply only to those subject to service law. That is incorrect. Our amendment defines a whistleblower as a person “subject to service law or…a relevant family member.” Thus a corporal’s sister, for example, could raise a whistleblowing concern if the corporal faced abuse or bullying by a military colleague. This provision ensures that family members have a voice, directly contradicting the Government’s assertion to the contrary. Let me give a brief theoretical example. Let us consider the possibility of a whistleblower being someone who served in the British Army in Northern Ireland under Operation Banner. That is an extremely topical issue at present, as the Minister will know, given the Government’s appalling remedial order to excise key parts of the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023. I do not know whether all armed forces personnel who served in Northern Ireland have privately signed the parliamentary petition entitled “Protect Northern Ireland Veterans from Prosecutions”, but I can say that as of today, more than 164,000 people have signed it. We therefore look forward very much to a debate in Parliament on 14 July on exactly that matter, which I am sure will be followed closely by the veterans community and their families. This is not an “angels on a pinhead” argument. It is actually quite important. The Government’s assurances about anonymity and communications campaigns to promote the commissioner’s role are welcome but insufficient. A campaign can be no substitute for a clear, statutory whistleblowing provision that service personnel can trust—to be fair, I should add that when we debated the Bill before, the Minister talked about the issue of trust repeatedly. The other place recognised that, delivering another cross-party defeat to the Government in the last fortnight by amending the Bill to include a robust, anonymous whistleblowing route. Our amendment represents a reasonable compromise, aligning with the Government’s own wording on anonymity while embedding a vital whistleblowing duty. To block it would signal that the Government are not serious about working constructively with the Opposition to improve the welfare of our armed forces personnel, so I urge them to accept this compromise in the interests of all who serve. I will listen closely to anything further that the Minister has to say, but if the Government persist in offering assurances without statutory weight, I will have no choice but to test the opinion of the House. Our service personnel deserve a system that hears their voices and protects their concerns, and if we carry on playing ping-pong—well, that is a sport that I was once quite good at.

• 17 Jun 2025 · Points of Order · Hansard source

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  Further to that point of order, Mr Speaker. We now know undoubtedly that T he Sunday Times was given access to the White Paper, because people could read most of it in The Sunday Times the day before Parliament saw it, although crucially the article did not mention up to 12 new SSNs—nuclear-powered attack submarines. I will explain in a quick second why that is important, Mr Speaker. At 10.30 on the Monday morning, journalists were invited to a reading room in Horse Guards Parade, where they were given access to the White Paper. Section 8.11 of the “Ministerial Code” clearly states: “where commercially sensitive material is involved, no copies should be made available to the media before publication.” Thus, that was clearly a breach of the code. However, there was an earlier sitting in the reading room, at 8 am, when we know the White Paper was also seen by members of defence companies, trade associations, academics, think-tanks and trade unionists, at the same time that the markets were opening. Mr Speaker, there is a possibility of insider trading. The share price of Babcock, which would benefit from maintaining SSNs, leapt very early on after 8 am—

• 5 Jun 2025 · Business of the House · Hansard source

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  May we have a debate in Government time on the three flagrant breaches of the ministerial code committed by the Defence Secretary on Monday? For the record, the Opposition received their copy of the strategic defence review mid-afternoon, the media received it at 10.30 am, and defence companies received it at 8 o’clock in the morning. Within minutes, there were share price spikes in a number of defence stocks. Section 8.11 of the “Ministerial Code” clearly states: “where commercially sensitive material is involved, no copies should be made available to the media before publication.”

• 13 May 2025 · UK-EU Summit · Hansard source

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  I defer to my hon. Friend, who is clearly a subject matter expert. I will conclude, because others want a chance to speak. The Labour Government will go for dynamic alignment. They will sign us up as a passive rule-taker at the behest of the EU, despite the British people voting in 2016 to take back control of their laws. I have absolutely no doubt that if the Labour Government get away with this surrender summit early next week, that is precisely what they will do. It is therefore very important that we alert the British people, and the media that serve them, to exactly what Labour is up to, in an attempt to expose the situation and prevent it getting any worse. In summary, we will not allow our obsessively Europhile Prime Minister—in this context, our “white flag” man—to surrender our right to govern ourselves. This surrender to the EU has absolutely no democratic mandate, and we will oppose it tooth and nail. If necessary, we will eventually overturn it. Remember what the booklet in the referendum said: “This is your decision. The Government will implement what you decide.” The British people decided to take back control of their own laws. It is not for Labour to give them away.

