Mark Francois MP: speeches

Speeches

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  For the absolute avoidance of doubt, I never said that, and the hon. Gentleman is putting words in my mouth. I never said, or even implied, that our armed forces are a laughing stock—absolutely not. They are still, man for man and woman for woman, among the best in the world, if not the best. It is the Government they serve who are now the laughing stock, not the military personnel. It is a Government who cannot take a fundamental decision about defence spending, whose own MOD Ministers are privately at each other, and who have an MOD and a Treasury that cannot agree. The only way that that is resolved in the British system is when the first among equals intervenes and knocks heads together, and the Prime Minister will not do that because he is terrified of what happens to him if he does. We have an impasse in which the Government, not the armed forces, are regarded as a laughing stock, not just in Washington but in the capitals of our adversaries. That being the case, I ask the Minister in all sincerity to tell us this afternoon when the defence investment plan will be published.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. The essence of the new clause is that changes that are under way in our national railway industry, including the taking back into public ownership of a number of rail franchises and the gradual evolution of an overall entity known as Great British Railways, should not disadvantage either serving or former armed forces personnel and their families by discontinuing the popular HM forces and HM veterans railcards. In highlighting that issue, I should immediately declare an interest, as I hold a veterans railcard. Indeed, I can attest to the Committee that the railcards represent excellent value for money, having cost, from memory, something like £70 for three years, but in return allowing for a discount of a third on almost all rail journeys, significantly including both the morning and evening peak periods; it is not just an off-peak railcard. Moreover, those holding a veterans railcard can also travel in company with their partner, who then qualifies for much the same discount on the same journey. It is an extremely positive measure, and I hope the Minister can give us a cast-iron assurance that the major changes under way within the railway industry will not somehow lead to either of the cards—or, worst of all, both—being discontinued. It was, admittedly, in their manifesto that the Labour party intended to take the railways back into public ownership. However, it was not in their manifesto that armed forces personnel, veterans or their families should suffer as a result.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will make just one point, given the current international situation. We will not get into a long debate about the conflict in Iran, as you would rightly call me to order, Mr Efford. However, it is on the record that our Security Service has identified upwards of 20 plots in recent years, at the hands of the Iranian Government or their proxies, against facilities or persons in the United Kingdom, which mercifully it has foiled. Therefore, it is not inconceivable that there could be a threat to those key pipelines that, bluntly, allow our jets to fly. Can the Minister reassure the Committee that the additional powers in the Bill will help to improve the security of that supply network? Is there anything else that he might want to place on the record this afternoon, subject to operational security, about what we are doing to maintain critical supplies to our armed forces, not least aviation fuel for our quick reaction alert aircraft?

