Mark Francois MP: speeches

Speeches

• 26 Jan 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

  More

  I want to make a bit of progress, but perhaps later if I have time. Turning to housing, I should declare a different interest, as this was an area I cared about very much when I served as an MOD Minister. When I left ministerial office in 2016, the then Prime Minister Theresa May commissioned me and a small team to write a report about military recruitment, including terms of service such as service housing. We eventually entitled it “Filling the Ranks”, and it was submitted to the Prime Minister, with a copy to the Defence Secretary, in 2017. The report made 20 recommendations for improving recruitment, ranging from better advertising and further expansion of cadet units through to taking a more realistic approach to minor medical ailments such as mild eczema and temporary childhood asthma. Nineteen of the recommendations were accepted and actioned, to varying degrees, but unfortunately the one that was not was to consider sacking Capita—or according to Private Eye “Crapita”. Unfortunately, I never managed to persuade our Ministers to do that, despite the company’s truly awful record on Army recruitment. The peer review of “Filling the Ranks” was positive. However, as we were making visits to military establishments and interviewing everyone from privates to very senior officers, including on many of the issues contained in the Bill, in nearly every case within 15 minutes of talking about recruitment, we found ourselves involved in a related conversation about retention. In simple terms, we learned very quickly that there was no point widening the aperture of the recruitment tap if we could not put a retention plug in the sink. We were, therefore, delighted to be recommissioned to undertake a second report specifically into retention, which we subsequently entitled “Stick or Twist?”, as we thought that that encapsulated the serviceman’s dilemma, and which was eventually submitted to the new Prime Minister—one Boris Johnson—in February 2020, a month before the country went into lockdown. This report touched on a number of facets of the armed forces covenant, which are also part of the Bill. I have copies of both reports here with me. Quite a few of the recommendations in “Stick or Twist?” were adopted, and the then Defence Secretary Ben Wallace used it to persuade the Treasury to provide some extra tens of millions of pounds to improve childcare facilities at a number of bases around the country. It was worth doing the report if only for that. I should like to pay tribute to the small team that helped me to compile the two reports: Colonel—now Brigadier—Simon Goldstein, himself a former distinguished reservist; and my two researchers Mrs Sophie Doward-Jones and Mr Rory Boden, who worked tirelessly to produce two documents written in a Select Committee style, with all the work that that entails, for the attention of the Prime Minister and Defence Secretary. Again, however, the most controversial suggestion in “Stick or Twist?” was not adopted. It was a proposal to form a forces housing association and thus bring in expertise from the registered social landlord sector to better manage service families accommodation—SFA. Frankly, at the time this was simply too much for the vested interests in the MOD’s Defence Infrastructure Organisation to accept. Nevertheless, I was delighted that my hon. Friend the Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge), the shadow Defence Secretary, announced a few months ago our intention to introduce such a body if we return to government. The Armed Forces Bill has much to say on this topic—as indeed have many Members this evening—especially in clause 3, which heralds the creation of a defence housing service. This is conceptually similar in some ways to what was first recommended in “Stick or Twist?” six years ago, but with some important differences. I genuinely look forward to debating the respective merits of the two approaches with the Minister in Committee. The Bill also touches on the issue of the armed forces covenant, which is a matter that we have discussed in this House on many occasions. In essence, the intention is to spread the authority of the covenant to cover other Government Departments, including Education and the NHS. We have a number of suggestions for how this process might be improved—for instance, in special needs education, which we hope to explore in Committee. I would like to pay tribute to the hon. Member for Birmingham Edgbaston (Preet Kaur Gill) for what she said about the Queen Elizabeth hospital in Birmingham. I had the privilege of visiting the military unit there on two occasions—once in the company of His Royal Highness, the then Prince of Wales, now His Majesty the King—and I echo everything she said about the excellence of that department at that hospital in caring for those who have served their country. The Bill goes into some detail about potential improvements in the service justice system. This touches in part on a number of quite sensitive areas, not least those highlighted by my former Defence Committee colleague Sarah Atherton in what became known as the Atherton report. We shall again attempt to explore the merits and details of those proposals in Committee. Before I conclude, I want to refer to the remarks of President Trump about the brave soldiers who fought alongside the United States and other allies in Afghanistan. Would that he had not said such things, especially as our troops also fought with the Americans in Iraq and in the caves of Bora Bora in 2001 after the United States invoked article 5 after 9/11—the only nation ever to do that. We traditionally avoid discussing royal matters in this House, but if it is true that President Trump’s volte face on this was in some way due to royal intervention, all I can say is: God save the King. We should endeavour to take a broadly positive attitude to the Bill, but I must caution that there are two areas where the traditional consensus might struggle. First, the Government claim to be fully committed to the two principles of the armed forces covenant—namely, that no members of the wider armed forces family, be they regulars, reservists, veterans or their loved ones, should suffer any disadvantage as a result of their military service, and that special treatment may in some cases be appropriate, especially for the wounded or bereaved. All that rings hollow, however, when we see what the Government are currently doing to our brave Northern Ireland veterans—a matter we were debating in the House just last Wednesday evening over Labour’s remedial order to undermine the Conservative legacy Act, which protects our veterans. Over 100 Labour MPs failed to back that order on the night, including, interestingly, the Prime Minister himself, who abstained, as did over half the Cabinet, including the Defence Secretary and even the Armed Forces Minister. The Government have performed 13 U-turns in the past few months alone, and we very much hope for a 14th U-turn over two-tier justice and facilitating lawfare, especially against our own vital special forces, allowing our brave Northern Ireland veterans to live out their lives in peace instead.