• 13 May 2025 · UK-EU Summit · Hansard source

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  Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker, for calling me to contribute to this important debate on the forthcoming UK-EU summit next Monday. As someone who has, I hope the House will concede, followed these matters reasonably closely for a number of years, I will focus on three broad areas. I will say something about the summit itself, make some points about the very worrying suggestion that we are about to waive a large part of our fishing rights, and raise my concerns and those of many others about the potential for so-called dynamic alignment by which the United Kingdom effectively would become a passive rule taker, despite voting peacefully and democratically to leave the European Union in the first place. Before I do that, I pay a personal tribute to Sir Roy Stone, who has tragically passed away. He was a constituent of mine and lived just a few minutes away from me. I once inadvertently canvassed him some years ago during the local elections. As a highly professional public servant, he was completely inscrutable about his voting intentions. I subsequently worked with him closely for two years in the coalition Whips Office between 2010 and 2012. He was always very patient, especially with me. When I was the Vice-Chamberlain of the Household, he always gave well-informed and canny advice. He believed passionately in the institution of Parliament and the principle of representative democracy, which he served so well. Our thoughts and prayers are with his widow, Dawn, and her family. May he rest in peace and always be warmly remembered. A crucial summit will take place between the leaders of the UK and the EU in London next month. I recall being told repeatedly during the referendum campaign that if we left the EU, we would be isolated and friendless. All the meetings that have taken place in London recently, including one with virtually every EU leader at Lancaster House regarding the so-called coalition of the willing, show how absolutely ludicrous that assertion was. However, according to multiple media reports, it seems as if this summit could involve some kind of defence pact between ourselves in the UK and the European Union. As I have Front-Bench responsibility for defence, I shall not dwell at length on those matters, but hopefully we will have a lot more to say on them next week once the details of any such agreement have been made public and, crucially, we have had an opportunity to read the small print. Nevertheless, I am sure that the Government’s tactic will be to try to talk almost exclusively about defence as a form of camouflage to mask likely concessions both on our fishing rights and, potentially, relating to our food. When the British people voted democratically to leave the European Union some nine years ago, they did so in order to decide their destiny for themselves. It would be completely against the spirit of the referendum, under the guise of some kind of reset with the EU, to surrender that principle next week. Moreover, after the absolute chaos of the Labour Government’s proposed Chagos deal, the Spanish Foreign Minister asserted only yesterday that the UK should make concessions over the sovereignty of Gibraltar as part of our reset at the summit. This is despite the fact that the Gibraltarians themselves voted by a majority of 99% to maintain the current position in their own referendum on the subject, a margin so emphatic that even the SNP would have to accept it. On fishing, in early 2020 during Boris Johnson’s premiership, the United Kingdom agreed what was known as the trade and co-operation agreement between the UK and the EU. While there has been much recent talk of trade deals, including with India and now the US, the TCA was in effect a major, comprehensive trade deal with the EU, negotiated in the context of having left the European Union. For the benefit of the hon. Member for Bournemouth East (Tom Hayes), who is no longer in his place, that agreement was 1,245 pages long—I know, because I read it. In essence, the TCA guaranteed virtually tariff-free trade between the UK and the EU. Moreover, the fact that we had left the EU, including the customs union, meant that we were able to negotiate unilateral trade deals of our own around the world.

• 28 Apr 2025 · Points of Order · Hansard source

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  On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I wish to raise a point of order, about which I have given Mr Speaker prior notice. All of us in this House know that Mr Speaker has a deep personal commitment to the safety of Members of Parliament and their families. In that context, a video has emerged this weekend of a concert held in London some months ago, at which an Irish republican band, called Kneecap, told a cheering audience that, “The only good Tory is a dead Tory”. The band then implored the audience to, “Kill your local MP”. I am not a lawyer, but to my mind that is incitement to murder. Quite rightly, counter-terrorism police are now investigating. This is beyond despicable and the issue affects all parties. I say that as I look across the Chamber at the plaque for our fallen comrade, Sir David Amess, and at the one behind me for our fallen comrade, Jo Cox. They both died serving their constituents. Through you, Madam Deputy Speaker, may I ask Mr Speaker three things? First, will the Home Secretary come to this House by no later than tomorrow and make a full statement on what the Government understand has happened here and exactly what they intend to do about it to protect all those in public life, not just MPs and their families? Secondly, will the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, who I see is in her place—I did notify her of my point of order—give a public explanation, ideally via a statement, of how it came to pass that this band were given some £14,000 of British taxpayers’ money in a grant?