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have listened to the contributions during this debate, one of which I think was particularly unworthy; having heard that contribution in particular, I now wish to press both new clauses to a vote. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Agreed.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I hope that we are all much refreshed. I should say up front that, while we have been able to conduct this Committee for most of the time in a relatively consensual manner, I fear that on this subject there may be some fundamental differences of principle at stake and that therefore we may find it genuinely difficult to agree. I would have been intrigued to know the attitude of Liberal Democrat members of the Committee, as we are debating the effect of the European convention on human rights on service personnel, but unfortunately they are no longer here. Nevertheless, the essence of new clause 13 is that it would reinstate a duty removed during the passage of the Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Act 2021 to require the Secretary of State to consider derogation from the ECHR during significant overseas operations. Similarly, the essence of new clause 15 is that it would make provision for members of the reserve forces who have been deployed under the provisions of the Bill to be exempted from the ECHR for the period of that deployment. Let me say at the outset that I have never met a member of His Majesty’s armed forces, whether past or present, who believed that the military should not operate subject to legal constraint. After all, soldiers fight to defend our democratic way of life and, in Northern Ireland, they fought to uphold the rule of law. We have had for decades the law of armed conflict, which has at its heart the well-established Geneva convention. It is not as if we have never had any boundaries to control the actions of armed forces personnel. How did we get to the situation in which we are today, where the European convention on human rights has spread to the battlefield, not just within Europe but globally? The history is significant, and it lies behind why we have tabled the new clauses. It all came about because of something called the al-Jedda case, which was heard before the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords a couple of years or so before the United Kingdom Supreme Court was created. I think, from memory, that the UKSC was stood up in 2009, but this case, or at least at the first crank of the handle, as I will go on to explain, predated that. In essence, the al-Jedda case was about the treatment of a prisoner detained in Iraq. The case was brought by a now disgraced lawyer called Phil Shiner. His name will be known to anyone who has ever served in the British Army. For the record, he was subsequently convicted of fraud and was struck off as a practising solicitor, although, at least to date, he never went to jail. The Appellate Committee of the House of Lords heard this case, and Phil Shiner instructed legal counsel to put forward his case to the House of Lords. The lead appellant in that case, before he became a Member of Parliament and our Prime Minister, was one Keir Starmer QC. The Minister for Veterans and People got into some trouble over this, because when we raised it in the Commons, she was adamant that that individual had not been working for Shiner and was merely acting as a so-called third party, as a kind of expert witness to the court on a point of law. Unfortunately for the Minister, we had the court records from the House of Lords, which showed very clearly that Keir Starmer, as he then was, was the lead appellant, appointed and “instructed”—that word is used in the records—by Phil Shiner’s law firm, Public Interest Lawyers. That law firm, I am pleased to say, is no longer in business, and quite right too. The Minister for Veterans subsequently had to come to the Commons in February and go through the embarrassment of having to correct the record and admit that our version of events, as explained to the Commons, was true. How did we get from there to now? Phil Shiner was a persistent man, particularly when money was at stake, so several years after losing in the House of Lords, he took the case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. To be clear, the current Prime Minister was not involved in the case at that stage, but he clearly had been previously. Shiner