• 26 Jan 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the hon. Gentleman for his kind intervention. It is true that we have sparred in this Chamber—famously, on one occasion—but I utterly agree with the spirit of his intervention, which I am sure carries the support of the entire House tonight. There are a number of measures in the Bill to improve reserve service, which was mentioned by multiple Members, including the hon. Member for Bracknell (Peter Swallow), my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Cambridgeshire (Steve Barclay), and the hon. Member for North Devon (Ian Roome). The measures cover the potential transition to war and the regularising of call-up liabilities across all three services. We think that the proposals largely make sense—though I have to confess that I recently turned 60, and seeing that the Minister wants to extend the call-up liability to 65, I had best dust off my old set of webbing at the back of the garage somewhere just in case.

• 26 Jan 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

  More

  My right hon. Friend is right. There is an old saying in politics that the world is run by those who turn up. Well, Reform did not turn up. On the reserves, I should first declare an interest. I served as a Territorial Army infantry officer in the 1980s in the 5th Battalion of the Royal Anglian Regiment, a NATO-roled battalion that formed part of the 49th Infantry Brigade, which in turn was part of the 2nd Infantry Division, whose core mission was essentially to reinforce what was then the British Army of the Rhine, or BAOR, in the event of world war three. Including service in the Officers’ Training Corps prior to joining 5 Royal Anglian, I did some seven years in total. I was on Exercise Lionheart in 1984 as an officer cadet and also exercised in Cyprus and West Berlin as a junior officer. Nevertheless, I was at no time deployed on active service and so, unlike the Minister, I have no medals at all, because I never did anything that merited one. Despite that, I am still proud to carry the late Queen’s Commission, and I like to believe that had the balloon gone up, our battalion would have done our best to defend the bridge over the Leine river, which was our wartime task.

• 26 Jan 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

  More

  The Secretary of State mentions such a wide spread, but when we debated the remedial order last Wednesday, over 100 Labour MPs abstained, including the Prime Minister, the Defence Secretary, the Armed Forces Minister and two thirds of the Cabinet. If it is such a good idea, why did the Secretary of State not come here and vote for it?

• 26 Jan 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

  More

  On that point, there are rumours that Reform is going to announce a shadow Cabinet. Constitutionally, there is only one shadow Cabinet, which belongs to the Opposition—even the Lib Dems do not have one. Instead, we are going to call it the drinks cabinet, because Nigel likes a drink, and so does Lee. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that that drinks cabinet should have a defence spokesman in it?