• 1 Apr 2025 · Point of Order · Hansard source

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  On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. Very worrying media reports have emerged overnight that the Iranian regime may be contemplating a military strike on our base on Diego Garcia. For instance, The Telegraph has reported: “A senior Iranian official said military commanders have been asked to target the joint UK-US base, which sits on Britain’s Chagos Islands, in an attempt to deter Donald Trump from striking Iran.” Moreover, in the last hour or so—with Foreign Office questions conveniently out of the way—there are emerging media reports that the Government may have come to a so-called deal with Mauritius over the future of the Chagos islands themselves. If that is true, the UK Parliament has yet again been kept in the dark about the future of what is still, today, British sovereign territory and a vital strategic installation. Madam Deputy Speaker, may I ask if you, or indeed Mr Speaker, have been given any indication that the Government intend to come to this House to make a statement tonight, or at the very latest tomorrow, about, first, an implied military threat to the Chagos islands, and secondly, a legal and diplomatic threat to the Chagos islands, which are and should remain fundamentally British?

• 19 Dec 2024 · Ukraine · Hansard source

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  I thank the Minister for providing advance sight of his statement, which we on this side of the House warmly welcome. As the Minister noted, last month marked the grim milestone of the 1000th day of Russia’s second unprovoked and illegal invasion of Ukraine. Ever since Russian troops crossed the border, and even before, we have stood shoulder to shoulder with our Ukrainian friends. Indeed, relative to the size of our Army, we have gifted more military equipment to Ukraine than any other NATO partner, including the United States. As well as training Ukrainians in the UK since 2014, following the first Russian invasion, we have provided them with everything from NLAWs through to Challenger main battle tanks and almost all of our AS-90 heavy howitzers. We have also provided Ukraine with Brimstone and Storm Shadow missiles and a very considerable amount of ammunition, everything from small arms to 155 mm rounds, as well as helping to procure other ammunition on their behalf from around the globe. When offered a way out of Kyiv immediately after the second Russian invasion in February 2022, President Zelensky defiantly retorted: “I need ammunition, not a ride.” We in Britain have subsequently provided quite a bit of it. Even more recently, we provided very high-tech systems such as advanced drones and the DragonFire anti-drone laser, which we initially procured and which the Ukrainians are putting into service. No one can doubt the commitment of Britain in support of Ukraine, and we are pleased to see this bipartisan approach continues under this Government, but we should not lose sight of the fact that at the end of the day Ukraine is a sovereign nation and only Ukrainian people can subsequently determine their own future. I have five specific questions for the Minister on his statement. First, as he is aware, we have been training Ukrainian troops in Britain since 2014, initially under Op Orbital and now Op Interflex. The key element of this was training troops to operate NLAWs in sophisticated anti-tank ambushes, a capability vividly demonstrated in video footage shortly after Russian forces crossed the border. Without this critical training, it is no exaggeration to say the Russians might well be having lunch in Kyiv today. With that in mind, what further training does the Minister foresee for Ukrainian troops, what additional support will we provide, and will any of this training now be delivered in-country? Secondly, how much of the £186 million from the international fund for Ukraine, which we co-ordinate, is from the UK and how much is from our allies? What, in other words, is the UK proportion? Thirdly, as the statement specifically referred to the supply of respirators, can the Minister confirm intelligence reports that the Russians have now even resorted to limited use of blister agent-type chemical weapons in Ukraine? Is that true? Fourthly, we have been unwavering in our military, political and diplomatic support for Ukraine as well as generous in providing equipment and ammunition. However, this raises concerns about replenishing our own war stocks, as highlighted by the Defence Committee, which I served on in the previous Parliament, including, indeed, on that inquiry. Six months ago the Chief of the General Staff announced clear objectives to double the lethality of the British Army by 2027 and treble it by the end of the decade. What steps are being taken to replenish the UK’s war stocks? More specifically, how do the Government plan to achieve the CGS’s ambitious commitment? Finally, the changes the Minister has announced today clearly feed into the ongoing strategic defence review, yet there are emerging media reports that the much-anticipated SDR publication may be delayed until June next year to now coincide with the comprehensive spending review. Ministers now appear to be sticking to a mantra that the SDR will be published in the first half of next year, which is commensurate with that timeline. With the worsening international situation and given that the initial conclusions have apparently already been seen by the Defence Secretary and even the Prime Minister, we cannot afford six months of paralysis by analysis while the Government decide how to respond. So can the Minister end on a positive note and tell the House today when the SDR will be published and assure us it will not be as late as next June? Slava Ukraini.