won, so the ECHR, which we were then subject to, ruled that the European convention on human rights would then apply to any theatre in which British armed forces personnel were serving. Through that judgment, they effectively created an industry that Shiner was very expeditious in exploiting. He brought literally hundreds of cases against current and past British armed forces personnel—many of the cases were funded by British taxpayers through legal aid and were completely and utterly fabricated—for money. It was the use of the ECHR that allowed him to do that. In other debates in the Chamber, we have heard senior Ministers, including the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, say that there is no such thing as a vexatious prosecution. Self-evidently there is, because otherwise why was Shiner struck off and convicted of fraud by a court of law? There can be—in fact, there were—hundreds of vexatious prosecutions against British military personnel. It was, for the record, Johnny Mercer when he served on the Defence Committee some years ago, when he was the Member for Plymouth, Moor View, who led a sub-committee to look into this issue. Its very powerful report helped to bring Shiner to book, no doubt saving the taxpayer a lot more money, and led to his career ending in disgrace. But what if there was a ceasefire in Ukraine? Let us posit a situation in which, under the auspices of the coalition of the willing, British service personnel were deployed to Ukraine. If, by some happenstance, they became involved in a firefight with Russian people who had perhaps crossed the line of ceasefire, who is to say that years—maybe decades—later, those personnel will not end up in a court of law for obeying what they believed to be perfectly legitimate orders, but which were subsequently second guessed by a human rights lawyer? For the avoidance of doubt, that is why the new clauses would alleviate such a situation. In short, we cannot allow this Government’s obsession with human rights to put our armed forces at risk—either now, in the future or, indeed, historically—and potentially force them to fight ruthless opponents with one arm tied behind their back. This issue is not going to go away, and at some point the Government, be it through the Northern Ireland Troubles Bill or some other mechanism, will be forced to address it. The purpose of these new clauses is to force them to address it today. It is a shame that we are not going to hear the Liberal Democrats’ view on this, but I will be intrigued to hear the Government’s. Before that, however, I suspect that we will hear from my hon. Friend the Member for Exmouth and Exeter East.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Briefly, I want to make just one point about visiting forces. As the Minister knows, in recent years certain high-profile cases have included people from visiting forces based in the United Kingdom. In one case in particular, a young boy was tragically killed in a road accident by someone who was alleged to have been driving irresponsibly—a citizen of the United States. For legal reasons, I will say no more on that particular case, but I can see members of the Committee nodding in recognition of what I am talking about. All I ask is that the Minister places on the record that we welcome the presence of those who come here as our allies to help protect us, but none the less make it plain to them that while they are in the United Kingdom, they should abide by our laws in all respects, in the same way that we ask our own citizens to. For reasons that I hope the Minister appreciates, I would like it if he could make that reassurance plain this afternoon.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I take the Minister’s point that via this method we could have a Strategic Reserve of 150,000 within a decade, but what if we do not have a decade? I suspect we will return to the point this afternoon, but for now, to use the Minister’s analogy of trying to cut through the spaghetti soup—I think we are all with him on that—how do we increase the size of the soup bowl? How do we have a bigger pool of manpower and womanpower that we can draw on, if necessary, in a full-scale war? These people will have had at least some military training and will be able to train others who have had none. That is why we are suggesting that we at least look at the practicalities of 250,000. Could the Minister say something about that?