• 26 Jan 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

  More

  Ah! Will the Secretary of State give way on that point?

• 21 Jan 2026 · Northern Ireland Troubles: Legacy and Reconciliation · Hansard source

  More

  So where are they all?

• 21 Jan 2026 · Northern Ireland Troubles: Legacy and Reconciliation · Hansard source

  More

  He is on the Committee.

• 21 Jan 2026 · Northern Ireland Troubles: Legacy and Reconciliation · Hansard source

  More

  And learned!

• 21 Jan 2026 · Northern Ireland Troubles: Legacy and Reconciliation · Hansard source

  More

  As the Secretary of State well knows, the Blair Government handed out hundreds of so-called letters of comfort to alleged IRA paramilitaries following their release from prison. John Downey, the alleged Hyde Park bomber, produced such a letter during his trial at the Old Bailey, whereupon the trial was immediately abandoned. Our Northern Ireland veterans have no such letters of comfort. Does the Secretary of State agree that that letter of comfort let John Downey off on that particular occasion?

• 20 Jan 2026 · Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill · Hansard source

  More

  Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

• 20 Jan 2026 · Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill · Hansard source

  More

  I refer the Minister to article 298 of the UNCLOS treaty, which means we have a complete opt-out on military bases, but may I take him back to costs? The Government Actuary’s Department, whose whole raison d’être is to calculate long-term spending commitments, stood up the £35 billion figure—in fact, it said it might be more. Who should the House believe—people whose whole life’s work is to calculate long-term costs, or this Minister?

• 20 Jan 2026 · Chinese Embassy · Hansard source

  More

  There is a pattern of behaviour here: the failure to act meaningfully over Jimmy Lai, the mysterious collapse of the Chinese spy case and now this abject national humiliation. Let’s call this what it is: this is appeasement of communist China for economic gain. We tried that in the 1930s, and look where it got us. Why are this Labour Government kowtowing to China—a communist regime that imprisons 1 million Uyghur Muslims in concentration camps for having the temerity to believe in God?

• 20 Jan 2026 · Chinese Embassy · Hansard source

  More

  Appeasement.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Chinese Embassy · Hansard source

  More

  indicated dissent .

• 19 Jan 2026 · Local Elections: Cancellation · Hansard source

  More

  “No taxation without representation.” Councillor Kevin Bentley, the dynamic Conservative leader of Essex county council, has been adamant that elections should go ahead. On 14 January, he wrote to the Minister: “You may be aware that at our Full Council on 9th December I stated that Essex County Council would not be calling for the postponement of elections in May 2026. This continues to be our position.” What was ambiguous about that? Is Labour simply running scared?

• 19 Jan 2026 · Local Elections: Cancellation · Hansard source

  More

  Shall I read it again?

• 14 Jan 2026 · Ajax Programme · Hansard source

  More

  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty) on very ably introducing this debate. I should begin by declaring an interest—as consistently being one of the greatest critics of the Ajax programme in the House of Commons for around a decade. Indeed, being very much an Ajax sceptic, I once described it to the Defence Committee as a reconnaissance vehicle that is “about as stealthy as a Ford Transit van full of spanners!”. My real epiphany, however, came when I visited the Ajax factory with that Committee in March 2022, when even the shop floor staff, for whom I had much sympathy in this situation—it was not their fault—were telling us that the vehicle was deeply flawed.