• 12 Dec 2024 · Armed Forces Commissioner Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  They are not directly comparable, but as I was coming on to say, the American Committees have a much stronger power over appointments. To illustrate my point, some debates in the American media are about whether the new Defence pick that Donald Trump is advocating may or may not come under some challenge during congressional appointment hearings. That issue only arises because the Committee has a stronger power. Here, there is an increasing trend that a Committee is allowed to interview people and express an opinion, but ultimately it cannot say no. We all agree that the commissioner will be a very important appointment, for all the reasons that the Minister has outlined. Getting it right is really quite important. In extremis, if the Select Committee were to decide, for some good reason, that a particular candidate were not suitable for the role, would the Minister support the idea of its being allowed to veto the appointment? If not, how does the Minister envisage the Defence Committee playing a part in the appointment of this very important person?

• 10 Dec 2024 · Armed Forces Commissioner Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Generals, good morning. Nick, could you give us some idea of how many service charities Cobseo now covers and some idea of the different topics? I know you have banded them together; how does that work? When you have done that, could you explain the charitable sector’s broad view—if it is possible for so many different charities, large and small, to have a collective view—of the Bill and any strengths and weaknesses therein? Please take it in those three parts. Lt General Sir Nicholas Pope: I must start by commending you for the “Filling the Ranks” report, which I have mentioned here before, and which was one of our opportunities to look at the way we carry out armed forces recruitment. I still go back to that report and read it by my bedside table. We believe there are currently around 1,735 military service charities. Some people would say, “Golly, that’s an awful lot,” but we are the one percenters—there are 160,000 charities in the UK and about 1,700 military service charities. The first thing to say is that whether that is too much or too little is irrelevant, because each charity is answerable through its board and trustees to the Charity Commission. We are not stuck with the number, because it changes, but that is the number of charities. All charities are not the same. Of that number, a vast swathe is focused on heritage, museums and monuments, or service funds—ship stations and aircraft stations. About 500 really cover welfare and benevolence—the kinds of military charity organisations you would typically think of. Of the 500, about 25 raise about 90% of the money. If you are going to focus on money and impact at the national level, the likes of Andrew in SSAFA, the Royal British Legion or Help for Heroes are the typical charities you would think of. That is not to decry the enormous contribution made by smaller charities. At local level, a fantastic amount of work is done, if you are thinking of a drop-in centre or breakfast club—a means of bringing together veterans, particularly for comradeship and belonging—but my point is that the word “charity” covers a smorgasbord of activities. In the sector, we tend to slice and dice in how we bring our charities together through what are known as clusters or communities of interest, where like-minded charities come together to talk about, for example, mental health, housing or employment or issues affecting non-UK or female personnel, so we use the charity sector to think thematically about issues. Sectorally, we have an executive committee that Andrew sits on, alongside 16 other chief executives—it is like a United Nations council—where we try to garner the systemic issues across the sector. It is right to say that there is not a sector view, but what the sector can do is bring together information to say, “These are the kinds of views that exist across the military charity sector.” It is probably also fair to say that the sector focuses not exclusively but predominantly on the veterans community, albeit some charities also link back into serving personnel. We tend not to think about either veterans or serving personnel; we try to use the nomenclature of “the armed forces community”, because it picks up the bereaved, spouses, dependants—the entire gamut of those who exist in that community. At the broadest, you might say that around 6 million or 7 million people, so gusting 10% of the UK population, have some relationship with the armed forces. That is a large number.

• 10 Dec 2024 · Armed Forces Commissioner Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Lastly, on the veterans point, most local authorities, in accordance with the covenant, have appointed armed forces champions, but I think it is probably true to say—this is not a party political point—that that is very patchy across different local authorities. Some, bluntly, pay lip service but do not really make a lot of difference for veterans. Others really do go the extra mile, particularly in the allocation of social housing. What is your experience, as Help for Heroes, of how that system works at the local government level? Ted Arnold: I think we would broadly say something similar. It is a postcode lottery in terms of support and how the covenant is applied, and there are inconsistencies with the armed forces champions. Some areas are very good—they have some density of serving personnel or veterans, and they are very aligned with some of those issues—and others less so. That seeps into the whole culture, and it touches on a previous point made by the ombudsman about having someone else to advocate on your behalf on those issues, be it getting the right welfare support or getting the right healthcare support. For many, the armed forces champion is seen as that point, but others have to draw on family and the charity sector to get access to the support that they need.