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The essence of the amendment, tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friends, is to place a requirement on the Secretary of State to create a plan to ensure and monitor the efficiency of the reserve forces and cadets associations in carrying out their duties and the relationship with local reserve and cadet units in their charge. I place formally on the record my thanks to the RFCAs as part of our overall national defence effort, and the appreciation of my party for the highly important role they carry out. Many people who serve on the RFCAs at national and regional level have tremendous experience of military life, often across each of the three services in the case of a regional RFCA. The fact that they wish to continue to make a contribution to defence, in many cases after their regular career is over, is to be welcomed and commended. Nevertheless, just occasionally, I come across examples of a perhaps overly bureaucratic approach by some RFCA staff, who are no doubt well meaning, but whose actions tend—perhaps inadvertently—to stifle innovation and creative thinking. I will illustrate that point to the Minister with two specific personal examples, one from some years ago and the other more contemporary. The first example relates to attempts to create new cadet units in my constituency. While I served as a Minister in the MOD more than a decade ago, I think it is fair to say that we had a successful programme to expand the number of cadet units in state secondary schools. We set a target of creating some 500 new cadet units at secondary level, specifically including some educational settings and some geographical areas that had perhaps not benefited from cadet units hitherto. We deliberately tried to set up some of those school cadet units in what might be termed quite tough inner-city areas. That went pretty well; we hit the target. That meant that thousands of young people at school had the opportunity to benefit from everything the cadet movement offers in terms of teaching teamwork, discipline, determination in adversity and all the other military virtues that they were therefore exposed to at a relatively young age. As the Minister knows, we do not have a cadet movement specifically to recruit people into the adult armed forces. Nevertheless, if many of those people, having experienced a taste of the military ethos, wish to continue their military involvement afterwards, that is all well and good, both for them and for their country. Therefore, on a personal level, I have always been a great believer in the cadet movement, and I am proud to say that I have four cadet units in my constituency: 1476 (Rayleigh) Squadron Air Training Corps and its sister squadron, 1474 (Wickford), and detachments of the Essex Army Cadet Force in both Rayleigh and Wickford. I have also, over the past year at least, made a point of attending both the Army cadets’ and the Air cadets’ annual awards ceremonies in Essex. After I left the MOD, and after we had hit the target of 500 new cadet units in schools, I was involved in conversations with the headteachers of two secondary schools in my constituency, who were also very interested in the programme but had not been part of the original cohort of 500. In essence, they were both keen to set up cadet units of their own. There was an original barrier to entry of a down payment of something like £17,000 by any school that wished to participate. Given the pressure on school budgets, even a decade or so ago, that was a prohibitive barrier to entry for many schools. Nevertheless, I am pleased to say that that requirement was eventually dropped, and, at that point, I had two headteachers who were very keen to go ahead. I attempted on numerous occasions to communicate that to the East Anglia RFCA, but I regret to inform the Committee that I got absolutely nowhere. Multiple attempts to raise this were met with a very lukewarm response; I was constantly referred to different people within the organisation, and then ultimately to one non-commissioned officer who appeared to have been given responsibility for new cadet units but, for various reasons, seemed very hard to reach. In the end, I am sad to report that the two headteachers in question lost interest. As one of them put it to me at the time, “Well, if they’re not interested in my school, I don’t see why I should still be interested in one of their cadet units.” That was a shame. I believe it was a missed opportunity—in fact, two. I raise that in the hope that if, in future, any hon. Member wants to help foster the creation of a cadet unit at a school in their constituency, they might have a more positive experience than I did. Perhaps, in responding to this amendment, the Minister could tell us where we are in terms of school cadet units. I think it would be handy if he could place it on the record that the Government would still like to see new cadet units in schools, and, very briefly, how hon. Members can go about encouraging that. Maybe I was just unlucky, but it would be a shame if we could not facilitate setting up new units in schools. Secondly—this is a more contemporary example—I have the honour and privilege of serving as the honorary president of 1476 (Rayleigh) Squadron. The Minister might recall that I alluded to an issue about the potential expansion of the squadron during one of the earlier evidence sessions. I was then invited to write to the head of the RFCA about that. I am grateful for that hint, and I still intend to do so following this debate. For the record, 1476 (Rayleigh) Squadron has won the Lees trophy as the champion squadron in the Essex wing two years running. A military type might well say, “Well, they must be doing something right then.” Suffice it to say, having declared my interest as the squadron president, I am slightly dismayed that attempts to refurbish and expand the facilities of 1476’s admittedly ageing base in Rayleigh have often fallen foul of what one might call bureaucracy at the RFCA level, even though a national house builder was offering to build a brand-new extension to the squadron base at Connaught Road as a gesture of good will and at absolutely no cost to the taxpayer. I am sure that we have all seen these things in our constituencies: a company offers to get together a group of volunteers at a weekend and do something up. The company was going to do that, and it also offered to build what was basically, in pub English, a large shed at the back of the unit, as the squadron has a particularly strong interest in engineering studies and needed a shed in which to store its equipment and conduct lessons. That was all to the good.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. On the point about CCFs, part of the Department’s thinking at the time was that a lot of young people, particularly in the independent sector, benefited from the cadet experience by joining combined cadet force units in independent schools, which, as the hon. Gentleman rightly pointed out, exist in some state schools too. We were trying to give more people in the state sector the opportunity to benefit from a similar experience, so we set the ambitious target of 500 units in state schools, which I am pleased to say we hit. Returning briefly to 1476, in the end, I think it has all been a misunderstanding, and it could be easily resolved with a measure of good will on both sides. I hope the Minister understands the spirit in which I, as the president of the squadron, have raised the issue. If he can personally do anything to help, it would be greatly appreciated. With that, I rest my case.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Minister just said that some categories of personnel could in certain circumstances continue to serve beyond 65 to 67, which is in line with the spirit of what the Opposition are proposing. Can he explain to the Committee who those people are?