• 14 Jan 2026 · Ajax Programme · Hansard source

  More

  I have with me the actual minute of the Committee’s 2022 visit, which confirms exactly what my hon. Friend said. Ajax’s genesis goes back several decades, under Governments of multiple colours. It effectively began life in the 1980s under the Conservatives as an Anglo-American reconnaissance vehicle programme called TRACER—the tactical reconnaissance armoured combat equipment requirement. Eventually that programme broke down, and the United States continued to develop the Bradley family unilaterally. Back in Britain, under Tony Blair’s Labour Government, the programme evolved into the future rapid effect system—FRES—which itself ran into considerable trouble. As the Defence Committee report of February 2007—I have it here—brutally concluded: “This is a sorry story of indecision, constantly changing requirements and delay...It is high time the MoD decided where its priorities lay.” That was 19 years ago. Following much criticism, FRES was abandoned and eventually re-emerged as the Ajax family of armoured vehicles, with six variants. In March 2010, during the dying months of the Brown Government, the decision was taken to meet the requirement by purchasing the vehicle known as ASCOD, which was also being procured by the Spanish army, in Spain, from US contractor General Dynamics. Crucially, this was originally intended to be an off-the-shelf procurement, with minimal design modification, to enter service in 2017. The coalition Government, at the Cardiff NATO summit in 2014, announced that Ajax would be manufactured in Merthyr Tydfil, using hulls imported from Spain. In short, Labour originally ordered Ajax, but the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats decided where it would be built. Unusually, this was to encompass both a development and production contract running simultaneously. Moreover, an early decision was taken to up-gun Ajax from a 30 mm to a 40 mm weapon, involving a major redesign of the turret. In all, the Army eventually insisted on an incredible 1,200 additional requirements, totally contrary to the off-the-shelf principle. Concerns regarding vibration and noise-related injuries to crews were first flagged by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory as far back as 2014, but it was not until November 2020—six years later—that Ministers were first informed that trials had been suspended over safety concerns. Defence Equipment and Support, after much internal angst, then issued a formal stop notice in June 2021. Ajax trials were eventually restarted in 2022, but not before the programme had been subject to trenchant criticism from the Defence Committee, the Infrastructure and Projects Authority, the National Audit Office—which famously concluded that Ajax was “flawed from the start”—and the Public Accounts Committee to boot. In 2022, Defence Secretary Ben Wallace, rightfully exasperated by the endless delays and the quality of advice being given to Ministers, commissioned the wholly independent Clive Sheldon KC to undertake a detailed review of Ajax. Sheldon’s 172-page review—I have it here—was excoriating. To summarise it in one sentence, it painted a picture of a completely dysfunctional UK procurement system, in which serious concerns articulated at junior level were routinely ignored or explained away by senior managers. Nevertheless, the Army began preparing to bring Ajax into operational service. On 5 November last year, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry headed up a major media event at General Dynamics’ Ajax production facility in Merthyr Tydfil to declare that Ajax had successfully achieved “Initial Operating Capability”. Given the controversial history of the programme, the Minister—who cannot be here today, but who is no fool—did exactly what I would have done, which was to ask for written assurances that the programme was safe, including from the Chief of the General Staff and the National Armaments Director. One key question, incidentally, is: who told both of them that it was safe? Armed with letters from both of those very senior gentlemen confirming that Ajax was indeed ready to enter service safely, the Minister went ahead—we believe in good faith—and declared to the media that Ajax is “a vehicle that is safe, effective and truly cutting-edge.” I can therefore only imagine his horror when, on 22 November, a major regimental exercise on Salisbury plain to test Ajax’s battle-worthiness—involving two squadrons of Ajax vehicles, along with command and support variants, some 60 vehicles in all—had to be rapidly abandoned after 23 crew members reported serious vibration and noise-related injuries. Subsequently, the Minister even halted trials on individual Ajax test vehicles, after further injuries to test crews were discovered. The response of GD UK, in the form of Mr Robert Skivington, one of its then managers, was—disgustingly—to blame the Army’s crews and their commanders in an expletive-ridden social media post. In my sorry, decade-long experience of General Dynamics, that just about sums up their management—not their workers. Moreover, I had a chance encounter with the Ajax senior responsible owner, Mr Chris Bowbrick, at the Defence and Security Equipment International exhibition last September, during which he categorically assured me that Ajax was now safe—and he even shook my hand on it. If the Minister feels angry that he was misinformed, I feel exactly the same way. Everyone agrees we simply cannot go on with this endless stop-start cycle regarding Ajax, not least as it represents the Army’s largest procurement programme at £5.5 billion for acquisition, or £6.3 billion including life-cycle costs. It is also the Army’s biggest chunk of the long-delayed defence investment plan. In short, as safety is paramount, Ministers now have one of two stark options over Ajax: either they must fix it or fail it once and for all. Let us look at both. Ajax has always been too big to fail. Many senior generals, senior civil servants and GD directors have their careers effectively invested in the programme. Indeed, Sheldon relates in some detail the reluctance over a long period of DE&S senior management to even admit that there were serious failings with the vehicle. I am not a qualified engineer, so I cannot pronounce on whether the problem is fixable. Some analysts argue that the vehicle is now so heavy—at up to 43 tonnes it is just two tonnes lighter than a world war two Panther main battle tank—and flawed that it cannot be saved, short of a fundamental redesign which would cost billions of pounds. However, if this really can be sorted by technical means, then conceptually we surely need a deep fix which effectively puts the problems to bed definitively. If that can somehow be achieved at GD’s expense, then all well and good. Nevertheless, the risk is that the MOD and GD merely tweak the vehicle yet again and then rerun that exercise—perhaps six months from now—with almost exactly the same outcome. In that context, I would humbly remind the Minister of Einstein’s definition of madness, which is doing the same thing over and over again and somehow expecting a different result. Conversely, if it emerges that Ajax is somehow fundamentally flawed and cannot be fixed, then the other option is to end the cycle of denial, rip off the plaster and fail it. That would then involve the Ministry of Defence in potentially tortuous negotiations with General Dynamics, in essence, to get its money back so that it could spend it on something else, such as the BAE CV90, which now successfully serves in many NATO countries—and which lost out to Ajax in the first place. If GD was not willing to accept liability, although many think it should, the MOD would probably have no recourse other than to sue it for liquidated damages for delivering a vehicle that was demonstrably not fit for purpose. To conclude, that could involve the Department in a highly aggressive court case potentially lasting years, but which would no doubt also be highly injurious to the reputation of General Dynamics as a global defence manufacturer. This cannot go on; Ministers must fix it or fail it once and for all.