• 2 Sept 2024 · Ukraine · Hansard source

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  May I follow the excellent point made by the Father of the House, my right hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh), on Storm Shadow? There is no third country exercising a veto on how Putin uses long-range missiles, which he uses without compunction even to attack children’s hospitals in Ukraine. Yet the media consistently report that there is an American veto on the Ukrainian use of Storm Shadow missiles to attack targets at depth in Russia, even though that would materially assist the Ukrainian war effort. Will the Minister, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence talk with our American allies to get that veto removed? The Ukrainians are fighting for our freedom too and, two years in, they can no longer be expected to do it with one hand tied behind their back.

• 24 Jul 2024 · International Immunities and Privileges · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend was a very good Defence Procurement Minister, and we on the Committee liked him because, crikey, he actually answered the questions. He will know from that experience that even the Americans, who have a new thing called the next generation air dominance fighter, are struggling to afford it; there have been media reports in the US that they may even cancel that programme, because even the Americans cannot afford to do everything unilaterally anymore. In the light of that, does my hon. Friend believe that a three-way programme represents good value for money?

• 24 Jul 2024 · International Immunities and Privileges · Hansard source

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  Madam Deputy Speaker, may I begin by congratulating you on your election and welcoming you to the Chair? I am sure that you will chair our proceedings excellently. We wish you all good luck. May I also thank the hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr Bailey) for a fine, fluent and—if I may say so—at times poignant maiden speech? He spoke well on behalf of his constituents. I have it on good authority that when my hon. Friend the Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge) was the procurement Minister, the hon. Member took him on a tour of Brize Norton and helped to brief him on the A400M. My hon. Friend has asked me to pass on his thanks. As a former Army officer, may I say to a former RAF officer what a great pleasure it is to see the RAF turn up on time? There is indeed a first time for everything. [ Laughter. ] The purpose of the order is laid out clearly in paragraph 4.1 of the explanatory memorandum, which states that it “gives effect to the Convention between the Government of the Italian Republic, the Government of Japan and the Government of the United Kingdom…establishing the Global Combat Air Programme International Government Organisation signed on 14 December 2023”. It points out that “The Convention was negotiated by the Ministry of Defence.” My third welcome is to the Minister; it is good to see her in her place. However, as the convention was nominated by the Ministry of Defence, could she explain for clarity why the FCDO and not the MOD is handling this statutory instrument? The Minister kindly nominated me for a place on the House of Commons Defence Committee. As today appears to be a day for people taking up nominations, I will gladly accept that and announce that I am going to run—for that Committee. I also point out that in the explanatory memorandum the policy context for the order—this is important—is described as follows: “In December 2022, the Prime Ministers of UK, Japan and Italy launched GCAP to deliver a next generation aircraft by 2035. The signing of the GCAP Convention between the partners took place in December 2023 and was conducted by the respective Defence Secretaries of the three nations. The GIGO will function as the executive body with the legal capacity to place contracts with industrial partners engaged in the GCAP.” So far, so good. The debate takes on some additional resonance, however, because we now have a defence review, which some people have interpreted as a sword of Damocles hanging over this important programme. My fourth welcome is to the new Minister for the Armed Forces, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), who represents a military constituency; it is good to see him in his place, too. A few minutes ago at Prime Minister’s questions, the Prime Minister described GCAP as a “really important programme”. It is. It is good that he was able to go to Farnborough, see the mock-up of the aircraft for himself and receive a briefing. When I served on the Defence Committee in the last Parliament, in March 2024 we travelled to Japan to examine the programme as best we could from the Japanese perspective. We spoke to politicians, civil servants, industrialists and the Japanese air self-defence force—its military. We were going to write what I believe would have been a very positive report, and then someone went and called a general election. We cannot blame the Minister for that, but she and some of her colleagues did somehow appear to benefit from it. I would like to stress three themes from that trip, which came out strongly. The first was the absolute unanimity of purpose among the Japanese to deliver the programme. As one politician put it to us, “We live in a tough neighbourhood, including three autocracies with nuclear weapons. We need to strengthen our defences, and this programme is fundamental to that.” I think that is a very good summary of the Japanese perspective. Secondly, we were struck by the willingness of the Japanese to consider third party exports of GCAP to make the aircraft affordable by increasing its production run. My hon. Friend the Member for South Suffolk was always hot on that when he was the procurement Minister. For various historical reasons, I do not think that the Japanese would necessarily