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Good morning to you, Mr Efford, and to all members of the Committee. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again today. I will lead for my party in this section on reserve forces. I will begin by offering some comments on Liberal Democrat amendment 7, which relates to retention and transfers between regular and reserve forces, and will follow with a few remarks on clause 31. In one of our evidence sessions, I raised the potential complexity when people wish to leave the regular armed forces and transfer into the reserves. That point is often a good time to catch them, as many people who have enjoyed their regular service but wish to earn their living in a different way are still often tempted to transfer to the reserves to keep their hand in and to continue to serve the nation and maintain the bonds of comradeship and friendship they have developed as regulars. However, in recent years, that transfer has often proved to be administratively difficult. I have heard anecdotal horror stories of former regular personnel who have attempted to re-enlist in the reserves when their regular service has come to an end but have had to overcome an assault course of bureaucracy to do so. In fact, I spoke relatively recently to a reserve officer who had had to fight his way through what he described as “the Capita circus”. The Minister sought to reassure the Committee in evidence by saying that this will be dealt with as a relatively straightforward administrative matter. That flies in the face of much of the anecdotal evidence to the contrary. If someone tries to initiate the transfer while they are still serving, it seems that the process works better, but if they leave it until after they have left the regulars, or if they perhaps have a change of heart after having left the regulars and decide that they want to re-enlist as a reservist after a few years, it is really difficult. In fact, I have been told that in some cases it is worse than if they just tried to join the reserves straight off, ab initio, as a civilian. I pressed the Minister specifically on whether the new tri-service armed forces recruitment programme—the AFRP—contract was written in such a way as to allow the contractor to facilitate the process in an effective and efficient manner. Again, the Minister sought to offer the explanation that it could all be done via administrative procedures. I want to press the Minister on how exactly these administrative procedures are intended to apply in practice. Under the new contract, what, in practical terms, will be different from the rather cumbersome arrangements that we still have in place? In short, how will the creases in this system, which everyone agrees exist, be ironed out to make the transition sufficiently smooth that those leaving the regulars are not put off by mind-numbing bureaucracy if they wish to convert to reserve service? Those are my comments on the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells, which he introduced very well. I now turn to clause 31. Reserves are a fundamental part of our armed forces, as both the Minister and I can attest, having served in the reserve forces at different times in our careers—although I handed back my kit shortly after the Berlin wall came down in 1989, whereas the Minister is still undertaking reserve service. Indeed, we understand he has been on manoeuvres only recently. However, it is a fact that compared with many other nations, we still have very small numbers of reserves, with some 26,000 in the active Army Reserve and many fewer in the Royal Naval Reserve and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force and related reserves. If we put those numbers in context and compare them with the United States, which has both an army reserve and large numbers of national guard—they are organised on a state-by-state basis and report to governors in peacetime, but they can be federalised in wartime—or the reserve elements of the Chinese and Russian armies, they pale by comparison, even though, as the Minister often likes to remind us, we had very large citizen armies in both the first and second world wars. The Army Reserve can be augmented by what is now generally referred to as the Strategic Reserve. For the avoidance of confusion, that is former regular soldiers and officers who would be liable for recall to service with the colours in a national emergency up to and including full-scale war. Indeed, the Bill extends the provision for recalling the Strategic Reserve to up to 18 years, I believe, from leaving the colours of the regular armed forces. For the record, we very much support that measure. When asked in evidence for his estimate of the size of the Strategic Reserve, the Minister gave a definitive figure of approximately 95,000. However, to put it in context, the 2021 census—after much campaigning over quite a few years by the Royal British Legion and some MPs who backed the proposal—specifically asked respondents whether they had ever served in His Majesty’s armed forces, and just over 2 million people positively answered the question. Since then, sadly, a number of those veterans will have passed away, but given that the question was not included in the census forms dispatched to Northern Ireland, which has historically proved a very healthy recruiting ground for our armed forces, it seems not unreasonable to assume that the current number is still probably somewhere around 2 million living veterans, or relatively close to it. Moreover, the Minister also revealed to the Committee, assisted by witnesses from the Ministry of Defence, that about 1 million of those people are still of what he called employment age. I take it that he means males aged up to about 67. I cite those figures to try to estimate the maximum theoretical strength of the Strategic Reserve—or, in military parlance, the absolute right of arc—if all those living veterans were included. Of course, in practice they would not be if they were in their 80s or 90s. For the avoidance of doubt, I do not think we are proposing to put Chelsea pensioners in the Strategic Reserve. We can discern from that calculation that the absolute maximum is theoretically about 2 million—assuming for a moment that we also include veterans who have also served in the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, because they will have ticked the same box. If we cut it differently and include only those of employable age, the Strategic Reserve would come out at about 1 million. If we believe that 95,000 is too small a Strategic Reserve to act as a credible deterrent, particularly given the darkening international situation that we face at present, could we, as it were, draw a line or establish a set of criteria that would achieve a Strategic Reserve of somewhere between 95,000 and, for the sake of debate, a quarter of a million? That would be a much more credible figure in deterrent terms. I ask the question deliberately to provoke debate about how we could, if we chose, expand the Strategic Reserve from the Minister’s 95,000 figure. If he cannot answer that question off the top of his head, perhaps he could write to me, to you, Mr Efford, and to other members of the Committee prior to Report about where, at least theoretically, a line could be drawn—perhaps defined by age or some other criterion—to create a Strategic Reserve of about a quarter of a million troops, rather than just under 100,000. Moreover, if we were to consider something as ambitious as that in order to provide a greater deterrent effect, how would we track and communicate with those people, above and beyond access to the His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs database that Ministers have prayed in aid before? For instance, if we assume that quite a number of those veterans are in receipt of a military pension of one type or another, presumably they would be known to Veterans UK and at least their basic details would be recorded on the MOD’s joint personnel administration system. Could we not use that as a means of tracking down those people?