• 14 Jan 2026 · Ajax Programme · Hansard source

  More

  Does the hon. Member agree that the Ministry could tell us the bonuses of the head of Defence Equipment and Support, so the idea that it does not know who else got a bonus is totally and utterly laughable?

• 14 Jan 2026 · Ajax Programme · Hansard source

  More

  My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. On Boxer specifically, just before Christmas I received an answer to a parliamentary question from the Department, saying that it now will not give the initial operational capability date for Boxer, and that it is subject to the long-awaited defence investment plan. Does my hon. Friend agree that Boxer has already slipped by years, and that we cannot let it slip any further?

• 14 Jan 2026 · Ajax Programme · Hansard source

  More

  The hon. Member may know that the previous National Armaments Director, Andy Start, was paid a performance bonus in 2023-24 of £165,000, and another one in 2024-25 of £160,000, while this was going wrong on his watch. Does the hon. Member agree that if Ajax is, unfortunately, finally scrapped, Mr Start should pay that money back?

• 14 Jan 2026 · Ajax Programme · Hansard source

  More

  I thank my hon. Friend for his generosity in giving way. As well as the delays to Boxer, there are now strong rumours about further delays to the upgrade of Challenger 2 to Challenger 3. As Rheinmetall BAE Systems Land is responsible for both programmes, does my hon. Friend agree that it really needs to sort itself out and get on with it?

• 12 Jan 2026 · Call for General Election · Hansard source

  More

  As my hon. Friend knows, seven of the top 10 constituencies in terms of numbers of people who have signed the petition are in Essex, and they include my own constituency. That is how unpopular Labour is in Essex. Does he think that might have anything to do with why Labour councillors want to cancel the local elections in Essex in May? Or is that just an amazing coincidence?

• 12 Jan 2026 · Call for General Election · Hansard source

  More

  The hon. Gentleman may recall that 17.3 million people voted in that referendum, peacefully and democratically, to leave the European Union. That is a lot more people than voted for Labour at the general election. If he is not prepared to respect the opinion of the million people who signed the petition, and as he is all about numbers today, will he respect the will of the 17.3 million people who voted to leave the EU? Or is that not a big enough number for him either?