have taken that view even a few years ago; that is important. Thirdly, the Japanese have an absolute determination to achieve the in-service date of 2035, which is referred to directly in the memorandum. The Japanese air self-defence force uses a mixture of F-15J Eagle aircraft and the F-2, which is sort of a souped-up version of the American F-16. They are both good and capable aircraft, but they are getting rather long in the tooth. The Japanese have to plan forward against a threat from the Chinese J-20 or the Russian Su-57. The risk is that by the mid-2030s those aircraft will be outmatched by those two powerful new combat aircraft. Reference has been made to the F-35. It is a fine aircraft, but it is expensive to buy and very expensive to run. The Americans have found that to their cost—the F-35 was nicknamed by the American media “the plane that ate the Pentagon”. It might not necessarily be the answer to the Treasury’s dream. Moreover, for the record, deliveries of the F-35 to the United States forces were suspended for nearly a year—they have only just been resumed—because of problems in upgrading the computers and the software. If we are to talk about the realities, the F-35 has been quite a troubled programme and, to some extent, continues to be so. What would be the implications of cancellation of GCAP? This is an international agreement and, as it says in paragraph 7 of the explanatory memorandum: “No external consultation was undertaken as the instrument implements provisions of an international agreement to which the United Kingdom will be obliged to give effect as a matter of international law once it enters into force.” The first implication were we to cancel it is that it would put back Anglo-Japanese relations and Anglo-Italian relations, arguably for decades. I would not want to be the CEO of a British company trying to sell something to the Japanese Government in the aftermath of the cancellation of GCAP. Secondly, given the scale and the prominence of the programme, there would be a serious risk that we in the United Kingdom would achieve a reputation as an unreliable partner in major military collaborative programmes—everything from AUKUS through to collaboration in space. In an era when things such as a sixth-generation combat aircraft are so expensive that, as I intimated earlier, even the Americans are struggling to afford one on their own, the reality for us as a medium power is that we need to collaborate. We would find it very difficult to find future partners if we suddenly cancelled such an important and sizeable programme for financial reasons. Thirdly, it would make a nonsense of the UK’s so-called tilt to the Pacific, which was inherent to the so-called integrated review and was reinforced when the review was refreshed before the general election. How can we tilt to the Pacific if we then cancel a major collaborative programme with a critical Pacific partner, which faces challenges from Russia and China even more immediately than we do? Bluntly, our name would be mud in that theatre of operations if we were to do that. Fourthly, there is what one might call the prosperity agenda. As they said in the King’s Speech, the Government are very committed to growth—let us not debate building and the green belt now, but focus on this issue. In the last few years, about 80% of the UK’s defence exports have come from combat air—mainly sales of Typhoon or our 15% workshare on the F-35. That has averaged roughly £6 billion a year. Again, what would be the threat to our exports and our reputation as a reliable supplier if we were to cancel the programme? What should we do? The GIGO, which this memorandum establishes, will incorporate prominent representatives from all three countries—the UK, Japan and Italy—and it will be headquartered here. If the programme is to survive, which I strongly believe it should, the GIGO has a vital role to play as the management organisation. It will have to be leaner and less bureaucratic than its predecessor organisations, which oversaw the Tornado and Typhoon programmes—two wonderful aircraft with a proud heritage in the Royal Air Force. I think everyone in the industry would admit that those organisations were a bit too bureaucratic. The GIGO will have to be a lot leaner and meaner to get the job done. The principal industrial partners—BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Leonardo, among others—will have a real challenge. Historically, the answer to such a dilemma might have been, “Look, it’s a very complicated programme. It will take years to achieve, and it all depends on how many countries join, how many aircraft they buy and what configuration they go for. Will the Saudis participate? Will they want it built in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia if they do participate? There are lots of imponderables, so we will come back to you in about five years’ time with a unit price.” That will not wash. I would submit that one of the first tasks of the GIGO, working with those industrial partners and the three Governments, is to come up with at least a realistic pricing envelope for the programme, which the Treasury can look at and, hopefully, take a positive view on. If they do not do that, there can be no blank cheque, even for this. To conclude, there is no such thing as an uncancellable defence programme—although I still hope for Ajax—but this comes close. To cancel this programme for short-term financial reasons would be a disaster militarily, politically, diplomatically and industrially. If it comes down to GCAP, AUKUS or Ajax, for me, Ajax has to go, and I say that as a former soldier. We need to understand how extremely serious the implications are of cancelling this programme. I was a soldier, but the Royal Air Force has a proud tradition in the defence of this country and its interests, going back to the Battle of Britain and the first world war—when it grew out of the Army, I hasten to say.