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member for South Ribble has raised a good point. When people leave the regulars now—I am probably rusty on this—is there a standard operating procedure where they are invited to consider joining the reserves and given a pathway for doing that before they leave? All the anecdotal evidence says that if they try to transfer at that point, it is still bureaucratic, but it is a lot less bureaucratic than doing it after they have left. Do we ask that question as a matter of course and offer people a pathway if they say yes when they are still in the regulars?

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I appreciate my hon. Friend’s comments. He proves that the issue is not all about recruitment, as he was in the Air Training Corps but joined the Royal Marines. I thank him for his tri-service.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  On a point of order, Mr Efford. We will not press amendments 20 to 23. I am grateful that the Minister agreed to take amendment 24 away—we note that—but because the suggestion came from within the ranks, as it were, we will press it to a vote. Clause 33 Recall for service Amendment proposed : 24, in clause 33, page 54, line 43, at end insert— “69C Notice periods for recall (1) Those reservists in Army Reserve Group A, or its equivalents, shall, following the coming into force of the Armed Forces Act 2026, have their standard notice reduced from readiness category R9 (180 days) to R8 (90 days) (2) For the purposes of this section, ‘Army Reserve Group A’ has the meaning defined in the Reserve Land Forces Regulations 2026.”— (Mr Francois.) This amendment would increase the readiness requirement for reservists in Army Reserve Group A from 180 days to 90 days. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will speak to amendments 20 to 24. As they have been grouped together in the largest individual group to be debated today, I will take them in turn, with a few brief remarks on each amendment. I begin by addressing amendment 20 and consequential amendment 21. The essence of the amendments is to further increase the maximum age of service in the reserve forces from 55 to 65, as currently proposed in the Bill, to a higher level of 67. That would mean having a maximum age limit in line with the normal male retirement age in civilian life. The Opposition appreciate the sense of increasing the maximum age for service in the armed forces from 55 to 65—for the record, that would include me, and I will opt in now. In his evidence, the Minister provided some practical examples of highly skilled personnel, such as highly experienced medics or air traffic controllers, who do not necessarily need to be as physically fit as, say, a 21-year-old infantryman to make an important contribution to defence. The point of the amendments is to ask a simple question: if that argument holds good at 65, does it not still hold good at 67, the age at which most people can draw a state pension in civilian life if they are male? If someone is a skilled surgeon in the Royal Army Medical Corps at age 65, would they not be equally skilled just two years later? Would those two additional years in their mid-60s represent significant skill fade in their ability to give medical aid? I hope the Minister can see why the Opposition have tabled these straightforward amendments to provoke a debate on the proposed age limit and the rationale for it. I look forward to hearing what he has to say on them. The essence of Opposition amendment 22 is to expand from 12 to 18 months the maximum allowable period for a recall order under the Bill. The rationale is that history shows that in a national emergency, including a peer-on-peer conflict, the war is not always over by Christmas. It is therefore not inconceivable that people who are mobilised for reserve service for up to a year might find themselves required to fight on the frontline for longer. In making this argument, I pray in aid the practical experience from Ukraine, where service personnel have been fighting on the frontline for years, some with relatively limited leave over the whole period. I visited Ukraine with UK Friends of Ukraine only a few weeks ago, and the Minister told the Committee on Tuesday that he had only recently returned from a trip to that country—again, time spent on reconnaissance is seldom wasted. It hardly needs saying, but I am sure that all Members and parties represented on the Committee will want to join me in expressing our determination to support the Ukrainians, for as long as it takes, in facing down Russia’s illegal and barbaric invasion of their country. A point made very powerfully to our delegation during our visit to Odesa, Chornobyl and Kyiv was that many in the west believe or perceive that Ukraine’s war with Russia has been going on for four years, from the date of the so-called full-scale invasion in February 2022, but in fact the Ukrainians are keen to point out that the war really began in 2014, or arguably even earlier, with the Russian occupation of Crimea in the south of the country and the occupation of significant portions of the Donbas in the east. In other words, Ukraine has been at war with Russia not for four years, but for 12. To put that into context, it is longer than the first and second world wars combined. It is immensely to the Ukrainians’ credit that they have continued to actively resist their larger and stronger neighbour to the east. The Ukrainians are fighting for western values of freedom and democracy, and they deserve our enduring support. Moreover, the Speaker of the Rada, who is a larger-than-life man in a whole range of respects, gave us a stark warning while we were there: “If we fall, you and your friends will be next.” Given all that, and bearing in mind the duration of the first and second world wars and of other conflicts such as those in Korea, Iraq and Afghanistan, it might make sense to allow a recall order to last longer than a year should circumstances demand it at the time. We have tabled amendment 22 accordingly. The essence of Opposition amendment 23 is to allow persons undertaking civilian work that the Secretary of State deems vital for defence purposes to be exempt from a recall order under proposed new section 69A of the Reserve Forces Act. This is by no means a new idea. There is an old saying in politics that there is nothing new under the sun, and this is not new either. For instance, during the second world war, many people who were eligible for military service by virtue of their age were nevertheless exempted from call-up because they were working in so-called reserved occupations—in other words, a field of civilian endeavour that was considered vital to the war effort.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  That is a very reasonable reply from the Minister. I thank him for his offer to look into this. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Clause 37 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 38 Parliamentary control of air forces numbers Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Does the Department have at least a working estimate of how many people it thinks will opt in to that liability, bearing in mind that they cannot be recalled otherwise? What is the planning assumption within the MOD?

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  That being the case, could the Minister place on the record—I hope he will say yes—that it remains the policy of this Government to create new cadet units within educational settings where that is appropriate, and where the headteacher is onside?

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 25, in clause 37, page 56, line 35, at end insert— “(4) The Secretary of State must create a plan for ensuring and monitoring the efficiency of the RFCA in carrying out its duties and its relationship with local Reserve and Cadet units. (5) The plan in subsection (4) must be laid before each House of Parliament within six months of the passage of this Act.” This amendment requires the Secretary of State to create a plan ensuring and monitoring the efficiency of the RFCA in carrying out its duties and its relationship with local Reserve and Cadet units.

• 15 Apr 2026 · Strategic Defence Review: Funding · Hansard source

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  Labour’s strategic defence review had three co-authors. I would like to ask the Minister a question about each of them in turn. Does he agree with Dr Fiona Hill that there is a “bizarre” lack of urgency in Government defence planning? Does he agree with General Sir Richard Barrons, co-author of the SDR, that there is “an enormous gap between where we have to be to keep the country safe…and where we actually are”? Or does he agree with Lord Robertson, lead author of the SDR, former Labour Defence Secretary and distinguished former NATO Secretary-General, that the Prime Minister has shown a “corrosive complacency” towards defence? All of those strong words have been spoken in the past 48 hours. This is no coincidence: the authors obviously understand the principles of combined arms manoeuvre. The truth is that Labour’s rhetoric on defence simply does not match the financial reality. We know that in the last financial year the Ministry of Defence was forced to make £2.6 billion of crippling in-year cuts. It has now been reported that in this financial year it will be asked to find a further £3.5 billion on top. That would be catastrophic for our armed forces. Can the Minister categorically assure the House that there will be no in-year savings exercise this year? Finally, Labour’s SDR, published last June, promised us a comprehensive 10-year defence investment plan, which is still nowhere to be seen. One Labour peer told me prior to Easter that waiting for the DIP was like waiting for Godot, except that Godot finally turned up. Can the Minister now tell the House in what month and what year Labour’s much-vaunted defence investment plan is actually going to be published, or is Labour’s Chancellor, who is adamantly refusing to sign it, still going to hold our armed forces to ransom? Is that not why our Prime Minister, who resolutely refuses to overrule her, is all mouth and no trousers on defence?

• 15 Apr 2026 · Strategic Defence Review: Funding · Hansard source

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  (Urgent Question) : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on his plans to fund the recommendations of the strategic defence review.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  For the record, whatever we did or did not do in Government, we did not bring in the £2.6 billion of operational spending cuts in the financial year just gone. That is why our availability is so poor, and that was a purely Labour decision, was it not?

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Yes, Mr Efford. I will conclude there. I just wanted to know why the RFA is doing a job that the Royal Navy is supposed to do. After our debate yesterday, perhaps the Minister will enlighten the Committee.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I do not think we need to have a debate on clause 20 stand part because we had a pretty thorough debate on the amendment, which covered most of the issues. I will seek the leave of the Committee to withdraw the amendment, but I would like to put down the marker that we have had an interesting debate and we might wish to return to this subject on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Clause 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 21 Power to impose post-charge conditions on persons not in service detention Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.